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Abstract 
 
Coastal governance in Indonesia is entering a new phase with new administration 
mechanisms, following the changes of political, administrative and fiscal framework 
resulting from decentralisation policy. For the first time provincial and district 
governments have mandates, resources, and responsibilities to manage their coastal zones. 
To this point, only a few studies have been conducted that focus on the analysis of effective 
coastal zone management (CZM) at district level in Indonesia under the decentralisation 
setting 
This dissertation presents a study of decentralized CZM in eastern Indonesia 
based on case studies of two districts in Sulawesi Island, Kabupaten Konawe in Southeast 
Sulawesi and Kabupaten Pangkajene dan Kepulauan (Pangkep) in South Sulawesi. The 
dissertation focuses on these district local governments’ responses to decentralisation 
policy in managing their coastal zones.  This new shift is very significant in the sector of 
marine and coastal governance in Indonesia. This research applied qualitative methods 
through in-depth and semi-structured interviews as well as field-site observations.   
I argue that the dynamic of the local socio-political context and the interaction of 
local actors, such as Heads of District (Bupati), determine the effectiveness of 
decentralized coastal zone management. Local socio-political contexts shape and influence 
the extent and characteristics of decentralized CZM that can be implemented in the region.  
The quality of local leaders, as local actors, influences the implementation of CZM through 
their interactions with other local stakeholders, the dynamic between them, the power 
distribution among local stakeholders, and local governments’ relationships vertically with 
higher levels of government. The manifestation of decentralized CZM in practice relies 
 iii
heavily on the combination of these considerations within the legal regulatory framework 
underpinning the process of decentralized CZM.  
The research findings from the Konawe and Pangkep cases studies indicate that 
decentralized CZM will continue to be effective if local government is constantly 
responsive, effective and competent. This consistency has to be combined with a 
committed central government in shifting its power to the regional government under the 
constellation of decentralisation. Both local and central governments shape the 
implementation of effective decentralized CZM. The findings of this research indicate that 
the signs and seeds for effective decentralized CZM implementation in Konawe and 
Pangkep exist in some aspects, and can be built upon to achieve more successful practices 
in decentralized CZM. 
This dissertation holds several implications for decentralization studies on CZM 
issues, such as whether decentralized CZM is linear with improving accountability 
mechanisms. It calls for better understanding of role of various forms of accountability in 
decentralized CZM, and its linkage with local-central governance arrangements. 
Replicating this study in other parts of Indonesia could provide a more complete 
comparison of decentralized CZM implementation. The degrees of variation in research 
findings are important to canvass in order to add to the lessons learnt from decentralized 
CZM implementation.  
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Bupati Regent, the Head of Kabupaten, which are autonomous regions with 
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Tata tertib (Tatib) Procedures of meetings, e.g. of representative councils, frequently 
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USAID United States Agency for International Development 
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(Law passed by the Parliament/DPR) 
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Currency Conversion 
 
In this thesis the value of the Indonesian Rupiah (IDR) and the American Dollar 
(USD) are calculated at a rate of USD 1 = IDR 8,700, the rate current during the main 
period of fieldwork in 2005. 
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Interviewee Coding Guide 
 
In this thesis, all informants and their information, thoughts and views are 
considered in accordance with research ethics protocols. This thesis does not reveal the 
identity of any informant. Informants are coded according to the following rule:  
Informant  Number of 
Informant  
(in  alphabetically) 
‐ Type of 
Informant 
‐ Origin of 
Informant 
‐  Year of 
Interview 
 
For example: Informant H-NGO-Kdi, 2007 means Informant number H from a 
non-governmental organization or a community leader who was based in Kendari and I 
interviewed him/her in 2007.  
Code explanation: 
Gov : Government 
NGO : Non Governmental Organizations and community leaders 
Exp : Expert 
Nat  : National, means informants are from the central government 
or his/her expertise or areas of concerned are national-based 
Kdi : Kendari, means informants are from Southeast Sulawesi Provincial Government 
or his/her expertise or areas of concerned are provincial-based 
Kon : Konawe, means informants are from Kabupaten Konawe or his/her expertise  
or areas of concerned are district (kabupaten)-based 
Mak : Makassar, means informants are from South Sulawesi Provincial Government  
or his/her expertise  or areas of concerned are provincial-based 
Pkp : Pangkep, means informants are from Kabupaten Konawe or his/her expertise  
or areas of concerned are district (kabupaten)-based 
 
 
 1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Studies on decentralized coastal zone management (hereafter CZM) in Indonesia 
have not been as intensive as studies on other decentralized areas of natural resource 
management (NRM), such as forestry1 and mining. Similarly, systematic studies that 
analyse the implementation of decentralized CZM in Indonesia are relatively rare. Among 
the few studies, most have focused primarily on the national perspective2 or on 
community-based management3. Several studies have the kabupaten level as their focus 
area4. Like other decentralized NRM, the main idea of decentralized CZM in Indonesia is 
to address how institutions should be arranged to enable new ways of defining local 
governments’ devolution mandates to manage coastal zones.  
This dissertation is a study of decentralized CZM and local governments’ capacity 
to respond to the significant shift in policy on managing coastal zones. The dissertation 
examines decentralized CZM at the local government (kabupaten) level and compares, in 
two cases, the enabling and constraining factors that can make the process work at the local 
government level.  
The dissertation also examines how decentralization has led to the formal 
influence of local government on coastal resource management and the consequent impacts 
on CZM. It applies a systematic analysis to local governments’ responses to decentralized 
CZM, one that offers an empirically grounded contribution to the policy of decentralized 
CZM in Indonesia. Two case studies are presented for examination of changing 
                                                     
1 See studies by Lindayanti (2000); Iskandar (2001); Ismail (2001); Konsorsium Nasional Untuk 
Pelestarian Hutan dan Alam di Indonesia (2001); and Effendi (2001a, 2001b) 
2 For example studies by Purwaka (1995); Purwaka and Sunoto (1997); Dahuri and Dutton (2000); Pet-
Soede (2000); PKSPL - IPB and Proyek Pesisir CRMP (2001); and Pratikto (2001) 
3 For example studies by Crawford et al. (1998); Sujianto and Maulana (2002); Yusran (2002); and 
Crawford et al. (2004) 
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governance: Kabupaten Konawe (hereafter Konawe) in Southeast Sulawesi and Kabupaten 
Pangkajene dan Kepulauan (hereafter Pangkep) in South Sulawesi (Figure 1). 
 
Figure 1.  Location of case studies 
                                                                                                                                                                 
4 For example study by Indrawasih et al. (2003) and Imron (2006) 
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In this dissertation, I argue that as a newly-devolved administrative entity, 
decentralized CZM relies heavily on local government and on the dynamics of local socio-
political conditions in which the local actors play an important role. Furthermore, 
achievement of an effective decentralized CZM needs the presence of a combination of 
strong and committed local leadership, incentives and enabling conditions for innovation. I 
use the cases of Konawe and Pangkep to explore how the dynamics of local socio-political 
conditions have affected the implementation of decentralized CZM. Konawe and Pangkep 
represent local governments that are facing the emergence of new local elites, 
administrative proliferation and geographic challenges.  
Konawe is a kabupaten that has seen an exceptional degree of administrative 
proliferation (pemekaran). This administrative process has gradually reduced Konawe 
coastal areas. Konawe is also more advanced than many other kabupaten in producing 
documents on coastal zone planning and management. Pangkep, on the other hand, 
represents an archipelagic district that confronts a common development problem: a 
combination of rich biodiversity coupled with a complexity of marine and coastal 
resources extraction and a lack of capacity to manage its resources. Its districts are at 
different stages of development. Indeed it provides a good example of the nature of 
decentralized CZM in eastern Indonesia with various gaps in development.  
1.1 Context and rationale of this dissertation  
The financial and governance crises of 1998 that produced radical policy reforms 
provided the momentum for local governments across Indonesia to examine their roles and 
responsibilities in managing their natural resources, including their coastal resources. This 
momentum challenged local governments to implement decentralized CZM, which 
constituted a major change to the nature of governance of these coastal resources.  
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The momentum that led to CZM in Indonesia entered a new phase with the 
passage of the Law 22/19995 on Regional Government (Decentralization Law) in 1999. 
The law devolved the responsibility for managing coastal resources in Indonesia from the 
central government to the provincial and local governments (Article 3 and 9 Law 22/1999). 
The law institutes significant changes in the hierarchical relationships among the central, 
provincial and local governments with the intention of establishing better notions of 
partnership. Three years later Law 32/2004 superseded this law with merger of Article 3 
and 9 Law 22/1999 into one article in Law 32/2004.  
Decentralized CZM has paved the way for mainstreaming local coastal resource 
management in Indonesia. Local governments are more aware of the importance of coastal 
resources that can be sources of revenue for local development. This awareness brings with 
it the responsibility to address coastal resource degradation and depletion. In this context, 
decentralized CZM is one important step toward the sustainable management of coastal 
resources.  
However, in some cases, the implementation of decentralized CZM has gone far 
beyond the expectations of decentralized CZM.  Some local governments have 
endeavoured to exploit coastal resources for the sake of local development without concern 
for the sustainability of coastal and marine resources. These local governments have passed 
local regulations (Peraturan Daerah/Perda) on coastal and fisheries resource exploitation 
                                                     
5 Law 22/1999 is derivation and interpretation of the principles as stipulate in the People’s Consultative 
Assembly Resolution no. XV/MPR/1998, that emphasized (i) the enactments of local autonomy by giving 
large, real competencies and proportional responsibilities to the regions;  (ii) the enactments of local 
autonomy that has to be based on the principles of democracy, taking into consideration the plurality of the 
regions; (iii) regulations on the sharing and benefiting from national resources between the central 
government and the regions must to be justly carried out for the sake of the welfare of societies in the regions 
and the nation as a whole; (iv) balancing the incomes and expenditures between the regions must be carried 
out by taking notice of the local [resources] potentialities, the extension of the regions, its geography, number 
of population and the level of [average] income of the local people; and (v) the Local Government has the 
competency to manage the local national resources and to manage the sustainability of the environment 
(Hartono, Susanto, and Surachman 2002) 
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that lack ecological and sustainability considerations and have the potential to seriously 
degrade coastal and fisheries resources.  
As the main legal instrument in a decentralized context, a Perda is a key 
mechanism in local government policy. Perda include details of decentralized and 
deconcentrated tasks for local government. Each Perda draws on the laws and regulations 
of the central government to fit them with the local conditions. The local government 
prepares a Perda and submits it to the local parliament for approval. Perda should not 
contradict national regulations and should avoid misinterpretation.  
The central government conducts screening and evaluation on issued Perda 
including its processes and contents. The central government can annul Perda that 
misinterpret national laws and regulations, or contains distortions.  The capacity of local 
governments to legislate with the suitable Perda depends on the competency of these local 
governments in determining their needs and in directing their development.  There are 
variations in both the quality and content of Perda on marine affairs and fisheries including 
coastal zone management because these tasks are new for local government. 
During the period 2004 - 2007, among 575 problematic Perda (514 of which were 
cancelled and another 61 revised: Figure 2), there were 40 Perda on coastal and fisheries 
management that were recommended by the Ministry of Finance for cancelation and 
revision. These Perda were considered to be counter productive within a business climate 
because they imposed high levies and taxes and could lead to coastal degradation 
(Appendix 1). This situation indicates that the approaches taken by many local 
governments not only lacked the capacity to manage coastal resourcse, but were also 
highly politicized in their use of coastal resources. These circumstances reflected a period 
of transition in the process of decentralizing CZM in Indonesia.  
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Figure 2.  Numbers of cancelled and revised Local Acts (Peraturan Daerah/Perda) 
relating to coastal areas and fisheries 2003 -2007 
 
1.2 Research objectives and questions 
The objective of this dissertation is to examine the responses of two local 
governments to decentralized policy on CZM by investigating how local socio-political 
contexts and CZM policies in these two kabupaten have changed in response to shifting 
policy directions. The dissertation also explores areas of institutional performance, notably 
in the provision of conditions for creating effective decentralized CZM implementation. To 
do so, the research examines the roles, interactions, interests and actions of various 
stakeholders involved in CZM, including the role played by the local District Head 
(Bupati), in the implementation of the decentralized CZM. This research also focuses on 
examining and comparing the effectiveness of decentralized CZM by exploring factors 
beyond the scope of CZM, such as bureaucracy reform and the assessment of the prospects 
for collaborative co-management in decentralized CZM. 
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To achieve these objectives, the following research questions are addressed: 
1. What is the extent and nature of decentralized CZM in Indonesia? 
2. How do the dynamics of local socio-political conditions affect decentralized CZM 
implementation? 
3. How have local government decision-making processes in coastal zone 
management been shaped in the context of decentralization? 
4. What are the theoretical and practical requirements for effective decentralized 
CZM?  
5. What are the lessons that can be learned from the process of decentralized CZM 
implementation in the Indonesian contexts? 
 
1.3 Research approach and methodology  
Decentralized CZM deals with people, resources, assets and interactions within 
particular political and socio-economic settings. Decentralized CZM is connected to the 
people’s attitudes, behaviour, values, interests and experiences, which are reflected in the 
plans and actions of institutions or communities.  
In order to explore the ways in which local governments manage their coastal 
resources, this research uses multiple methods. The research approach consists of the 
collection and compilation of both primary and secondary data. It comprises semi-
structured interviews, field site observations, documentary research, critical reviews, the 
comparative study approach, focus group discussions and an analysis of the literature in 
order to obtain the primary and secondary data summarized in Figure 3. 
This research has involved in-depth and semi-structured interviews as well as 
field-site observations for sources of primary data. There were numbers of arranged 
interviews with key informants from different types of institutions who were involved in 
and contributed to decentralized CZM implementation at the district, provincial and 
national levels. The purpose of these interviews was to gather information, opinions and 
suggestions from local communities, professionals, experts, non-governmental 
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organizations, activists and officers from a range of government agencies involved in 
decentralized CZM.  
 
 
Figure 3.  Summary of research methodology 
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The research methods involved the participation of 130 key informants: 93 key 
informants at the local level and 37 at national level, from local and central government 
agencies, research centres, universities, local community groups, non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs) and other related institutions (Figure 4). I purposely selected key 
informants to obtain their perceptions and experiences. I also selected the key informants 
through membership in my professional and institutional networks with government 
officers and NGO activists at the national, provincial and district levels. My professional 
ties at the Ditjen Bangda (Directorate General of Regional Development) in the Ministry 
of Home Affairs assisted me in the selection of informants in the government sector and in 
NGOs in both case study areas. In addition, key informants from the Ministry of Marine 
Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF) who had actively promoted the decentralized CZM policy 
helped me to identify the key informants at various levels of government for my two case 
studies.  
The most important criterion for the selection of key informants was their ability 
to represent the visions, policies, objectives and action plans of their organization or 
institution. Key informants in an organization were not always high-ranking members of 
the management. Some were lower ranking officials who had knowledge of the main 
policy, planning and implementation processes and more importantly, could provide 
information on decentralized CZM implementation. 
This research also involved extensive interviews with individuals on a focused 
number of subjects. The interviews explored conditions that would make decentralized 
CZM work at the kabupaten level. Claims by key informants were evaluated and 
confirmed through discussion with other key informants. Selected focus group discussions 
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were used to examine group perceptions and stimulate general discussion on decentralized 
CZM. 
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Note:  
1. National Government refers to the informants from central government;  
2. National Experts refer to researchers and resource person from Jakarta, and activist from national Non Governmental 
Organizations;   
3. Sulsel Government refers to the informants from South Sulawesi Provincial Government;  
4. Sulsel Experts refer to researchers and resource person from Makassar;  
5. Sulsel NGO refers to informant from Makassar-based Non Governmental Organizations and community leaders; 
6. Pangkep Government refers to the informants from Pangkep Local Government;  
7. Sultra Government refers to the informants from Southeast Sulawesi Provincial Government;  
8. Sultra Experts refer to researchers and resource person from Kendari;  
9. Sultra NGO refers to informant from Kendari-based Non Governmental Organizations and community leaders; 
10. Konawe Government refers to the informants from Konawe Local Government;  
 
Figure 4.  Types of key informants 
 
To conduct the semi-structured interviews in an effective manner, I developed an 
interview guide or aid memoir based on relevant selected topics (Appendix 2). Questions 
were normally specific, but I also probed beyond the answers I received. Not all questions 
were asked in all contexts: this depended on the nature of the responses received. The 
contexts of the interviews were an important aspect of the process of interview.  
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Before interviews, I always informed my interviewees about my research, 
obtained their consent and told them of their right to ask me not to record the interview, as 
they wished. Therefore, not all my interviews were recorded, as some informants did not 
wish to be recorded and felt uncomfortable when I tried to record their interview. I then 
extracted and combined my interviews results with field observations to provide the most 
reliable possible data, which could highlight (i) decentralization policy in the coastal zone, 
(ii) managerial, organizational and regulation aspects of policy and (iii) achievements and 
limitations in decentralized CZM implementation. 
I also recorded field observations when conducting interviews and collecting 
secondary data. Field site observations were useful as ground checking for biophysical and 
socioeconomic conditions. It was also helpful in obtaining a clear picture of the 
management practices and as a critical first step in evaluating these procedures. I took 
some photographs and maps of the study areas to obtain views of the different research 
areas. Some photographs and maps were supplied by the Provincial Planning and 
Development Board (Bappeda Provinsi), Kabupaten Planning and Development Board 
(Bappeda Kabupaten), and Marine and Fisheries Services (Dinas Kelautan dan 
Perikanan).  
My secondary data consist of documents and statistical data on CZM practices, 
current policies, programs, laws and regulations related to decentralized CZM. I gathered 
these documents and data from various sources such as government offices, universities, 
research organizations and NGOs. I examined the official documents and reports, such as 
strategic planning reports, zoning plans, evaluation reports, consultant reports and local 
government reports. Overall, this research followed a strategic analysis process by 
applying this research methodology in combination with literature reviews, documentary 
analysis and comparative perspectives (Figure 5).  
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Figure 5.  The Research Design  
 
1.4 Structure of the dissertation   
This dissertation consists of three parts. The first part comprises of Chapters 1, 2 
and 3. Chapter 1 presents an introduction to the dissertation that describes the context, 
rationale for and objective of the research. This chapter summarizes the research approach 
adopted and the methodology as well presenting the thesis structure.  
Chapter 2 introduces the theoretical concepts of decentralization and the historical 
background to decentralization policy in Indonesia, which is important as the framework of 
analysis. Chapter 2 then summarizes a range of dynamic and enduring changes in 
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decentralization policy in Indonesia that cover the institutional, financial and planning 
processes. Chapter 3 presents a framework and working definitions of coastal zone, CZM 
and decentralized CZM. This chapter examines the evolution of decentralized CZM in 
Indonesia.  
The second part of this dissertation (Chapters 4 and 5) provides an analysis of the 
two case studies, Konawe and Pangkep, in Sulawesi. Each chapter has a similar structure. 
Each begins with a general description of the case study area (people, geography, culture, 
history and economy) as an important foundation for understanding each area’s special 
characteristics, local dynamics and processes of social changes. This general description of 
the case study areas also helps in understanding the present social and environmental 
situation. Then each chapter examines the capacities for and responses to decentralized 
CZM policy in the case study area based on data and information that I collected during 
my fieldwork.  
The last part of this dissertation (Chapter 6, 7 and 8) presents a comparative 
analysis, synthesis and lessons learned from the two case studies. This part also examines 
the research and policy implications of the research. In more detail, Chapter 6 
demonstrates both common and distinct themes from a comparative perspective of the two 
case studies.  
Chapter 7 suggests various factors that may contribute to effective decentralized 
CZM, followed by a discussion that draws on lessons learned to look beyond the two case 
studies to a broader view of decentralized CZM in Indonesia. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes 
the dissertation by considering how the knowledge gained in the thesis may contribute 
broadly to development of decentralized CZM. This chapter highlights the importance of 
local socio-political context and role of central government in enabling and supporting 
decentralized CZM implementation.  
 2 DECENTRALIZATION: BASIC CONCEPTS AND 
HISTORY 
 
Decentralized CZM in Indonesia cannot be separated from the wider contexts and 
pathways of decentralization policy in Indonesia. This chapter discusses the concept of 
decentralization and the evolution of the decentralization policy and highlights the colonial 
legacy of government administration in Indonesia. The chapter then elaborates the dynamic 
and enduring fundamental changes in decentralization policy that have occurred since its 
inception.   
2.1 Decentralization: Basic Concepts  
Decentralization is a broad concept relating to development and governance 
strategies6, which involve a wide spectrum of general development and governance policy 
goals. This concept has became a global phenomenon in the reform of centralized 
governance structures (United Nations 1962, 1996; UNDP 1997, 1998, 1998b, 1998c; 
Brillantes Jr 2001; Farazmand 2002; Kumssa et al. 2003). As the United Nations (1996:7) 
pointed out, in the adoption of governance reforms “[a] large number of developing and 
transitional [countries] have embarked on some form of decentralization programs”. 
Decentralization reforms are significant as they shift models of governance from a 
centralized bureaucratic model to participatory and localized bureaucratic structures. The 
reforms represent a change from a 20th century to a 21st century governance model (Figure 
6) (Brillantes Jr 2001).  
                                                     
6 Important studies on decentralization include Commonwealth Secretariat (1983); Conyers (1983); 
Mawhood (1983); Rondinelli and Cheema (1983); Rondinelli et al. (1983); Smith (1985); Mawhood (1986); 
Rondinelli and Nellis (1986); Bennet (1990); Samoff (1990); Lauglo (1995); Devas (1997); Kumssa et al. 
(2003); and Farazmand (2004) 
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Figure 6.  Governance structure changes from the 20th to the 21st century 
Source: (Brillantes Jr 2001) 
 
Decentralization has been studied through many cross-disciplinary approaches 
(Faguet 1997), including its application in natural resources management7. Thus, the study 
of decentralization involves a variety of disciplines such as economics, public 
administration, political science, sociology and anthropology.  In many cases, the concept 
of decentralization has emerged from these fields (Cheema and Rondinelli 1983). There is 
a variety of interpretations and meanings of decentralization at the core of the debates on 
decentralization.  
The various definitions of decentralization in the literature cover a range of 
perspectives and dimensions. These definitions centre on the stratification of government 
systems and strategies for distribution of power. Among the various definitions of 
                                                     
7 See Agrawal (2001), Agrawal and Gibson (2001); Agrawal and Ribot (1999), Ahmed and Mbwambo 
(2004), Bazaara (2003), Benjaminsen (1997), Bigombe-Logo (2003), Brown (1999), Resosudarmo (2004), 
Ribot (2003, 2004), Ribot and Larson (2004) and Ribot (2003)  
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decentralization, there are three commonly accepted interpretations. First, the United 
Nations (UN) definition of decentralization which appears in the report, Decentralization 
for national and local development (ST/TAO/M/19) (United Nations 1962), has become 
the standard definition that has since been refined by scholars (Kumssa, Edralin, and Oyugi 
2003). In the 1962 report, decentralization is defined as “the transfer of authority on a 
geographic basis whether by de-concentration (i.e., delegation) of administrative authority 
to field units of the same department or level of government or by the political devolution 
of authority to local government units or special statutory bodies” (United Nations 1962: 7) 
Second, the World Bank (2006a) provides a definition of decentralization as the 
“transfer of authority and responsibility for public functions from the central government 
to subordinate or quasi-independent government organizations and/or the private sector” 
(World Bank 2006a: 1). This definition refers to the division of four broad categories of 
decentralization, namely; political, administrative, fiscal, and market decentralization 
(World Bank 2006a). The World Bank (2006a:1) indicates that each category has “different 
characteristics, policy implications and conditions for success” (Table 1).  
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Table 1.  Main ideas, attributes and requirements of four types of decentralization. 
Category Main ideas Attributes Requirements 
Political 
decentralization 
to give citizens or their 
elected representatives 
more power in public 
decision-making 
 pluralistic politics and 
representative government 
 more influence of society in 
the formulation and 
implementation of policies 
 greater participation 
 local electoral jurisdictions 
 constitutional or statutory 
reforms  
 development of pluralistic 
political parties  
 the creation of local political 
units  
 strengthening of legislatures  
 encouragement of effective 
public interest groups 
Administrative 
decentralization 
to redistribute authority, 
responsibility and 
financial resources for 
providing public 
services among 
different levels of 
government 
to transfer of 
responsibility for the 
planning, financing and 
management of certain 
public functions 
 deconcentration redistributes 
decision making authority and 
financial and management 
responsibilities  
 delegation, transfer 
responsibility for decision-
making and administration of 
public functions  
 devolution of functions, 
transfer authority for decision-
making, finance, and 
management 
 redistribution system among 
different levels of the central 
government. 
 semi-autonomous 
organizations not wholly 
controlled by the central 
government, but ultimately 
accountable to it  
 quasi-autonomous units of 
local government with 
corporate status 
Fiscal 
decentralization 
to transfer responsibility 
for the financial 
responsibility 
 self-financing or cost recovery 
through user charges,  
 co-financing or co-production 
arrangements through which 
the users participate in 
providing services and 
infrastructure through 
monetary or labor 
contributions;  
 expansion of local revenues 
through property or sales 
taxes, or indirect charges;  
 intergovernmental transfers  
 authorization of municipal 
borrowing and the 
mobilization of either national 
or local government 
resources 
 adequate level of revenues –
either raised locally or 
transferred from the central 
government 
 authority to make decisions 
about expenditures 
 mechanisms to shift general 
revenues from taxes collected 
by the central government to 
local governments for general 
or specific uses; 
 loan guarantee mechanisms 
for local governments 
Market 
decentralization 
to shift responsibility for 
functions from the public 
to the private sector 
 privatization by allowing 
private participation, 
contracting, financing public 
sector through the capital 
market, transferring 
responsibility for providing 
service deregulation 
 economic liberalization and 
market development policies 
 reduction of the legal 
constraints on private 
participation in service 
provision 
 enabling  competition among 
private suppliers for services 
Source: Ribot (2004) and World Bank (2006a) 
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As it is driven by a market-based premise, the World Bank definition considers the 
private sector as an important actor in decentralization (Bennet 1990). For some scholars, 
market-based decentralization is referred to as economic decentralization (Bennet 1990; 
Faguet 1997; World Bank 2006a). However, some scholars also argue that this type of 
decentralization is not formally defined as decentralization (Ribot 2004). For example, 
Ribot argues that market-based decentralization is not part of decentralization (Figure 7) 
because decentralization only exists in the presence of power transfers within the 
government administration (Ribot 2004)8. 
 
Figure 7.  Formal definitions: decentralization, not decentralization  
Source: Ribot (2004) 
                                                     
8 Political decentralization is referred to as democratic decentralization or devolution. Administrative 
decentralization is known as de-concentration. The main theme of these types of decentralization is the 
transfer of power to lower levels of authority, while the difference is the level of empowerment of the local 
people (Ribot 2004). Political decentralization allows greater participation of the local people in decision-
making processes through their local representative authorities while administrative decentralization aims to 
better the delivery of services from public institutions. 
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Rondinelli and Cheema (1983) promote the third definition of decentralization. 
They define decentralization as “the transfer of responsibility for planning, decision-
making, or administrative authority from central government to its field organizations, 
local administrative units, semi-autonomous and parastatal organizations,9 local 
governments or non-governmental organizations” (Rondinelli and Cheema 1983:18). This 
definition has become the cornerstone of many analyses of decentralization and is cited by 
many scholars. 
These three definitions of decentralization are similar with only small differences 
in the lexicon of the types of units that receive the transfer of authority or delegation.  The 
key commonality among the various definitions of decentralization is the notion of a 
transfer of power from an upper level to a lower level of governance. 
The definition of decentralization in Indonesia is in line with this key 
commonality of the definitions discussed above. Law 32/2004 concerning Regional 
Government defines decentralization as the delegation of government authority from 
central government to autonomous local government to regulate and take care of 
government affairs within the system of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia 
(Article 1 item 7 Law 32/2004). Law 27/2007 concerning Management of Coastal Zone 
and Small Islands adopted this definition as one of the main principles for managing 
coastal zone and small islands (Article 3 Law 27/2007). Therefore, this dissertation adopts 
the concept of decentralization as the transfer of authority from central government to local 
government in the areas of planning, decision-making and administration in government 
affairs.  
                                                     
9 Parastatal refers to a company or agency owned or controlled wholly or partly by the government. 
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Many scholars and organizations emphasize that decentralization is a process 
leading to good governance10. Through the process of structural and policy reforms, 
decentralization is designed to improve local governance, delivery of services, allocation 
of fiscal resources, promotion of public participation and government responsiveness 
(Brillantes Jr 2001; UNDP 1997). In this sense, decentralization is expected to lead to more 
creative, innovative and responsive programs by allowing local experimentation and 
involving citizens and other stakeholders in local decision making processes and programs 
at the local level (UNDP 1997; World Bank 2006a).  
In practice, decentralization has so far produced both success and failure. There 
are arguments for and against decentralization (Table 2). Both arguments frequently refer 
to the “cross-disciplinary claims about the effects of administrative measures on the quality 
and efficiency of both government and social interaction” (Faguet 1997:2). These 
arguments reflect the intensive debates about the success and failure of decentralization 
(Faguet 1997). The debates refer to arguments both from theoretical and empirical studies 
on the efficiency and effectiveness of decentralization with political and economic theories 
being  dominant in the debates (Faguet 1997).  
The arguments for supporting decentralization lie mainly in the idea that if 
governments are closer to beneficiaries, they will be more effective in providing better 
services11. The arguments are led by the premise that governing large areas and diverse 
populations in a country such as Indonesia, using a centralized approach, is financially 
costly and resource intensive (Alm and Bahl 1999). Similarly, government units that are 
closer to the local people are “better able to make choices that reflect the needs and 
                                                     
10 For examples, see also UNDP (1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c); and Brillantes Jr (2001) 
11 See also Commonwealth Secretariat (1983); Conyers (1983); Mawhood (1983); Rondinelli and Nellis 
(1986); Devas (1997); Faguet (1997); Farazmand (1997); Alm and Bahl (1999); Balogun (2000); Brillantes Jr 
(2001); Farazmand (2002); Devas and Grant (2003); Mokhsen (2003); and World Bank (2006a) 
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priorities in their jurisdiction than is a remote central government; and that it is easier to 
hold local elected representatives and officials accountable for decisions and performance 
than those at the centre” (Devas and Grant, 2003:352). In this case, decentralization may 
be effective for solving blockages in decision making processes and bureaucratic 
procedures (World Bank 2006a).  
Table 2.  Compilation of arguments for and against decentralization 
Pro-decentralization Contra-decentralization 
 broadens participation in political, economic and social 
activities  
 alleviates the bottlenecks in decision-making that are 
often caused by central government planning and 
control of important economic and social activities 
 cuts complex bureaucratic procedures  
 increases government officials' sensitivity to local 
conditions and needs  
 helps national government ministries reach larger 
numbers of local areas  
 allows greater political representation for diverse 
political, ethnic, religious, and cultural groups in 
decision-making;  
 relieves top managers in central ministries of routine 
tasks to concentrate on policy.  
 creates a geographical focus at the local level for 
coordinating national, State, provincial, district, and 
local programs more effectively  
 provides better opportunities for participation by local 
residents in decision making 
 leads to more creative, innovative and responsive 
programs by allowing local experimentation and 
innovation.  
 increases political stability and national unity by 
allowing citizens to better control public programs at 
the local level 
 not always efficient, especially for standardized, 
routine, network-based services 
 loss of economies of scale and control over scarce 
financial resources by the central government 
 less efficient and effective service delivery in the 
absence of strong administrative or technical capacity 
at local level 
 coordination of national policies more complex 
 vulnerable to local patronage and corruption 
 potentially creates opportunities for local elites to play 
a disproportionate role in planning and management 
of projects 
 tends to create greater inequities among communities 
and regions with different levels of organizational 
capacity 
 leads to disappointing results in absence of or 
through weakness in supporting institutions 
 vulnerable to political judgments which lead to 
unexpected results.  
Source: Compiled from various sources12  
 
Proponents of decentralization also argue that decentralization will accommodate 
local differences and preferences in order to provide better services13. They anticipate that 
                                                     
12 See: Devas (1997); Faguet (1997); May et al. (1997); Scott (1997); Turner and Hulme (1997); UNDP 
(1997, 1998b, 1998c); UNDP-Government of Germany (1999); Azfar et al. (2001); Devas and Grant (2003); 
and World Bank (2006a). 
13 See: United Nations (1962, 1996); UNDP (1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c); Alm and Bahl (1999); 
Brillantes Jr (2001); Farazmand (2002); and Kumssa et al. (2003) 
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this process will increase political stability and national unity (Alm and Bahl 1999), and 
lead to more creative, innovative and responsive programs through local experiments 
(World Bank 2006a).  
Arguments opposing decentralization highlight the fact that most of the 
decentralization process is extremely complex and time consuming14. These commentators 
argue that decentralization has the potential to fail where formal local governments units 
are large and too remote from local communities, as in many developing states (Devas 
1997), including Indonesia. From the political point of view, this situation can create an 
opportunity for “local elites to play a disproportionate role in the planning and 
management of projects” (Faguet 1997:3). 
Such arguments are informed by empirical studies and evidence of the failure of 
decentralization. These studies propose that decentralization may not always be efficient 
and effective (Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema 1983), especially in areas where local or 
supporting institutions have limited capacity to make decisions; thus, enabling conditions 
are required for decentralization to work. In these areas, central governments can also lose 
control over scarce financial resources. Decentralization, then, can be considered as a 
transfer of inefficiency that carries a high economic cost leading to a loss of economies of 
scale (Scott 1997).  
Arguments that oppose decentralization also highlight that in most cases central 
government decentralizes several administrative tasks and responsibilities to local 
governments without proper design, and local governments do not have the capacity to 
handle the new mandates. This leads to under-performing or even non-functional, local 
government units.   
                                                     
14 See: United Nations (1996); UNDP (1997, 1998a, 1998b, 1998c); and World Bank (2006a) 
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The opponents of decentralization use the argument that to deliver services more 
effectively and efficiently than the central government, local governments need larger 
budgets and additional resources (Fukasaku and Hausmann 1998; Rondinelli and Nellis 
1986). For example, local governments in Latin America required more resources to 
conduct shared responsibilities with the central government, but these resources were taken 
from unclear areas of joint jurisdiction (Fukasaku and Hausmann 1998). Cross-country 
studies have shown that decentralization in most countries faced serious problems of 
implementation (Rondinelli, Nellis, and Cheema 1983). In many instances, decentralized 
policies were handicapped by a slow pace of implementation and poor organizational  
reform (World Bank 2006a). There are several reasons for these failures. Perhaps the best 
observation is provided by Smoke (2000:4), who explains the root cause of the failure of 
decentralization in developing countries: 
[r]ecent decentralization and local government reform programs in developing 
countries have often been undertaken during domestic political or economic 
crises, and some have been externally imposed or influenced by donors. Such 
efforts have been undertaken by central governments because they may feel 
they have no choice when faced with structural adjustment programs, poorly 
performing economies, declining public service levels and political unrest. 
When decentralization takes place within the context of political unrest, as 
happened in Indonesia during the reformasi movement, the “careful, rational and orderly 
process of decentralization” is often neglected (Burki et al. 1999:33). This neglect is not 
exclusive to unstable countries, but “[e]ven where decentralization happens in a less 
dramatic context, questions of strategy and timing still arise” (Burki et al. 1999:33).  
Another reason for the failure of decentralization is the lack of “autonomous 
elected sub national governments [that are] capable of taking binding decisions in at least 
some policy areas” (World Bank 2006a:1). Insufficient capacity in local institutions and the 
lack of bureaucratic support also cause serious problems of implementation of 
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decentralization policy (Mokhsen 2003). In the same way, the legacy of centralistic 
attitudes and behaviour among political and administrative leaders has also been held for 
decentralization failure in developing countries (Mokhsen 2003). Centralistic attitudes and 
behaviour, such as egocentric control of decentralization by power brokers, can also lead to 
unexpected results and failure of decentralization policy15  (Smoke 2000).   
Failure also can arise when decentralization is framed as the only alternative to the 
inadequacies of centralization (UNDP 1998b). Decentralization is sometimes held as a 
magic potion or mantra for reforming governance structures and achieving better service 
delivery. In fact, decentralization is not a stand-alone panacea for management of any 
public resources (Ribot 2004; World Bank 2006a). Both decentralization and centralization 
can play complementary roles (UNDP 1998b), and the careful and rational analysis of 
responsibilities, roles and duties can provide an opportunity to achieve the desired 
intention of decentralization (Ribot 2004; World Bank 2006a). 
The essential aim of decentralization is to build capacity at the local level by 
strengthening local government capacity and capability. This aim is not intended to weaken 
the role of central government (Azis 2003). Achieving the aim of decentralization requires 
careful definition of appropriately shared responsibilities and duties. It also requires 
innovative approaches and a full understanding of the potential outcomes of different local 
government systems in public service delivery (World Bank 2006a). In other words, the 
analysis should respect diverse policy influences.  
                                                     
15 Such ego-centrism arises in the competition to control elements of the decentralized program. This 
competition is putting the program “under the leadership of a single central agency that is perceived as a rival 
by other agencies whose cooperation is required for success” (Smoke 2000:6). For example, Smoke cited the 
competition for control of the World Bank’s Second Urban Project in Indonesia during the late 1980s. This 
competition led to a project design that inappropriately gave substantial control to a technical ministry 
(Smoke 2000). 
  25
 
Furthermore, the choice of the most appropriate form of shared responsibilities 
relies heavily on the need to balance power and knowledge, and, indeed, to understand 
when the distribution of power is in or out of balance (World Bank 2006a).  Political and 
economic factors influence the complexity of balancing decentralization and centralization 
(Brillantes Jr 2001; World Bank 2006a). Political and economic factors can determine the 
division of responsibilities among decentralization and centralization, and have the most 
significant bearing on motives for decentralization.  
Similarly, in Indonesia political and economic factors are the two main motives 
for choosing and implementing decentralization.16 Political unrest in May 1998 combined 
with the impacts of the Asian monetary crisis “led to widespread calls for fundamental 
changes [reformasi] in Indonesia’s system of governance” (McCarthy et al. 2006:31). 
Decentralization, regional autonomy and equitable sharing of revenues became important 
agenda items for fundamental changes in the governance system in Indonesia, especially 
for maintaining the unity and integrity of the state and avoiding political unrest (Rasyid 
2005:5). These agenda items then were conceptualized by President Habibie into Law 
22/1999 and 25/1999. The rush and political justification for enacting these two laws 
caused several call for improvement, and even withdrawal of these laws.  Political and 
economic issues thus became the leading factors to address all the deficiencies arising from 
the implementation of these two laws.  
To sum up, political and economic factors were the main considerations in 
enacting the decentralization policy in Indonesia. These factors influenced the path of 
decentralization in Indonesia following on fromthe political justification and economic 
                                                     
16 See: Cheema and Rondinelli (1983); Alm and Bahl (1999); Hidayat (2000); Dwiyanto (2003); 
Mokhsen (2003); Hidayat (2004); Erb et al. (2005); Rasyid (2005); DRSP (2006); and McCarthy et al. (2006) 
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considerations of the rulers of Indonesia. This theme is the topic of discussion of the 
following section.  
2.2 Decentralization in Indonesia 
Contemporary discourse on decentralization in Indonesia has to acknowledge the 
political history of the nation from the colonial era to the reformasi era (Figure 8). The 
political settings of every phase of Indonesia’s political history have shaped the forms and 
mechanisms of government interaction and the central-local relationship that set down the 
pathway of decentralization policy in Indonesia. The pathway of decentralization in 
Indonesia is like a “long and winding road” (Chalid 2005:1) and the history of 
decentralization has been shifting, especially in the last past 60 years (Mokhsen 2003). 
This section discusses the history of decentralization in Indonesia from the pre-colonial 
period to the reformasi era to provide a framework for understanding contemporary local 
government administration. 
 
Figure 8.  Decentralization timeline in Indonesia  
 
  27
 
2.2.1 Dutch Colonial Rule 
In the colonial period (1603 – 1945), Indonesia was subject to successive Dutch, 
British and Japanese occupation. Their occupation of Indonesia influenced the passage of 
decentralization but the motives for and scales of decentralization varied (Fauzan 2006; 
Ferrazzi 1998; Kansil and Kansil 2002). The motives were shaped by the policies of each 
ruler, but there was a common intention, which was the effective maximization of control 
and exploitation of resources (Malo 1995; Mokhsen 2003). To pursue this power, colonial 
rule had to be maintained by a centralized government. Thus, the imperatives of 
colonialism have dominated the trajectory of the development of local government 
administration in Indonesia. The legacy of colonialism remains in some aspects of the 
current governance system, such as in the paternalistic relationships still existing in the 
bureaucracy (Ferrazzi 1998). 
The Dutch colonial system inherited the remarkable legacies of local government 
systems and provided the seeds for decentralization. The Dutch introduced two broad 
administration systems in the Netherlands East Indies (NEI)17: direct rule (Direct bestuur 
gebied/Gouvernements gebied) and indirect rule (Indirect bestuur 
gebied/Landschapsgebied). These two systems18 were related to the degree of Dutch 
colonial control on its NEI colony (Mokhsen 2003).   
                                                     
17 The name of Indonesia under Dutch colonial rule. 
18 This division of administrative systems was the legacy of the Dutch United East India Company 
(Verenigde Oostindische Compagnie or VOC), which was created in 1602. The VOC expanded its political 
power by a monopoly on trade in a number of territories and then gradually interfered in the administration of 
the native rulers. Through its intervention with the native rulers, the VOC was able to control the strategic 
spice-trading network and through this, applied its political control. In some areas, these approaches were 
successful, and in other areas, the Dutch struggled with the native rulers. It was necessary for the Dutch to 
apply the two different systems of administration and this was a reflection of the strength and loyalty of the 
local power and authority. 
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Direct rule applied in the areas under the control of the NEI government, while 
indirect rule referred to the level of compromise between the NEI and the native rulers of 
the areas not under effective Dutch colonial. Under direct rule, these areas were 
administered through a division of administrative units into: the gewest (also called 
residentie), the afdeling (region), the onderafdeling (sub-region), the district (district) and 
the onderdistrict (sub-district) (Fauzan 2006; Kansil and Kansil 2002; Mokhsen 2003). 
Only in the lowest unit, onderdistrict, were native rulers eligible to participate as native 
civil servants (pangreh pradja). The first four levels were restricted to expatriate Dutch 
officials (Mokhsen 2003).  
The seeds of decentralization were sown at the beginning of the 19th century. 
Having taken over again at the end of British rule in 1816, the Dutch rearranged and 
extended the role of the native rulers who were appointed as Bupati in 1820. Under the 
Dutch colonial regime, these Bupati had extended responsibilities in the fields of 
agriculture, farming, security, irrigation, public health, road maintenance, taxes and law 
enforcement (Malo 1995). This led to the formation of seventy kabupaten or afdeling in 
Java and Madura, except in the Sultanates of Yogyakarta and Surakarta. 
In 1854, the Dutch enacted the 1854 Government Code of the NEI 
(Regeringsreglement 1854/RR 1854), which was intended to establish a rechtsstaat 
(constitutional state). The law provided enormous power to the Governor General of the 
NEI as the highest ruler and the envoy of the King of the Netherlands. The Governor 
General had chief authority in military matters, administrative control, appointing the 
highest ranking officers in the Raad van Indie (Council of the Indies) and granting amnesty 
for criminals accussed persons (Wignjosoebroto 2004). This enormous, monopolistic 
power of the Governor General created a highly centralized and rigid administration 
(Niessen 1999). However, there was considerable dissatisfaction with the highly 
  29
 
centralized and rigid administrative government among the Dutch entrepreneurs 
(Nederlandse bugerij) (Mokhsen 2003). They called for reform and requested participation 
in the policy making processes (medezeggenschap).  
Their requests were supported by the Dutch legislative member, L.W.C 
Keuchenius, who brought their request to the legislative assembly (Tweede Kamer) and 
proposed the establishment of a council for the Dutch and Europeans (Gewestjik raden) in 
the NEI to represent their aspirations to the NEI administration (Wignjosoebroto 2004). 
This proposal stimulated a plan for more decentralization in the NEI. The Tweede Kamer 
then enacted the first decentralization law for the NEI, De Wet Houdene Decentralisatie 
van Het Bestuur in Nederlands-Indie on 23 July 1903. This law was filed as Staatblad van 
Het Koninkrijk Der Nederlanden 1903 and is known as Decentralisatie Wet 1903 (The 
Decentralization Law of 1903). 
 The Decentralisatie Wet 1903 provided an opportunity to restructure local 
governments in the NEI. The law gave the mandate to the NEI Governor General to 
establish “several levels of locale resort [councils] possessing a degree of autonomy over 
their own affairs” (Mokhsen 2003:49). There were three regional councils: Gewestelijke 
Raad for the residencies, Plaatselijke Raad for units under the residencies and Gemeente 
Raad for urban centres (Kansil and Kansil 2002). Civil servants chaired most of the 
councils. The expatriate community could only participate in the Gemeente Raad. 
In practice the Decentralisatie Wet 1903 followed the principles of the RR 1854 
which separated the administration into Java and the Outer islands (Malo 1995). This 
distinction led to uneven decentralization in the Outer islands, and only in Java and 
Madura was decentralization consistently introduced. The implementation of the 
Decentralisatie Wet 1903 mainly related to administrative decentralization (Mokhsen 2003: 
49) and provided limited space for inviting local communities to participate and exercise 
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their interests. The implementation of this form of decentralization highly favoured the 
Dutch population, and the expatriate population was granted many more opportunities for 
participation than local people.  
Dutch and European members of the civil service (Europesche 
bestuursambtenaar) received special privileges to be in charge of the decentralized 
government as local administrators (Kansil and Kansil 2002; Mokhsen 2003). However, in 
most cases the local administrators were officials of the central government (Malo 1995). 
In this way, the central government could still exercise tight control and suppress local 
interests and aspirations. This led to further calls for reform after the implementation of the 
Decentralisatie Wet 1903. In 1918 the Dutch colonial authority adopted the Ontvoogdings 
Ordonantie (Emancipation Order) in order to allow greater involvement of local people 
especially with a Western-trained background in local administration (Malo 1995; Poeze 
1989). The Dutch colonial administration set up “the formation of a reservoir of Western-
trained Indonesians [for fulfilling] the needs of government and business for cheap native 
middle-cadre personnel” (Poeze 1989:88).  
Four years later, the Dutch enacted a law on governmental reform, the 1922 
Government Reform Act (Wet op de Bestuurshervorming). This law provided the 
opportunity for local administrators to exercise their authority without interference from 
the central colonial government (Niessen 1999). The law also granted mandates to regroup 
and merge the existing residencies into provinces, which were larger territorial divisions 
based on the principles of decentralization (Malo 1995; Mokhsen 2003; Niessen 1999).  
In 1924, the Dutch passed an ordinance on the formation of provinces (Provincie 
ordonnantie) to accommodate the provincial structure. The ordinance stated that the 
formation of provinces required the establishment of provincial councils (Provinciale 
Raad) (Niessen 1999). The members of the council were partly elected and partly 
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appointed by the Governor General. For operational purposes, the council had the authority 
to appoint a council of deputies (college vangedeputeerden) (Mokhsen 2003). The 
Governor General also appointed governors to supervise the provincial council and council 
of deputies. The governor not only acted as the chairperson of both councils but also 
possessed rights and responsibilities for and on behalf of the Governor General. The 
governor therefore was a local official whose authority and power were derived from the 
central government. 
The pathway of decentralization during the Dutch colonial period was limited in 
nature and subject to the direct supervision and control of the central authority through its 
representatives in the regions. The political arrangements during the colonial period show 
that in the same areas both European and native authorities maintained some limited 
degree of self-rule and political autonomy (Malo 1995). The Dutch policy to enact the 
ordinance on the formation of provinces (Provincie ordonnantie)19 established some 
principles of decentralization by granting the provinces authority to manage their internal 
affairs and by setting forth the distribution of responsibilities between central and regional 
governments (Mokhsen 2003; Niessen 1999). As the central government was unable to 
finance the operations of regional governments, the Dutch also applied principles of 
‘deconcentration’ by giving the power and authority to a number of native kingdoms 
occupying large areas on Java. Deconcentration principles were stimulated by 
administrative constraints rather than by a goal to grant direct political power (Malo 1995).   
                                                     
19 The Dutch also passed an ordinance on the formation of districts, the Regency ordinance (Regentschaps 
ordonnantie) in 1924 and two years later the Municipality Ordinance (Stadsgementee ordonnantie) for Java 
and Madura (Niessen 1999:49).  
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2.2.2 British Interregnum  
British colonial control lasted only five years (1811 – 1816) during the 
Napoleonic wars20 in Europe. During the British interregnum, the Lieutenant-Governor 
Thomas Stamford Raffles had reorganized the administrative regions in Java and Madura 
by converting two areas into sixteen prefectures. These later, under Dutch rule, became 
residencies. Raffles appointed Bupati from local noble people as salaried employees of the 
colonial administration whose main task was to administer the cultivation of agricultural 
products and their subsequent sale to the colonial administration (Malo 1995).  
Raffles also founded the position of assistant resident whose purpose was to 
control the rights and authority of the Bupati. Under Dutch rule, the relationship between 
Bupati and Dutch assistant resident (controleur) was “rather clientelistic than bureaucratic” 
(van Klinken, 2002:5). Despite this clientelistic relationship, the Bupati was the highest 
position in the local noble population at district level and became an important actor in 
local development. Together with other local noble people who had a strong educational 
background, the Bupati was part of the corps of aristocratic functionaries (pangreh praja  
or pamong praja) who served as cheap staff for the colonial bureaucracy (van Klinken 
2002). The role of Bupati and pamong praja remained significant in the Indonesian local 
government system as they occupied key positions, established alliances with the army and 
continued to supervise the local bureaucracy (Magenda 1989).  
 
 
 
                                                     
20 The Napoleonic Wars (1803–15), a series of wars fought against Napoleon's First French Empire. War 
was conducted by Napoleon I of France against an alliance of Britain, the German states, Spain, Portugal, 
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2.2.3 Japanese Occupation 
Under the Japanese occupation (1942 – 1945), the administration was reshaped 
into the three military regions of Java, Sumatera and the Outer islands. The first two 
regions were under the control of the army commanders (Guisenkanbu). The third was 
under a naval commander (Minseibu). The Japanese still utilized the administration and 
government system set up by the Dutch, but renamed all structures and nomenclature for 
heads of government units in Japanese terminology.21 The Japanese also imposed a 
massive military command system. 
There were two important laws on local government enacted during the Japanese 
occupation, namely the Law 27/1942 concerning Changes to the Organization of Regional 
Government (Oendang-oendang No. 27 tentang Peroebahan Tata Pemerintahan Daerah) 
that was enacted on 5 August 1942 and Law 28/1942 concerning the Regulation of 
Residency Government and Special Municipality Government (Oendang-oendang No. 28 
tentang Atoeran Pemerintahan Syuu dan Aturan Pemerintahan Tokubetu-si) that was 
enacted on 7 August 1942.  
Japanese occupation (1942 – 1945) in Indonesia heralded a radical renaming 
policy and imposed a military government, which was more concerned with command and 
maintaining a centralistic system. Japanese occupation left insignificant legacies on the 
pathway to decentralization except the renaming of the regional government.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
and Russia, following the Revolutionary Wars, and aiming for French conquest of Europe. It took place 
mainly in Europe but also involved some other parts of the world (Asprey 2000).  
21 For example, Ken for Regency (kabupaten), Kentyoo for Regent (Bupati), Si for Municipality and 
Sityoo for Mayor.  
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2.2.4 Independent Indonesia  
Indonesia gained independence on 17 August 1945. In the early period of 
independence, two factors influenced decentralization: the need to establish and strengthen 
Indonesian sovereignty and the need to accommodate regional diversity. There was also 
debate over the choice of a suitable form of state and government within the Investigating 
Committee for Preparatory Work for Indonesian Independence (Badan Penyelidik Usaha 
Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia or BPUPKI).22 Within the BPUPKI, the serious issues 
of the federal system and decentralization were discussed.23 The main outcome of the 
committee related to decentralization was article 18 of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution on 
local diversity and traditional government structures. This article was the main reference 
point in central-local relationships and the main framework for the Law 1/1945 and the 
Law 22/1948, two key regulations in Indonesia’s early independence period. At this time, 
the Dutch were attempting to reoccupy Indonesia and the nation was divided by the 
resulting civil war.  
The concept of decentralization emerged with the change of government system 
from a unitary state to a federal system, which survived for less than a year, from 1949 to 
1950. At this time, both the independent Federal Republic of Indonesia and several Dutch-
created states existed. The legal basis of the federal system was Law 22/1948 that only 
remained in force in the regional governments in Java, Sumatera and Kalimantan 
(Mokhsen 2003). These areas formed the United States of Indonesia (Republik Indonesia 
Serikat or RIS).  
                                                     
22 BPUPKI formed in March 1945 following the Japanese promise of independence for Indonesia. This 
committee was composed of leaders from the main nationalist and socialist parties, religious leaders and 
bureaucrats (Mokhsen 2003).  
23 More detail on the BPUPKI’s debate on decentralization can be seen in Mokhsen (2003:55-62).  
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There were two reasons why the Indonesian government did not adopt a federal 
system as a long-term solution. First, a federal system corresponded too closely to the 
legacy of Dutch occupation and, second, it was considered to be dominated by Javanese 
(Mokhsen 2003). The common perception among Indonesian nationalists was that the 
Dutch administration wished to regain its power by imposing a federal system.  
After the RIS system, Indonesia entered the provisional constitution phase (1950 – 
1956). During this phase, Law 22/1948 was reintroduced despite criticisms from central 
and local politicians relating to the position and power of regional heads (Mokhsen 
2003:79). In 1956, a new government from the first general election in 1955 was formed 
which consisted of a coalition of three major parties; Partai Nasional Indonesia (PNI), 
Masjumi, and Nadhatul Ulama (NU). The first cabinet also was named according to the 
leadership of the three parties, and was called the cabinet of Ali-Roem-Idham.24  
One of the most important milestones for decentralization arising from the Ali-
Roem-Idham cabinet was Law 1/1957. This law “was the only decentralization law [that] 
offered real autonomy to the regions” (Mokhsen 2003:81). The implementation of this law 
immediately ended when Presidential Decree (Dekrit Presiden) 6/1959 was endorsed. This 
law was then replaced by Law 18/1965 that focused autonomy on the residencies at the 
first-level, and on sub-districts (kecamatan) at the second level, and also turned the 
provinces into administrative regions (Malo 1995). This division maintained the discourse 
on the function of governor as regional head and intensive debate occurance on how to 
maintain central-local relationships in the context of a unitary republic. The main issues 
                                                     
24 Cabinet Ali-Roem-Idham was the coalition cabinet of three winning parties in the 1955 General 
Election which was represented by Ali Sastroamidjojo of PNI, Mohammad Roem of Masjumi and K.H. 
Idham Chalid of NU. Ali was Prime Minister, Roem and Idham were appointed as Deputy Prime Ministers. 
This cabinet was established with reference to Presidential Decree No. 24/1965. There were six PNI cadres in 
the cabinet, five for Masjumi and six for NU.  
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related to the power of autonomous government units and the degree of central supervision 
over the regions. These issues were on the main agenda for 16 cabinets under former 
President Soekarno. Every cabinet put these issues as core agenda items in their manifesto. 
As Mokhsen (2003:97) argues, the “idea of decentralization [and regional autonomy] in the 
unitary republic seemed too difficult technically and politically to be translated into 
action”.  
These issues were still not settled during the New Order (Orde Baru) government 
(1966 – 1998), despite the government having passed Law 5/1974 concerning the 
Principles of Governments in the Regions (Undang-undang 5/1974 tentang Pokok-pokok 
Pemerintahan di Daerah). This law was the main legal basis for central-local relationships. 
Law 5/1974 contained the concepts of territorial decentralization and deconcentration by 
dividing the country into autonomous regions (daerah otonom) and administrative 
territories (wilayah administratif). The law also introduced the concept of co-
administration (medebewijn) for transferring power. 
Territorial decentralization referred to two regional levels of government (Daerah 
Tingkat I and Daerah Tingkat II). Deconcentration referred to the delegation of 
administrative tasks to the lower level of government. This meant decentralization and 
autonomy were a combination of full and partial transfers of autonomous rights, but still 
under the close supervision of the central government. These concepts remained unclear in 
practice and in most cases: co-administration dominated the central-local relationship. The 
law was intended to promote the idea of decentralization; however, the Orde Baru 
government was never fully committed to its implementation (Ferrazzi 1998). Mokhsen 
(2003:168) argued that the failure to fulfil the ideal of decentralization and regional 
autonomy was related to the weakness of the legal framework that accommodated the 
establishment of semi-independent regional governments.  
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This weakness led to several biases in the interpretation of the law. The 
supervision and control, both proactive and reactive25, of the central government over the 
regional and local governments dominated the Orde Baru. These approaches were related 
to the main theme of the Government, which was to establish a “remarkably united country 
with an impressive economic performance” (Devas 1997:354). It required uniformity and 
national stability in the central-local relationship. Thus, the law was “unsuccessful in 
establishing the nexus between administration deconcentration and territorial 
decentralization” (Malo 1995:23).  
Another failure of Law 5/1974 was the lack of clarity in the central-local financial 
relationship and in issues relating to the sharing and distribution of natural resources 
revenue (Devas et al. 1989). These weak points caused a high financial dependency of 
local government on central government and stimulated jealousy and disillusionment 
among local governments especially in the resource-rich outer islands. Mechanisms such 
as Presidential Instruction (Instruksi Presiden or Inpres) and Subsidy for Local Autonomy 
(Subsidi Daerah Otonom or SDO) retained the high dependency of local government on 
grants from the central government. The result was an absence of proper legal frameworks 
and the creation of piecemeal administration arrangements (Devas et al. 1989).  
In late 1997, Indonesia experienced economic hardship.  The financial crisis in 
1997 that led to the economic crisis in 1998 created a bad image of Soeharto’ presidency 
and caused a lack of trust on his leadership both domestically and internationally. His 
attempts to extract Indonesia from the crisis had no significant impact. There were many 
                                                     
25 According to Malo (1995), a proactive control is manifested when a regional or lower level government 
is prevented by the central government from performing activities and functions contrary to national rules, 
regulations, or policies. Reactive control is done when a higher tier of government represses, annuls, or 
invalidates a lower tier's action or actions found to be illegitimate or regarded as unauthorized and 
disadvantageous in the pursuit of national or supra-regional goals, objectives, and general welfare. 
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protests and riots to urge the resignation of Soeharto from his more than three-decade 
presidency.  
Pressure to reform the Orde Baru forced the authoritarian ruler, President 
Soeharto, to instigate the political transformation on 21 May 1998, which is known as the 
reformasi era. Soeharto steped down from his presidency and handed power to his hand-
picked vice president, B.J. Habibie. During the Habibie presidency, rapid reform emerged 
with more press freedom and decentralization as the basis of the central-local government 
relationship. The emergence of decentralization as a key element of national security and 
stability gained great prominence.26  
Reformasi brought with it the need to redefine central-local relationships, 
especially financial responsibilities. With eight months preparation following the mandates 
from the extraordinary session of the People's Consultative Assembly (MPR)27 in October 
1998, two laws on central-local relationships were passed to replace the antiquated Law 
5/1974. The two laws, Law 22/1999 on Regional Governance and Law 25/1999 on Fiscal 
Balance between the Centre and the Regions, were passed without public consultation and 
debate (Resosudarmo 2007; McCarthy et al. 2006), but they brought the opportunities to 
transform the concept of decentralization and regional autonomy into reality (Sumaryadi 
2006). In addition, the laws were required to be effectively implemented by 1 January 
200128.  
                                                     
26 See van Klinken, G. (1999). Is Indonesia breaking down?, Far Eastern Economic Review, March 18th, 
1999: 33 
27 Majelis Permusyawatan Ralyat (MPR) Decree No. XV/MPR/1998 
28 Both laws stipulated that the new decentralization framework would come into effect in May 2001 
(giving a two-year time frame to allow for the necessary preparations), however, this date was later advanced 
to 1 January 2001 by the MPR Decree No. IV/MPR/2000. Thus, the beginning of decentralization would 
coincide with the new fiscal year. 
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A key feature of these two laws is the devolution of a wide range of public service 
delivery functions to local government. The laws also provide more balance in the central-
local financial system. They stipulate the restructuring of the executive and legislative 
relationships at the local level through empowering elected regional councils (Dewan 
Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah or DPRD). These laws also led to a multitude of implementing 
regulations to support the implementation of both laws.  
The purpose of these two laws was to reform the central-local government 
relationship and to ensure fiscal balance between the central government and regional 
governments (province, district and municipality). However, the reform was challenged by 
political resistance and the conservative views of most bureaucrats. In addition, Laws 22 
and 25/1999 are sectoral laws enacted by the Ministry of Home Affairs instead of an 
umbrella law (Mawardi 2002). As a result, other ministries hindered the implementation of 
these two laws. Some scholars29 identified eight issues that followed the implementation of 
these laws: 
 unclear distribution of functions between the levels of government; 
 ineffective system of supervision of regional governments by the central 
government;  
 lack of clear responsibilities of the provinces;  
 failure of the current intergovernmental fiscal system to ensure an equalization 
between resource-rich and resource-poor regions, and a mismatch between the 
assignment of expenditures and the assignment of revenues;  
 lack of policy coordination with sectoral laws and regulations, leading to 
contradictory regulations for instance in the forestry and in the mining sector;  
 strong role of "money politics" in the election of Head of Regions (Kepala Daerah) 
by the regional councils (DPRD);  
 unsatisfactory accountability mechanism which focuses on the annual report of the 
Head of Region to the council; and   
                                                     
29 See: Mokhsen (2003); DRSP (2006); McCarthy et al. (2006); Sumaryadi (2006); Sunarno (2006); 
Ratnawati (2006c); and Resosudarmo (2007) 
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 lack of capacity at the regional level to fully implement the new decentralization 
framework, and lack of programs of the central government to support capacity 
building in the regions.  
 
These problematic issues, combined with the short period allowed for drafting the 
laws and political pressures, contributed to the need to revise the laws. Indeed, the proposal 
to revise these laws was made only a few months after their enactment. However, political 
resistance and lack of support from the legislature stalled the proposal for the revision. The 
introduction of direct elections for Heads of Regions (Pemilihan Kepala Daerah or 
Pilkada) was at the same time with the first direct election of the President and Vice-
President. This escalated the need to revise the laws. Finally, in October 2004 Law No. 
32/2004 on Regional Government and Law No. 33/2004 on Fiscal Balance between the 
Centre and the Regions were passed to replace the two previous laws governing the 
central-local relationship (Laws 22 and 25/1999).  
In summary, the pathway of decentralization in Indonesia can be divided into ten 
time periods starting with the Dutch colonial era and ending with the reformasi era. Each 
period has legal bases for adopting and implementing its decentralization policy (Table 3).  
Table 3.  Periods and legal bases of decentralization in Indonesia. 
Period Legal Bases Remarks  
Dutch Occupation  
(1603 – 1811) 
(1816 – 1942) 
 
 
 Regeringsreglement Wet 
1854 
 Decentralisatie Wet 
1903 
 De Inlandsche 
Gemeente Ordonantie 
1906 
 Bestuurshervorming 
1922 
 
 Introduction of modern public sector management in 
Indonesia 
 Introduction and formation of local councils (Raads) 
 Introduction of self-governing administrative units 
(Zelfbestuur) as part of its ethic policy for the NEI 
 Ethik policy as the stimulator for decentralized policy 
 Zedelijk roeping (Executive/King Order) was the policy. 
 Decentralization policy was led by the private sector 
and European entrepreneurships (de Europeche 
burgerij) 
British occupation 
(1811 – 1816) 
  Reorganization and conversion of the Dutch-created 
government administration in Java and Madura into 
sixteen prefectures 
 Bupati as colonial salaried employee 
 Creating the assistant resident (Asisten 
Wedana/Bupati) position to limit  the Bupati power  
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Period Legal Bases Remarks  
Japanese occupation 
(1942 – 1945) 
 Osomu Seirei (Oendang-
oendang) 27, 2602 
(1942)  
 Osomu Seirei 28, 1942 
 Osomu Seirei 30, 1942 
 Recentralization of local government by imposing direct 
line military command  
 Enforcing a strong, simple government administration 
(koekoeh, dan koeat serta sederhana)  
 Java-centric style of military ruler as much of the 
reorganization was done in Java and Madura 
 Renaming all the Dutch nomenclature and the Dutch 
language was forbidden.  
 Introduction the local neighborhood system (tonari gumi 
or Rukun Tetangga/RT) as lower level of government. 
Early Independence  
(1945 – 1948)  
 
 Article 18 of the 1945 
Constitution  
 Law No. 1, 1945  
 Law No. 22, 1948  
 Law No. 1, 1945 set down the principles of 
decentralization. First use of self-rule administration 
units, which classified provinces into three sections: 
residencies, kabupatens and municipalities. 
 Law No 22, 1948 defined the territory of the Republic of 
Indonesia into three (self-rule areas, namely: (1) 
provinces; (2) kabupatens and municipalities; and (3) 
cities, villages, and communities.  
 The law also designed the structure and functions of 
regional governments; the province governments were 
abolished and turned into administrative regions  
Dutch reoccupation  
(1945 - 1949)  
 
 Law No. 22, 1948 
 Pre-war colonial system 
of decentralization for 
areas under the rule of 
the Netherlands lndies 
Civil Administration. 
 Broad division of governing the territory of Indonesia: 
the Provisional Government of the Republic of 
Indonesia (Pemerintah Darurat Republik Indonesia or 
PDRI) in Sumatera and the Republic of Indonesia in 
Yogyakarta  
United Republic of 
Indonesia  
(1949 - 1950) 
 
 Article 47 of the 
constitution of the United 
Republic of Indonesia 
(the RIS) 
 Changing the Indonesian state system from a unitary 
state into a federal system.  
 Each state within the federation had the authority to 
promulgate laws, policies, and rules for and on behalf 
of its own autonomous regions. 
 Introduction of the concept of self-ruling regions 
swapradja and three levels of autonomous regions in 
Eastern Indonesia. 
 Authority passed to regional government boards 
(Dewan Pemerintah Daerah) or governors in their 
capacity as the provincial head.  
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Period Legal Bases Remarks  
Provisional Constitution 
of 1950  
(1950 - 1959)  
 
 Law 22/1948 
 Government Regulation 
(Peraturan Pemerintah) 
20/1952 
 Reintroduction of Law No. 48, 1948 and enactment of a 
number of regulations on decentralization 
 Formation of seven (7) autonomous provinces in Java 
and Sumatera and transfer of a number of functions 
from the central government to the provinces 
 Formation of eighty one (81) kabupaten, eleven (11) 
municipalities and eight (8) administrative units within 
the provinces together with the delegation of research 
to these new autonomous regions  
 Formalization of the procedures for the election of 
members of the Regional People's Representative 
Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) 
 Adoption of the principles of equity and uniformity for 
regional finance principles to prevent interregional tax 
disparity 
 Introduction of deconcentration concept through the  
placement of representative offices of various branches 
of the national government (jawatan) in the regions 
Orde Lama (Old Order)  
(1956 - 1965) 
 Law 1/1957 concerning 
the principles of regional 
government based on 
the Provisional 
Constitution of 1950 
 Law 18/1965) based on 
the 1945 Constitution. 
  
 Introduction of three broad concepts: (i) the real 
autonomy concept, (ii) the strata of regional 
government; and (iii) elected head of the region 
(Kepala Daerah) who represents the regional 
government and chairs of the regional government 
board (Dewan Pemerintahan Daerah). 
 Distinction mode between self-governing regions 
(daerah swatantra) and special regions (daerah 
istimewa)  
 Introduction of three (3) strata of regional governments: 
region or province (Daerah Tingkat I), the regency 
(Kabupaten),  municipalities and autonomous cities 
(kotamadya) as Daerah Tingkat II, and kecamatan and 
lower level municipality (kotapraja) as the third level. 
 Formation of eight (8) first level and 94 second level 
regional governments  
 Promoting the concept of harmonious relationships 
between the central and regional governments through 
appointing a representative of the central government 
as a Chair of the Regional Peoples' Representative 
Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) 
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Period Legal Bases Remarks  
Orde Baru (New Order) 
(1966 - 1998) 
 Law 5/1974 to replace 
Law 18/1965 
 Government Regulation 
6/1988 
 The enactment of the concept of territorial 
decentralization and deconcentration by dividing the 
country into autonomous regions (daerah otonom) and 
administrative territories (wilayah administratif) 
 Each province composed of regencies (kabupaten) and 
municipalities was further divided into sub districts 
(kecamatan) 
 Promoting the principles of popular participation and 
equity was main principle.   
 Highlight the importance of the role of second level 
regional government (Daerah Tingkat II) 
 The central government maintained its right to limit the 
powers of autonomous regions if not totally withdrawing 
them in case regional governments fail to perform their 
mandated functions and responsibilities. 
Reformasi  
(1999 – 2004) 
 Law 22/1999 
 Law 25/1999 
 Introduction of five fundamental principles: (i) 
democracy, (ii) people's participation and 
empowerment, (iii) equity and justice, (iv) recognition of 
the potential and diversity of regions, and (v) the need 
to strengthen the regional legislatures.  
 The local level (kabupaten/kota) given broad wide-
ranging autonomy ("otonomi yang luas").  
 The local level has responsibility for all governmental 
matters (kewenangan dalam seluruh bidang 
pemerintahan) except in the five areas of (i) foreign 
affairs, (ii) defense and security, (iii) justice, monetary 
and fiscal affairs, (iv) religion and (v) other matters.  
 The “other matters” responsibility is a blurred 
responsibility and can create the conflict of interest.  
Post-reformasi 
(2004 – now) 
 Law 32/2004 
 Law 33/2004 
 Local governments are authorised and have the 
responsibility to provide wide ranging public services in 
almost all sectors of community life. 
 More flexible framework for fiscal management 
relationships under the General Allocation Fund (DAU) 
and Specific Allocation Fund (DAK). 
 Criteria for DAU and DAK are based on (i) general 
criteria based on the net fiscal index (NFI), (ii) specific 
criteria based on legislative regulation and regional 
characteristics, and (iii) technical criteria based on 
technical indexes in the relevant sector.  
Source: Soehino (1991); ASEAN-USAID CRMP and DGF (1992); Malo (1995); Devas (1997); Alm and Bahl (1999); Koswara (2001); 
Yudoyono (2001); Kansil and Kansil (2002); Rasyid (2002); Azis (2003); Mokhsen (2003); Turner et al. (2003);  Erb et al. (2005) 
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2.3 Dynamic and Enduring Fundamental Changes  
In this section, I investigate the processes that have brought about change in 
decentralization in Indonesia in the context of central-local relationship. The historical 
background of decentralization, as discussed in the previous section, brings our attention to 
five important laws (Law 5/1974, Law 22/1999, Law 25/1999, Law 32/2004 and Law 
33/2004) that changed local government structures. These five laws show the dynamic 
changes of local government structures, rights and responsibilities. Indeed, the significant 
changes in local government administration brought about by these laws can be divided 
into 13 important themes (Table 4).  
To analyse dynamic and enduring fundamental changes in local governments’ 
administrations, this research uses these five laws as its main reference but emphasises 
Law 32/2004 and Law 33/2004. Law 32/2004 on Regional Government focuses on 
administrative and political decentralization and includes the guiding references for the 
devolution of expenditure responsibilities. Law 33/2004 on Fiscal Balance concerns 
financial decentralization management and distribution of resources across regions. 
Law 32/2004 and Law 33/2004 have led to significant changes in local 
government in Indonesia. These two laws changed central-local government relationships 
in political, fiscal, planning process and local administration arrangements. In political 
arrangements, the central government no longer has the rights to control the appointment 
of local government chief executives (Bupati, Walikota and Gubernur). Local parliaments 
(DPRD) have significantly upgraded rights and responsibilities that change power 
arrangement at local levels.  
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Table 4.  Changes in decentralization from Law 5/1974, Law 22/1999 to Law 32/2004 
Items Changed  Law 5/1974 Law 22/1999 Law 32/2004 
 Local government 
structure 
 DPRD is part of the 
Executive 
 DPRD is independent   DPRD is independent  
 Local Election for 
District Head 
 Prerogative of 
national government 
with the Ministry of 
Home Affairs as key 
agency 
 DPRD’s prerogative    Direct elections in 
which independent 
candidates can 
nominate themselves 
 Oversight  Executive oversees 
DPRD   
 DPRD oversees the 
executive  
 DPRD and Executive 
can oversee each 
other with proper 
mechanisms  
 DPRD as the 
legislative body 
 The population elects 
1 out of 3 parties; 
seats allocated based 
on proportional 
representation 
 Closed-list 
Proportional 
Representation; 
many parties (>100); 
seating according to 
party list 
 Open-list 
Proportional 
Representation; 
seating depending on 
the number of votes 
the party obtained 
and their order in the 
party list 
 DPRD Right  DPRD rights 
differentiated from 
DPRD members’ 
rights 
 DPRD rights as well 
as DPRD members’ 
rights 
 DPRD rights as well 
as DPRD members’ 
rights 
 DPRD Budget  Determined and 
managed by the 
Executive 
 Determined and 
managed by DPRD  
 Determined and 
managed by DPRD  
 DPRD summons to 
officials or member 
of community 
 Delegated to 
subordinates of 
witness 
 DPRD could impose 
sanction on 
witnesses who did 
not respond 
 DPRD could impose 
sanction on 
witnesses who did 
not respond 
 Exploration of 
natural resources 
 DPRD had no 
knowledge of 
agreements related to 
exploitation of region’s 
natural resources 
 DPRD has the 
authority to provide 
opinion and advice 
 DPRD has the 
authority to provide 
opinion and advice 
 DPRD’s Rights of 
Investigation  
 Never used as there 
was no Law 
stipulating it 
 The right is stipulated 
by DPRD themselves 
in DPRD Standing 
Order 
 DPRD can establish 
an investigation 
committee which 
comprises 
representatives from 
all fractions 
 Implementation of 
people’s aspirations  
 DPRD just 
accommodated and 
channelled them to 
the Executive 
 DPRD was given a 
task to accommodate 
and channel people’s 
aspirations  
 DPRD has a task to 
accommodate and 
channel people’s 
aspirations 
 DPRD factions  There were only three 
(3) factions  
 Could be more than 5 
factions 
 Equal with number of 
commissions in 
DPRD (3 – 4 faction 
depends on number 
of DPRD members).  
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Items Changed  Law 5/1974 Law 22/1999 Law 32/2004 
 Role of military  Territorial command 
system (komando 
teritorial) enables 
military self-financing 
 Reserved seats at 
DPRD as part of Dwi 
Fungsi policy 
 Military staff seconded 
to government’ 
positions 
 No reserved seats at 
DPRD 
 Territorial command 
systems remains 
active  
 No reserved seats at 
DPRD 
 Territorial command 
systems remains 
active 
 Civil society   Tight restrictions on 
press and NGOs 
 Free press and 
proliferation of NGOs 
 Free press and 
proliferation of NGOs 
Sources: Government of Indonesia (1999a, 1999b, 2004a, 2004b); and World Bank (2006b) 
 
In fiscal arrangements, balanced funds (Dana Perimbangan) have been initiated 
to support decentralization policy. These funds include the general allocation fund (DAU), 
the specific allocation fund (DAK) and the revenue sharing fund (DBH). Local 
government can borrow funding for its local development needs from national or 
international financial institutions with certain mechanisms. Local governments have the 
rights to pass their local regulations (Peraturan Daerah/Perda) to maximize their local 
area revenues (PAD)30 as long as it is not contradictory to national policy and higher legal 
regulations. In planning process arrangements, minimum service standards (Standar 
Pelayanan Minimum/SPM) and transparent and performances-based budgeting (Anggaran 
Berbasis Kinerja) become important factors in district and provincial planning.  
 
2.3.1 Central-local political relationship 
The most fundamental change in the central-local political relationship is the 
direct election of local chief executives (pemilihan langsung kepala daerah/pilkada). The 
pilkada holds the implication that Bupati have to be accountable and responsible to their 
constituency. Bupati no longer serve as government employees who are appointed as 
representatives of the central government in the district. Law 32/2004 abolishes the direct 
                                                     
30 There are numbers of studies on Perda that describe how Perda leads to poor business climate.  
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hierarchy, which placed the Bupati as a subordinate to the Governor. The Bupati now only 
have to submit a report about the local government administration under their leadership, 
provide an accountability report to DPRD and inform the public about the report on local 
government administration (Article 27 item 2 Law 32/2004).  
The central government can dismiss a Bupati under several circumstances, 
including at their own request or by termination (Article 29 item 1 Law 32/2004). Central 
government can terminate Bupati if they meet one of the following conditions (Article 29 
item 2 Law 32/2004): 
 term of office has expired and yet they continue to hold the position; 
 unable to continuously carry out duties for six months; 
 no longer meet the requirements of a Bupati; 
 declared as having breached their professional oath/pledge as Bupati; 
 fail to carry out his or her obligations; and 
 have violated prohibitions imposed upon the Bupati.  
 
Law 32/2004 stipulates in detail the process for terminating a Bupati and the legal 
proceedings for termination (Article 29 – 36 Law 32/2004). Law 32/2004 also changes the 
local legislative’s (DPRD) position at the local level, from being a part of local government 
administration to being an independent institution. Under this law, the DPRD’s rights and 
obligations give more balance to the local executive’s power than was the case under the 
previous Law 5/1974. DPRD members are entitled to similar rights, under their obligation 
to the DPRD as the local legislative institution, which includes rights of investigation, 
making inquiries and expressing an opinion (Article 43 item 1 Law 32/2004).  
In carrying out their duties, DPRD members have the right to propose drafts of 
Local Regulations (Perda), raise questions or make an inquiry, submit proposals and 
express opinions, and present draft financial and administration policies to the DPRD 
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(Article 44 Law 32/2004). Meanwhile, the duties of the DPRD as the local legislative 
institution include (i) proposing the appointment and dismissal of the Bupati and deputy 
Bupati; (ii) stipulating district regulations and determining the district budget together with 
the Bupati; and facilitating and following up the requests of localities and communities. In 
addition, the DPRD has supervisory tasks and responsibilities for the implementation of 
local regulations and other laws and regulations, the Bupati’s decisions and the district 
budget and district policies.   
2.3.2 Central-local fiscal relationship 
Under Law 32/3004 and Law 33/2004, local government has greater financial 
responsibilities in terms of the expenditure and revenue systems. These laws restructure the 
intergovernmental transfer and revenue systems, which have changed significantly. 
Previously, the intergovernmental transfer and revenue system for local government relied 
on the centralistic system and non-budgetary transfer (Alisjahbana 2005; Devas 1989). 
Transfer from central government constituted the greater part of local governments’ 
budgets. By the mid-nineties, two-thirds of the local government budget was constituted by 
central government transfers (Table 5). This illustrates how local governments’ financial 
capability was heavily dependent on the central government. 
Table 5.  Financial dependence of provincial and district governments on the central 
government. 
Budget Item Provinces Districts/Municipalities 
1980/81 1985/86 1989/90 1994/95 1980/81 1985186 1989/90 I993/94 
Own revenues 
as % of 
budget* 
24.6% 18.34 % 23.94 % 31.01 % 13.04% 18.85 % 15.86 % 11.24 % 
Central 
Transfers as 
%  of budget* 
69.30 % 69.46 % 62.54 % 54.69 % 79.66% 63.87 % 66 .74 % 70.87 % 
Source: Ferrazzi (1998:50) 
* Columns do not add to 100% as other regional budget items are not incorporated. 
 
  49
 
 Intergovernmental transfer from central government under Law 5/1974 consisted 
of three important sources, namely, the Subsidy for Autonomous Regions (Subsidi Daerah 
Otonom/SDO), the Inpres (Instruksi Presiden, Presidential Instruction), the grants program 
and shared revenues. SDO were central government grants, which were allocated to 
provincial and local governments to cover staff salaries and other routine administrative 
expenditures. Local government budgets consisted of a high proportion of SDO, which 
accounted for more than half of the total local government budget (Alisjahbana 2005; 
Ferrazzi 2005). SDO effectively functioned as the central government’s instrument to 
control local governments (Lewis 2003). The source of SDO came from the central 
government’s revenues, including royalties, taxes, levies and natural resource extraction 
revenues from permits and shared revenues. Oil and gas shared the highest proportion of 
central government revenues drawn from the lucrative natural resource extraction 
(Alisjahbana 2005; Devas 1989).  
Unfair distribution, especially for the producer areas, combined with the high 
level of control of politics and economics were paradoxical phenomena during the New 
Order period. This unfair distribution became one of the central themes in the fiscal 
balance between central and local governments; it was addressed by Law 22/1999 that was 
superseded by Law 33/2004.  
The second intergovernmental transfer during the New Order period was the 
Inpres grant program. Inpres is the block grant aid to local government for financing 
general purpose and specific-purpose development activities that gave some flexibility to 
local government to spend the budget for their own needs. Inpres constituted 25 to 28 per 
cent of most local governments’ budgets (Alisjahbana 2005; Resosudarmo 2007).  
There were eight Inpres grants during the New Order period that were distributed 
through various levels of government (Inpres Umum) and specific national sectoral 
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ministries (Inpres Khusus). The Inpres grants included (i) Inpres Desa (village), (ii) Inpres 
Kabupaten (district), (iii) Inpres Provinsi (province), (iv) Inpres SD (primary school), (v) 
Inpres Kesehatan (Health), (vi) Inpres Penghijauan dan Reboisasi 
(regreening/reforestation), (vii) Inpres Jalan Propinsi (provincial roads) and (viii) Inpres 
Jalan Kabupaten (district roads).  
     Among these eight Inpres, Inpres Kabupaten constituted a significant 
proportion of local governments’ budgets. Inpres Kabupaten was allocated on a per capita 
basis for multipurpose programs contributing to selected local government projects (Devas 
1989). Provincial government played a central role as an assessor of local government 
proposals, provider of guidelines and evaluator for the Inpres Kabupaten. This grant 
mechanism involved the local branch of the Bank Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian Peoples 
Bank) in paying contractors’ bills. This mechanism was intended to minimize the 
authorized payments or payment for unallocated projects (Booth 1989). 
Other grants from the central government which were allocated to local 
government budgets included the ‘on top fund’ which served as matching funds and was 
usually required by aid-funded projects (Booth 1989). Proposals for these grants involved 
the sectoral central departments and Bappeda; approval was the right of Bappenas and the 
Ministry of Finance.  
Beside these intergovernmental transfers, local government sometimes obtained 
contributions to its local development budget from central sectoral department expenditure 
that allocated APBN funds to provincial dinas. Then the funds were distributed to the local 
government’s dinas under the control of provincial dinas. Local government could also 
obtain loans for its local development projects, such as from Bank Rakyat Indonesia, for 
market improvements. This local loan mechanism was also under the control of the central 
government.  
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On the revenue side, with reference to Law 18/1997 on Regional Taxes and 
Levies, local government had the authority to collect less attractive revenues from 
advertisement, hotels and restaurants, entertainment, street lighting, C-grade (sand and 
gravel) mining and surface and ground water. Mechanisms for collecting these revenues 
were subject to strict control by the central government. Thus, only small revenues could 
be collected by local government, and consequently they were highly dependent on the 
allotment of the central government’s revenues (Ferrazzi 1998). 
The Law 25/1999 restructured the previous intergovernmental transfer by 
providing more revenue for local governments. Local governments then received a higher 
percentage of revenue from natural resources, revenue which for more than three decades 
had fallen under the tight control of the central government. According to Alisjahbana 
(2005:114), this law “fundamentally altered the fiscal relationship between the central 
government and the [local] government”. This law was then superseded by Law 33/2004, 
which inaugurated several changes with regard to the percentage of natural resource 
revenue shared, with special allocations for Aceh and Papua as special autonomy areas 
(otonomi khusus). The divisions of intergovernmental transfer remained similar.   
The structures of local government’s budget consist of a balancing fund (dana 
perimbangan), local government revenues (PAD), local loans (pinjaman daerah) and other 
legal sources of income (Article 5 and 51 Law 33/2004). Dana perimbangan includes a 
general allocation fund (dana lokasi umum/DAU), a specific allocation fund (dana alokasi 
khusus/DAK) and shared revenues (dana bagi hasil/DBH) (Article 10 Law 33/2004). 
Sources of PAD are local taxes, levies, results of management of separate local assets and 
other legitimate income (Article 6 Law 33/2004). Loans to local government can come 
from central government, other local governments, bank financial institutions, non-banking 
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financial institutions and communities, whose mechanisms and processes are subject to 
central government guidelines and DPRD approval. 
The general allocation fund (DAU) is a general-purpose grant to equalize fiscal 
capacity31 across sub-national governments. DAU allocations use a specified formula 
which refers to population, area, and the size of the fiscal gap between expenditure needs 
and fiscal capacities. DAU is the core of the new system of inter-governmental transfers, 
which has effectively replaced the SDO and Inpres block grants transferred during the pre-
1999 period. Allocations of DAU are mostly to cover routine expenditure, especially public 
servants’ salaries.  
The special Allocation Fund (DAK) is a specific purpose matching grants fund, 
which is sourced from a relatively small pool of central government revenues. The 
objective of DAK allocation is to assist local government to finance special needs that 
cannot be covered through the DAU formulation. This grant addresses the specific needs of 
particular areas, are mostly for the provision of basic services (health, education and 
infrastructure) and other services (public administration infrastructure, marine and fisheries 
and the environment). The DAK allocation depends on the availability of central 
government resources. In order to receive DAK, local governments must provide a 
counterpart fund of at least 10 per cent of the total allocated DAK. The counterpart fund 
must be allocated on APBD (Article 41 item 1 and 2 Law 33/2004). However, there are 
exceptions made for those local governments with lack fiscal capacity (Article 41 item 3 
Law 33/2004). 
Revenue Sharing Funds (DBH) is a major breakthrough in the distribution of 
revenues from natural resource extraction (oil, gas, mining, forestry and fishery). DBH 
                                                     
31 Fiscal capacity is money available for local development programs. 
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modified the previously unfair or unclear revenue sharing mechanisms during the New 
Order period and divided the revenues into certain percentages for local governments, 
especially resource-producing local government. The subjects of shared revenues are more 
varied. The calculation of DBH percentage must allocate a special revenue sharing 
percentage for producing areas (Table 6). Central government still holds the largest 
percentage of royalties from oil (84.5 %) and gas (69.5 %).  
Table 6.  Tax and Natural Resource Revenue Sharing Scheme between Central and Sub-
national Governments before and under Decentralisation (% of allocation) 
Source 
Pre-decentralization Decentralization 
CG PG LG CG PG RPLG OLGP OLG 
Land and Building tax 10 16 64 10 16.2 64.8 0 0 
Land and building transfer fee 20 16 64 20 16 64 0 0 
Income tax 100 0 0 0 40 60 0 0 
Oil 100 0 0 84.5 0 15.5 0 0 
LNG 100 0 0 69.5 0 30.5 0 0 
Geothermal 0 20 0 80 0 0 
Mining-land rent 20 16 64 20 16 64 0 0 
Mining-royalty 20 16 64 20 16 32 32 0 
Timber Concession Fee (IHPH) 30 56 14 20 16 64 0 0 
Forest Resource Rent provision 
(PSDH) 55 30 15 20 16 32 32 0 
Reforestation Fund 100 0 0 60  40 0 
Fishery exploitation levy 0 20 0 0 0 80 
Fisheries products levy 0 20 0 0 0 80 
 
Note: CG: Central Government, PG: provincial governments; LG: local governments; RPLG: resources-producing local governments; 
OLGP: other local governments in the province; OLG: all other local governments. 
Source: Articles 12- 18 Law 33/2004; Alisjabana (2005); Resosudarmo (2007) 
 
The new revenue sharing arrangements increase local revenues, especially for 
kabupaten in resources-rich areas, such as Kutai Kertanegara in East Kalimantan and Siak 
Sriindrapura in Riau. These new arrangements also regulate the sharing of revenues from 
fisheries, which was unclear before 1999. Fisheries revenue consists of revenue from the 
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fishery exploitation levy (pungutan pengusahaan Perikanan/PPP) and fisheries product 
levy or output tax (pungutan hasil Perikanan/PHP). These revenues come out of the 
central government revenues and are shared in the same proportion to districts and 
municipalities throughout Indonesia (Article 18 Law 33/2004).  
Local Area Revenues (Pendapatan Asli Daerah/PAD) are revenues that a local 
government can raise directly from within its own jurisdiction from three major sources: 
local taxes, local levies and revenues from local government assets, such as local 
government enterprises (Badan Usaha Milik Daerah/BUMD). Local governments can 
create their own taxes and levies through local by-laws (local regulations/Perda) following 
certain criteria, but with approval of central government. PAD constitutes a smaller portion 
of district revenues relative to balance funds.  
Law 33/2004 authorized local governments to seek funding for their development 
needs through loans schemes with reference to conditions and predictions of national 
economic development (Article 49 Law 33/2004). Local government loans consist of short 
term (less one year), medium term (one to five years) and long term (more than five years) 
loans. The medium and long terms loans had to secure approval from the DPRD (Article 
53 item 4 Law 33/2004). Total cumulation of local government loans should not exceed 60 
per cent of the Gross Domestic Products of the ongoing fiscal year. Local government 
cannot raise loans directly from foreign parties unless through the central government.  
The last category of local government revenue sources is derived from other legal 
sources of income, for example grant and emergency funds from domestic sources or 
overseas (Article 43 and 44 Law 33/2004). This miscellaneous income is related to 
emergencies. 
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Several laws and regulations frame all these local government revenue 
arrangements and implementation. There are four organic laws that administer local 
government planning and budgeting, accounting and financial reporting, treasury and 
audit. These laws are: 
Law 17/2003 on State Finances as a legal framework for a unified budget;  
Law 1/2004 on State Treasury as reference to a variety of financial management functions;  
Law 15/2004 that provides for the audit of all governmental units; and  
Law 25/2004 on developmental planning as a guideline for local government planning.  
 
The guidelines for daily operations of local government finance is the 
Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah/PP) 58/2005 concerning management of 
local government finance, which derives from Law 33/2004. The Ministries of Finance and 
Home Affairs jointly developed the PP 58/2005 that brought comprehensive changes to 
regional planning, budgeting, accounting and financial reporting.  
2.3.3 Central-local planning process relationship 
Changes in central-local political and financial relationships affect the central-
local planning relationship. The main change is that local governments have more authority 
to draft and elaborate the needs and budgets required for their local development. The 
changes also emphasize two annual planning processes at the district level: the 
bureaucratic sectoral planning process carried out by Local Government Technical 
Departments (Satuan Kerja Perangkat Daerah/SKPD), and the participatory spatial 
planning process of the Development Planning Deliberative Meeting Forums (Forum 
Musyawarah Perencanaan Pembangunan/Forum Musrenbang). These two planning 
processes take a year, from drafting to enactment of the local budget document (APBD) 
  56
 
which runs according to Indonesia’s fiscal year from 1 January to 31 December (Figure 9 
and Table 7). 
 
 
Figure 9.  Annual budget preparation cycle 
Source Lewis (2003:15) 
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Table 7.  Annual district planning cycle  
Month  Activities 
Jan  Fiscal year begins;  
The Planning Development Agency (Bappeda) formulates a document called the “Regional Economic 
Framework” (Kerangka Ekonomi Daerah), comprising a projection of revenues and expenditures 
based on the previous year’s budget, and a list of local government activities, referring to the Medium-
Term Development Plan and the Strategic Plans of the Local Government Technical Departments 
(SKPD);  
All activities related to public services are discussed in public meetings called the Development 
Planning Deliberative Meeting Forums (Forum Musrenbang); and  
Musrenbang at the village level begins in January  
Feb  Musrenbang at the subdistrict level  
Mar  Musrenbang at the district level  
Apr-May  All activities coming from the various technical departments. SKPD are coordinated and written out in 
the form of a document called annual regional development plan (Rencana Kerja Pembangunan 
Daerah/RKPD)  
Jun-Aug  Drafting of KUA of APBD, prepared on the basis of RKPD;  
Formulation of provisional priorities and budget ceilings for each work unit; and  
Drafting of the Local Government Technical Department Work Plans (Rencana Kerja Satuan Kerja 
Perangkat Daerah, Renja SKPD).  
Based on the priorities and ceilings that have been set, the technical departments prepare budget 
estimates for their work programs (RKA-SKPD) and submit these to the local government.  
Sep  Compilation of RKAs submitted by the various technical departments.  
Oct  Finalization of the draft budget (RAPBD), done by the Executive Budget Committee comprised of the 
Bappeda (for activity budget) and BPKD (for the personnel budget), coordinated by the regional 
secretary (Sekda);  
Local government prepares draft local regulation on the draft budget (RAPBD) to seek approval from 
DPRD; 
Discussion meetings between the legislature and the executive branch; and  
Drafting of the RAPBD note.  
Nov  Discussion of the budget by the DPRD 
Enactment of the budget by DPRD.  
Dec  Drafting of Budget Implementation Document to be enacted through a decree by the Bupati.  
Source: Lewis (2003: 16) 
  
The output of SKPD planning (annual workplans) and Musrenbang (project lists) 
forms the basis for the draft annual regional development plan (Rencana Kerja 
Pembangunan Daerah/RKPD) with the draft of the estimated budget. RKPD is the ouput 
of district-level Musrenbang, which is attended mainly by district level government 
officials. Then, the Budget Team of DPRD and Regional Chief Finance Officer (Pejabat 
Pengelola Keuangan Daerah/PPKD) headed by the Regional Secretary (Sekda) under the 
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Bupati prepare the draft of the local budget regulation, (APBD Perda/RAPBD), which 
consists of the revenue budget, expenditure budget, and financing budget.  
During the first week of October, Bupati submit the RAPBD to DPRD for 
approval. The approval process in the DPRD involves various plenary and commission 
meetings between DPRD members, heads of SKPD and executive budget committee 
members. During the process, DPRD members can organize meetings with their 
constituencies (jaring aspirasi) in order to identify priority projects. The approval process 
in DPRD may take up to two months but must be completed by the end of November 
(Beleli and Hoelman 2007). 
After DPRD approval, the Bupati submits RAPBD to the Governor for evaluation 
within three days.  If the Governor declares that the draft APBD conforms with public 
interest and laws, the Bupati announces the RAPBD is granted as Local Regulations 
(Peraturan Daerah/Perda). If the Governor declares that the draft contradicts public 
interest and laws, he or she returns it to the Bupati for amendment. The Bupati and DPRD 
must then jointly make the necessary changes before the Bupati turns the draft into a 
Perda. The Governor can terminate the Perda if the Bupati and DPRD still put forward a 
RAPBD without following the Governor’s amendments. This termination leads to 
allocation of the previous year’s budget as the maximum limit for the upcoming year’s 
budget. 
The enduring dynamic changes in political, financial and planning relationships 
under Law 32/2004 and Law 33/2004 has led to more equitable power distribution between 
the local executive and local legislature as well as between central and local governments. 
The changes also establish fairer revenue sharing arrangements especially those from 
natural resources.  
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2.4 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has illustrated this dissertation’s adopted definition of 
decentralization as authority and responsibility transfer in political, financial and planning 
from central government to local government, which is in line with the decentralization 
definition from Rondinelli and Cheema (1983). The pathways of these transfers in 
Indonesia’s history were framed by national and local situations, such as the influence of 
colonial policies and the activities of local governments within the framework of a unitary 
state (negara persatuan). Under the current Indonesian decentralization policy, these 
transfers significantly change the relationship between political, financial and planning 
process arrangements. All these changed arrangements frame and influence the pathway 
and implementation of decentralized CZM in Indonesia, which will be discussed in the 
following chapters. Before discussing the history of decentralized CZM in Indonesia, it is 
important to look at the concept of CZM, decentralized CZM and the pathway of CZM, 
which are the topics of discussion for the next chapter.     
 
 3 DECENTRALIZED CZM IN INDONESIA: 
PATHWAY AND DEBATE  
 
This chapter discusses the concept of decentralized CZM as a mechanism for the 
transfer of authority and responsibility to local governments to manage the coastal zone 
through a cooperative process, building trust and common understanding, strengthening 
local governments’ capacity and enhancing upward and downward accountability 
mechanisms. In doing this, the chapter defines several important terms, including coastal 
zone, CZM, integrated CZM and decentralized CZM. The chapter then examines the policy 
of decentralized coastal zone management that is closely linked with the history of coastal 
zone management in Indonesia and the evolution of the decentralization policy as 
described in Chapter 2. This chapter is therefore divided into four sections. 
3.1 Coastal Zone 
The term, ‘coastal zone’ is associated with a variety of public programs, projects 
and activities at the local, national and international levels. Some scholars use the term 
“coastal area” refer to similar regions, although there is a distinction between the terms 
“coastal zone” and “coastal area” (Kay and Alder 2005). This study uses the term coastal 
zone. 
The most accepted definition of coastal zone refers to the transitional region 
between terrestrial and marine zones. In a coastal zone, both terrestrial and marine 
environments influence each other (Carter 1988; Clark 1996; Kay and Alder 2005; 
Woodroffe 2002).   
A coastal zone is a unique ecosystem that derives its dynamic influences from 
terrestrial and marine ecosystems. Each ecosystem has its specific characteristics and the 
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interactions between the two ecosystems are ever-changing due to natural fluctuations in 
biological, chemical and geological attributes.  A coastal zone benefits from the interaction 
of three bio-ecological systems: land and sea, sea and air, and sea and sediments (Carter 
1988; Clark 1996). These interactions make a coastal zone one of most productive 
ecosystems with abundant natural resources (Woodroffe 2002).  
The physical features of a coastal zone include coast, beach or shore and near-
shore zones (Carter 1988; Clark 1996; Kay and Alder 2005; Woodroffe 2002) (Figure 10). 
The coast is the area beyond the backshore in a landward direction. The seaward area 
beyond the coast is known as the offshore, where oceanic influence is predominant. A 
coastal zone extends seaward to the extreme low tide mark, and landward in several ways 
through the influences of tidal and salinity, including the area covered by extreme high 
tides and/or coastal flooding.  
 
 
Figure 10.  Geography of coastal zone  
Source: Millersville University of Pennsylvania (2006) 
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A coastal zone can support many coastal communities and economies.  A coastal 
zone also provides functions and services for different human purposes and activities such 
as tourism, fisheries, transportation, mining and communication32. These multiple uses 
make a coastal zone an area of highly intensive exploration and exploitation. These 
multiple uses combined with rapid economic and industrial growth in recent decades, have 
attracted an increasing number of people to live in coastal zones (UNEP RRCAP 2004). 
This increased population has led to significant impacts on coastal zones (Adeel and 
Pomeroy 2002; Burke and Spalding 2002; UNEP RRCAP 2004).  
3.2 CZM and ICZM  
Coastal Zone Management (CZM) involves the process of planning, managing 
and controlling the utilization of a coastal zone for various activities and purposes33. 
Similarly in Indonesia, definition of CZM refers to managing and controlling the 
utilization of a coastal zone for various activities (BAPPENAS/CIDA 1987; Dahuri et al. 
1995). CZM covers permitting, licensing, funding, and development activities in the 
coastal zone in line with government policies (Dahuri et al. 1995). Law 27/2007 on Coastal 
and Small Island Management provides a definition of CZM as follows:  
Management of coastal zones and small islands is a process of inter-agency 
planning, exploitation, control and management of coastal zones and small 
islands resources, between central and local governments, between the land and 
marine ecosystems, as well as between science and management, to enhance 
people’s prosperity. (Article 1 item 1 Law 27/2007) 
In line with this definition, there are three important relationships in CZM (Cicin-
Sain and Knecht 1998; Clark 1996). First is the relationship among people who live, use, 
                                                     
32 See also Pomeroy (1994); Dahuri et al. (1995); Dutton and Hotta (1995); Pomeroy (1995); Dahuri 
(1996); Dahuri and Dutton (2000); and UNEP (2001) 
33 See also Knecht (1993); Clark (1996); Dahuri (1996); Soegiarto (1996); Idris and Siry (1997); Cicin-
Sain et al. (1998); Sorensen (1993a, 1993b, 2000); and Olsen (2003) 
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or otherwise are concerned (in their beliefs or behaviours) with the coastal zone. Then, 
there is the relationship between policy makers and managers whose decisions and actions 
affect the behaviour of coastal peoples. A relationship also exists among members of the 
scientific community: natural scientists who study the coastal environment and social 
scientists who study human behaviour in coastal zones. These three relationships are 
complex and often not limited to the administrative boundaries of a coastal zone.   
For management purposes, the boundaries of a coastal zone are influenced by 
political context and by country specifics (Table 8). The boundaries of a coastal zone can 
be pragmatically defined by including the areas and activities that are related to 
management issues. For example, in Indonesia, according to Law 32/2004, the coastal zone 
boundaries of a kabupaten enclose one third of the provincial authority area (12 nautical 
miles) seaward, while the landward boundaries follow the administrative boundaries of the 
sub-district (kecamatan) of the kabupaten/kota34. 
The complexity of utilization and interaction in coastal zones requires an 
integrated approach to maintain the continuous benefit and productivity of the coastal zone 
(Clark 1996). The current integrated approach to CZM, known as integrated coastal zone 
management (ICZM), provides a conceptual framework for the ecologically sustainable 
use of coastal resources. This concept is associated with the effort to achieve the best long-
term and sustainable use of coastal zones (Burke and Spalding 2002).  
ICZM covers all aspects of a coastal zone such as existing economic activities, 
development planning, natural resource conservation and utilization (Cicin-Sain and 
Knecht 1998; Clark 1996; Olsen 2003; Sorensen 1993a). It addresses multi-stakeholder 
                                                     
34 Law 27/2007 on Coastal Zone and Small Islands Management clearly defines the landward boundaries, 
which follow the kecamatan (sub-district) boundaries.  
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conflicts of interest through the utilization of an inter-disciplinary approach that engages 
effectively with the complexity of coastal zones (Westmacott 2002). 
Table 8.  Selected examples of coastal zone and its boundaries. 
Country  
(Source) 
Landward Boundary Seaward boundary 
Indonesia 
(Law 32/2004) 
Sub-district (kecamatan) boundaries 12 nautical miles for provincial waters, 
and one third of provincial waters for 
regency or municipality.  
Brunei 
(ASEAN/US CRMP) 
All land and water areas 1 km inland 
from MHWM and areas inundated by 
tides any time of the year.  
From MHWM to 200 m isobaths  
Costa Rica  
(Law of the Marine and 
Terrestrial Zone 6043) 
200 m from MHWM  Not available 
Ecuador 
(URI/CRMP) 
Variable line depending on issues in 
five special management areas.  
Not available 
Malaysia 
(ASEAN/US CRMP) 
 
District boundaries  
 
Up to 20 km off shore to include islets 
off Mersing  
ICZM Sarawak Edge of tidal boundary EEZ 
ICZM Sabah 60 meters contour line 12 Nautical miles 
ICZM Penang Entire island and mainland 12 Nautical miles 
TWG-1 5 km EEZ 
Singapore 
(ASEAN/US CRMP) 
Entire island  Territorial waters and offshore islands  
Philippines 
(ASEAN/US CRMP) 
 
 
Boundaries of coastal municipalities 
and inland municipalities with brackish 
water aquaculture 
 
100 fathom isobaths  
 
(ADB) Inner regions in marine dependant 
systems or 1 km whichever is the 
greatest 
Outer reaches of fisheries resource 
systems which are associated with or 
influenced by the coast 
Sri Lanka  
(Coast Cons.  Act 1981) 
300 m from MHWM  2 km from MLWM  
Thailand 
(ASEAN/US CRMP) 
District boundaries  Shallow continental shelf  
United States    
New Jersey 30 m - 30 km depending on urban 
conditions 
Tidal, bay and ocean state waters 
Rhode Island 
 
200 feet from shoreward boundaries of 
coastal features and specified actions 
likely to damage coastal environments 
Territorial sea (3 mile) excluding 
fishery 
 
Hawaii 
(State Coastal Program) 
All land except state forest reserves State waters 
 
Note:  MLWM is Mean Low Water Mark. MHWM is Mean High Water Mark. EEZ is Economic Exclusive Zone 
Sources: Cicin-Sain and Knecht (1998) and Law 32/2004 Republic of Indonesia 
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ICZM incorporates modern principles of planning and resource management, the 
intensive use of information bases and interdisciplinary processes to deal with conflicts 
arising from the interactions of the various users and stakeholders in a coastal zone 
(Christie 2005a, 2005b; Clark 1996; Thia-Eng 2002; Westmacott 2002). ICZM also 
depends upon cooperation among level of governments in the preparation ICZM guidelines 
to maintain the biodiversity and productivity of marine species and habitats (Cicin-Sain 
and Knecht 1998). 
Several definitions exist for ICZM35, but perhaps the most accepted one is the 
following definition from Westmacott (2002:69), which includes the main elements of 
ICZM: 
ICZM is a continuous, dynamic, iterative, adaptive and participatory process in 
which an integrated strategy is developed and implemented for the allocation 
of environmental, socio-cultural, and institutional resources to achieve the 
conservation and sustained multiple use of the coastal zone while taking into 
account traditional cultural and historical perspectives and conflicting interests 
and uses. 
 
Two United Nations Conventions, the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention and 
Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 provide the milestones for the foundation of an ICM definition36.  
These two conventions give the necessary prescriptions for ICM as the way forward in 
addressing the increasing pressures on the coastal zones (Cicin-Sain and Knecht 1998). 
Specifically, Chapter 17 of Agenda 21 presents a series of suggested actions that 
coordinating institutions should consider by undertaking the following steps:  
                                                     
35 See: (Christie 2005a, 2005b; Cicin-Sain and Knecht 1998; Clark 1996; Courtney and White 2000; EPU 
and DANCED 1999; Mokhtar and Aziz. 2002; Patlis et al. 2001; Sorensen 1993a, 1993b; Vallega 2005; 
White et al. 2005; White et al. 2006) 
36 This chapter is a part of the United Nations Convention for Environment and Development (UNCED), 
which entitled "Protection of the Oceans, All Kinds of Seas, Including Enclosed and Semi-Enclosed Seas, 
and Coastal Areas and the Protection, Rational Use and Development of Their Living Resources”. 
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 preparation of coastal and marine use plans, including profiles of coastal 
ecosystems and of user groups; 
 environmental impact assessment and monitoring;  
 contingency planning for both human-induced and natural disasters, improvement 
of coastal human settlements, particularly in terms of drinking water and sewage 
disposal;  
 conservation and restoration of critical habitats; and  
 integration of sectoral programs (such as fishing and tourism) into an integrated 
framework.  
 
Surveys conducted in 1993 and 2000 indicated a significant increase in the 
number of ICZM programs and countries participating in implementing ICZM within a 
seven-year period (Figure 11). This increase has accelerated the rise in interdisciplinary 
research and CZM integration into management, as well as the use of traditional 
knowledge and management systems and local participation in the ICZM efforts (Christie 
and White 1997). 
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Figure 11.  Increase in ICZM programs from 1993 to 2000   
Source: Adopted from (Sorensen 1993b, 2000) 
 
The theory of ICZM is sound but its implementation remains challenging. ICZM 
implementation often faces complex interagency relationships, stakeholder conflicts of 
interest and gaps in knowledge (Christie 2005a, 2005b; Clark 1996; Thia-Eng 2002; 
Westmacott 2002). These challenges have resulted in only a few examples of successful 
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implementation of ICZM (Westmacott 2002). For example, an evaluation of eight ICZM 
programs in Southeast Asia found that only one program had achieved most of the 
implementation objectives due to the complexity of the interrelationships in the 
implementation of ICZM (Thia-Eng 1998).  
Furthermore, the success of ICZM program implementation has become the 
subject of considerable debate due to the lack of common evaluation criteria and 
inadequate measurable objectives (Thia-Eng 1998). Assessment of the effectiveness and 
success of ICZM must rely on a defined set of objectives and measurable criteria (Thia-
Eng 1998). In the absence of such objectives and measurable criteria, evaluation of ICZM 
programs only refers to the number of project components implemented rather than the 
impact success of each component. Therefore, assessment of the effectiveness and 
successes of ICZM requires the establishment of a common vision and consensus (Thia-
Eng 1998; Thia-Eng and Garces 1993).  
ICZM program implementation faces further challenges such as poor 
communication among agencies responsible for managing the coastal zone and this can 
also lead to conflicts of interest. Obstacles exist at the local level when local governments 
overestimate their effectiveness in managing resources (Thia-Eng 1998; Thia-Eng and 
Garces 1993).  
3.3 Decentralized CZM, CBM and Co-management  
As a combination of decentralization and CZM concepts, decentralized CZM is an 
approach intended to maximize performance of delegated authority and responsibility for 
managing coastal zones. It operates through a cooperative process, building trust and 
common understanding with strong political will, strengthening local government capacity 
and enhancing upward and downward accountability mechanisms in handling multiple 
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users, interests and stakeholders in coastal zones. This means decentralized CZM deals 
with the design of intergovernmental relationships, evolving civil society in governance, 
management capacity, accountability issues and commitments (see also Lowry 2000). 
Lowry (2000) divides decentralized CZM into five categories with reference to 
levels of relationships and the flow of power (Table 9). The types of decentralized  CZM 
are: (i) classic deconcentration, (ii) coercive devolution, (iii) cooperation devolution, (iv) 
devolved experimentation, and (v) local entrepreneurship (Lowry 2000).  
Table 9.  Types of decentralized CZM  
Type Level of relationship Flow of power Remarks 
 
Classic 
deconcentration 
One way; top-down  Direct from upper 
level to lower level of 
government 
 Needs high knowledge and skill of 
upper level. 
 Top-down review  
Coercive 
devolution 
One way; treats the 
lower level as the 
regulating agents 
 Direct from upper 
level to lower level, 
but more diverse 
 Higher understanding among the 
levels of government is essential 
 Requires sufficient knowledge from 
lower level, and sophisticated design 
from upper level 
Cooperative 
devolution 
Two way; bottom 
up and top down  
 Two ways with the 
partnership 
treatment  
 Lower level must have management 
capacities, and upper level must have 
power to assure legal devolution.  
 Two-way accountability mechanisms.  
 Building lower level commitment by 
on-going interaction.  
Devolved 
experimentation 
Two way; bottom 
up and top down  
 Two-way with more 
concern to local 
capacities, 
resources and 
solutions.  
 Special treatments 
apply for 
experimentation.  
 Required strong leadership from 
lower level and community.  
 Accountable upward to upper level.  
 Needs collective self management 
Local 
entrepreneurship 
One way: bottom-
up 
 Less power 
influences from 
upper level.  
 Rely on the initiative 
and capacity of 
lower level to 
manage 
 Needs strong local knowledge, 
leadership and readiness from 
community and lower level of 
Government to implement the 
programs.  
 Accountable applies to lower level by 
local resource users and community 
residents.  
Source: Adopted from Lowry (2000).  
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Implementing decentralized CZM faces several challenges (Lowry 2000). These 
challenges are related to the implementation and maintenance of interrelationships 
resulting from the balancing of power and responsibilities between central governments 
and other levels of government and NGO actors (Christie et al. 2005c; Courtney and White 
2000; Courtney, White, and Deguit 2002; Lowry, White, and Courtney 2005; White 1986; 
White et al. 2005; White and Cruz-Trinidad 1998; White et al. 2006).  
Implementing decentralized CZM requires a shift in management regimes from 
conventional management (top-down management) to more participative decision-making 
management. To carry out this shift, appropriate rules and regulations must be exercised in 
order to accommodate the multiple interests and participative aspects of decentralized 
CZM.  There are two approaches available to accommodate different interests and 
participative aspects in decentralized CZM, namely, community-based management 
(CBM) and co-management. Each approach has its own distinct characteristics (Table 10).  
CBM is people-centred, community-focused resource management where the 
local community takes primary responsibility for major decision-making (Israel 2001). 
This approach has become popular since the 1990s due to the previous absence of 
community and other stakeholders in the planning, implementation and management of the 
coastal zone (Israel 2001) and the fact that such an approach was not allowed by the 
government. The community-based approach has been an important innovation because it 
encourages greater community responsibilities over activities to sustain the use and 
management of valuable resources in the coastal zone (Berkes 2003; Israel 2001). In this 
scheme, communities share a certain level of management responsibility, including the 
ability to regulate and control access and use of the resources (Berkes 2003; Israel 2001). 
Co-management refers to the sharing of responsibility between government, local 
community, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other stakeholders in CZM 
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(Pomeroy and Williams 1994). Co-management has also been called collaborative, joint, 
mixed, multi-party or round-table management (Borrini-Feyerabend et al. 2000). As a 
sharing arrangement, co-management aims to achieve joint responsibility and authority for 
resource management through cooperation between government and local resource users. 
Co-management emphasizes community involvement and capacity building in the 
management process (Israel 2001).  
Table 10.  The variable characteristics of community-based and co- management  
Characteristic Community based management Co-management 
Spatial Application Site-specific (small)  Multiple networked sites  
 
Primary Authority Local decision making structure and 
residents  
Shared; national government with ultimate 
authority  
 
Responsible Parties Communal; local decision making 
bodies  
Multiple stakeholders at local and national 
levels  
 
Participation Level High at a local level  High at multiple levels  
 
Timing of Efforts Rapid initiation; required broad buy-in, 
slows decision making process  
Moderate initiation; slow decision making 
process with all stakeholders  
 
Management 
Flexibility 
Highly adaptive; sensitive and 
responsive to changes in natural 
surroundings  
Moderately adaptive; responsive to changes 
in natural surroundings with adequate time  
 
Human and Financial 
Investment 
Uses existing human resources; 
moderate to low financial costs  
Builds human resources at multiple levels; 
moderate to high financial costs  
 
Sustainability of 
Efforts 
Short time frame without ongoing 
external support  
Ongoing if effective, equitable coalitions 
built  
 
Procedural 
Orientation 
Impact oriented over the short term; 
designed for local site conditions only  
Impact oriented over the long term, process 
oriented over the short term; designed for 
multiple sites  
 
Legal Orientation De facto resource control; res 
communes or private property rights  
De jure resource control; communal, 
private, or public property rights  
 
Source: (Berkes et al. 2001) 
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3.4 Pathway of decentralized CZM in Indonesia  
The time frame of decentralized coastal zone management can be divided into five 
periods, the pre-colonial, pre-independence or colonial, post-independence (1945 – 1950), 
Old Order (1950 – 1966), New Order (1966 – 1998), and reformasi (1999 – present) 
periods. Each period encompasses of legal, political and management frameworks in 
utilizing coastal resources within this time frame, decentralized CZM has been an ‘on and 
off’ policy.  
3.4.1 Pre-colonial 
In the pre-colonial period, customary rights were the most common and 
fundamental tools in managing coastal resources. The coastal resources belonged to a 
particular clan or local group or were recognized as common resources by two or three 
neighbouring clans/groups (Putra 2003). The division and use of resources followed the 
clan/local group rules with proportional rights for clan members (family) and often a 
greater portion for clan leaders (Adhuri 2002, 2003). The primary resource utilization was 
for subsistence (daily food and material consumption) and extractive exchange (harvested 
for barter and trade).  
The clan/local group recognized, revitalized, transferred and adapted rights 
through intergenerational succession (Putra 2003). The clan/local group applied legal and 
social sanctions to non-members or non-assigned clan members in using the recognized 
coastal resources (Adhuri 2002, 2003, 2004). This system existed as the only means of 
managing coastal resources until the colonial period.  
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3.4.2 Colonial period 
The Dutch left a significant legacy of coastal management. The Dutch colonial 
administration passed four related laws and regulations on coastal management (Table 11). 
Some laws and regulations acknowledged and recognized the customary rights of 
fishermen. However, no case studies have been produced that demonstrate the 
effectiveness of the Dutch-imposed laws that acknowledged customary rights (Yusran 
2002:115). The Dutch colonization fostered a centralistic approach rather than truly 
acknowledging and implementing the de jure recognition of customary rights in its laws 
and regulations.  
Table 11.  Related laws and regulations on coastal management under the Dutch colonial 
regime.  
Laws and regulations Main stipulation Remarks 
Statblad 1916/157  To regulate pearl oyster, pearl snail 
and coral reef fisheries that were 
allowed to operate within three miles 
of coastline.  
 Minister of Agriculture had the 
strongest position in decision-
making in fisheries management 
 Local people who lived on the coast 
or in a beach area for long or short 
period had full rights over the 
marine-coastal area to 
approximately 9 meters depth, and 
this right was not transferable 
(Article 2) 
 This law was part of a centralistic Dutch 
colonial management regime to 
regulate coastal resources. 
 Legal recognition of the territorial use 
rights, as part of common property 
rights 
 Lack of recognition of management 
rights of the local people  
 Put the local people and fishermen as 
authorized users instead of any 
“claimant” or “proprietor” of the fisheries 
resources. 
Visscherij Ordonantie 
1920/396 
 To regulate traditional fishery rights 
and customary law. 
 Legal recognition of the customary law 
in coastal fisheries 
Kustvisserij Ordonantie 
1927/144 
 To regulate whaling exploration by 
prohibiting  catch whaling within 
three nautical miles of the coast.  
 Exceptions for traditional fishers 
who had engaged in whaling for 
generations.   
 The law adapted the principle of 
recognition of customary law on coastal 
fishery.  
  
Terrotoriale Zoen en 
Maritime Kringen 
Ordonantie 1939/442 
 Declares that territorial water existed 
three nautical miles seaward from 
the low watermark of each island. 
 Fishers had free access to catch fish 
within territorial waters. 
 Local communities strongly embrace 
common rules on inshore waters in front 
of their village, such as sasi in Maluku 
or seke in Sangihe Talaud, North 
Sulawesi 
Source: Yusran (2002); Putra (2003); and Satria (2006) 
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3.4.3 Post-independence (1945 – 1950) 
The post-independence period was the period of nationalisation and naturalisation 
of all the identified assets under the Dutch colonial administration. During that period, the 
newly independent Indonesian nation took over control of all coastal resource utilization 
and management (Putra 2003; Satria 2006; Yusran 2002). The philosophy was that 
government was the primary actor in ensuring the benefits from resource utilization and 
management were available to all Indonesian people. Central government had the 
responsibility and obligation to “plan, organize and control the utilization of natural 
resources” (Rudiyanto 2002:113). Stipulations in the Preamble and article 33 (3)37 of the 
1945 Constitution (Undang-undang Dasar 1945) confirmed this philosophy and intention.  
This centralistic approach was seen as a “fair [system to] distribute the wealth of 
the [coastal and] fishery to Indonesian people, as well as for the nation’ (Yusran 2002:116). 
A combination of a centralistic approach and strict control was seen as the most 
appropriate approach to realize this philosophy and for utilizing and managing the 
resources. Yusran (2002:116) has argued that the post-independence period was “the 
beginning of the centralized system of [coastal and] fisheries management” which 
remained strongly centralized until the end of the New Order government.  
The post-independence period was a period of struggle for national sovereignty, 
and coastal management was not a significant issue during this time. There were no coastal 
or marine related decrees or regulations passed during this period (Rudiyanto 2002).  
                                                     
37 Article 33 (3) of the 1945 Constitution states that “Land and water and natural resources therein should 
be controlled by the State and should be utilized for the utmost welfare of the Indonesian people”.   
  74
 
3.4.4 Old Order period (1950 – 1966) 
During the Old Order period, national sovereignty over coastal and marine waters 
was the major issue in coastal management. Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo established 
the Inter-departmental Committee on 17 October 1956 for preparing the Indonesian 
political and legal declaration on expanded territories and boundaries in marine waters. The 
most important outcome of this committee was a draft of the Law on Indonesian Territorial 
Waters and Marine Environment (Danusaputro 1980). Prime Minister Djuanda 
Kartawidjaja, who replaced Prime Minister Ali Sastroamidjojo, signed his name to the 
draft and declared it in 1957 as a political declaration, known as the Djuanda Declaration. 
This monumental and fundamental political affirmation expanded the old marine 
boundaries and territories (Danusaputro 1980). 
Three years later, parliament ratified the Djuanda Declaration and passed it as the 
Indonesian Marine Water Act (Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-undang Perairan 
No. 4/1960). This passage expanded Indonesian territory approximately two and a half 
times38 by declaring an extension to Indonesian territorial waters of 12 nautical miles from 
the baseline, thereby connecting the outermost points of all Indonesia’s islands.  
The Djuanda Declaration clearly states that the entire Indonesia archipelago and 
its water in between must be considered as a unitary entity. This declaration later became 
one of the pillars for the Archipelagic Principles (Wawasan Nusantara) (Djalal 2007). It 
became the foundation for the Indonesian diplomatic effort in recognizing Indonesia as an 
                                                     
38 Total Indonesian territory expanded from 2,027,087 square kilometres to 5,193,250 square kilometres 
(Rudiyanto 2002: 134).  
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archipelagic state39 and the expansion of the Indonesian Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 
at the third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (Gaynor 2007). 
The Old Order government also passed the Basic Agrarian Law (Undang-undang 
No. 5/1960)40 which recognized waters and fishery rights as agrarian domains (Saad 2000a, 
2000b, 2003). However, how these water and fishery rights were implemented remained 
unclear. The law contained little guidance on the rights and ownership over waters and 
fishery resources.  
The primary interest of the Old Order government in marine waters focussed on 
the efforts to assert territorial control over those waters, to regulate activities therein, and to 
create some kind of national political identification (Djalal 1995). Natural resources played 
only a minor role in establishing the new boundaries until the end of the Old Order in 
1966. The government had not recognised the significance of oil in these waters yet, and 
fisheries remained small-scale traditional operations. 
3.4.5 New Order period (1966 – 1999) 
Under the New Order government, marine and coastal resources, mainly in the 
form of oil and offshore mining exploration, became one of the biggest potential assets for 
development. Tangible economic benefits were the primary motives of the New Order 
government’s awareness of marine and coastal issues. A combination of high revenue and 
high risks from on-shore and offshore oil and gas exploration led the government to 
liberalize regulations, in order to attract foreign investment to stimulate economic 
production. 
                                                     
39The concept of archipelagic states was adopted in Part IV of United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS) Articles 46 – 54. 
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The New Order government applied production-sharing mechanisms41 in 
petroleum exploration and production, whereby foreign investment took on part of the 
responsibility for capital-supply, high risks and using advanced technology (Rudiyanto 
2002). As a consequence of this concept, oil and gas exploration in marine and coastal 
areas because massive and were dominated by petroleum exploration activities (Dahuri 
1992). Oil and gas exploration in marine and coastal areas accounted for 60 per cent of 
total petroleum exploration in Indonesia during this period (Rudiyanto 2002).  
Aside from economic benefits, management of marine and coastal areas under the 
New Order government was influenced by international and regional geopolitical situations 
(Putra 2003; Rudiyanto 2002; Saad 2003). Indonesia played an active role in the initiation 
and formulation of various international and regional conventions. National sovereignty 
and jurisdiction issues were reflected in Indonesian policy relating to international 
concerns, and in this regard, Indonesia ratified a number of international conventions 
(Table 12). However, these collective actions were also a reflection of “a single purpose, 
sector by sector approach to national marine and coastal policy “(Rudiyanto 2002:135).  
Table 12.  List of ratifications of international conventions or multilateral documents. 
No. Convention Ratified Main Provision or Related to 
1. UNCLOS (United Nation 
Convention Law of the Sea) 
1982 
Law 
5/1983 
Extending jurisdiction to the edge of EEZ from 12 to 200 
nautical miles from base line 
2 United Nation Convention on 
Biological Biodiversity 
Law 
5/1994 
Obligation to protect, conserve and sustainably use 
biological biodiversity 
3. RAMSAR Convention 1971 Keppres 
48/1991 
Wetland management and protection primarily for wetland 
areas used by migratory birds 
4. MARPOL Convention 
1973/78 
Keppres 
46/1986 
Safety and prevention of marine pollution from shipping 
and tankers on the sea 
Source: Putra (2003) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
40 The law regulates the rights of land ownership, the right of ownership (hak milik), the right of 
exploitation or leasehold (hak guna usaha); the right of building (hak guna bangunan); and the right of use 
(hak pakai) 
41 This concept is still in use in some oil and gas exploration endeavours. 
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One important policy of relevance to marine and coastal zone during the New 
Order period was Wawasan Nusantara42 (Archipelagic Principles) that was declared in 
1973. Wawasan Nusantara was one of the key doctrines of national development. This 
doctrine aimed to unite Indonesia as one political, social, cultural, economic, defence and 
security entity. The doctrine viewed marine waters as the connector for thousand of islands. 
The doctrine also made the state the distributor of benefits and revenues from extraction 
and exploration activities, which in many cases the state failed to fulfil. 
The centralistic approach, which undermined the plurality of local, traditional and 
informal existences, was the main cause of the failures. Most of the laws, regulations and 
their enforcement during the New Order government proved to be failures. Yusran (2002) 
argues that most government regulations on coastal and fishery resources under the New 
Order government (Table 13) were centralistic and showed the hegemonic approach of the 
central government. Most regulations aimed to gain maximum benefits for the nation and 
to make loan repayments to international donor agencies (Yusran 2002:118). The 
regulations did not address small-scale and traditional stakeholders’ interests and needs in 
extracting and utilizing coastal resources. Indeed, the regulations caused social conflicts 
and the marginalization of small-scale and traditional fishermen due to the unbalanced 
allocation of fishing resource rights and unhealthy competition for resource use (Satria and 
Matsuda 2004; Yusran 2002).  
 
 
                                                     
42 According to Anwar (2003:6) Wawasan Nusantara, or “Archipelagic Outlook” is “another key aspect 
of Indonesia’s foreign policy”. The root of this outlook is the efforts of Indonesia government to “win 
international recognition for the archipelagic principle, whereby the waters connecting the islands in 
archipelagic countries should be recognised as territorial waters, instead of being treated as international seas 
as had been the case in the past” (Anwar 2003).  
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Table 13.  List of coastal and fishery related regulations. 
No. Regulations Main Provision or Related to 
1. Ministry of Agriculture Decree No. 
561/Kpts/UM/11/1973 
Utilization of post-harvest fishery 
2 Ministry of Agriculture Decree No. 
01/Kpts/UM/1/1975 
Guidance for sustainable use of fishery resources 
3. Ministry of Agriculture Decree No. 
123/Kpts/UM/3/1975 
Determination of mesh size of purse seine for scad, 
mackerel, yellow strip, herring and other pelagic fish species 
4. Ministry of Agriculture Decree No. 
607/Kpts/UM/9/1976 
Type of fishing grounds 
5. Ministry of Agriculture Decree No. 
609/Kpts/UM/9/1976 
Fishing grounds for trawlers 
6.  Ministry of Agriculture Decree No. 
503/Kpts/UM/1980 
Step for removal of the trawl at the first stage 
7.  Presidential Decree No. 39/1980 Removal of trawl 
8.  Presidential Decree No. 85/1984 Use of fish traps 
9. Ordinance No. 9/1985 Indonesian fishery 
10.  Ministry of Agriculture Decree No. 
769/KPts/HK.210/10/1988 
Guidelines for the use of bottom gill nets 
Source: Yusran (2002).   
       
During the New Order period, many conflicts also arose from the mismanagement 
of the marine and coastal resources (Down to Earth 2000; Purwaka and Sunoto 1997). 
Conflicts occurred due to the absence of community property rights and the lack of 
acknowledgement of the linkages between rural communities’ needs and livelihood issues 
(Down to Earth 2000). Conflict existed because of competition among central government 
ministries that focussed on implementing only their own development sector, which in 
most cases contradicted each other.  
Each ministry set its own objectives, a variety of targets and operational plans for 
utilizing the coastal zone and maximizing coastal resource extraction. However, most of 
these actions were uncoordinated, overlapping and mismatched (Dahuri 1996; Purwaka 
and Sunoto 1997). For example, the specific target for fisheries to expand fish and prawn 
cultivation for an additional 355,000 hectares required mangrove land to be cleared for 
ponds and supporting facilities and access. The fisheries sector made its own projection, 
that 1,733,000 ha mangrove forests and other wetland areas could be converted into fish 
and prawn ponds in the future (Putra 2003). This specific target and the projection from the 
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fisheries sector failed to match the target of marine conservation, which required an 
additional 10 million hectares by 2003 (Table 14). The target of marine conservation then 
became too ambitious to achieve. This mismatch exemplified how most of these sectors 
locked common goals and objectives and locked any understanding of the concept of 
environmental sustainability.  
Table 14.  List of general objectives and specific targets of selected sectoral agencies 
relating to the coastal zone 
Sector Objectives Specific Targets 
Fishery To increase prawn and fish culture as well 
as fish capture in the EEZ, to increase 
fishery export 
To increase area of fish ponds and 
prawn pond (mariculture) by 
355,000 ha and boost foreign 
exchange earning by US$10 billion 
by 2003 
Agriculture To increase food crop production & 
maintain food self-sufficiency 
To produce rice, corn, soy, 
coconut, oil palm, rubber 
Tourism To develop tourist objects & resorts, 
improve tourist facilities, promote tourism 
To increase foreign tourism by 
US$15 billion by 2005 
Mining To explore and produce oil, gas, gold, tin & 
other minerals 
To produce 3.2 million barrels of oil 
per year 
Marine conservation To protect and conserve marine reserves, 
mangroves, coral reefs, and endangered 
species 
To conserve around 10 million ha 
of marine ecosystems by 2003 
Marine transportation To develop ports, boats, ships, improve 
service quality and shipping safety  
To develop ships & marine 
transportation facilities in eastern 
Indonesia 
Public works To develop shoreline protection To construct physical beach 
protection, manage irrigation 
systems, road development 
Urban Development To boost economic growth and generate 
local revenue. 
To develop infrastructure, public 
housing, water supply, and health 
services. 
Environment Sustainable use of coastal resources To control environmental impact 
and marine pollution, provision of 
environmental impact assessment 
(EIA) 
Industry and trade To develop basic industry, multi-industry, 
and strategic industry  
To promote marine tourism 
Agrarian To develop a land tenure system and foster 
land management 
To register land rights and land 
certification 
Defence and security To defend Indonesian sovereignty and 
jurisdiction 
To maintain security on the sea 
Government affairs To develop government systems  To promote autonomy and 
decentralization 
Finance  To manage fiscal and monetary policies To facilitate coastal development 
Source: Putra (2003: 83) 
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Meanwhile, local governments, which were supposed to be the prime movers of 
these development targets, did not have the clear authority to manage the coastal resources 
in their regions. Local policies and strategies were ambiguous and conflicting and there 
was little attempt at elaborating clear objectives. Local government also had limited direct 
revenue-raising mechanisms. Local government budgets for coastal management programs 
depended on allocations from the central government (Section 2.3.2).  This financial tie 
was also a mechanism used by the central government to keep regional areas under direct 
financial and political control. All the major areas of decision-making were either in the 
hands of central government or, to a far lesser extent, provincial government. Local 
government had almost no decision-making power. This situation continued with little 
change until the end of 2000 (Ferrazzi 1998).43 
The legal framework for local government with regard to CZM during the New 
Order period refers to two local government laws: the Basic Local Government Law No. 
5/1974 and the Village Government Law No 5 1979. The Local Government Law 
implicitly restricted local government jurisdiction only to the land area down to the low 
water mark. Since 1974, most local governments have not had a program for managing 
coastal resources, and they no longer manage their shipping ports or fishing ports, which 
are managed by the central government (Putra 2003; Rudiyanto 2002). Meanwhile, the 
Village Government Law, intended to make the rural governance system uniform and 
certain, actually led to the neglect of customary systems of resource governance (Siry 
2006).  
                                                     
43 One good example of the challenges of local governments in setting up their legal framework on 
managing coastal resources is the experience of North Sulawesi province to enact the local regulation on 
coastal and fisheries management. For more discussions see Dutton, I.M. (2005) If Only Fish Could Vote: the 
Enduring Challenges of Coastal and Marine Resources Management in Post-reformasi Indonesia, in B. 
Resosudarrno (Ed.) The Politics and Economics of Indonesia's Natural Resources, 'SEAS, Singapore, 162-
178. 
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There was no single specific law passed on CZM during the New Order period.  
The legacy of the New Order period on CZM regulations was 21 laws, four ratifications of 
international conventions, eight government regulations, and four presidential decrees 
(Appendices 3 and 4). Most of the regulations related to the CZM during the New Order 
period were identical in encouraging competition among development sectors; they are 
maintained less integrated notions, which led to legal ambiguities (Idris, Ginting, and 
Budiman 2007; Putra 2003; Rudiyanto 2002). Indeed, a lack of law enforcement was 
common, which led to ineffective management, conflict, redundancy and gaps among the 
development sectors. The combination of these factors led to an increase in conflicts of 
interest among different users and became a threat to Indonesia’s coastal zone. 
During the New Order period, CZM in Indonesia was only a small part of the 
national development plans (Rencana Pembangunan Lima Tahun/REPELITA). In the first 
long-term 25-year development plan (1969–1993), the main concern of the New Order 
regime was economic development, which was to be based on the intensive extraction of 
natural resources such as timber, oil, gas, gold and coal (Dahuri 1996; Dahuri and Dutton 
2000; Pratikto 2001; Rudiyanto 2002). The implementation of such a development plan led 
to large-scale detrimental environmental impacts, especially the biophysical degradation of 
marine and coastal regions in the heavily populated areas of Java and Sumatra (Dahuri 
1996).  
Starting in 1987, the national government began to consider the importance of 
coastal resources within both economic and political frameworks. A study funded by the 
Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) in 1987 estimated the contribution of 
coastal resources to the national economy. This study confirmed that more than 22 per cent 
of the Indonesian Gross Domestic Product (GDP) came from marine coastal resource 
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production, such as oil and gas, marine transportation, marine related industries, fisheries 
and marine tourism (BAPPENAS/CIDA, 1987).  
The results of the CIDA study triggered the National Development Planning 
Board (Bappenas) to take into account marine and coastal resources within the structure of 
long-term development policy. Dahuri and Dutton (2000) argued that the CIDA report 
encouraged policy makers to change their views so that for the first time, policy makers in 
Indonesia could declare that marine and coastal resource management should become a 
sub-sector in the sixth national development strategy (Repelita) for 1993-1998. The CIDA 
study stimulated a change in CZM policy at the national level and was a major milestone in 
CZM in Indonesia (Dahuri and Dutton 2000).  The change in CZM policy called for 
integrated CZM and the need to involve various stakeholders in coastal zones, including 
local governments.  
Several international donors through their CZM project initiatives specified the 
need to acknowledge an integrated CZM and emphasized the importance of local 
government involvement in CZM as part of their support packages (Idris and Siry, 1997). 
Total investment for coastal and marine management projects from 1987 to 1998 was 
approximately USD 400 million (Sofa 2000). The main donors were the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), the United Nations Development Programs (UNDP), the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank-IBRD, the 
Global Environmental Facilities (GEF) and the Australian Agency for International 
Development (AusAID). 
The ADB initiative through the Marine Resources Evaluation and Planning 
(MREP) and Segara Anakan Conservation and Development (SACD) Projects contributed 
to improved national policy. It did this by strengthening the capability and capacity of 
government institutions and developing a strategic plan for integrated coastal management. 
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The most recent ADB project whose focus is on marine and coastal management is the 
Marine and Coastal Resources Management Project (MCRMP), which was begun in 2002 
(ADB 2000).  
The UNDP initiative was based on the urgent need for a strategy and action plan 
to optimally manage the coastal resources of Riau using an issue-based approach. The 
USAID initiative provided a model for integrated coastal management from the local 
(village) level to the district and up to the provincial and national level through a “two 
track”44 approach. The World Bank and AusAID initiatives focused on institutional 
capacity to develop integrated coral reef management systems (Siry 2005).  
Most CZM initiatives and projects during the New Order period (during the mid- 
to late 1990s) were too advanced and ahead of their time in that they proposed to devolve 
the managing authority for the coastal zone to local governments. Such proposals were not 
in accord with the centralistic approach at the time with its uneven decentralization. 
Implementing CZM in an integrated and decentralized manner was not possible during the 
New Order period.  
Although some initiatives were carried out on an ad-hoc and piece-meal basis 
(Dahuri and Dutton 2000), the initiatives have positively influenced CZM policy in 
Indonesia. Decentralized CZM in Indonesia has benefited from the feedback, learning and 
the progressive accumulation of knowledge occasioned by both the successes and failures 
of these initiatives. 
                                                     
44 A two tracks approach consists of a local and national approach. The local track approach received 
outstanding and unparalleled support from provincial and local governments, research and community 
groups. For the national track approach, many of the activities emphasized developing the institutional 
awareness, understanding and capacity necessary to improve coastal resource governance and in defining 
governance options which are workable and sustainable. Considerable attention has been given to acquiring 
and sharing information of relevance with central government agencies and in encouraging links (both formal 
and informal) between government and non-government stakeholders in coastal resources to ensure that they 
have a common perception of issues and access to information relevant to addressing those issues.  
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3.4.6 Reformasi period (1999 – 2004) and post-reformasi period (2004 – present) 
Commencing in 2000, CZM in Indonesia entered a new phase. Fundamental 
changes to the Indonesian political situation, following the fall of the Soeharto regime in 
1998, led to improvements in the system of governance and in the administration of coastal 
resources. The enactment of the two new laws (Law 22/1999 and Law 25/1999) on 
administrative and fiscal decentralization provided opportunities for a shift in CZM (Patlis 
2005; Patlis et al. 2001). The establishment of the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries 
(MMAF) (Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan/Dep.KP) in 1999 proved the political will 
and innovation from the central government on marine, coastal and fisheries affairs. The 
establishment of MMAF has been the most significant move so far in national policy 
relating to the development of CZM (Dahuri and Dutton 2000; Dutton 2005). 
Law 22/1999, which was superseded by Law 32/2004, provided for administrative 
decentralization of CZM to provincial, district and municipality governments (Article 3 
and 9, Law 22/1999).45  Provincial governments have jurisdiction over the marine and 
coastal zone up to 12 nautical miles from the coastline. Local governments have the 
authority to manage over one third of the provincial management areas (up to four nautical 
                                                     
45 Law 22/199 was a part of the decentralization law package (Law 22/1999 on Regional Governance and 
Law 25/1999 on the Financial Balance between Central and Regional Government). These two laws were 
revised into Law 32 and 33/2004 that were concerned with the current political setting, such as direct election 
for local leaders (Bupati and City Mayor). There were no changes made to the titles of these two laws. 
However, articles concerning coastal issues in the previous law (Law 22/1999), Articles 3 and 9 were merged 
as a single article (Article 18). Article 18 of Law 32/2004 establishes a decentralized coastal zone, under 
provincial administration that extends up to 12 nautical miles from the coastal shoreline and over one-third of 
the provincial waters, seaward from the island shoreline, or 4 nautical miles from the coastal shoreline under 
district and municipality administration. Under this law, central government has authority and jurisdiction to 
explore, conserve, process and exploit the resources beyond the 12 nautical mile mark out to 200 nautical 
mile maritime areas, including the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). The central government also has the 
right in to enforce the laws and regulations of waterways. The law also clearly notes that traditional fishing 
rights are not restricted by this decentralized coastal zone delimitation. This means that traditional fisherman 
can access fishing grounds beyond the decentralized coastal zone. 
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miles in most cases). Provincial, district and municipality governments are also required to 
enforce the related regulations on CZM within their designated areas.  
In order to demarcate accurately administrative boundaries for provincial and 
local government management areas, the MMAF, in cooperation with the National Survey 
and Mapping Coordinating Board (Bakosurtanal) and the Navy's Hydrographic Service 
(Dishidros), have issued new guidelines and maps. The map was officially launched in 
2004 as the Territory Map of the Republic of Indonesia/Peta Batas Negara Kesatuan 
Republik Indonesia (Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan 2004) 
Law 32/2004 allowed local government to initiate and pass its locally-based 
regulations on CZM. Local government can adopt and integrate traditional and local 
values, norms and knowledge, as well as customary law and local property rights, into its 
local policy. Some provincial and local governments have already passed their CZM local 
regulation (Appendix 5). For example, the North Sulawesi provincial government enacted 
the Provincial Law (Perda) 4/2000 to manage the Bunaken Marine National Park and 
Manado Bay through the setting up of an integrated management coordination body. This 
Perda also administers the collection and distribution allocation of entrance fees from 
these two areas. The Perda stipulates that 80 per cent of the collected entrance fees are 
used exclusively for monitoring, managing and conservation activities, such as joint 
surveillance, enforcement and conservation programs within the Bunaken Marine National 
Park (Pratikto 2001).  
At the district level, the Minahasa District in North Sulawesi and the Bengkayang 
District in Wesr Kalimantan have issued their local regulations (Perda) on CZM. The 
Perda provide guidelines for development of village-based marine sanctuaries and for the 
empowerment of coastal communities. The Perda makes provision for local government 
revenue to finance the implementation of decentralized CZM (Crawford et al. 2003).   
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To implement the mandates of Law 32/2004, the central government issued the 
Government Regulation 38/2007 concerning the Division of Governmental Affairs 
between Central, Provincial and Local Government (Peraturan Pemerintah No. 38 Tahun 
2007 tentang Pembagian Urusan Pemerintah Antara Pemerintah, Pemerintahan Daerah 
Provinsi dan Pemerintahan Daerah Kabupaten/Kota or PP 38/2007)46. PP 38/2007 sets 
out 108 items of government responsibility on marine, coastal and fisheries47 that are 
divided into seven sub-divisions. These are marine and coastal affairs (30 items; Table 15); 
general affairs (13 items); capture fisheries (24 items); aquaculture (22 items); monitoring 
and surveillance (8 items); processing and marketing (8 items); and extension, training and 
education (3 items). However, this division still lacks clarity in terms of the technical 
aspects of these matters at each level of government (Appendix 6). It contains considerable 
repetition and an overlap of some items, such as zoning plans and land use arrangements. 
  
                                                     
46 This government regulation is an updated version of the Peraturan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia 
Nomor 25 Tahun 2000 Tentang Kewenangan Pemerintah Daerah dan Kewenangan Pemerintah Propinsi 
Sebagai Daerah Otonom (Central Government Regulation No. 25/2000 on the Authority of the District and 
the Provincial Government as the Autonomy Region). This PP also refers to the Peraturan Pemerintah 
Republik Indonesia Nomor 106 Tahun 2000 Tentang Pengelolaan dan Pertanggungjawaban Keuangan dalam 
Pelaksanaan Dekonsentrasi dan Tugas Pembantuan (Central Government Regulation No. 106/2000 
Concerning Financial Responsibility in the Implementation of Deconcentration and Coadministration) for 
government administration division. The PP 25/2000 is intended to provide detailed provision for 
government administration between the central, provincial and local governments (Brodjonegoro 2004). 
However as Brodjonegoro (2004:2-3) has noted the PP 25/2000 “fails to close the gap between the central 
government obligatory functions and the local government, and the inconsistency between functions for the 
central government and sectors of local governments [because] of a lack of political willingness on the 
central government side to manage and control the formation of new local governments”.  
47PP 38/2007 Appendix cc.: Urusan Kelautan dan Perikanan, Sub-Bidang Kelautan. 
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Table 15.  Division of marine and coastal affairs according to PP 38/2007 
Primary role/Authority areas/Sub-
division/Divisional item on marine, coastal 
and fisheries affairs 
Central Government Provincial 
Government 
Local Government 
Establishment 
policies, norms, 
standards, 
procedures and 
criteria 
Implement policies, 
norms, standards, 
procedures and 
criteria within 
provincial authority 
areas 
Implement policies, 
norms, standards, 
procedures and 
criteria within local 
authority areas 
Beyond 12 nautical 
miles (including EEZ) 
12 nautical miles  One third of 
provincial authority 
Marine affairs    
1. Coastal and fisheries resources    
2. Spatial planning and resource mapping    
3. Coastal zone and small island 
management 
   
4. Monitoring and law enforcement    
5. Integrated resource management  
including inter-
provincial areas 
 
including inter-
district/municipality 
areas 
 
6. Integrated permit system for resource 
extraction 
   
7. Coastal community empowerment    
8. Research, exploration survey on 
resources, technology development  
  
including to 
coordinate and 
harmonize 
 
including planning, 
system and 
mapping 
9. Management, utilization and protection 
of marine and coastal resources 
including shipwrecks  
  
including to 
implement 
monitoring 
 
including to 
implement 
coordination 
monitoring 
10. Management and conservation of 
marine and coastal resources 
  
including to establish 
policy and 
arrangement 
 
including to provide 
technical guidance 
in implementation 
11. Human resources and capacity building    
12. Coastal reclamation and mitigation of 
natural disasters in coastal zone and 
marine areas 
   
13. Maritime and authority boundaries  
including with 
neighboring 
countries 
 
including to 
coordinate national 
boundaries 
 
14. Ratification of international treaties    
15. Mapping of resources and potentiality    
16. Harmonization of laws and regulations 
on coastal zone 
   
17. Management assigned to authority 
areas 
   
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Primary role/Authority areas/Sub-
division/Divisional item on marine, coastal 
and fisheries affairs 
Central Government Provincial 
Government 
Local Government 
Establishment 
policies, norms, 
standards, 
procedures and 
criteria 
Implement policies, 
norms, standards, 
procedures and 
criteria within 
provincial authority 
areas 
Implement policies, 
norms, standards, 
procedures and 
criteria within local 
authority areas 
Beyond 12 nautical 
miles (including EEZ) 
12 nautical miles  One third of 
provincial authority 
18. Prevention of pollution and degradation 
of marine, coastal  and fisheries 
resources 
   
19. Rehabilitation and restoration of marine, 
coastal and fisheries resources 
   
20. Fisheries trading (allowable and 
excluded tradable fishes within 
Indonesian jurisdiction) 
   
21. Types of protected fish    
22. Mitigation of environmental damage in 
coastal zone and marine areas 
   
23. Maritime and marine environmental 
services 
   
24. Management and utilization of specific 
genetic plasma  
   
25. Exploration, exploitation, conservation 
and management of biodiversity in 
marine and inlands waters 
   
26. Zoning and spatial plan     
27. Management of conservation areas and 
rehabilitation resources 
   
28. Planning, utilization, monitoring and 
controll of spatial plan in coastal and 
marine areas 
   
29. Conservation management of fisheries 
and environmental resources 
   
30. Rehabilitation of coastal zone, small 
islands and marine resources  
   
Source: Government of Indonesia (2007) 
 
 
In order to follow up the mandate arrangements for decentralized CZM, the 
MMAF proposed the enactment of a Coastal Zone and Small Island Management Act 
(RUU Pesisir). Following a seven year preparation and discussion process, the RUU 
Pesisir finally was enacted in July 2007 as Law 27/2007 concerning Management of 
Coastal Zones and Small Islands (Undang-undang No 27 tahun 2007 tentang Pengelolaan 
Wilayah Pesisir dan Pulau-pulau Kecil/UU-PWPPK). The UU-PWPPK enactment was a 
major step forward in managing coastal resources and small islands in Indonesia. 
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Law 27/2007 recognizes the necessity for a framework for coordination, 
integration and consistency in decision-making as the basis for decentralized CZM. In 
order to achieve the goal of setting up such a framework, the law provides voluntary, 
incentive-based program mechanisms that encourage the implementation of decentralized 
CZM. The law also provides general provisions relating to administration and 
implementation, such as monitoring and evaluation, conflict resolution and funding (Idris, 
Ginting, and Budiman 2007).  
The Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries has passed six (6) Ministerial 
Regulations (Peraturan Menteri Kelautan dan Perikanan) to implement the technical 
regulations of the Law 27/2007 as follows:  
1. Ministerial Regulation Number 16/MEN/2008 on Coastal and Small Island 
Planning Management (Peraturan Menteri Kelautan dan Perikanan Nomor 
PER.16/MEN/2008 tentang Perencanaan Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan 
Pulau-pulau Kecil); 
2. Ministerial Regulation Number 17/MEN/2008 on Conservation Areas in 
Coastal and Small Island (Peraturan Menteri Kelautan dan Perikanan Nomor 
PER.17/MEN/2008 tentang Kawasan Konservasi di Wilayah Pesisir dan 
Pulau-pulau Kecil); 
3. Ministerial Regulation Number 18/MEN/2008 on Accreditation for Coastal 
and Small Island Planning Management Programmes (Peraturan Menteri 
Kelautan dan Perikanan Nomor PER.18/MEN/2008 tentang Akreditasi 
terhadap Program Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan Pulau-pulau Kecil); 
4. Ministerial Regulation Number 20/MEN/2008 on Utilization of Small Islands 
and Surrounding Water (Peraturan Menteri Kelautan dan Perikanan Nomor 
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PER.20/MEN/2008 tentang Pemanfaatan Pulau-pulau Kecil dan Perairan di 
Sekitarnya); 
5. Ministerial Regulation Number 08/MEN/2009 on Community Participation 
and Empowerment in Coastal and Small Island Planning Management 
(Peraturan Menteri Kelautan dan Perikanan Nomor PER.08/MEN/2009  
tentang Peran Serta dan Pemberdayaan Masyarakat dalam Pengelolaan 
Wilayah Pesisir dan Pulau-pulau Kecil); 
6. Ministerial Regulation Number 14/MEN/2009 on Sea Partnership (Peraturan 
Menteri Kelautan dan Perikanan Nomor PER.14/MEN/2009 tentang Mitra 
Bahari). 
Starting in 2004, MMAF through its Coral Reef Rehabilitation and Management 
Program Phase II (COREMAP II)48, promoted community-based marine sanctuaries and 
Marine Management Areas (MMAs) with two important mutual objectives: (i) to conserve 
biodiversity and (ii) to provide long-term economic benefit to coastal communities (Putra 
2006). MMAF also supported the establishment Fisheries Reserves (Suaka Perikanan) and 
Community-based Marine Sanctuaries (Daerah Perlindungan Laut/DPL)49. This strategy is 
a part of the COREMAP II target to establish 10 per cent of coral reef and related 
ecosystems as no-take-zones by 2010. In order to achieve this target, MMAF has applied a 
policy that coastal communities are the main promoters and players in the process of 
formulating and establishing management plan (Putra 2006) 
                                                     
48 COREMAP is Indonesia’s largest investment in coral reef management (Putra 2006). The project is a 
15 year program with support from the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the World Bank (WB), Global 
Environment Facility (GEF), and Australian Assistance (AusAid). COREMAP II Project (2004 – 2009) is 
continuing implementation of COREMAP I that was initiated in 1997 as a pilot program. There are three 
objectives of COREMAP II; (i) to ensure biodiversity conservation and sustainable management of coral 
reefs and related ecosystems, (ii) to strengthen the capacity of communities and local institutions to manage 
coral reef and related ecosystems, and (iii) to reduce the poverty of coastal communities.  
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3.5 Concluding remarks 
This chapter has examined and offered definitions of coastal zone, CZM, 
integrated CZM, CBM and co-management, particularly in the Indonesian context. It 
followed chapter illustrated the development of CZM policy in Indonesia, which 
importantly included a sectoral overlap with CZM by central ministries during the New 
Order period.  
The chapter also illustrated the current shifting political will on CZM, which is 
still in transition with the enactment of Law 27/2007. The law plays a strategic role in 
promoting decentralized CZM by providing for the devolution of authority and 
responsibility to manage the coastal zone and its resources to provincial and local 
governments. As a new policy shift, the policy of devolution and its implementation is 
challenging. Shifting from centralized to decentralized settings requires adjustment and 
rearrangement in many aspects of central–local relationships. Dynamic local socio-political 
contexts strongly influence these relationships. This is the focus of the next chapters’ 
analysis, which is illustrated in two cases studies in Konawe and Pangkep (Chapters 4 and 
5).  
                                                                                                                                                                 
49 By 2007, MMAF facilitated 60 Community-based Marine Sanctuaries (DPL) in 52 villages under 
COREMAP II Project (Ditjen KP3K DKP 2007).  
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4 KABUPATEN KONAWE 
 
This chapter presents a case study of Kabupaten Konawe and provides an analysis 
of the relationship between the dynamic local socio-political contexts and decentralized 
CZM implementation that led to a proliferation of administrative units (pemekaran) and 
the emergence of local elites to influence the local administration processes. The chapter is 
divided into eight sections. Section 4.1 introduces Kabupaten Konawe in general. Section 
4.2 provides geographic perspectives on Kabupaten Konawe. Section 4.3 describes the 
history of Konawe. Section 4.4 presents the demographic profile and ethnographic setting 
of Konawe. In Section 4.5, I analyse the administrative development and proliferation 
(pemekaran) processes of Konawe. In Section 4.6, I review the Konawe economy that 
concerns coastal areas, fisheries and other related economic activities. Section 4.7 
examines coastal and fisheries management in Konawe. The concluding section 4.8 
summarizes the key points of Chapter 4.  
4.1 Introduction  
Kabupaten Konawe (the new name for Kabupaten Kendari, 
hereafter called Konawe),50 one of ten districts in Southeast 
Sulawesi province, was named after the pre-colonial Tolaki 
chiefdom51. Unaaha, the capital of Konawe is about 75 kilometres 
from Kendari, the capital of Southeast Sulawesi. Administratively, 
                                                     
50 The legal basis for this name change is the Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) 26/2004 
concerning Changing Nomenclature Kabupaten Kendari to Kabupaten Konawe (Perubahan Nama 
Kabupaten Kendari menjadi Kabupaten Konawe), which refers to the Local Parliament Decree (Keputusan 
Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah) Kabupaten Kendari 37/2003. 
51 See Velthoen (2001) who discussed the name change in the context of the struggle between Tolaki and 
ToMekongga. 
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there are 30 sub-districts (kecamatan), that are divided into 45 kelurahan and 359 villages 
(desa) (Appendix 7) (BPS Sultra 2007).  
At the time of my fieldwork the area of Konawe was 11,669.91 square kilometres 
or about 42.43 per cent52 of the total area of Southeast Sulawesi province (BPS Sultra 
2007). Konawe had 495 kilometres of coastline and 2,592 square kilometres of coastal and 
marine area. There are seven coastal kecamatan53 with 84 coastal villages (Pemda 
Kabupaten Konawe 2005a). Current Konawe administration areas consist of 22 islands,54 
only nine of which are inhabited (BPS Sultra 2007).   
4.2 Geographic and Climatic Setting 
Konawe is located between longitudes 121o 15’ to 123 o 30’East and latitudes 2 o 
45’ to 4 o 15’  South (Figure 12) (BPS Sultra 2007). Konawe district shares administrative 
boundaries with Central and South Sulawesi Provinces to the north, with Tiworo Strait, 
Kabupaten Muna and Buton to the south, the Banda and the Maluku Seas to the east and 
with Kabupaten Kolaka to the west (BPS Sultra 2007).  
There are two seasons in Konawe, the dry season from May to October and the 
rainy season from November to April. Humidity in Konawe is relatively high (averaging 
85%). The average rainfall, in the range of 1,500 to 1,900 millimetres annually, is 
distributed evenly throughout most of the district. However, the pattern can vary and in 
2002, rainfall in Konawe was 2,173 millimetres with 150 rainy days. The average 
                                                     
52 This data was gathered from the presentation of the Head of Regional Planning and Development 
Agency (Bappeda) Konawe at the National workshop on Marine and Coastal Management on 2 February 
2005 in Jakarta. The area of Konawe is now 10,404.62 square kilometres, after the establishment of 
Kabupaten Konawe Selatan which takes in some former parts of Konawe. The new coastal line 415 
kilometres long and takes in marine areas of 2,592 square kilometres. Konawe still has 22 islands. 
53 Kecamatan Wawonii Timur, Wawonii Selatan, Wawonii Barat, Soropia, Bondoala, Sawa and Lasolo. 
54 The largest inhabited islands are Pulau Wawonii, Karama, Bokori, Saponda Laut, Campada, Labengki, 
Bawulu, Saponda Darat and Hari (BPS Sultra 2007). 
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temperature is 27º Celcius with temperatures range of 21º - 31º Celcius (BPS Konawe 
2006). 
 
Figure 12.  Map of Kabupaten Konawe, Southeast Sulawesi.  
 
Landscapes in Konawe are generally suitable for most agriculture activities (BPS 
Kendari 2003). Nearly 80 per cent of the land is less than 500 metres above sea level, and 
most land ranges between 25 – 100 meters (31.62% of the total land mass) and 100 – 500 
meters (39.98%) above sea level. Land types in Konawe are latosol (23.35%), padzolitic 
(28.15%) and mixed textures (35.39%) (BPS Kendari 2003). Alluvial and organosol 
respectively account for only 4.8 per cent and 4.71 per cent of land. 
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4.3 Historical Perspective 
Konawe was formerly part of the former kingdom of Konawe. A history of this 
kingdom was published as the History of National Awakening in Southeast Sulawesi 
(Sejarah Kebangkitan Nasional Daerah Sulawesi Tenggara) (Proyek Penelitian dan 
Pencatatan Kebudayaan Daerah 1979).55 For Konawe’s current local government, the 
symbols and legacy of the Konawe kingdom are being used for different political reasons. 
Understanding something of the historical background of Konawe will be of benefit in 
analysing local government patterns in Konawe and its challenges in implementing good 
governance.  
Konawe mythology states that at the beginning of humankind Sangia Ndudu56 
came down to earth accompanied by To Lahianga. These two mythic figures formed the 
Kingdom of Konawe, and later divided the kingdom into three autonomous empires 
(Padangguni, Wawosela and Besilutu). Each empire had a Mokole (Ruler). This situation 
continued until Mokole Padangguni and To Tongano Wanua57 rejoined the three empires. 
In that period a reincarnation of Sangia Ndudu, by the name of Weikola, was believed to 
have been sent to Konawe to join up the Kingdom once again. According to local folklore, 
Weikola came from Kediri, East Java, and she was associated with the Luwu Kingdom. 
Weikola married Ramandalangi, son of To Tongano Wanua, and became Mokole More I 
Konawe (Royal Queen of Konawe). This moment symbolizes the rebirth of the Kingdom 
of Konawe. 
                                                     
55 This report contains a concise history of Southeast Sulawesi including a history of Konawe and other 
former kingdoms in Southeast Sulawesi such as Buton, Muna, Mekongga and Lauwui. 
56 Literally,  Sangia means God and Ndudu means down to earth. 
57 Literally, To means man, Tonggano means middle and Wonua refers to state. 
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In the 16th century, Mokole Melamba became King of Konawe. He was a brother 
of Halu Oleo, the first Sultan of Buton. Under Mokole Melamba rule, the Kingdom of 
Konawe reached its golden period, and most of the current mainland of Southeast Sulawesi 
came under Konawe control, except for Mekongga near Kolaka. In the mid 17th century, 
King Tebawo of Konawe, successor of the late Sangia Inato, restructured the government 
system and made it more decentralized. He divided the Konawe territory into four 
autonomous areas (Siwole Mbatohuu), appointed a cabinet (Pitu Dulabatu), established the 
Crown Prince’s governing area (Inea Sinumo Wuta Mbinosito) and established a special 
area called Andoolo. There was also a government agency that dealt with naval security 
(Kapitalau/Naval Security Chief).  
 Konawe Kingdom in the 17th century consisted of 30 Tobu, each Tobu headed by 
a Puu Tobu. At the lowest level of governance structure, there were 300 smaller 
government units governed by Toono Motuo or Elders (Figure 13).  
This restructured government system later disintegrated because of a lack of 
control and poor leadership. Indeed, the Dutch colonial government maintained an 
effective policy to force the division of states into small units and this made them easy to 
subdue and occupy. Velthoen (2001:7) has stated that “[a]round 1830 and in 1903 the 
polity of Konawe was no more than a loose federation of smaller units each ruled by 
aristocrats”. The death of Lakidende, the last ruler of Konawe elected by the Royal 
Council58 at the end of the 18th century, led to a leadership vacuum in Konawe, since the 
Royal Council was unable to appoint a new king. When the Konawe Kingdom weakened, 
the Dutch administration found it easy to expand its power and influence into Konawe. 
                                                     
58 The Royal Council consisted of four leaders of Siwole Mbatohu, seven cabinet Pitu Dalu Batu 
members,  30 Puu Tobu, and 300 Toono Motuo. The council was chaired by Sulemandara. 
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Figure 13.  Structure of Kingdom of Konawe in 17th century.  
Source: (Proyek Penelitian dan Pencatatan Kebudayaan Daerah 1978) 
 
During the Dutch period Konawe was a minor kingdom compared to the powerful 
Sultanates of Buton and Muna. Its geographic location, situated in a remote area and away 
from the main waterways, was the main reason that the Dutch neglected Konawe. At this 
time, Konawe became separated into small autonomous units. One of the units was Laiwui, 
which became the strongest unit with privileged access to external trade and arms. Laiwui 
overtook Konawe in influence by the beginning of 19th century and Laiwui governed its 
kingdom by separating government administration based on geographic boundaries. Thus, 
Queen Maho of Laiwui appointed a Sulemandara (Prime Minister) to administer 
Pondidaha, one of the Kingdom’s remoter areas.  
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During the same period, the Dutch appointed Assistant Resident Vosmaer, based 
in Kendari, to prevent Kendari Bay from being attacked by sea pirates and to ensure 
security for colonial trading ships in the east. Appointing a Dutch administrator in Kendari 
also led to a massive migration of people from Muna and other coastal islands of Southeast 
Sulawesi to Kendari Bay (Velthoen 2001). The stability and security of Dutch control were 
responsible for the region becoming a centre for inter-island commerce. To protect its 
interests, the Dutch government forced King La Mangu59 of Laiwui to sign the Long 
Contract (Perjanjian Panjang) on 13 April 1858, which forced Laiwui to accept the Dutch 
administration. This contract became the first treaty to be signed between the local 
kingdoms and the colonial regime in Southeast Sulawesi.60  
Dutch occupation during the early 20th century discouraged the formation of local 
states and changed the internal structure of the traditional kingdoms. The Dutch appointed 
district and onderdistrict officers to govern Southeast Sulawesi. Later on, this system was 
upgraded to the Afdeling system. The current areas of Konawe became part of Afdeling 
Buton en Laiwui, which was formed to bring together the areas of the Sultanate of Buton 
(including Muna) and the Laiwui Kingdom.  
During World War II (1942-1945), the Japanese forces occupied and ruled the 
current areas of Konawe. A military governor was based in Kendari and the Japanese 
created a single administrative unit combining the Kolaka, Luwu, and Mekongga areas, 
including the current areas of Konawe. People lived in fear of the brutality of the Japanese 
                                                     
59 La Mangu was the son of Queen Mahon and King La Sambawa, the late first royal couple of the 
Kingdom of Laiwui. 
60 Sultan of Buton signed a similar treaty on 13 April 1860, and the Sultan of Luwu on 16 September 
1861. 
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occupying forces. They were forced to be miners and romusha (forced labourers),61 at 
nickel mines in Pomalaa and in the asphalt pits of Buton.  
The Japanese occupiers also controlled the crop harvests. The military applied the 
catuh system that forced an unequal distribution of the harvest. The military took most of 
the harvest and left only a small portion for the people. There was no serious local 
resistance to the Japanese forces except for the attacks on the Gunco (District Head) led by 
La Ode Maniru and La Ode Abdulu in Wanci. Japanese forces executed both men. The 
Japanese cut off the current areas of Konawe from the outside world. This period was one 
of extreme hardship for all the people.  
After independence, the current areas of Konawe came under the jurisdiction of 
transitional governments. Between 1945 and 1950, the current areas of Konawe were part 
of the State of Eastern Indonesia (Negara Indonesia Timur/NIT). When this was disbanded 
along with the South Sulawesi government (Hadat Tinggi), Konawe became part of 
Daerah Sulawesi Tenggara, a sub-grouping from the old Afdeling Buton en Laiwui areas 
with the exception of North Kolaka. Daerah Sulawesi Tenggara was part of the Province of 
South and Southeast Sulawesi. In 1960, following the enactment of Government 
Regulation (PP) 29/1959, Daerah Sulawesi Tenggara was divided into four kabupaten 
(Kendari, Kolaka, Buton and Muna). Four years later, the central government declared 
Southeast Sulawesi as a province with the four kabupaten under its administration. 
Konawe also experienced a tightening of control over its politics with the formation of a 
highly centralized administration when Law 5/1974, was passed defining the regional 
government structure. This was followed by Law 5/1979, which decreed that all village 
                                                     
61 Romusha worked under poor condition and were treated as slaves, without food and on rests. Most of 
them died from starvation and disease. 
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governments had to be redesigned to follow a ruling that did not accommodate traditional 
(adat) institutions (Siry 2005).  
The New Order period (1966 – 1998) was characterised by a highly centralized 
government and the dominance of party majority. The Golongan Karya (Golkar Party) has 
been the dominant political party in both previous and present Kendari and Konawe 
governments. About 60 per cent of Konawe members of parliament are Golkar cadres 
(BPS Kendari 2003) and in the 1997 election, Golkar obtained 98.8 percent of the votes: 
this trend continued for the five elections under the New Order regime (Simanungkalit, 
Nainggolan, and Santoso 2004). In the Post-reformasi period, Golkar continues to be the 
majority party in the local parliamentary elections although there was a reduction in votes 
in the 1999 election. Golkar received 68.7 per cent of votes in the 1999 general election 
(Simanungkalit, Nainggolan, and Santoso 2004). This situation is very similar across 
Southeast Sulawesi province.  
In the 2004 election, Golkar popularity dropped to 36.67 per cent (BPS Kendari 
2003). However, Golkar still won 11 of the 30 seats in the local parliament (DPRD). The 
existence of new parties such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (The Justice and Welfare 
Party), Partai Amanat Nasional (The National Mandate Party) and Partai Bulan Bintang 
(The Crescent and Star Party) contributed significantly to the reduction in Golkar's voting 
majority, but Golkar remains the biggest single party in the region. This has allowed them 
to establish their own faction in the DPRD without forming a coalition with other minor 
parties.   
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4.4 Demographic profile and ethnographic setting 
The population of Konawe in 2005 was 263,189 people with 62,876 households 
and a population density of 22.6 people per square kilometre (BPS Konawe 2006). 
Konawe population figures changed significantly in 2005 as a result of the pemekaran 
process whereby districts and subdistricts were merged or separated. Several heavily 
populated kecamatan were previously under Konawe administration but now are under 
Konawe Selatan administration. In 2002, before the split of Konawe Selatan, the 
population in Konawe was 469,767 people with a population density of 29 people per 
square kilometre (BPS Kendari 2003). The kecamatan with the highest population density 
in 2005 were Wawotobi and Unaaha, while those with the lowest density were new 
kecamatan such as Latoma, Langgikima, Wiwirano and Routa (BPS Konawe 2006).  
The annual population growth rate in Konawe for the decade 1993-2002 was 2.67 
per cent (BPS Kendari 2003). Successful family planning programs have contributed to the 
reduced population growth. The highest population growth in Konawe occurred during an 
intensive transmigration phase at the beginning of the 1970s. This program contributed to 
increasing population growth for the two decades 1970–1990 (BPS Kendari 2003) when 
the current area of Konawe was the main focus of the transmigration program from Java 
and Bali into Southeast Sulawesi.62   
The Tolaki people are the main ethnic group in Konawe and they account for 
almost two thirds of the total population (BPS Kendari 2003). The Tolaki are also the main 
ethnic group in the central and eastern part of the south-eastern Sulawesi peninsula 
(Tarimana 1989; Velthoen 2001). There are a number of sub-groups of Tolaki, such as the 
Bingkokak (Joshua Project 1999), and the Tolaki language and dialects are spread right 
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across the region. The other ethnic groups in Konawe are Jawa (21 %), Bugis (17.16 %), 
Bali (6.49 %), and Bajo (2.96 %) (BPS Kendari 2003). Members of ethnic groups from 
Muna, Buton and Madura are in the minority in Konawe and they account for only 2.37 per 
cent, 2.02 per cent and 0.14 per cent, respectively, of the total population. Other ethnic 
groups in Konawe in 2002 totalled 48,881 people or 14.33 percent of the population; this 
was comprised of representatives from most of eastern Indonesia’s myriad ethno-linguistic 
groups.  
Ethnic conflict in Konawe is rare63, and any conflict that has occurred has been 
caused by economic disparities and land disputes between local groups (Tolaki) and 
migrants (Kasim and Taewa 2003). Other factors contributing to the ethnic conflict in 
Konawe are the politicisation of the local bureaucracy and socio-cultural differences such 
as appointment particular ethnic group to fullfill upper echelon (Kasim and Taewa 2003). 
The first two factors, economic disparities and land disputes, are attributed by migrants to 
the lack of work ethos and cultural values of the Tolaki people (Moita, Sabarudin, and 
Tawulo 2002). Meanwhile, as Syahrir and Iskandar (2003) reported, migrants have more 
endurance and are committed to hard work: their economic conditions are relatively better 
than local groups. However, Tolaki people are the dominant ethnic group in the local 
bureaucracy, which remains a big issue after reformasi and has led to downplaying ethnic-
based awakenings (Eko 2008).        
The Bajo are the dominant ethnic group in almost all coastal kecamatan in 
Konawe. Bajo people are mostly concentrated on the islands of Konawe and along the 
coast of Wawonii Island. They make up practically 100 per cent of the total population in 
                                                                                                                                                                 
62 During 1985-1995, 59,000 formal transmigrants were relocated to Southeast Sulawesi (BPS Sultra 
1996). 
63 One of major ethnic conflicts in Konawe occurred on 16 February 2002 when 500 Tolaki people from 
five villages attacked migrants and burned at least three migrants’ houses (Kasim and Taewa 2003).  
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the villages of Bajo Indah and Saponda in kecamatan Soropia and Langgara Laut on 
Wawonii Island (Mead and Lee 2007). They also make up the highest percentage of the 
population (more than 75 %) in the villages of Mekar and Bokori in kecamatan Soropia 
(Mead and Lee 2007).  
Tolaki coastal groups are mainly distributed along the coastal villages close to 
Kendari, such as Toli-toli village. A distinction can be made between Tolaki and Bugis or 
Bajo people in coastal areas on the basis of their different ways of life. Tolaki are likely to 
treat coastal resources more casually; they tend to fish in the morning and return in the 
afternoon (Informant C-Gen-Kon, 2005). This reflects the nature of their fishing gear and 
vessels, which are designed for short periods of fishing. My informants agreed that Tolaki 
people treat coastal resources more casually than Bugis or Bajo people who are a more 
enterprising group using expanded, advanced fishing gear, methods, and tend to fish for 
longer periods.  
More than half of the Konawe population lives below the poverty line 
(Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan 2007). The proportion of poor communities is 
greater in coastal areas. Unskilled and poorly educated people constitute the dominant 
profiles in Konawe coastal areas. Figures on education level reached for Konawe coastal 
communities show that half the people have only primary education, with only a small 
proportion attaining higher education (Bappeda Konawe and FT Universitas Lakidende 
2004).  
Islam is the major religion of the Konawe people. About 93 per cent of the 
population follow the Sunni tradition of Shafii scholarship (mazhab) (BPS Konawe 2006). 
The Christian Protestant population is very small, accounting for only 1.6 per cent, and 
Catholics form 0.5 per cent. Large sections of Balinese voluntary transmigrants in Konawe 
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are adherents of the Hindu religion, and they comprise 4.6 per cent of the Konawe 
population.   
Islam was introduced into Konawe through the Kingdom of Buton and it became 
the state religion of Buton in the 17th century. By the end of the 18th century large parts of 
Konawe, Wawonii and Tinnagea were known as centres of Islamic education (Proyek 
Penelitian dan Pencatatan Kebudayaan Daerah 1978). Islam reached Konawe’s more 
remote areas towards the end of the 19th century. However, Veltoen (2001:7) has suggested 
a different pattern of religious development in Konawe when she stated that: 
Formal ties between the Tolaki aristocracy and the Bugis kingdom of Bone 
resulted in the introduction of Islam, but its influence remained very limited 
until the 1920s and 1930s when Islamic religious teachers started to proselytise 
in the interior, often supported by the local aristocracy. 
 
4.5 Administrative developments 
In Konawe administrative developments, administrative proliferation or 
pemekaran wilayah (literally ‘blooming of districts’) have been the key feature in local 
socio-political contexts and interaction among local stakeholders. Pemekaran wilayah 
(hereafter called pemekaran) is a process of administrative proliferation whereby new 
administrative units are created by dividing existing ones. In many ways, the pemekaran 
process contains untold stories that need further investigation to obtain a detailed view of 
the pemekaran. In order to gain in-depth insights and discourses on the pemekaran process 
in Konawe, this study used semi-structure interviews with several key informants who 
could present and provide updated data and information on the ‘behind the scenes’ reasons 
for pemekaran in Konawe.    
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Pemekaran in Konawe has influenced the implementation of decentralized CZM. 
One immediate effect is the reduction in coastal area, which requires a refocus of programs 
and the scope of their activities. Konawe has been divided three times for the purposes of 
pemekaran. First, in 1996 Kabupaten Kendari was divided into Kabupaten Kendari and 
Kotamadya (now Kota) Kendari64 with the enactment of Law 6/1995 concerning the 
establishment of Kotamadya Kendari. This first pemekaran reduced the area of Kabupaten 
Kendari by 1.8 per cent (295.89 square kilometres). Urban growth in Kota Kendari then 
absorbed some parts of Kabupaten Konawe.  
In 2003, Kabupaten Kendari was subdivided into Kabupaten Konawe and 
Kabupaten Konawe Selatan following the passage of Law 4/2003.65 The new kabupaten 
was a combination of 11 kecamatan and resulted in a loss of almost one-third (4,514.20 
square kilometres) of the Konawe administrative area. This pemekaran also placed Rawa 
Aopa Watumohai (RAW),66 the largest tropical swamp in Sulawesi (Astuti 2001a), located 
in Kecamatan Tinanggea, under the control of Kabupaten Konawe Selatan.  
Finally, four years later in 2007, Kabupaten Konawe Utara was formed through 
the next pemekaran process with the enactment of Law 13/2007. Again, this latest 
                                                     
64 Law 13/1964 confirmed Kota Kendari as the capital of Southeast Sulawesi province. At that time, the 
Kota Kendari area covered two kecamatan, Kendari and Mandonga, with total areas 75.76 square kilometres. 
Then in 1978, the status of Kendari was upgraded into Kota Administratif according to Government 
Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) 19/1978, with additional kecamatan, Poasia. Kendari’s status was 
elevated into Kota Madya Daerah Tingkat II Kendari by the enactment of Law 6/1995 with the total area 
increased to 295.89 square kilometres. 
65 Law 4/2003 concerning the Establishment of Kabupaten Konawe Selatan, Southeast Sulawesi 
(Undang-undang No 4/2003 tentang Pembentukan Kabupaten Konawe Selatan di Provinsi Sulawesi 
Tenggara). This law was followed up by Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah/PP) 26/2004 on 28 
September 2004. 
66 Rawa Aopa Watumohai (RAW) is about 120 kilometres from Kendari and covers an area of 105,000 
hectares including the swampy area Aopa and the mountain Gunung Watumoha. RAW biodiversity is 
perhaps the second richest in the world after Madagascar, Africa (Astuti 2001a). In 1990, RAW was 
established as a national park, becoming Sulawesi's fourth national park (Colijn 2005). The key ecosystems 
in RAW are savanna with palm trees, alang-alang, mangrove swamp forest, hilly terrain covered by tropical 
rainforest. The swamp land Rawa Aopa serves as an important habitat for water-birds, which can be watched 
from Pulau Harapan, a small island with a hut for bird-watchers in the middle of the swamp (Colijn 2005). 
  106
 
pemekaran significantly reduced the area of several coastal kecamatan such as Lasolo and 
Tapunggaya that have important marine resources (Informant D-Gov-Kon, 2007).  
Because of patterns of ethnic grouping, the pemekaran process can also be seen as 
a statement of local ethnic awareness. Pemekaran remains an ongoing discussion within 
Konawe political circles. The ongoing discussion is about establishing a new separate 
administrative unit on Wawonii Island. Regrouping five new coastal kecamatan as the 
outcome of the pemekaran process of previous kecamatan Wawonii will allow for 
establishing a new kabupaten. There is now a move to combine five kecamatans on 
Wawonii Island into a new kabupaten to be called Kabupaten Wawonii (Informant C-Gov-
Kon, 2005). If this occurs, it will significantly reduce the coastal areas within Konawe 
district.  
Pemekaran is also a process occurring at the kecamatan and village levels. In 
2001, Kabupaten Kendari established four new kecamatan. Andoloo was created from 
kecamatan Tinanggea, Laonti from Maromo, Anggata from Lambuya, and Sawa from 
Lasolo67. Three of them (Andoloo, Laonti and Anggata) together with Tinanggea and 
Maromo now come under the administration of Kabupaten Konawe Selatan. Andoloo is 
also proposed as the future capital of Kabupaten Konawe Selatan. In 2004, the number of 
kecamatan in Konawe increased by one third as part of continuing pemekaran68 
developments at the kecamatan level (Figure 14). These dynamic changes within the local 
administration are expected to continue. 
                                                     
67 Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Kendari Nomor 15 tahun 2002 tentang Pembentukan Enam Kecamatan 
dalam Wilayah Kabupaten Kendari (Lembaran Daerah Kabupaten Kendari Tahun 2002 Nomor 17).  
68 Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Kendari Nomor 06 tahun 2005 tentang Pembentukan Kecamatan 
Anggaberi, Meluhu, Amonggedo, Lembo, Molawe, Langikimma, Routa dan Kecamatan Wawonii Tengah 
Kabupaten Kendari (Lembaran Daerah Kabupaten Kendari Tahun 2005 Seri D Nomor  06) 
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1959-1996, Kabupaten Kendari was formed which 
includes Kendari as capital of SE Sulawesi. There 
were kecamatan, kelurahan/desa and one Kota 
Administratif Kendari 
1996, Kabupaten Kendari split into Kabupaten 
Kendari and Kota Kendari with 19 kecamatan and 334 
kelurahan/desa.  
  
2004, Kabupaten Kendari change its name into 
Konawe and divided some areas as Kabupaten 
Konawe Selatan. Number of kecamatan in Konawe 
23 and kelurahan/desa 631.  
2007, northern part of Kabupaten Konawe became 
new administrative units, Kabupaten Konawe Utara. 
Number of kecamatan in Konawe increased to 30 
with 405 kelurahan/desa. 
 
Figure 14.  Pemekaran and changes in administrative units in Konawe.  
 
The legal basis for the pemekaran process was Government Decree 129/2000 that 
provided easy, simply-applied parameters for the administrative regrouping process 
(Ratnawati 2006b). The decree only required that three administrative units be grouped to 
form a new unit (Government of Indonesia 1999a). This parameter was then revised so that 
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at least five districts or cities were needed to be regrouped to form a province, or at least 
five sub-districts (kecamatan) were needed to form a new district. Four kecamatan were 
needed to establish a city as clearly stated at Article 5.5 Law 32/2004.  
Previously, during the New Order government, the pemekaran process at the 
kabupaten level was rare and could only be considered based on population numbers. Only 
three new kabupaten were established up to 1996 and these were all in Lampung Province 
in Sumatera (Fitrani, Hofman, and Kaiser 2005). However, during the first ten years of the 
post-reformasi period there have been 173 new administrative units formed. This includes 
seven new provinces, 135 new kabupaten and 31 new kota (GATRA 2008). In a study 
undertaken by the Ministry of Home Affairs, almost 80 per cent of 148 new kabupaten and 
kota failed to meet requirements especially in terms of a self-financing system to run local 
government and perform public services (GATRA 2008). 
Another study by the MoHA of 65 kabupaten and kota indicated that 87 per cent 
of new pemekaran units had not finished their basic financial, personnel, infrastructure and 
documentation arrangements (pembiayaan, personil, peralatan termasuk 
dokumennya/P3D) (GATRA 2008). Therefore, Ryas Rasyid, the former Minister for 
Regional Autonomy, in 2008 suggested stopping the pemekaran process nationally and 
conducting an evaluation of the process in action as well as determining new parameters 
that are more stringent (GATRA 2008). However, the pemekaran processes continue.  
Despite the ideal of pemekaran being to expand lower level administration and 
bring government services closer to the rural communities, the largely negative view of 
pemekaran remains an outstanding issue (TEMPO Interaktif 2006c). Informant K-Exp-Kdi 
(2005) stated that pemekaran in Konawe and in Southeast Sulawesi in general is “far from 
the aim to provide closer government services to the community and to make an effective 
bureaucratic system”. Indeed, he stated that: 
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“much of [pemekaran efforts in Konawe] can be seen as part of tricky ways to 
accommodate the political loser in a local election or a local parliament 
member who has ambitions to be a Bupati or Camat and push his own agenda 
to control local bureaucrats and take advantages for personal gain.”69 
The pemekaran process in Konawe has been a legally acceptable way to combine 
bureaucratic and political rent seeking70. In many cases, if not all, staffing of the 
bureaucracy is highly politicized, lacks appropriate capacity and exhibits poor forward 
planning. New administrative entities, new kabupaten or kecamatan require competent 
bureaucrats to fill management and administrative positions, however, qualified personnel 
to fill these positions are scarce. In fact, the establishment of new administrative units 
creates opportunities for local bureaucrats and politicians to install their own associates and 
candidates and impose personal agendas (Fitrani, Hofman, and Kaiser 2005).  
The problem of ‘putting the wrong man in the wrong position’ is a common 
feature of the pemekaran process. The additional fiscal revenue required for new 
administration units leads to further conflicts of interest. The principal conflicts arise when 
those who can benefit from putting their own candidates in new administration units, do so, 
allowing them to gain access to new positions at higher levels. Motives for this political 
movement include gaining access to lucrative resources through new construction projects, 
appointing members of their extended family, associates or colleagues as new civil 
servants, and the wish to support the agendas of a local political party (Fitrani, Hofman, 
and Kaiser 2005).  
                                                     
69 Interview on 16 October 2005. 
70 As Fitrani et al. (2005) proposed, there are four motives of pemekaran: (i) administrative dispersion 
due to large jurisdictions areas, (ii) preference for homogeneity in terms of ethnicity, language, religion, 
urban–rural character or even income level, (iii) fiscal spoils through incentive for splitting and (iv) 
bureaucratic and political rent-seeking. Pemekaran can be a combination of two or more motives. 
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Appointing a caretaker Bupati (pejabat sementara Bupati) and creating upper 
echelon positions in new pemekaran areas in many cases also exposes hidden agendas and 
conflicts of interest71. For example, the acting Southeast Sulawesi Governor, Yusran A 
Silondae, proposed to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) that his uncle, Djafar 
Silondae, be appointed acting Bupati of Kabupaten Konawe Utara (Sinar Harapan 2007; 
Harian Umum PELITA 2007). In doing so, Yusran ignored three candidates proposed by 
the Bupati of Konawe and the Speaker of the Konawe House of Representatives (DPRD 
Konawe) (Sinar Harapan 2007).  
The proposal of Konawe District included Aswad Sulaiman (Local 
Secretary/Sekda of Konawe), Ridaman Abunawas (Head of Local Revenue Office/Kadis 
Pendapatan Konawe) and Nur Sinapoy (Head of Konawe Employment and Transmigration 
Services/Kadisnakertrans)72 (Harian Umum PELITA 2007). Yusran then changed the 
Konawe proposal by recommending Djafar Silondae (his uncle and Head of Kendari 
Municipality Environmental Impact Agency) and Thamrin Pattoro (a senior bureaucrat at 
the Southeast Sulawesi Provincial Secretariat) to the Ministry of Home Affairs (MoHA) 
without consultation with the Konawe government (Koran Tempo 2007).  
Yusran’s political manoeuvre was strongly criticised by the Bupati of Konawe 
who stated that Yusran had flouted government ethics (Koran Tempo 2007). His 
manoeuvre also led to protests from the Forum Solidaritas Masyarakat Konawe (FSMK) 
(Sinar Harapan 2007) that demanded Yusran retract the letter of appointment from the 
MoHA.   
                                                     
71 Interviews with Informant A-Exp-Kdi (2005) on 6 September 2005, Informant K-Exp-Kdi (2005) on 16 
October 2005 and Informant E-NGO-Kdi (2007) on 9 July 2007. 
72 Other candidates proposed as caretaker for the Bupati Konawe Utara were Aswad Sulaiman (Local 
Secretary/Sekda of Konawe), Mustari (Head of Bappeda Konawe) and Nur Sinapoy (Head of Konawe 
Employment and Transmigration Services) (Koran Tempo 2007). 
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Yusran Silondae finally approved the Konawe proposal that had recommended 
Aswad Sulaiman as caretaker Bupati for Konawe Utara. The interim Minister of Home 
Affairs, Widodo AS, inaugurated Aswad Sulaiman as caretaker Bupati for one year, from 2 
July 2007 to 2 June 200873 (Kendari Ekspres 2007). His primary role was to run the new 
administrative units and to facilitate the direct local election for a definitive Bupati. Within 
two weeks after his inauguration, Aswad Sulaiman formed his cabinet by appointing 20 
new Heads of Services (Kepala Dinas) and five Heads of Agencies (Kepala Badan dan 
Lembaga).     
Despite some provocative campaigning Aswad Sulaiman was seen as an ideal and 
professional figure for the definitive Bupati of Konawe Utara (Indonesia Timur News 
2008; Kendari Pos 2008b), although his performance as caretaker Bupati generated some 
criticism. In mid May 2008, more than 500 protesters urged Aswad to hand over his 
position. Aswad was acussed of corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN) 
(MetroNews.com 2008). 
In July 2008 as his term finished, Governor Nur Alam did not extend Aswad’s 
caretaker term (Kompas 2008a). Nur Alam then appointed H Sudiro, Sekda Konawe Utara 
as interim caretaker Bupati responsible for day to day management and sent a radiogram74 
to the Ministry of Home Affairs (Kendari Ekspres 2008a). Aswad refused to accept the 
governor’s appointment of Sudiro and declared that he held an extension of Minister of 
Home Affairs decree and had a legal base to continue his term as caretaker Bupati (Kendari 
Ekspres 2008a). All these political movements can be seen as part of a new local political 
division (Tolaki-based) struggle between Nur Alam and his associates in the new 
                                                     
73 Decree of Minister of Home Affairs (Keputusan Mendagri ) No. 131.74-305  2007 on 21 June 2007. 
74 Radiogram of Southeast Sulawesi Governor No. 131-3458 on 2 July 2008 
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pemekaran kabupaten. It also showed the fragile nature of new administrative units caused 
by political intervention from local elites.  
4.6 Economy of Konawe  
The economy of Konawe relies heavily on a large government sector. Central 
government grants make up a large percentage of local expenditure. The secondary and 
tertiary sectors play very little part in the local Konawe economy. The agriculture sector 
that consists mainly of subsistence-oriented smallholder activities contributed only a 
quarter (26 %) of district domestic revenue. A part of that, fisheries constituted 74.02 per 
cent of this contribution. That is, fisheries contributed only about 19 per cent of the 
domestic revenue. Konawe is known as the “rice bowl” (lumbung beras) of Southeast 
Sulawesi province and there are more than 60,000 hectares of potential paddy rice in the 
district75 (Astuti 2001b), but only 20,000 hectares are productive due to the irrigation 
problems (Kompas 2004).  
Marine and fishery products have the potential to be significant contributors to the 
development of Konawe (Centre for Political Studies 2001). In 2000, tuna provided USD 
3,270,829 from both export and domestic trade. Other fishery products also contributed 
significant income to the local economy. Frozen squid (USD2,029,860), fish fillet (USD 
302,962), crab (USD 233,582), mackerel (USD 154,854), calamari (USD 151,712), white 
prawn (USD 120,431) and tiger prawn (USD  72,873) were all important market products 
that added to the fishery resources of the region (Centre for Political Studies 2001). These 
contributions are from the abundant coastal and fisheries resources of Konawe.  
                                                     
75 Annual rice production is estimated at 70,000 tons with more than 60,000 ha of paddy field(Astuti 
2001b). Some staple of non-rice foods are also available in Konawe, such as sago. 
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The estimated maximum sustainable yield (MSY) of the marine fishery in 
Konawe is 70,000 tons per year, but only 49.49 percent (34,641.3 tons) was being utilized 
in 2002 (Diskanlut Kabupaten Kendari 2003). Key commercial species include tuna, 
skipjack, prawn, squid and a variety of small pelagic fish (anchovies, mackerel and 
sardines). However, these marine fisheries resources are exploited not only by the local 
population but also by boats based in the city of Kendari as well as boats from other parts 
of Indonesia and foreign fishing vessels. Konawe remains the main area for total fish 
landing within the Kendari Fishing Port76 (Informant D-Gen-Kon, 2005). 
Only three percent of the population of Konawe were directly engaged in the 
fishery sector in 2002 (Diskanlut Kabupaten Kendari 2003).  The majority of these fishers 
were marine fishers, followed by inland capture fishers, pond breeders and tambak 
(brackish water ponds) breeders. There was a small proportion of marine fisheries breeders 
and fishers engaged in mina padi (combined paddy and fish) cultivation.  
The total catch of fish landed in Konawe in 2005 was 16,819.4 tons and was 
valued at  IDR 118.45 billion or USD 13.61 million from all coastal kecamatan (BPS 
Konawe 2006). This catch was landed at five local fish landing points (tempat pendaratan 
ikan/TPI), namely TPI Mekar and TPI Lalonggasumeeto in Kecamatan Soropia, TPI 
Laimeo in Kecamatan Sawa, and TPI Torobulu and TPI Pamadanti in Kecamatan Lainea.  
There are 135 units of motorized and 3,197 non-motorized fishing vessels (jukung 
and wooden perahu) in Konawe. Small motorized fishing vessels (motor tempel/katinting) 
accounted for 628 units and are fairly evenly distributed across coastal kecamatans (BPS 
Konawe 2006).  
                                                     
76 Kendari Fishing Port (Pelabuhan Perikanan  Samudera/PPS Kendari) is one of five Indonesian fishing 
ports. Other fishing ports are PPS Belawan, PPS Bungus, PPS Nizam Zahman Jakarta and PPS Cilacap. 
Further information about PPS can be accessed through http://www.pelabuhanperikanan.or.id .   
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Beach seine (pukat pantai) and hook and line (pancing tonda) are the two main 
fishing methods used by fishers operating within a few miles from shore (BPS Konawe 
2006). These two fishing methods account, respectively, for 1,441 units and 1,484 units, 
(BPS Konawe 2006) which are distributed mostly in kecamatan Wawonii (578), Lasolo 
(533) and Sawa (160) (Diskanlut Kabupaten Kendari 2003).  
Other dominant fishing methods are gillnet, rawai, trammel net and troll line. 
There are three types of gillnet commonly used in Konawe, namely driftnet, encircling 
gillnet and shrimp gillnet. Fishing ground distance and type of fishing vessels determined 
the types of fishing gear to be used on board (Diskanlut Kabupaten Kendari 2003).  
Fisheries post-harvest and processing technology in Konawe primarily rely on 
traditional post-harvest technology. Drying, salting and freezing fish products are the most 
common processing methods. These methods, respectively, earned IDR 45.56 million 
(USD 5,236) for 3,658.3 tonnes salted/dried products, and IDR 16 million (USD 1,840) for 
1,000 tonnes frozen products (BPS Konawe 2006). Shrimp/fish paste (terasi) was still not 
a popular technique for adding value to fisheries products. Smoked fish contributes 13 per 
cent of total fisheries revenue from fish processing. Per capita fish consumption in Konawe 
also increased as a result of the availability of fisheries products in the domestic market 
and increasing purchasing power (Diskanlut Kabupaten Kendari 2003). 
Mariculture was not optimally utilized in Konawe. Total production of mariculture 
in 2005 reached only 469 tons and the value of this was only IDR 16.358 billion or USD 
1,877,555 (BPS Konawe 2006). Mariculture activities are spread across kecamatan 
Wawonii Barat, Wawonii Selatan and Soropia although almost all of the coastal kecamatan 
in Konawe have the potential for mariculture development. The only exceptions are 
Wawonii Timur and Wawonii Utara due to the steep, unsuitable coastal conditions. Key 
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commercial commodities from mariculture include pearl shell, seaweed farming, snapper 
and mud crabs.  
Tambak are concentrated in two kecamatan Sampara (BPS Konawe 2006) and 
Bondoala (Bappeda Konawe and FT Universitas Lakidende 2004), which produced 764.7 
tons of fishes and earned IDR 13.309 billion or USD 1,529,770 (BPS Konawe 2006). 
Potential land for tambak development in Konawe accounted for 5,540 hectares. Tiger 
prawn and milkfish are two important tambak commodities (Diskanlut Kabupaten Kendari 
2003).  
Technically, Konawe district has a number of suitable areas for tambak 
development because it has many bays and capes with calm oceanographic conditions 
especially in areas with strong diurnal tides (two high tides per day), and water levels that 
fluctuate between two and four meters. However, many tambak are in poor condition due 
to a lack of financial and technical skills as well as technological support, such as 200 
hectares of tambak in Kecamatan Bondoala that remains unproductive (Bappeda Konawe 
and FT Universitas Lakidende 2004). 
4.7 Coastal management in Konawe 
Coastal morphology in Konawe varies from cliffs in the eastern part of Wawonii 
Island to sandy and muddy coastal areas in Soropia, Lasolo and the western part of 
Wawonii (Bappeda Konawe and LKPP Unhalu 2004). Konawe coastal areas cover seven 
kecamatan and seven small islands (Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan 2007). Two 
kecamatan are on the Sulawesi mainland (Soropia and Bondoala) and five are on Wawonii 
Island (Wawonii Barat, Wawonii Timur, Wawonii Tengah, Wawonii Selatan and Wawonii 
Utara). Infrastructure along the Konawe coast is mostly unreliable and local government 
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services to the current areas are poor. Kecamatan Soropia and Bondoala have relatively 
better roads and bridges to Unaaha and Kendari than in five kecamatan in Wawonii Island.  
The infrastructure in five kecamatan in Wawonii Island remains poor in standard 
when compared with the coastal kecamatan in mainland Sulawesi. Most roads and bridges 
on Wawonii Island are in poor condition. Transportation along the coast of Wawonii Island 
is not regularly available. Ojek (motorcycle taxis) provide services in some of these areas, 
but at extra cost. Using waterways transportation such as bodi batang (small boat) is more 
expensive and time-consuming (Bappeda Konawe and FT Universitas Lakidende 2004). 
These geographic challenges continue to be a problem due to less attention being paid by 
the Konawe district government to developing disadvantaged areas. My informants 
confirmed that most government offices are reluctant to provide services to these 
disadvantaged areas. 
There are nine issues besetting the coastal area of Konawe. These are: (i) marine 
and coastal resource degradation, (ii) low income of fishermen and coastal community, (iii) 
low rate of regional economic growth for marine and fisheries sector, (iv) lack of qualified 
human resources to staff marine and coastal management, (v) poor sanitation conditions in 
the fishing villages, (vi) downgraded role and function of social and cultural aspects in 
marine and coastal management, (vii) lack of law enforcement, (viii) less optimal role and 
function of related institutions, and (ix) lack of accurate and reliable information on marine 
and coastal resources (Pemda Kabupaten Kendari 2004). This section discusses coastal 
resource issues, stakeholders’ involvement and the local government response in CZM that 
link these above issues.  
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4.7.1 Coastal resources and issues 
Konawe has various coastal resources. These include coral reefs, mangrove and 
seagrass beds; these are discussed in detail in the following sub-sections. However, coastal 
degradation77 has increased significantly during the last decade and this is also a major 
concern in Konawe (Pemda Kabupaten Konawe 2005a).  
4.7.1.1 Mangroves  
Mangrove ecosystems exist along the coastal areas of Wawonii Island, Kecamatan 
Bondoala and Soropia. On Wawonii Island, mangroves are found  in most coastal villages 
which cover an area of 2,158.24 hectares (Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan 2007). 
Mangroves ecosystems on Wawonii Island are mostly in good condition with a thickness of 
20 to 700 meters and density of one to seven trees per square meter. The dominant genera 
of mangrove vegetation are Bruguiera, Rhizophora and Xylocarpus (Table 16). Degraded 
mangroves ecosystems exist in two villages on Wawonii Island, Dimba in Wawonii Timur 
and Langara Iwawo in Wawonii Barat. Degradation is also beginning to occur in Langara 
Laut in Wawonii Barat (Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan 2007).  
Mangroves ecosystems in Soropia cover an area of 167.38 hectares and 59 
hectares in Bondoala. The mangroves in these two kecamatan are mostly in poor condition. 
The only mangroves in good condition are in the two kecataman on Bokori Island. 
About 60 to 70 per cent of mangrove ecosystems in Konawe are heavily degraded 
(Pemprov Sultra 2004) as result of lack of concern for the green belt policy (sempadan 
                                                     
77 Coastal resources degradations are one of serious major problems in managing coastal zone in 
Indonesia. The driving for the degradations include changing settlement and demographic pattern in coastal 
areas, high population growth, a shift of coastal communities from subsistence to cash economies and poor 
land practices that lead to pollution and siltation (Dahuri et al. 1995; Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan 
2007; Idris, Ginting, and Budiman 2007). These cause to reduction of mangrove coverages and mangrove 
conversion, legal and illegal sand mining, over-exploitation of coastal and marine resources and destructive 
harvesting practices such as destructive fishing. 
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pantai) in tambak development (Pemda Kabupaten Konawe 2005a). Kecamatan Soropia 
has the most degraded mangrove habitat. Settlement and logging activities are other 
primary contributors to mangrove degradation.  
Among the degraded mangroves, 102 highly critical hectares78 in Konawe need to 
be rehabilitated immediately (Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan 2007). These areas 
include Langgara Iwawo (11 hectares), Batumea (6 hectares) in Wawonii Barat, Wawouso 
to Lawei (25 hectares) in Wawonii Selatan, Lebo (20 hectares) in Wawonii Timur, 
Tapulaga (25 hectares) and Toli-toli (15 hectares) in Soropia, and along the coast of Muara 
Sampara, Lalimbue Jaya and Tani Indah.  
  
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
78 There is no further explanation from the report on this figure. The report referred to data from Konawe 
Forestry Services without further justification.  
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Table 16.  Mangroves ecosystems in Konawe District.  
No. Kecamatan/ Village/ Areas Type of mangroves 
Dominant 
diameter  
Density 
(Number 
of trees/ 
10 m2) 
Condi-tions 
Thickness 
to 
seaward  
(metres) 
1 Bondoala (59 hectares) 
 Muara Sampara Bruguera, sp. Avicennia, sp.  
Rhizophora, sp. Nipa, sp. 
20-35 
 
3 Poor -
Moderate 
10-50 
 Lolimbue Jaya Bruguera, sp. Avicennia, sp. 
Rhizophora, sp. Nipa, sp. 
20-30 2 Poor -
Moderate 
5-50 
2. Soropia (167.38 hectares) 
 Sorue Jaya Sonneratia, Avicennia 
Rhizophora 
35 3 Poor 20 
 Tapulaga Sonneratia,  Bruguera  40 2 Poor 15 
 Bajo Indah Sonneratia,  Bruguera  50 1 Poor 10 
 Bokori (P.Bokori) 
 
Sonneratia,  Avicennia 
Rhizophora 
20-50 3 Poor 10 
 Toronipa Sonneratia, Bruguera 
Avicennia, Rhizophora 
40 2 Poor 30 
 Atowatu Sonneratia, Bruguera  
Avicennia, Rhizophora 
35 3 Moderate 75 
 Sawapudo Sonneratia, Bruguera 
Rhizophora 
40 2 Moderate 50 
 Soropia Sonneratia, Bruguera  30 2 Moderate 25 
 Waworaha Bruguera,  Rhizophora 35 2 Moderate 25 
 Toli-Toli Sonneratia,  Rhizophora Avicennia 50 1 
Poor 25 
 Lalombonda Sonneratia 50 1 Poor 15 
 Watunggarandu Bruguera, Rhizophora 40 1 Poor 10 
3.  Wawoni Barat dan Wawonii Selatan (1,313.17 hectares) 
 Wawouso B.gymnorrhiza, 
R. apiculata, S. alba,  
X. granatum 
40 6 Good 150 
 Lamongupa B.gymnorrhiza,.  
R. apiculata, R. Mucronata;  
R. stylosa, S. alba,   
X. granatum, 
50 7 Good 700  
 Langara Iwawo 
 
B. gymnorrhiza 
R. apiculata,  S. alba 25 6 Poor 50  
 Langara laut B gymnorrhiza, R. apiculata, S. alba  30 1 
Start to poor 
 20  
4.  Wawonii Timur (845.07 hectares) 
 Lebo R. apiculata, R. mucronata,  R.  50 2 Good 200 
  Stylosa, S. alba,  X. granatum     
 
Dimba 
R. apiculata, R. mucronata,  
R. stylosa, S. alba, 
 X. granatum  
40 6 Poor 100 
 
Ladianta 
R. apiculata, R. mucronata,  
R. Stylosa, S. alba, 
 X. granatum 
55 7 Good 300 
 Source: Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan (2007) 
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4.7.1.2 Coral reefs 
Konawe has 3,511.67 hectares of coral reef ecosystems concentrated in Lasolo 
Bay and the western part of Wawonii Island (Table 17). Other areas of coral reefs 
distributed in Konawe include Soropia, Wawonii Selatan, Wawonii Barat and Wawonii 
Timur. Live coverage of coral reefs in Soropia is 35 to 85 per cent, in categories of mostly 
moderate to good condition. Similarly, in Wawonii Island live coverage of coral reefs 
varies from 35 to 80 per cent with most in moderate condition. Poor coral reefs conditions 
are found in Nambo Jaya (Wawonii Selatan), Lampeapi and Batumea (Wawonii Barat) and 
Masolo (Wawonii Timur).  
There is no accurate data on coral reef degradation in Konawe. However, a 
general estimation regarding the level of degradation is that it is now very serious (Pemda 
Kabupaten Konawe 2005a). The growing use of destructive dynamite fishing is the major 
contributor to coral reef degradation. This degradation weakens the wave-reduction 
capacity of coral reefs, which leads to abrasion of the shoreline along the Konawe coasts. 
Critical coastal erosion is already taking place in Kecamatan Soropia. There are four 
kilometres of eroded coastline near the villages of Bajo Indah, Mekar, Bokori and Saponda 
(Pemda Kabupaten Konawe 2005a). 
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Table 17.  Coral reefs ecosystems in Konawe District.  
No Kecamatan/ Desa 
Area (hectares) 
Type of coral  
Cover 
percentage 
(%) 
Conditions 
1. Soropia (2.608.36) 
 Toronipa Laminar, Encrushing, Foliaceous, Acropora 35-75 Moderate - Good 
 Atowatu Branching,  Foliaceous Acropora,  40-80 Moderate - Good 
 Soropia Laminar, Encrushing  Foliaceous, Acropora 40-85 Moderate - Good 
  Waworaha Encrushing,  Foliaceous Acropora 60-85 Moderate - Good 
2. Wawonii Selatan (903,31) 
 Wawouso Encrushing;  Foliaceous Acropora 50-60 Moderate 
 Nambo jaya Encrushing, Foliaceous Acropora, Soft coral 30-40 Poor - Moderate 
3. Wawonii Barat 
 Lampeapi Encrushing;  Foliaceous 60-65 Poor - Moderate 
 Lamongupa Acropora 56-70 Moderate 
 Batumea Encrushing;  Foliaceous 60-69 Poor - Moderate 
 Langara iwawo Acropora 59-78 Moderate - Good 
 Langara laut Encrushing;  Foliaceous 65-70 Moderate - Good 
4. Wawonii Timur 
 Mosolo Encrushing,  Foliaceous Acropora, Soft coral 60-80 Poor - Moderate 
 Takonea Encrushing,  Foliaceous Acropora, Soft coral 56-70 Moderate 
 Munse Encrushing,  Foliaceous Acropora, Soft coral 50-67 Moderate 
 Lebo Encrushing,  Foliaceous Acropora, Soft coral 59-60 Moderate 
 Dimba Encrushing,  Foliaceous Acropora, Soft coral 47-67 Moderate 
Source: Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan (2007) 
 
 
4.7.1.3 Seagrass beds 
Seagrass beds (padang lamun) are not seen as economically valuable resources by 
Konawe coastal communities. While there are no direct, obvious benefits of seagrass beds, 
the ecosystems can provide raw materials for mats, compost, fertilizer, baskets, roofs and 
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cigar wrapping (Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan 2007). Most of the seagrass beds are 
in moderate to good condition (Table 18) because of less intensive utilization of these 
ecosystems. Seagrass beds in Konawe are mostly part of the spawning and nursery grounds 
for several highly valued species of fish (Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan 2007). 
Seagrass beds in Kecamatan Soropia and Wawonii Island cover an area of 228.5 hectares 
(Bappeda Konawe and LKPP Unhalu 2004).  
Table 18.  Seagrass bed ecosystems in Konawe District.  
No. Kecamatan/ Desa 
Type of dominant 
seagrass beds 
Cover 
percentage 
(%) 
Conditions Utilization 
1. Soropia     
 Toronipa E. acoroides; 
T. hemprichii, H. ovalis  
40-50 Moderate - 
Good 
No direct utilization. 
 Atowatu E. acoroides; 
T. hemprichii, H. ovalis  
35-45 Moderate  No direct utilization. 
 Soropia E. acoroides; 
T. hemprichii, H. ovalis  
25-50 Moderate  No direct utilization. 
 Tapulaga E. acoroides; 
T. hemprichii, H. ovalis  
30-50 Moderate  Utilized as locatios for 
fish cages (karamba 
tancap) 
2. Wawonii Barat      
 Tumbu-Tumbu   
Jaya 
E. acoroides; 
T. hemprichii, H. ovalis  60 – 80 
Good No direct utilization. 
 Langara Laut E. acoroides; T. hemprichii, H. ovalis  50-70 
Good No direct utilization. 
3. Wawonii Selatan     
 Bobolio E. acoroides; T. hemprichii, H. ovalis  50-60 
Moderate  No direct utilization. 
4. Wawonii Timur     
 Takonea E. acoroides; T. hemprichii, H. ovalis  80 
Good No direct utilization. 
 Munse E. acoroides; T. hemprichii, H. ovalis  80 
Good No direct utilization. 
 Dimba E. acoroides; T. hemprichii, H. ovalis  90 
Good No direct utilization. 
 Ladianta E. acoroides; T. hemprichii, H. ovalis  80 
Good No direct utilization. 
Remarks:  E = Enhalus, T = Thalaessia, H = Holophilla. 
Source: Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan (2007) 
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4.7.1.4 Monsoon 
In Konawe coastal villages, the monsoon season is the major factor in determining 
fisheries activities (Bappeda Konawe and FT Universitas Lakidende 2004). During the 
west monsoon (musim barat), the weather and sea conditions are relatively calm. This 
allows fishermen access to a range of fishing activities. However, this changes during the 
east monsoon (musim timur). The high waves and strong winds force fishermen to stay at 
home and find alternative income at this time. In Sorue Jaya village in Kecamatan Soropia 
for example, most fishermen utilize their skills as clove and cashew farmers or as 
carpenters and builders’ labourers in order to earn alternative incomes for their households 
(Bappeda Konawe and FT Universitas Lakidende 2004).  
Another alternative income during the east monsoon season is tourism. This 
activity is mostly based in coastal tourist destinations such as Bokori Island. Tourism in 
Bokori Island is an alternative source of income generation during the east monsoon for 
Bajo people and fishermen from the village of Bajo Indah. Bokori Island was designated as 
a marine tourism hub for Kendari and surrounding areas. My informants explained that a 
special intention was to establish a retreat area for La Ode Kaimuddin (previous Southeast 
Sulawesi governor) and his family on this island.  
Compulsory and forced relocation of Bajo people to Bajo Indah village was a 
main part of the strategy in setting up this island as a tourist resort. Wood style cottages 
were then built in place of the Bajo’ community settlement along the coast of Bokori 
Island. However, as Kaimuddin’s term finished, the tourism facilities started to erode due 
to a lack of maintenance and professional management. During my visit to this island in 
2005, it was clear that the island was dirty, poorly maintained and rundown. 
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4.7.1.5 Poverty 
Poverty is widespread in Konawe coastal communities and the majority of people 
live below the poverty line79. Household expenses in Konawe coastal communities 
commonly appear to be greater than incomes. Bappeda Konawe and FT Universitas 
Lakidende (2004) formulated the following monthly household cash flow in Konawe 
coastal areas: 
Expense = 315139.7 + 0.453 x Income  
In the formula, monthly household expenses are IDR 315,139.7 (USD 36.2) 
regardless of income available and on top of those expenses. On top of these baseline 
expenses, every IDR 1 of incomes contains another IDR 0.453 of definitive spending. The 
average monthly income of Konawe coastal communities is IDR 567,416.7 (USD 68.3) 
while their monthly expenditure is IDR 572,307.4 (USD 70) (Bappeda Konawe and FT 
Universitas Lakidende 2004). This situation means that saving is difficult for people from 
coastal communities because their average monthly expenditure IDR 4,890.7 (USD 0.6) is 
apparently always greater than their monthly income. Socio-economic studies by the 
Konawe government have found that only 0.9 percent of the respondents had any savings 
(Bappeda Konawe and FT Universitas Lakidende 2004). This low percentage indicates that 
almost all Konawe coastal communities live below the poverty line.  
In order to survive and fulfil their basic consumption needs, many coastal 
communities have developed supportive social networks among themselves. The networks 
are based on the extended family (Bappeda Konawe and FT Universitas Lakidende 2004). 
If a household is in need, the network will help by providing services, spare goods, or by 
lending money or goods.  
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There are many causes of poverty in Konawe coastal communities. Most of the 
fishing areas are within one to two kilometres of the coastline and fishing methods are 
mostly beach seine, and hook and line. These methods, the types of vessels and gear used 
by Konawe fishers do not support expansion into other fishing areas. The poor quality and 
low quantity of fish catches result from these limitations. Only some of the fishermen have 
access to wider fishing areas, which are regularly fished by non-Konawe based fishermen.  
Because of the low level of knowledge and skills related to on-handling and 
processing, catches are mostly sold directly to local middlemen (paballong) who tend to 
monopolize prices. These conditions, together with the lack of access to information and 
marketing, mean small-scale Konawe fishermen have little or no profit margin in trading 
fish sales. Empowerment programs, fair access to capital and adequate support systems 
would be important factors in improving the living conditions of Konawe coastal 
communities.    
4.7.2 Stakeholders in Konawe CZM 
4.7.2.1 Local government institutions 
There are several local government agencies involved in coastal management in 
Konawe. These may be classified into two major groups according to the extent and 
emphasis of their involvement on CZM. The first group consists of institutions directly 
working in coastal and fisheries activities and dealing with providing resources (staff, 
planning, funding and infrastructure) for the various coastal zone management programs. 
This group includes the Konawe Marine Affairs and Fisheries Service (Dinas Kelautan dan 
Perikanan Konawe/DKP Konawe), the Konawe Planning and Development Agency 
                                                                                                                                                                 
79 The poverty line in Indonesia based on National Socio Economic Survey Panel on March 2008 IDR 
182,636 per capita per month (BPS 2008). 
  126
 
(Bappeda Konawe), the Konawe Transportation Service (Dinas Perhubungan Konawe), the 
Konawe Forestry Service (Dinas Kehutanan Konawe) and the Konawe Agency for 
Environmental Impact Management (Badan Pengendalian Dampak Lingkungan 
Daerah/Bapedalda Konawe). 
DKP Konawe and Bappeda Konawe are the most important local government 
institutions for decentralized CZM and these two agencies are the primary institutions for 
administering CZM. DKP Konawe has the mandate for the implementation of programmes 
involving marine and fisheries affairs in Konawe. DKP Konawe is also responsible for the 
encouragement and provision of technical services in developing coastal and fisheries 
activities. DKP Konawe also has the rights to issue permits for marine and fisheries-related 
business activities within four nautical miles seaward. 
Bappeda Konawe is a coordinating body for all planning and development at 
district level and reports directly to the Bupati. This coordinating agency plays important 
roles in the coordination, planning and budget allocation of all marine, coastal zone and 
fisheries development activities. Bappeda Konawe is the executing agency for the Marine 
and Coastal Resources Management Project (MCRMP),80 an Asian Development Bank 
funded project that assists in the production of planning documentation on coastal zone 
management (strategic, zoning, management and action plans) which are fundamental 
planning documents for decentralized CZM.  
                                                     
80 The Marine and Coastal Resources Management Project (MCRMP) is a loan-funded project (2002-
2006) to the government of Indonesia from the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and has a two-year 
extension (2007-2008) to the effective loan period for project implementation. MCRMP promotes sustainable 
management of marine and coastal resources for environment protection and socioeconomic development 
under a decentralized framework of government in 46 Districts in 16 Provinces of North/West Sumatra, Riau, 
Bengkulu, Jambi, East/West Nusa Tenggara, West/Central/East Kalimantan, Gorontalo, 
North/Central/Southeast/South Sulawesi, and Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam. MCRMP provides capacity 
building for local governments to strengthen their capacity in sustainable planning and management of 
marine and coastal resources. It also intends to improve the availability of and access to quality spatial and 
biodiversity information and data useful for resource planning, as well as the legal and regulatory framework 
in resource management and compliance (ADB 2000). 
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The MCRMP focuses on planning and management of marine and coastal 
resources, while provincial and district planning development agencies (Bappedas) operate 
as executing agencies at the provincial and district levels. This arrangement is also linked 
to the decision makers’ process in the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF), 
the national executing agency. In fact, the Directorate of Coastal Management (Direktorat 
Bina Pesisir) is a project management office run by many ex-Ministry of Home Affairs 
personnel who have had experience in a similar project, the Marine Resource Evaluation 
and Planning (MREP) program, which was structured around Bappeda. For them, macro 
and sectoral planning activities in provincial and local governments should be linked to the 
Bappedas. As regional coordinator of sector development initiatives, Bappeda can deal 
with intra and inter-sectoral conflict and its orientation is aligned regionally instead of 
sectorally. In such ways, Direktorat Bina Pesisir argued that Bappeda are appropriate 
partners in implementing the MCRMP (Informant A-Gov-Nat, 2005).  
Dinas Perhubungan Konawe, Dinas Kehutanan Konawe and Bapedalda Konawe 
are technical offices within the Konawe local government and directly report to the Bupati. 
These offices have some programs related to fisheries and coastal zone management. Dinas 
Perhubungan Konawe has responsibility for providing infrastructure such as sea-lanes and 
inter-island transportation. Dinas Kehutanan Konawe has responsibilities to conserve and 
implement sustainable mangrove protection and management. Bapedalda Konawe has the 
authority to set water quality standards in coastal and marine areas.  
A second group of local government agencies involved in coastal management 
includes the institutions indirectly involved in coastal zone management issues. This group 
includes the Spatial Planning Service Office (Dinas Tata Ruang Konawe), the Energy and 
Mining Service (Dinas Pertambangan dan Energi Konawe), the Tourism Service (Dinas 
Pariwisata Konawe) and the Education Service (Dinas Pendidikan Konawe).  
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Dinas Tata Ruang Konawe is a regulatory body for construction and building 
permits, including coastal land use spatial planning, monitoring and evaluation of space 
utilization in coastal zones. Dinas Pertambangan dan Energi Konawe is a technical office 
designed to assess and issue permits for mining and energy activities within the coastal 
zone. Dinas Pariwisata Konawe has a mandate to manage tourism programs and activities 
in Konawe coastal areas and Dinas Pendidikan Konawe has the responsibility of enhancing 
access and improving the quality of education for Konawe coastal communities.  
There is a proposal to establish an Agency for Marine and Coastal Management 
(Badan Pengelola Pesisir dan Laut) under the direction of the Bupati of Konawe (Pemda 
Kabupaten Konawe 2005a). The proposed agency will have a Steering Committee and 
Task Force comprising high-ranking officers of the Konawe local government. There will 
be five supporting units: a (i) Secretariat, (ii) Project Evaluation Group (Pengkajian 
Proyek), (iii) Economic Planning and Development Group (Perencanaan Pembangunan 
Ekonomi), (iv) Zoning Plan and Management Group (Pemanfaatan dan Perencanaan 
Zonasi Sumberdaya), and (v) Marine and Coastal Resource Information Unit (Perencana 
dan Pengelola Data dan Informasi Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan Laut) (Figure 15).  
Membership of this agency will consist of representatives from local government 
agencies, universities, NGOs, as well as professional and community leaders. The BPPL is 
expected to be a self-funded agency, sourcing its revenue from permits, study assessments 
and application process fees. In the medium term, the proposed agency will rely on local 
government funding. This means that the proposed agency must be provided with 
personnel, financial and institutional resources that unfortunately are not available in 
Konawe. Consequently, at present there is no progress towards the establishment of this 
proposed agency.  
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Figure 15.  Proposed structure of Badan Pengelola Pesisir dan Laut. 
Source: Pemda Kabupaten Konawe (2005a) 
 
 
 
 
 
4.7.2.2 Non- Governmental Organizations 
Most non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Konawe are active in local 
politics, operating as democracy watchdogs, advocacy providers and even as promoters for 
the various local political leaders in the post-reformasi phase. Most of these NGOs are 
manifesto organizations that were established in the bloom of local democracy (Informant 
K-NGO-Kdi, 2005). A few Konawe-based NGOs are active in Konawe environmental 
management, but only one, Yayasan Hijau Sejahtera (Green Welfare Foundation), is active 
in CZM.  
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This NGO may be considered a leading player in issues of local CZM. However, 
it only recently put coastal and fisheries issues on its agenda after it was granted a contract 
from Bappeda Konawe for the implementation of integrated management at the village 
level in 2004. Previously, this NGO focused on forestry related issues and has had seven 
years of experience.  
Yayasan Hijau Sejahtera was formerly a partner with Bappeda Konawe on the 
implementation of small-scale natural resource management (SNSRM) activities in Desa 
Toli-toli, Kecamatan Soropia (Yayasan Hijau Sejahtera 2004). This program is one of the 
core activities of MCRMP. The program has provided a learning process and experience to 
Yayasan Hijau Sejahtera on dealing with CZM issues. Yayasan Hijau Sejahtera facilitated 
several community meetings on the establishment of the Village Coastal Zone 
Management Agency (Badan Pengelola Pesisir/BPP) formed in November 2003. BPP is 
expected to promote five main functions (mediation, conflict prevention and conflict 
resolution, planning assistance, monitoring and evaluation, and coastal community 
empowerment) (Yayasan Hijau Sejahtera 2004). BPP has a permanent community centre 
(pos komando/posko) where it is possible to facilitate community meetings and training as 
well as day-to-day management of coastal resources in Toli-toli.  
Yayasan Hijau Sejahtera assisted BPP to promote community mapping of its 
coastal and marine resources in a project to record and assess the potential of Toli-toli 
coastal resources. BPP also assisted in the establishment of Village Marine Protected Areas 
(Daerah Perlindungan Laut Desa). The process involved focus group discussions and 
community consultations that finally resulted in agreement on the creation of three 
management zones (core, buffer and utilization zones) in Toli-toli village. There are three 
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protected coral reefs and five hectares of mangroves areas within the core zone.81 The 
Village Regulations (Peraturan Desa/Perdes) legally established the three zones and 
designated three types of violations (Table 19). 
Table 19.  Types of violations and fines regulated by Toli-toli Villages Regulations. 
Category of 
violations 
Type of violations Type of punishmentfines 
Heavy  Using poison (potassium) 
 Using fish bombs 
 Breaking up coral reefs  
 Penalty of IDR 3 million 
 Confiscation of fishing gear 
 Social isolation  
 Arrest by police 
Medium  Taking coral and sand from reefs 
 Cutting mangroves illegally 
 Using bubu (fish traps) 
 Hunting specific protected marine biota 
 Penalty of IDR 1 million 
 Confiscation of fishing gear 
  
Low  Throwing trashes into coastal water  Penalty of IDR 100,000  
Source: BPP Toli-toli Konawe (2004) 
 
 
Kendari-based NGOs, such as Yayasan Bahari (Maritime Foundation/YARI), 
LEPPMIL and Walhi Sultra (Friends of the Earth Southeast Sulawesi Chapter), dominate 
coastal zone management programs in Konawe. These NGOs have sufficient financial and 
human resources to operate effectively. They have good access to donor and national 
organizations.  Some of them are active in several coastal villages and islands, all of which 
are handicapped by long distances from Unaaha, the capital of Konawe. CZM in those 
remote areas is poorly understood and inadequately resourced. The absence of local 
government engagement in those areas provides opportunities for NGOs to implement and 
organize programs on marine and coastal. Saponda Island has been a target area for 
Yayasan Bahari (YARI), a leading marine and coastal management NGO in Southeast 
Sulawesi (Box 1). 
                                                     
81 The three reefs are Reef Tomba (100 meters x 200 meters), Reef Toli-toli (50 meters x 50 meters) and 
Mehau-hau (40 meters X 200 meters) (BPP Toli-toli Konawe 2004). Mangrove areas are located near the 
border of Desa Toli-toli and Waworaha. 
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Box 1. Saponda Island and Yayasan Bahari 
Saponda is an island of 7.5 hectares (RANESI 2007), located two nautical 
miles or about one to two hours sailing time from Kendari, depending on the 
type of boat. If using a small boat with a 40 horsepower engine, a perahu 
batang (bodi), it takes one hour to sail from Kendari, but it will be more than 
an hour if using a normal perahu (katinting). There are no regular 
transportation services to and from Saponda, except these fishing boats. 
Saponda islanders feel closer to Kendari than Konawe although 
administratively this island comes under Kabupaten Konawe. 
Saponda borders with Menui Strait in the north, Wawonii Strait in the east, 
Moramo Strait in the south and Kendari Strait in the west (Ashmarita and Nasir 2004). Most of Saponda islanders 
(1,030 people with 227 households) are Bajo (YARI 2005).  
Yayasan Bahari (YARI), a leading NGO on marine and coastal conservation, has been active in Saponda since 2003. 
With a UNDP-Global Environmental Facility-Small Grant Programme (UNDP GEF-SGP), YARI implemented coral reef 
community based management in the Hari Island area. Hari Island has been a fishing ground for two YARI targeted 
villages, Saponda in Konawe and Labuan Beropa in Laonti, Konawe Selatan. These two villages are also known for 
the use of destructive fishing activities (YARI 2005). 
YARI was awarded a USD 41,000 grant by the UNDP GEF-SGP for 18 months (May 2003 – November 2004) to 
develop a community assistance program in these two villages. YARI then started to initiate community meetings for 
the implementation of programs but faced many challenges to its work. Their first meeting was to establish a 
conservation group, but only 29 people joined. Villagers were disinterested due to the failure of previous programs 
without preparation for post-program or post-project strategies (Informant D-NGO-Kdi, 2005; Informant G-NGO-Kdi, 
2007). They were also sceptical about community officers who villagers thought would be part of state surveillance on 
preventing destructive fishing. The most important reason for villagers rejecting YARI was that they were still engaged 
with destructive fishing.  
To work with these challenges, YARI arranged for its Community Officer to live in the village and persuasively explain 
its programs. It took more than three months just to inform the community of the benefits of the program (Informant D-
NGO-Kdi, 2005; Informant G-NGO-Kdi, 2007). YARI then successfully implemented 
participatory community mapping, coral reef rehabilitation and restoring coral reefs 
with artificial reefs.  
In order to achieve a higher level of community awareness, YARI together with 
conservation groups established a community radio station (see side picture). Youth 
and conservation groups run this station using the Bajo language for its programs. 
The radio station has a special program on community education about coral reefs. 
However, having run for two years, conflict arose triggered by a lack of 
communication among the management of the station (YARI 2007). This issue was 
solved when YARI obtained another extension grant for its program.  
In 2006, the UNDP GEF-SGP provided another grant IDR 465 million (or USD 
53,450) for continuity of the YARI program in these two villages for two more years 
(November 2006 – November 2008) (YARI 2007). Under this grant, YARI expanded 
its target areas by adding Tanjung Tiram village in Konawe Selatan district. YARI also 
implemented a fund scheme to enable local fishers to access the live fish trade chain 
in Makassar, South Sulawesi.  
 
 
In 2005, YARI assisted Saponda village to pass its Village Regulation (Peraturan 
Desa/Perdes) concerning the establishment of a marine and coastal management area 
(kawasan kelola laut/KKL) in Saponda. This regulation set up three zones of KKL: core, 
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tourism and limited utilization zones. It also stipulated the types of activities prohibited in 
the three zones and the types of fines for infringement (Table 20) (Pemdes Saponda 2005).  
Table 20.  Scope of Perdes KKL Saponda regulation 
Zone Type of prohibited activities 
 Core zone  All fishing activities, including using hook fishing (pancing), arrow, fishnet, 
trawl and lamps.  
 Taking meti-meti or other biota even at low tide 
 Conducting mariculture 
 Hunting and catching protected marine animals  
 Tourism zone  Throwing trash into the coastal water and coastal areas 
 Hunting and catching protected marine animals  
 Limited utilization zone  Fishing by using not approved fishing gears (hook, bubu, fishnet and sero) 
 Bomb and cyanide fishing 
 Using gae (mini purse seine)  
Source: Pemdes Saponda (2005) 
 
Perdes Saponda on KKL stipulates three tiers of punishment for illegal activities. 
In the first tier, the offender will be warned and made to sign a promissory stating that he 
or she will not repeat the violation.  If the offence is repeated, then the offender will be 
charged a fine of IDR 25,000 (USD 3) and issued with a serious warning. The highest tier 
is to pay a fine of IDR 50,000 (USD 6) and the offender will be handed over to the police 
or law enforcement office.  
There is a common theme in the passage of the Perdes Toli-toli and Saponda. 
Village administration and communities become strategic partners in implementing coastal 
resource protection and management as well as carrying out law enforcement. These two 
Perdes share some distinctions. The enactment process of Perdes Saponda took longer than 
Perdes Toli-toli. Perdes Saponda required wide consensus among village members, which 
did not exist at the beginning of the Perdes-making process due to the existence of 
opposing views on the ways to fish (destructive and non-destructive). Meanwhile, Perdes 
Toli-toli was driven by government support for project activities with assistance from 
academics and NGOs. The way to pursue consensus on the Perdes Toli-toli was different to 
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Perdes Saponda. The fines for violations in Perdes Toli-toli are much higher than in Perdes 
Saponda. For Saponda, the scale of the fines for violations is appropriate to the current 
conditions of its coastal communities, most of which are poor. 
By way of an example of the enforcement of these regulations, there was a 
dynamite bombing violation in the Saponda KKL area at the beginning of January 2007 
that involved the extended family of the Village Leader (Informant G-NGO-Kdi, 2007). 
The conservation group and villagers urged the Saponda village government to charge the 
offender.  
On 4 January 2007, a trial was held, which almost half the Saponda villagers 
attended. The Village Leader actually chaired the trial and there was much discussion on 
the type of fine appropriate for the violator (YARI 2007). Eventually, the violator was 
given two fines; one of IDR 1 million (USD 115) to be paid within a month, and the 
second fine was the signing of a promise not to repeat the violation. The impacts of his 
repeated violations caused the violator be charged 20 times the maximum penalty 
(Informant G-NGO-Kdi, 2007). The trial was a warning that this case should be the first 
and last case of violation KKL (YARI 2007). This case was intended as a test case for 
deterring destructive fishing activities on Saponda Island (Informant G-NGO-Kdi, 2007). 
While the actual amount of the fine may seem insignificant to outsiders, to poor a Bajo 
fisherman it would be a considerable financial cost. There is also a certain amount of 
public shaming involved in the process and this is an additional deterrent.  
The trial was powerful enough to reduce the number of violations of the 
destructive fishing rules in KKL areas (YARI 2007), for it acted as shock therapy for other 
villagers as well. My in-depth interviews with several key informants in Saponda Island 
confirmed that they became more conscious of reducing their own destructive fishing 
activities because they feared such punishment. The trial also led to the villagers to become 
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more aware of the importance of protecting nursery and feeding grounds in order to ensure 
a supply for their fishing (RANESI 2007; YARI 2007). They can now expect the direct 
impact of protecting the core zone to be an increase in their catches (RANESI 2007).  
4.7.2.3 Academic institutions 
The Konawe case is closely followed by academics interested in the policy 
formulation process for coastal zones. Most of these academics are from the Kendari-based 
University of Halu Oleo (Unhalu) as there is no higher education institution in Konawe 
that focuses on fisheries or coastal zone management. Several of the academic staff and 
researchers are engaged as consultants or research workers in the study of coastal zone 
management to provide technical input for planning documents. Despite having limited 
expertise and experience in coastal zone management, their involvement has influenced the 
coastal zone management process in Konawe, especially at the provincial level. 
The appointment of academics to implement scientific studies of the coastal zone 
and to formulate planning documents is primarily decided through personal networking. 
For example, my informants stated that a senior Unhalu lecturer is always preferred for 
MCRMP Project consultancies by the Provincial Bappeda because of his good relationship 
with the project manager and the high-ranking officers in Bappeda (Informant K-Exp-Kdi, 
2005). His educational background and training in fisheries, with a specialization in crab 
culture, as well his position as part of Unhalu management, also account for his continued 
employment in these positions. 
In choosing his team and commencing the projects, he selects most of his team 
members from the Fisheries Department of the Faculty of Agriculture of Unhalu,82 who are 
again part of his personal network. For some jobs, he acted as lobbyist and negotiator for 
                                                     
82 Unhalu’ Fisheries Department has now become the Faculty of Marine Science and Fisheries.  
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Bappeda instead of team leader. There have also been criticisms of his role within the 
university (Informant K-Exp-Kdi, 2005; Informant M-Exp-Kdi, 2007). His critic state that 
his work is of poor quality because of his heavy workload and that much of the material 
produced is repetitious and negatively affects the image of Unhalu (Informant M-Exp-Kdi, 
2007). 
Despite some negative views on Unhalu academics’ involvement in CZM studies, 
collaboration between Unhalu with local and provincial governments provides promising 
signs of more opportunities in policy-based and policy-oriented research. These 
opportunities will be the proper medium for Unhalu academics to take and amplify their 
roles in CZM decision-making process. To take full advantage of these academics’ 
contributions to local decision-making policy, Unhalu needs to encourage potential 
researchers to contribute to the collaborations and make the process of involvement more 
transparent. Unhalu also needs to act as “more than just a rubber stamp” stakeholder in 
CZM policy.           
4.7.3 Administering the coastal zone 
Obtaining a complete and accurate picture of spending related to coastal and 
fishery management in Konawe is not a simple task, although budget documents such as 
APBD do provide some data on local government spending. Coastal management and 
fishery programs in Konawe are highly dependent on external funding sources, mostly 
transfers from the central government in Jakarta. Konawe district's own revenues from 
marine and fisheries are too small to fund any significant coastal management and fisheries 
programs. Consequently, without any funding transfer from the central government, there 
are no effective programs on coastal zone management in the region.  
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4.7.3.1 Available funding 
Coastal and fisheries management was often seen as a supplementary (pelengkap) 
service component that promised to enhance economic development for both Kabupaten 
Kendari and then for Konawe. Coastal and fisheries management tasks were neglected in 
favour of revenue earning. Geographic conditions and the complexity of coastal issues in 
the region have combined with a growing lack of natural resources and poor economic 
returns, resulting in a lack of interest that has marginalized coastal and fisheries policy 
areas.  
This condition was reversed when MMAF was formed and required partners at 
both the provincial and kabupaten levels for the implementation of the MMAF mandates. 
Subsequently, additional funding for partnership engagement in coastal and fisheries 
management programs was provided. A flow of resources from transfers from the central 
government and the implementation of projects on coastal and fisheries issues in Konawe 
increased substantially when compared with the situation prior the establishment of the 
MMAF (Informant A-Gov-Kon, 2007) (Figure 16). MMAF pushed a strong agenda for 
fiscal balance in coastal and fisheries issues by initiating the Fisheries Revenues Sharing 
Fund (Dana Bagi Hasil Perikanan) in 2000 and the Specific Allocation Fund on Marine 
Affairs and Fisheries (Dana Alokasi Khusus/DAK Bidang Kelautan dan Perikanan) in 
2004.  
Prior to the establishment of the MMAF, the budget allocation for coastal and 
fisheries projects in Konawe was under the allocation for the agriculture and forestry sector 
(Sektor Pertanian dan Kehutanan/SPK). Under this allocation, the coastal and fisheries 
management sector shared only a small proportion, as it was not considered a competitive 
or promising sector. By taking the pro-rata proportion (30 %), the maximum budget 
allocation for coastal and fisheries management pre-MMAF establishment (pre-1999) in 
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1997 was only one third of the available funding for coastal and fisheries activities after 
the establishment of MMAF in 2002 (Table 21).  
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Figure 16.  Estimated and available funding for coastal and fisheries management 
program in Konawe (1994 – 2008).  
 
Starting in fiscal year 2004, the available funding for coastal and fisheries in 
Konawe increased significantly. The only exception was for the fiscal year 2005 when 
funding dropped, although it was still a significant increase when compared with the pre-
MMAF budget (almost five fold). This available funding illustrates the gradual shift in the 
policy process of the central government as well as whose stronger political will and a 
greater financial commitment toward fostering decentralized coastal and fisheries 
management.  
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Table 21.  Coastal and fisheries funding available for Konawe 1994 - 2008 
Fiscal Year 
Annual Budget for 
Agriculture and 
Forestry Sector 
(including 
fisheries and 
coastal) (SPK) 
Estimated 
budget 
allocation for 
fisheries and 
coastal 
management 
(33% of SPK) 
Specific 
Alocation Fund 
(DAK) 
Fisheries 
Sharing 
Revenue (DBH) 
DAK + DBH 
1994/1995 295,790,000  88,737,000  NA  NA  NA  
1995/1996 469,800,000  140,940,000  NA  NA  NA  
1996/1997 1,558,280,000  467,484,000  NA  NA  NA  
1997/1998 438,320,000  131,496,000  NA  NA  NA  
1998/1999 302,920,000  90,876,000  NA  NA  NA  
1999/2000 1,842,070,000  552,621,000  NA  NA  NA  
2000/2001 1,910,530,000  573,159,000    684,390,000  684,390,000  
2002 3,551,790,000  1,065,537,000    739,200,000  739,200,000  
2003* 1,560,657,858       960,000,000  960,000,000  
2004     3,040,000,000  1,355,688,141  4,395,688,141  
2005     1,350,000,000  1,272,727,000   2,622,727,000  
2006     3,390,000,000  752,992,730  4,142,992,730  
2007     3,888,000,000  454,545,454  4,342,545,454  
2008      3,888,000,000  454,545,454  4,342,545,454  
Sources: 
Data 1994 - 2000 are from website of Directorate General of Budget, Ministry of Finance 
Data 2001 accounted from part of shared revenue from natural resources and mining.  
Data 2002 refers to Keputusan Menteri Keuangan Republik Indonesia Nomor 214/KMK.O6/2002 tentang Penetapan Perkiraan Jumlah 
Dana Bagian Daerah dari Sumber Daya Alam Minyak Bumi dan Gas Alam, Pertambangan Umum serta Perikanan Tahun Anggaran 
2002 
Data refers to budget allocation for DKP Konawe from Keputusan Bupati Kendari No. 85/2003 tentang Penjabaran Perubahan APBD 
2003 
Data 2004 accounted from part of shared revenue from natural resources. 
Data 2007 refers to Peraturan Menteri Keuangan Republik Indonesia Nomor 141 / PMK.07 / 2006 Tentang Penetapan Perkiraan 
Alokasi Dana Bagi Hasil Sumber Daya Alam Perikanan Tahun Anggaran 2007 
Data 2008 refers to Peraturan Menteri Keuangan 142/PMK.07.2007 tentang Penetapan Alokasi Dana Alokasi Khusus Tahun 2008 
 
  Significant increases in budget availability for the coastal and fisheries 
management programs were not immediately associated with the competencies to manage 
the budget. Head of DKP Konawe in 2004, Yusuf Supriatna, was reported to have taken 
IDR 450 million or USD 51,725 for personal use when he instructed the DKP Konawe 
Treasurer to transfer state funds to a colleagues’ bank account (TEMPO Interaktif 2004b). 
Yusuf stated it was a temporary loan but he never repaid the money. At that time, he was 
reported to be lobbying for the position of Bupati (TEMPO Interaktif 2004b), although he 
was not even a front runner in the campaign. It has not been made clear whether the money 
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was for his campaign, but he is now Head of  the Konawe Transportation Service (Dinas 
Perhubungan Konawe) (Kendari Ekspres 2008b). 
4.7.3.2 Budget allocation 
The Konawe budget allocation for coastal and fisheries management is now more 
than ten times the budget allocation of 2004 (Table 22). Sources of budget allocation are 
mostly DAK Bidang Kelautan, PAD and Dana Bagi Hasil Perikanan. General block grant 
allocation (Dana Alokasi Umum), which is the largest transfer fund from the central 
government, is mostly spent for civil service salaries and office operational costs. 
There are four revenue sources for the Konawe district government: local taxes, 
local rates and service fees, profits from local government enterprises (which remain in 
deficit at present), and an ‘other’ category (mostly permits for trading and company 
registration). Among these, the resource extraction fee (Retribusi Ijin Pengambilan Hasil) 
is the major contributor to Konawe revenue, accounting for 90 per cent (IDR 6,050 million 
or USD 695,400) of local revenue (Pemda Kabupaten Konawe 2006c). Fisheries and 
coastal resource fees form part of this Retribusi Ijin Pengambilan Hasil. 
In 2003, the budget allocated for DKP Konawe increased by almost 200 percent 
compared with the estimated budget of the 1999/2000 year. Almost 75 per cent of the 2003 
budget was spent on salaries, office operations and maintenance costs. The rest of the 
budget was allocated to asset procurement (21.8 %) and operational and maintenance costs 
for fisheries landing facilities (3.8 %). The proportion of the 2003 budget allocated to 
coastal and fisheries management is only 0.5 per cent of the total Konawe budget. 
Revenues in 2003 from fisheries and coastal activities contributed 14 per cent of the total 
budget for coastal and fisheries management.      
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Table 22.  Konawe Local Government Budget (APBD) 2003 – 2007 
 
Sources: Pemda Kabupaten Kendari (2003); and Pemda Kabupaten Konawe (2004b, 2005b, 2006c, 2007) 
 
Despite an increasing budget for the fiscal year 2004 when 79 per cent of the 
budget was allocated for asset procurement and development such as land acquisition and 
fish landing facilities, revenues from fisheries and coastal related activities fell to about 
half of the 2003 revenues. The ongoing development of the fisheries landing facilities 
affected this decreasing revenue. 
No.  2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1 Budget Allocation for DKP Konawe 
   
1,560,657,858  
   
4,425,727,890  
   
3,311,952,338  
   
6,387,574,288  
   
12,701,681,960  
  Detailed allocations  
a. 
Salary, lump sum 
and office operation 
and maintenance 
   
1,160,907,858  
   
922,727,890  
   
983,391,796  
   
2,293,168,275  
   
2,368,796,200  
b. Asset and its maintenance cost 
   
341,075,000  
   
3,503,000,000  
   
2,328,560,542  
   
4,033,526,677  
   
8,589,755,760  
c. 
Operational cost for 
coastal and 
fisheries facilities 
   
58,675,000                         -                          -   
   
42,567,000  
   
1,743,130,000  
2 Total Konawe Budget (APBD) 
  
308,831,988,750  
  
197,909,100,000  
  
209,780,531,019  
  
285,320,714,845  
   
546,739,503,937  
3 
Percentage DKP 
Budget (1) to Total 
Budget (2) 
                   0.51                      2.24                     1.58                      2.24                      2.32  
4 Revenue from DKP    219,000,000  
   
107,000,000  
   
200,000,000  
   
215,000,000  
   
200,000,000  
  Detailed revenues sources 
a. Levy on fishery quality examination 
   
165,000,000  
   
100,000,000  
   
190,000,000  
   
190,000,000  
   
170,000,000  
b. Fishery sales fee    14,000,000  
   
7,000,000  
   
10,000,000  
   
15,000,000  
   
10,000,000  
c. Levy on fisheries production service 
   
40,000,000                         -                          -     
   
20,000,000  
5 Total Konawe Revenue 
   
13,800,296,919  
   
14,112,540,000  
   
8,091,998,208  
   
6,720,379,115  
   
12,767,706,360  
6 
Percentage DKP 
Revenue (4) to 
Total Revenue (5) 
                   1.59                      0.76                     2.47                      3.20                      1.57  
7 
Percentage DKP 
Revenue (4) to 
DKP Budget (1) 
                  14.03                      2.42                     6.04                      3.37                      1.57  
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In 2005, the budget for DKP Konawe decreased by almost one fourth of the 2004 
budget. Spending on asset procurement and development still took a large proportion (70 
%) of the total budget for the year 2005. However, Konawe was confident that there would 
be an increase in the revenue targets from marine and fisheries activities for the year 2005. 
Revenue from fees for fishery quality examination (Retribusi Pengujian Mutu Hasil 
Perikanan) was predicted to increase up to 90 per cent to IDR 190 million (USD 21,840). 
Similarly, fees from fishery sales (Retribusi Penjualan Hasil Perikanan) increased by 
almost 50 percent to a total of  IDR 10 million or USD 1,150 (Pemda Kabupaten Konawe 
2005b). However, only 80 per cent of the targets for revenue from fishery quality 
examination and 60 per cent from the fishery sales fee can be achieved (Pemda Kabupaten 
Konawe 2006c). Fees from fisheries production services (Retribusi Jasa Perikanan) 
increased almost six-fold, which is the highest percentage increase of all Konawe revenues 
(Pemda Kabupaten Konawe 2006c). Total revenues in the 2005 fiscal year increased by 87 
per cent compared with the 2004 revenues. 
The budget of DKP Konawe for the year 2006 increased by 90 per cent compared 
with the 2005 budget. For 2007 fiscal year, the budget for DKP Konawe also increased by 
90 per cent over the 2006 budget. A large proportion of this budget was still spent for asset 
procurement and development, which accounted for 63 per cent in 2006 and 68 per cent in 
2007. Konawe also spent one third of its total budget on fisheries apparatus and fishing 
gear.  
In 2007, most of the asset procurement and development budget was spent for 
land acquisition and construction for fish landing facilities. The source of this spending 
was a combination of DAK, PAD and adhoc funds. The revenues for fiscal years 2006 and 
2007 remained constant with no significant increase. 
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The Special Allocation Fund (DAK) was the main source for the asset 
procurement and development fund for the fiscal years 2005 to 2007. Konawe used a 
formula, which estimated that 90 per cent of total cost for asset procurement and 
development would come from DAK and 10 per cent from Local Area Revenue (PAD). 
Continuous development of fish landing facilities in Wawonii took about one quarter of the 
total budget for asset procurement and development. 
These budget figures provide a chronicle that shows the Konawe budget for the 
coastal and fisheries management program depends highly on the transfer of funds from 
central government. This is understandable since coastal and marine affairs are a rapidly 
developing sector in the region and to foster these efforts requires the expenditure of more 
resources, especially financial resources. Furthermore, the cost to develop infrastructure in 
coastal areas is relatively higher than in terrestrial areas due to the challenges and 
geographic features of coastal areas. Most of Konawe expenditure on coastal and fisheries 
amounts to a small proportion of its PAD and central government transfers dominate. 
Konawe revenues from coastal and fisheries-related activities remain similar without 
remarkable fluctuation.  
4.7.3.3 From dinas air mata to dinas mata air 
The significant increase in the DKP Konawe budget resembles the changing 
situation with regard to the DKP Konawe as a whole. In this changing situation DKP 
Konawe has became one of the most successful dinas, simply because more resources were 
involved that could be allocated to local programs. DKP Konawe ceased being a dinas air 
mata83 (agency with limited annual budget) to a dinas mata air84 (agency with adequate 
                                                     
83 Literally, means ‘tears agency’. 
84 Literally, means ‘spring agency’ 
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annual budget). It also became possible for staff to receive additional income; the position 
of the Head of DKP Konawe is now a highly sought-after position, but one which the 
Bupati has the authority to fill according to his own personal preferences.85  
Appointment to the Head of DKP Konawe involves considerable conflicts of 
interest. The appointment is now based more on the personal ties of the candidate to the 
Bupati and whether the candidate can be seen as the Bupati’s associate rather than a person 
with managerial qualities, professionalism and leadership. The current Head of DKP 
Konawe is allied to the socio-political branch of Konawe Secretariat. His performance in 
this position and his actions on the issues facing coastal management and fisheries in 
Konawe confirms local opinions that he lacks competency in the position and that he was 
appointed because of his close links to the current Bupati (Informant B-Kon-Gov, 2007). 
4.7.4 Rising expenditure, stagnant performance? 
“However, we realize that changing behaviour is a difficult task although 
[decentralization] has been six years in implementation”   
(Informant A-Exp-Kdi 2005) 
 
Despite funding for coastal zone management having increased three times, the 
implementation of programs is still in the “wait and see” stage (Informant A-Gov-Kon 
2005). The Konawe district administration in most cases is reluctant to find and create 
innovative ways for spending the coastal and fisheries management budget. There are two 
main reasons behind this reluctance. First, Konawe is accustomed to work under Juklak 
and Juknis settings86. This means that Konawe will implement a program only as long as 
                                                     
85 Based on interviews with Informant A-Gov-Kon (2007), Informant K-Exp-Kdi (2005) and Informant 
B-Gov-Kon (2007). 
86 The settings are the New Order budgetary process and mechanism. Juklak is Petunjuk Pelaksanaan, an 
implementation guidelines document. Juknis is Petunjuk Teknis, a technical guidelines document containing 
technical aspects of some project or program activities. For development projects, these two types of 
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they receive Juklak and Juknis guidelines from the central government. Second, the central 
government on several occasions has provided unclear directions. Even for the internal 
central ministry, the Juklak and Juknis can often be contradictory (Informant K-Gov-Nat 
2005). These Juklak and Juknis processes remain part of the local orientation in 
administering the budget for coastal and fisheries management.  
There are two other main obstacles to effective financial management in Konawe; 
the commitment of local government officials in the areas of coastal management and a 
cash oriented approach to funding. As one informant remarked: 
 “[L]ocal officials from Kabupaten, Kecamatan even Desa [levels] often abuse 
their position in government for their own benefits and remain unaccountable”.  
(Informant B-Exp-Kdi, 2005) 
 
However, the Corruption Eradication Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan 
Korupsi/KPK) has now become a motivating force for the Konawe district to manage its 
local budget (APBD) honestly. Under Law No. 30 of 2002 on the Corruption Eradication 
Commission, KPK can conduct investigations, indictments and prosecutions against 
corrupt activities, as well as monitor local government operations.  
Earlier KPK actions against corruption, which put many local civil servants in jail, 
have daunted program managers and heads of office in local governments. They worry that 
they will be targeted for investigation, which is sometimes politically motivated. Instead, 
they look for safe rather than innovative ways to spend their budget allocation. They prefer 
less risk of KPK investigation in spending their budget.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
guidelines merge into Petunjuk Operasional – PO, a more specific description of planned activities and 
expenditures, which was prepared for the development budget (DIP) approval (Rohdewohld 1995). 
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In addition, grey legal areas and unclear directions in some regulations from the 
central government have led to wide interpretations of rules and laws. These interpretations 
may be effective in terms of financial control, but can also lead to fears that the KPK will 
conduct unwarranted ‘witch-hunts’. Consequently, local government officials wait for clear 
directives from the central government rather than spend funds for development.   
The legacies of the New Order regime, such as a tightly controlled bureaucracy 
and limited opportunities for creativity and innovation, are still found in Konawe (TEMPO 
Interaktif 2006a). The Bupati operates a local version of the heavy-handed authoritarian 
rule (Box 2) and the chain of decision-making in the bureaucracy is still hierarchical, in 
which the Bupati is the head of an extended family (Informant L-Gov-Kon, 2005). 
Appointing the wife of the Bupati as the Project Manager (Pemimpin Proyek/Pimpro) of 
the Kecamatan Development Program (PPK), a World Bank funded project, and as the 
Treasurer of the Village Empowerment Office (Kantor PMD), illustrates clearly the way in 
which the patrimonial, family-oriented structure of administration is allowed to operate in 
Konawe (Informant A-Gov-Kon 2007). As one of my informants described:  
“[T]he longest extended relationship [among civil servant] in Konawe 
[government] is second cousins (sepupu dua kali). You even can find family 
members in one home who are together staff members in one [Konawe] office”  
(Informant H-NGO-Kdi, 2007) 
Potential conflicts of interest under this obvious nepotism have increased and 
numerous instances of collusion, corruption and the promotion of self-interest have been 
witnessed by local officials. Indeed Informant L-Gov-Kon (2005) stated, “staff will not be 
promoted or even be considered unless they have a link to the Bupati circle or have Tolaki 
background”. This in effect stifles innovation and stops attempts to pursue effective 
decentralized CZM. 
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Box 2. Abunawas Dynasty: Family Rule in Konawe 
Abunawas is one of the most famous Tolaki clans in Konawe. This clan’s historical struggle with another famous Tolaki 
clan, the Silondae, has been highly influential in determining the political history of Konawe District. Both these families 
have long been competitors in politics and government on the Southeast Sulawesi mainland (Eko 2008). They also 
compete with local politicians from the island kabupaten (Muna, and Buton).   
The Abunawas clan dates back to the time when the Abunawas elder, the father of Lukman and Munsyi, was the most 
famous Regional Secretary (Sekwilda) of Southeast Sulawesi. Munsyi is the eldest brother of Lukman. His sister, 
Rusiati Abunawas, is wife of Yusran Silondae, former Vice Governor of Southeast Sulawesi (Kendari Pos 2008a).  
The rise of the Silondae clan started when the late Abdullah Silondae, former Bupati of Kendari in 1960 – 1965, was 
appointed Governor of Southeast Sulawesi in 1981–1982 (Kompas 2007). The clan rose to prominence again when 
Yusran Silondae was elected Vice Governor under Governor Ali Mazi from 2003 – 2008. Yacob Silondae, sibling of 
Yusran Silondae, is also a Member of People Consultative Assembly (MPR Utusan Daerah) (Chazin and Rabani 
2003).  
Currently the Abunawas clan dominates politics, the bureaucracy and consequently the local budget flows in both 
Konawe and Kendari (Eko 2008). Their domination is evident in the fact that Lukman Abunawas is Bupati of Konawe 
(2003-2008) and Mansyur Masie Abunawas was the former Mayor of Kendari (1997-2007).  
Lukman Abunawas is currently in his second term (2008-2013) and will be Bupati of Konawe until 2013. In Kendari 
Mansyur Masie Abunawas also served two terms as Mayor of Kendari. Both their leadership periods are also 
dominated by patrimony with family members appointed to senior positions. The regimes are strongly ethnic Tolaki 
based (Eko 2008). With this structure, they have been able to lay the foundation for long-term political power.  
Lukman was suspected of corruption in the fiscal year 2003 for manipulating and marking up the local budget (APBD) 
for education (National Examination/EBTA) and severance pay (pesangon) of the DPRD members for the term 1999–
2004. The sum totalled IDR 2 billion rupiah or USD 230,000 (Kompas 2006). The formal legal documentation of the 
Lukman corruption allegation highlights the problems of discrimination in legal proceedings and the propensity for 
bribery and political intervention in local politics. Minister of Home Affairs (Mendagri) sent a formal letter to recommend 
the suspension of Lukman as Bupati and support for the appointment of Toni Herbiansyah (Vice Bupati) as acting 
Bupati. The acting Governor, Yusran Silondae, did not support either the recommendation or act on the proposal to 
appoint a new Bupati (Kompas 2006).  
Lukman’s charge of corruption was highly controversial and very public (TEMPO Interaktif 2006b). At a meeting with 
the Director of Provincial Public Persecutors Office, Antasari Azhar (former Deputy Attorney General for General 
Criminal, and currently chairman of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK)) released Lukman before the verdict 
was announced and without any charges. Lukman was re-appointed as Bupati of Konawe and confirmed in his second 
term in the first direct election (pemilihan kepala daerah/pilkada) in Konawe.   
Partnered with Masmudin, Lukman Abunawas won 68.16 percent of the total ballot in the first Konawe direct election 
(TEMPO Interaktif 2008). His success at the pilkada remained controversial and caused considerable protest. His 
victory in the election enforced the belief that there was a considerable mark-up of ballots and highlighted the role of 
'money politics' within the Local Election Committee (KPUD). The Governor of Southeast Sulawesi Province, Nur 
Alam, refused an order from the Minister of Home Affairs to inaugurate Lukman Abunawas as Bupati and Masmudin 
as Vice Bupati of Konawe for period 2008 - 2013. A similar situation arose when Governor La Ode Kaimoeddin refused 
to inaugurate Masyhur Masie Abunawas – Musakkir Mustafa as Mayor and Vice Mayor of Kota Kendari in 2002 
(Kendari Pos 2008a). 
Finally Lukman’s second term as Bupati was inaugurated by the Ministry of Home Affairs, Jakarta, on 22 May 2008 at 
a special session of the Konawe House of Representative/DPRD Konawe (TEMPO Interaktif 2008). Only 15 members 
of the 30 member DPRD Konawe parliament attended this special session. The Minister of Home Affairs issued the 
Minister of Home Affairs Decrees 131.74-230 and 131.74-231 2008 for the appointment of Lukman as Bupati and 
Mahmuddin as Vice Bupati (Kendari Pos 2008a).  
 
Changing the leadership structure in Konawe could bring dynamic changes to 
local political action and the bureaucratic machinery. Filling vital civil servant positions, 
which most certainly contain power and the promise of lucrative financial benefit, are high 
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priorities for the Bupati. For example, the Bupati still makes the final appointment despite 
candidates having qualifications and skills when applying for the position of Sekda 
(Sekretaris Daerah), the highest civil servant position in the district level.87  
Direct elections (Pilkada) increase the influence of the Bupati on Sekda’s 
appointments. The Sekda must be willing to translate the Bupati’s promises into action, 
especially those made during the local election campaign. It is a rare occasion when the 
Sekda takes the opposing position to the Bupati’s promises, including the promises88 made 
by his political advisers, campaign team (Tim Sukses) or investors. The Sekda must appear 
to be a loyal bureaucrat. This patronage can sometimes result in Sekda being appointed as 
caretaker Bupati for new pemekaran administrative units, as happened with Aswad 
Sulaiman, previous Sekda under the Bupati Lukman Abunawas. Lukman even fought for 
Aswad when the interim governor rejected his appointment as candidate for caretaker 
Bupati Konawe Utara (Section 4.5).   
Under Government Regulation 84/2000, the authority to promote a civil servant as 
Sekda is the prerogative of the Bupati. The local parliament has very limited power to 
control the appointment of the Sekda. The Bupati just needs approval from the local 
parliament. If the local parliament disagrees with a decision, it must submit an objection in 
writing and then the Bupati has 30 days to reconsider. If there is no consent to his proposal 
then the Bupati can ignore the local parliament’s concerns and inaugurate his candidate as 
Sekda.  
The Sekda then has the authority to propose and select the head of services 
(Dinas) and agencies (Badan) including the Head of the DKP Konawe. The Bupati 
approves this position. This flow of nepotism creates an elite structure of men allied to the 
                                                     
87 Article 20 Government Regulation 84/2000 on Guidelines for Local Government Organization. 
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Bupati and the selection process can ignore questions about competency and level of 
management skills. The bureaucracy often becomes stagnant and underperforms. “Business 
as usual” turns out to be a common theme in the implementation of decentralized CZM. 
Indeed, it opens the door for widespread corruption and collusion. Corruption, in turn, 
places heavy burdens on the limited natural resources of Konawe. 
While Konawe suffers from poor governance due to nepotism and corruption, 
several other factors also mitigate against efficient development of coastal and fishery 
resources.89 Local financial management is one of the constraining factors on the 
implementation of decentralized CZM. My informants confirm that there are four typical 
type of financial failure in Konawe: (i) not enough funding to pay for service delivery; (ii) 
spending on the wrong thing; (iii) misappropriation; and (iv) poor management and poor 
supervision. These financial failures existed in the absence of accountability in proposing 
funding as well as the way of budget spending. These failures also correspond to the 
chronic bureaucracy “illness” that has existed and grown for more than three decades 
under the New Order period. Maximizing rent seeking and personal interest in local budget 
allocations was the main contributor to financial failures.  
Many of the issues in financial failure are management problems that could be 
solved with education, commitment and dedication, but developing these capacities in 
poorly-paid rural bureaucrats is a long-term project and the problem cannot be solved 
simply with an injection of money. However, there have been some promising actions such 
as improvement of the remuneration system for civil servants and the pakta integritas 
(integrity pact) for upper echelon positions.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
88 Promises can be development tenders, promotions for upper positions and other lucrative jobs orders.  
89 Interview with Informant B-Exp-Kdi (2005), Informant E-Exp-Kdi (2007) and Informant E-NGO-Kdi 
(2007) 
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Ideally, Konawe, as the oldest administration unit in Southeast Sulawesi, should 
have a more advanced administration and bureaucracy than its pemekaran districts. 
However, the bureaucracy remains unchanged without further innovation on better service 
delivery. In a typical sceptical view on Konawe is local government’ performance, one of 
my informants stated:  
If I put Konawe in a local government ranking system, I will prefer Konawe as 
anchor ranking. Many [incredible statistical] numbers which show the current 
progress of Konawe [in development] are rhetoric only with lack of 
improvement. [In fact] the realities are far beyond the numbers  
(Informant H-NGO-Kdi 2007). 
 
4.7.5 Local regulation in Konawe 
Konawe district has issued a number of local regulations (Peraturan 
Daerah/Perda) on marine and coastal management in recent years. The latest Perda is 
Local Government Regulation 18/2006 on Marine and Coastal Zone Management in 
Konawe90. This Perda designated three zones for marine and coastal management areas 
(MCMA) including (i) Wawonii Island, (ii) Soropia Bondoala and (iii) Lasolo Bay (which 
consists of sub-zones Sawa and part of Lasolo currently under the administration of 
Kabupaten Konawe Utara). This latest Perda follows up the Decree of Bupati Kendari 
317/2004 which legally established the Konawe Strategic Planning for Marine and Coastal 
Resources 2004-2008 (Rencana Strategis Pengelelolaan Sumberdaya Pesisir dan Laut 
Kabupaten Kendari 2004 - 2008/Renstra PWP Konawe)91 and emphasised the urgency for 
Konawe to cement the legal basis for marine and coastal zone management.  
                                                     
90 Perda No. 18 Tahun 2006 tentang Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Wilayah Pesisir dan Laut Kabupaten 
Konawe. 
91 This document consists of vision, mission, issues, strategies and targets on managing marine and 
coastal resources in Konawe. Vision of Konawe on marine and coastal resource is “Sustainable marine and 
Coastal resources/Pesisir dan Lautku Lestari”. 
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The Renstra PWP Konawe expresses for the first time the political will of 
Konawe on marine and coastal issues. With assistance from the MCRMP Project, this 87-
page document presents (i) a profile of marine and coastal resources, (ii) the vision and 
mission of Konawe on marine and coastal zone management, (iii) objectives and targets, 
(iv) strategies to achieve the targets, (v) the implementation process, and (vi) a review and 
evaluation. However, this strategic planning document lacks primary and up-to-date data. 
Instead, due to the short period given to produce the document, it relied only on the 
available secondary data. Despite the style of the document and its shirt coming, this 
document signals a breakthrough of Konawe political will on marine and coastal resources.  
In 1995, another Perda on fees for Fishery Enterprises in Kabupaten Kendari was 
passed92. For almost ten years, tariffs and fees for fishery activities in Konawe had 
remained unchanged, but the Decree of Bupati Kendari Number 132/2003 that set a 
general tariff and fees adjustment subsequently amended this Perda.93 The fees were 
increased from 50 percent to 500 percent depending on the fishing activities and the gear 
used.  
These decrees were also tied to two Southeast Sulawesi Provincial Regulations 
(Perda Provinsi); Perda 3/2002 on Quality Assurance for Fish Products94 and Perda No. 
4/2002 on Fishing Licences95. Perda 3/2002 established a compliance regulation that 
fisheries products should meet the national food standards as issued by the National 
Standardization Council, and requires regular six-monthly inspections by the Provincial 
Marine Affairs and Fisheries Services (Dinas KP Provinsi). The main areas of concern for 
                                                     
92 Perda Kabupaten Daerah Tk. II Kendari Nomor 39 Tahun 1995 tentang Retribusi Izin Usaha Perikanan 
dalam Kabupaten Daerah Tk II Kendari. 
93 Keputusan Bupati Kendari Nomor 136 Tahun 2003 tentang Penyesuaian Tarif Retribusi pemberian Izin 
Usaha Perikanan dan Surat Penangkapan Ikan dalam Wilayah Kabupaten Kendari. 
94 Perda Provinsi Sulawesi Tenggara Nomor 3 Tahun 2002 tentang Pengujian Mutu Hasil Perikanan 
95 Perda Provinsi Sulawesi Tenggara Nomor 4 Tahun 2002 tentang Izin usaha Perikanan 
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standardization include raw materials, ingredients and packaging for fisheries products. 
The commodities inspected vary from live to processed fish and include dried and salted 
fish as well as canned fish. Perda 3/2002 also imposes fees and charges for quality 
insurance inspection. 
Perda 4/2002 regulates the licence system for fishery enterprises and under this 
ruling fishery enterprises must obtain permits (izin usaha perikanan) for capture and 
aquaculture fisheries in Southeast Sulawesi. Companies are required to submit an 
enterprise report every three months to Dinas KP Provinsi. They are prohibited from using 
to use harmful and destructive fishing gear and methods. Failure to meet the terms and 
conditions of permit requirements will lead to permit cancellation and suspension. This 
Perda is similar to others issued in different provinces across the country. The Perda 
controls the levy on fisheries with the following exceptions: 
 traditional fishers with non-motorized boats, or outboard engine or inboard engine 
boats less than five gross tons or less 15 horse-power; 
 inland aquaculture holding fewer than two hectares;  
 brackish water (tambak) on fewer than four hectares or with spreading density of 
50,000 fry per hectare;  
 mariculture held in less than 0.5 hectares; and  
 fisheries activities for scientific purposes.   
 
These two regulations put emphasis on the levy or fee payment but also establish 
the criteria for the maintenance and extraction of marine resources in sustainable ways. 
However, behind the regulations are strong economic targets: in 2005, Konawe expected to 
receive IDR 200 million (USD 22,990) from the fees and charges but figures show that 
only 70 per cent of the target was achieved. This was repeated in 2006. This shortface in 
revenue from fees and charges also shows that Konawe is considered an unattractive 
fisheries landing and processing area. Fishermen prefer to sell their catches in Kendari 
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instead of Konawe despite the presence of fishing port facilities. Better prices and access to 
households shopping after transaction are two of the main reasons why fishermen sell their 
catch to Kendari instead96.  Some even prefer to sell their catch to inter-island collectors 
who pick them up at sea and provide cash payment on delivery.  
Local values and fishery management methods in Konawe are also pertinant 
(Pemprov Sultra 2004). These include: 
 tubba dikatu tuang or Bajo traditional open-closed system management for marine 
and coastal resources,  
 controlling some of coastal areas for protection purposes in kecamatans Lasolo, 
Sawa, Soropia and Bondoala, and  
 dumping waste prohibition to coastal areas by organizing houses along the coastal 
areas as happened in Tappunggaya in kecamatan Lasolo (now part of Konawe 
Utara).  
 
These local values are gradually being eroded due to economic forces and the 
search for a materialist lifestyle among coastal villagers. Indeed, there is no formal 
recognition for these local values in the Konawe Perda CZM. 
4.8 Concluding Remarks 
“Applying [reformasi] spirit in Konawe is like building a house on an unstable 
foundation. No matter how much [we] put in the effort; [we] will end up with 
no progress results because [we] ignore the fundamental basis that needs to be 
fixed”.  
(Informant H-NGO-Kdi, 2007) 
This chapter has shown that coastal and fishery management in Konawe operates 
in a dynamic socio-political context. The two most important socio-political factors at play 
in Konawe are (i) the role of the Bupati who acts as an authoritarian figure without 
                                                     
96 Interviews with Informant D-Gen-Kon (2005), Informant F-Gen-Kon (2005) and Informant G-Gen-
Kon (2005) 
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significant opposition and (ii) the proliferation of new administrative units (pemekaran). 
Competition between two prominent Tolaki clans, Abunawas and Silondae, during the 
emergence of modern Konawe led the Bupati to impose unilaterally his agenda while 
others in the local administration strategically allied themselves to him in order to obtain 
upper echelon positions with lucrative benefits. The Bupati is the main local actor in the 
saga of Konawe governmental administration and in many cases puts the bureaucracy in 
limbo.  
Konawe has three times experienced the pemekaran process and pemekaran 
discourses remain a big issue for Konawe, as there is now a proposal to form a new 
kabupaten by merging five kecamatan on Wawonii Island. The new administrative units 
resulting from pemekaran in Konawe are relatively better-off than Konawe itself. Kota 
Kendari and Kabupaten Konawe Selatan have higher and better development indicators 
and public service performance than the Konawe administration. This occasions two 
remarks. First, despite the existence of motives for lucrative positions, the pemekaran can 
provide better public service administration for new pemekaran government unit. Second, 
Konawe remains to slowly respond to local changes and to refocus its coastal and fisheries 
management in changing the nature of local administration. Konawe is busy dealing with 
pemekaran issues, as well as being like a ‘parental carer’ (kabupaten induk) for the new 
administration units during the transition period of new kabupaten, especially with regard 
to financial and human resources. In many cases, qualified people prefer to join the new 
administrative units because they offers better prospects for promotion and career 
development, as well as providing a new, challenging and promising working environment. 
In this way, Konawe lost many of its qualified personnel to new kabupaten without 
replacing the staff.  
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My case study of Konawe shows that the significant funding available for coastal 
and fisheries management has been a magnet for local administrations to compete for 
several lucrative positions that provide many personal benefits. The significant budget 
increase also lifted DKP Konawe positions from some of the least preferred to the most 
favoured in all the local administration.  
The case study of Konawe also reveals the exclusivity of current coastal and 
fisheries management projects. Despite the fact that Konawe is advanced in the production 
of coastal and fishery planning documents, its record on fair and representative 
participation levels, with local government, universities, NGOs and communities, is 
lacklustre. As one informant stated:  
If [we] refer to the [Bappeda’s] job descriptions and procedures, the [MCRMP 
Project] actually should be under my portfolio. However [because the Bupati] 
appointed my colleague as project manager [who has a relationship with the 
Bupati] to run the project, I only have to admit it. My involvement in the 
project is mostly on a casual basis without room to contribute in the project 
implementation. From my point of view, although the project is administered 
in exclusive ways, I think [the project manager and treasurer] produce good 
documents in a style [that] remains a big question on how to translate and 
implement what the documents say 
(Informant C-Gov-Kon 2007).       
In summary, the evidence presented here, from my interviews and the literature, 
supports my argument that the role of Bupati and the local socio-political dynamic 
undermines the policy processes and the administration of coastal and fisheries 
management. Evidence also points to administrative constraints that are rooted in deeper, 
unresolved and more complex problems in the context of Konawe’s cultural and historical 
background. The case study of Konawe also raises the question of how coastal and 
fisheries management would operate with a different local socio-political context. This 
question will be explored further in Chapter 5, which will present a case study of 
Kabupaten Pangkajene dan Kepulauan. 
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5 KABUPATEN PANGKAJENE DAN KEPULAUAN 
 
This chapter is a case study of Kabupaten Pangkajene dan Kepulauan (Pangkep) 
in South Sulawesi. It presents a portrait that shows how an archipelago district (kabupaten 
kepulauan) manages its coastal resources. Some lessons learned from this case study 
exemplify the challenges facing kabupaten kepulauan.  
This case study is similar in structure to the previous chapter and uses a similar 
framework. The first six sections consist of the same divisions as the previous chapter: 
introduction (Section 5.1), geographic and climate setting (Section 5.2), historical 
perspective (Section 5.3), administrative development (Section 5.4), demographic and 
ethnographic setting (Section 5.5) and the economy of Pangkep (Section 5.6). Coastal and 
fisheries management is examined in Section 5.7. This section also presents the issues 
involved in destructive fishing. Finally, the concluding Section 5.8 summarizes key points. 
5.1 Introduction 
Kabupaten Pangkajene dan Kepulauan (hereafter called 
Pangkep), one of 23 districts in South Sulawesi, is 51 kilometres 
from Makassar, the capital city of South Sulawesi and is located 
at the crossroads of the western coast of South Sulawesi (Figure 
17). Pangkep has served as an extension and a commercial transit 
area of Makassar with Pare-pare linkages, two major seaports in KTI97 and an important 
KAPET98 in the eastern Indonesia. 
                                                     
97 KTI is the short name for Kawasan Timur Indonesia, the eastern Indonesia development area. This 
term has been a geo-politic term since the 1990s. Former President Soeharto’s annual budget speech in 
January 1990 was a basis for more attention from central policy makers to the importance of development in 
Eastern Indonesia (Azis 1996:83).  This area has a wide variety of natural resources and a low population, 
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Figure 17.  Map of Kabupaten Pangkep, South Sulawesi.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
which is unevenly distributed.  The transmigration program was one notable government effort to address the 
problem of uneven population distribution. However, there were complex issues resulting from accelerated 
KTI development, such as environmental sustainability, extraction and exploitation of resources, and 
institutional problems, which led to conflict between the state and local communities. 
98 KAPET stands for Kawasan Pembangunan Ekonomi Terpadu (Integrated Economic Development 
Areas). It was established in 1995 to attract economic development with a focus on food crops and 
horticulture, plantations, fishery, forestry, tourism, mining, and industry. 
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The term ‘Pangkajene dan Kepulauan’ refers to the condition of this kabupaten, 
which has a diverse set of geographic features. ‘Pangkajene dan Kepulauan’ refers to a 
combination of inland areas including a mountainous region and a group of islands. 
Ma’dika (1997) stated that the term Pangkajene refers to an area covering inland and 
brackish waters, ponds, paddy fields, low lands and mountainous areas. Kepulauan is the 
group of islands. Kabupaten Pangkajene dan Kepulauan represents a district that has 
lowlands, mountains and islands. The emblem of this kabupaten presents this symbolism. 
For practical reasons, Kabupaten Pangkajene dan Kepulauan is shortened to Pangkep.   
Administratively, there are 12 sub-districts (kecamatan), of which nine kecamatan 
are inland, and three kecamatan comprise the group of 112 small islands in Pangkep. These 
kecamatan are divided into 36 kelurahan and 64 villages and consist of 69 lingkungan, 147 
dusun, 480 Rukun Warga, and 1,502 Rukun Tetangga (Appendix 8) (BPS Pangkep 2003).  
In 2000, Kabupaten Pangkep established three new sub-districts99: Mandalle, which 
previously belonged to Segeri-Mandalle, and Tondang Tallasa and Minasa Te’ne sub-
districts, which had originally derived from Pangkajene and Balloci. Previously these three 
kecamatan were kecamatan pembantu/perwakilan100 (liaison sub-districts). With reference 
to article 66 (6) Law 22/1999 and the Decree of Minister of Home Affairs 4/2000, these 
three kecamatan could be upgraded to sub-district level to avoid confusion in 
administrative matters. The establishment of new administrative units (pemekaran) in 
Pangkep has only occurred at the kecamatan level.  
                                                     
99 Perda Kabupaten Pangkajene Kepulauan No. 13/2000 and Approval from DPRD Pangkep No. 
22/KPTS/VI/2000 on 14 June 2000.  
100 The status of these three kecamatan as kecamatan pembantu/perwakilan was established by Surat 
Keputusan Kepala Daerah Tingkat I Sulawesi Selatan No. SK 81/11/1995 on 6 Februari 1995 and Surat 
Keputusan Kepala Daerah Tingkat I Sulawesi Selatan No. SK.953/XI/1998 on 14 November 1998.  
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5.2 Geographic and Climatic Setting  
Pangkep is located at longitude 110o east and at latitude 4o 40’ to 8o 00’ south. It 
shares administrative boundaries with Kabupaten Barru in the north, Kabupaten Maros in 
the south, and Kabupaten Bone in the east, and in the west with five large and important 
islands, Kalimantan, Jawa, Madura, Nusa Tenggara and Bali (Figure 18). 
The area of Pangkep covers 2.44 per cent (12,362.73 square kilometres) of the 
total South Sulawesi province area (BPS Sulsel 2006; Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2008a). 
The geography of Pangkep consists of a terrestrial area of 898.29 square kilometres and a 
marine area of 11,464 square kilometres (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2008a). The 
terrestrial area consists mostly of lowlands (73,721 hectares) with a mountain range (BPS 
Pangkep 2003) which extends from the western coast to the eastern part of the Pangkep. In 
the eastern part of Pangkep, there are mountainous and elevated areas that range from 100 
– 1000 meters above sea level with many karst deposits.  
There are 112 islands under Pangkep administration: 71 of these islands 
(Appendix 9) are inhabited with 51,469 people or 34 per cent of Pangkep’s population 
(Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2008a). Previously, these islands were grouped into three 
main groups, namely Spermonde (57 islands), Kalu Kalukuang (eight islands) and 
Postelion Patamoster (52 islands); each group of islands was governed by a Gallareng or 
village leader (Ma'dika 1997).  
Spermonde is a famous group of islands.  About 90 per cent of this group falls 
under Pangkep administration while the rest belongs to another seven-district 
administration in South Sulawesi (Taslim 2003).  The distance of Kapoposang Bali, the 
outermost island from Pangkajene (the capital of Pangkep) is about 270 nautical miles 
(Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2008a). It takes more than two sailing days to reach the island. 
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There are seven land formations in Pangkep (Figure 18 and Table 23). Almost half 
of Pangkep’s land formations consist of alluvium combined with (marine) clastics (23 %). 
The best-known geological platform in Kabupaten Pangkep is the Tonasa Carbonate 
Platform, which provides the carbonate and limestone as raw materials for the Tonasa 
Cement Company (PT Semen Tonasa101). The eastern part of Pangkep has coal and granite 
deposits with different vegetation forms to the other part of Pangkep (Ma'dika 1997). Like 
the western coast of South Sulawesi, Pangkep is geologically part of a low-intensity 
earthquake zone (Pemprov Sulsel 2002). 
  
Karst Turf 
  
Volcanic Marine deposit 
 
Figure 18.  Landscape and land formations in Kabupaten Pangkep.  
Source: Pemprov Sulsel (2002) 
 
                                                     
101 PT. Semen Tonasa has been a major supplier of cement for eastern Indonesia (Whitten, Mustafa, and 
Henderson 1987). 
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Table 23.  Land formations and land use in Kabupaten Pangkep 
Land formations Ha % Land use Ha % 
Alluvial 6 843 46,8 Forest  26.674 24,0 
Marine deposit 1 519 10,4 Plantations 13.558 12,2 
Marine karst  3 372 23,1 Paddy fields 21.815 19,6 
Turf 201 1,4 Ponds 10.818 9,7 
Terrain 1 150 7,9 Residential 6.183 5,6 
Volcanic 1 107 7,6 Transmigration 
areas - - 
Karst  408 2,8 Other purposes 32.181 28,9 
    111.229  
Source: (BPS Pangkep 2003; Ma'dika 1997; Pemprov Sulsel 2002) 
 
Humidity in Pangkep is relatively high (BPS Pangkep 2003). During the west 
monsoon (December – February), rainfall ranges from 493 to 1,007 millimetres with 20 to 
22 rainy days per month. By contrast, rainfall is less than 18 millimetres with 0 - 4 rainy 
days per month during the east monsoon (May – September) (BPS Pangkep 2003). 
Pangkep has 30 rivers that comprise 131 kilometres of watershed and 25 estuaries 
(Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2008c). Some of the rivers have freshwater inlets with 
brackish water used for fish and shrimp ponds (tambak) as well as freshwater resources 
(Appendix 10). Some rivers form a natural boundary between two kabupaten, kecamatan 
or villages. The Kalibone River in the south is the natural boundary of Pangkep with 
Kabupaten Maros. In the north, the Limbangan River also forms a natural boundary 
between Kecamatan Labakkang and Ma’rang (FKSS IKIP Ujung Pandang 1979). In the 
middle, Pangkajene River (Tabo-tabo) is the main water supplier to the Tabo-tabo Dam and 
Leang Lontong.102 
Forest areas constitute a high percentage of Pangkep land, accounting for 24 per 
cent of the total area of Pangkep (Pemprov Sulsel 2002).  Total forest area in Pangkep 
                                                     
102 Former President Soeharto inaugurated Tabo-tabo Dam on 15 June 1978, as part of the BIMAS 
movement to intensify paddy production.  
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comes to 33,767 hectares, consisting of 21,631 hectares of protected forest, 3,485 hectares 
of limited production forest, and 1,264 hectares of mangrove and nypa forest (BPS 
Pangkep 2003).  
5.3 Historical Perspective  
 The area of Pangkep was the centre of the former Siang Kingdom (Fadillah and 
Mahmud 2000), one of Sulawesi’s most important ports until the 16th century (Ammarell 
1999). The Siang Kingdom was a maritime kingdom and the hub of maritime trade for the 
western coast of Sulawesi. Travel accounts by Portuguese sailors103 mentioned the Siang 
Kingdom (Portugese: Sciom or Ciom) relied on Pangkajene as an important entry port for 
the western coast of Sulawesi (Pelras 1996). Siang was also the home of the Sama sea 
nomads (Bajo Laut) prior to their subjugation by the Gowa and Tallo kingdoms in the 
sixteenth century (Ammarell 1999). The important trading commodities for the Siang 
Kingdom were imported porcelain, cotton, forest products, timber, agriculture, cattle and 
gold (Pelras 1996; Fadillah and Mahmud 2000).  
The Siang Kingdom was heavily influenced by traders from China 
(Ming/Yuan/Sing), Anvam and Svargaloka (Sawankhalok) (Reid and Reid 1988). The 
porcelain dating from 14th to the 16th centuries is an indication of this influence. Siang 
became a trade transit point in the struggle for spices (Haylor et al. 2003). Arsuka 
(2002:309-310) noted that: 
 
 
                                                     
103 These Portuguese sailors were Antonio de Paiva and Manuel Pinto, who in the mid sixteenth century 
wrote in their travel diaries that in the period, Siang was still under paganisme/animism although Islam and 
Catholicism tried to infiltrate.  The main purpose of their mission was to convert the Siang Kingdom to 
Catholicism.  
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When Malacca City, which for centuries had become the busiest port in the 
world, at least in Asia, fell under Portuguese cannons in 1511, some Malay 
warriors, refusing to admit defeat, migrated in flocks to Siang (Pangkajene 
Islands, close to the Macassar capital). They later moved to Sombaopu upon 
receiving a written protection guarantee from the King of Gowa X, Karaeng 
Tunipalangga (reigned 1548–1566). This guarantee to let all of peoples 
establish communities in Sombaopu and pass freely through its waters, a form 
of extraterritorial law, was the first pre-European guarantee issued in 
Nusantara, the historical name for the Indonesian Archipelago.  
In the 15th century, the ruler of Gowa IX, Daeng Marante of Tumapakrisik 
Kalonna104 governed Siang Kingdom as part of Gowa’s territory. Under this ruler’s 
administration, Pangkep was divided into three autonomous units, Barasa (around 
Kecamatan Pangkajene), Siang (Bungoro) and Lambasang (Labakkang). 
The rise of the Siang Kingdom began in the 16th century under the control of the 
Makassar kingdom. Its rise occurred before the growth of the twin kingdoms of Gowa and 
Tallo at the beginning of the 17th century (Fadillah and Mahmud 2000), that is, in the era 
prior to the conversion of Makassar to Islam. The fall of the Siang Kingdom began when 
the riverside of Pangkajene started to silt up. 
In 1625, the ruler of Gowa XIV, Sultan Alaudin Tumengga ri Agamana, appointed 
his representative in Labakkang, Karaeng Lambasang. Almost a half century later, in 1667, 
the Dutch occupied the Gowa Kingdom. This occupation led to the control of the northern 
part of Gowa, including Maros and Pangkajene.  
In 1736, an alliance between Karaeng Bontolangkasa of Gowa, Arungkaju of 
Bone, and La Maddukelleng Arung Sengkang was formed to wage guerrilla war to defend 
the Gowa territory. This alliance regained the northern and eastern parts of the Gowa 
Kingdom (Maros, Pangkep and Bantaeng) and led to a massive Bugis settlement along the 
west coast of Pangkajene.  
                                                     
104 This ruler of Gowa passed away in middle of 15th century.   
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However, not more than two years later, in 1738, the Dutch reoccupied those 
areas, prompting many local rebellions thereafter. One of the most famous rebellions 
occurred over a hundred year later, led by Andi Maruddani Karaeng Bontobunto. He 
opposed the Dutch colonial government for about ten years (1868 – 1878) and forced the 
Dutch to compromise by signing a treaty on tax reduction.  
At the beginning of the 20th century, the Dutch colonial government administered 
South Sulawesi through a system of afdeling and onderafdeling105, with some 
zelfbesturende lanschappen, which were more autonomous. An afdeling reported directly 
to a Dutch official. The area of the present-day Pangkajene mainland used to be 
Onderafdeling Pangkajene under the direction of Afdeling Makassar. A gezaghebber 
(Controller) governed Onderafdeling Pangkajene. Its administrative onderafdeling 
included six adat gemeenschap (Pangkajene, Bungoro, Labakkang, Segeri, Mandalle and 
Balloci). Each adat gemeenschap was headed by a chief or Karaeng who was appointed 
because of his nobility status and thereafter endorsed by the Gezaghebber.  
During the Japanese occupation (1942 – 1945), the structure of governance in 
Pangkep remained similar to that of the Dutch colonial period. The Japanese only replaced 
the nomenclature of administrative units with Japanese names. This change was also in line 
with the very strict and rigid regulation of the usage of non-Japanese names. Adat area was 
changed into a Gun, which was headed by a Guntyo Sodai, an Indonesian-appointed to 
administer the unit, under the direction of Bunken Kantikan, a Japanese-appointed 
administrator. 
                                                     
105 An afdeling was the basic Dutch administrative and political unit at the district level in the 
NetherlandsEast Indies and Netherlands New Guinea. The Indonesian government regrouped afdeling into 
kabupaten and onderafdeling into kecamatan or sub-districts.   
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During the transition era (1946-1950), South Sulawesi was under the sovereignty 
of Negara Indonesia Timur (NIT). Andi Ijo Karaeng Lalolang, acting Chief of Hadat 
Tinggi, proclaimed the separation of South Sulawesi from NIT, and its integration into the 
Republic of Indonesia in 1951. This proclamation also established several districts within 
the South Sulawesi province. One of these districts was Kabupaten Makassar, which 
comprised the former onderafdeling Gowa, Takalar, Jeneponto, Maros and Pangkajene. 
The appointed Governor of South Sulawesi had the authority to prepare the establishment 
of autonomous district units.106  
The instruction referred to the former areas under Rechtreeks Bestuuid Gebeid, 
which were established under Staadblad 1946/17, allowing for the formation of new 
government units (neo zelfbestuur). Pangkajene was one of those areas; the established 
new government unit included Hadatgemeenschap Labakkang. The islands of Pangkajene 
were established as neo zelfbestuur Haminte Makassar. 107  This Haminte administrative 
area included 57 small islands in Spermonde, eight islands in Kalu-kalukuang, and 52 
small islands in Postelian Patarmoster. A Gallareng (village head) ruled each one of the 
island groups.  
In 1957, Kabupaten Makassar was divided into three autonomous administrative 
units, Maros, Pangkajene dan Kepulauan and Makassar according to the Contingency Law 
(Undang-undang Darurat) No. 2/1957. Two years later, Law 2/1959 stipulated Pangkep as 
a kabupaten and second level autonomous unit (Daerah Tingkat II) with a Bupati as the 
head. Then, according to Bupati Pangkep Decree 174/S/ST/72, kecamatan Pangkajene 
became the capital of the kabupaten. 
                                                     
106 According to the Minister of Home Affairs’ Instruction Number Deal/14/4 dated 22 September 1951. 
107 The first Haminte Makassar had Abdul Rachim Daeng Tupuu as chief of hadat who governed with 
five members (Gallareng Balang Lompo, Gallareng Sapuka, Gallareng Salemo, Gallareng Kalu Kalukuang, 
and Gallareng Kodinggareng). 
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5.4 Administrative Development 
“From my first day as Bupati Pangkep, I will fully commit and work hard, not 
letting the [Pangkep] islanders develop their islands by themselves”  
Gaffar Pattape, 2004b. Pengabdianku untuk Rakyat p.79. 
During the New Order period, the job of Bupati Pangkep was reserved exclusively 
for someone from an army background108 as part of the dwifungsi ABRI109 (dual function of 
military officers in the civilian bureaucracy) policy. The dwifungsi policy maintained an 
“equation between the army territorial and civil administration” (Jenkins 1984:45). All 
Bupati Pangkep during the New Order were active army officers who were assigned 
(dikaryakan) responsibility for local administration and bureaucracy. Among the five 
Bupati Pangkep with military background, only HM Arsyad110 was an army general 
(Brigadier General); the rest were of colonel rank (Table 24) and  were unable to gain 
promotion to the rank of general, which was the normal requirement for a higher position 
such as governor or minister.  
In the New Order era, these military officers, mostly from the army, dominated 
social and political affairs. The army used its territorial structures111 to penetrate political 
affairs and extend army capacity into non-military affairs (kekaryaan)112 (Jenkins 1984). 
To fill a Bupati post, an army (military) officer had to have at least colonel rank. In many 
                                                     
108 This situation was similar to other districts in South Sulawesi: most of the Bupati were from the army.   
109 For a detailed study of dwifungsi ABRI, see Notosusanto et al. (1984) 
110 HM Arsyad was the first and most famous Bupati appointed when the New Order began. 
111 Army territorial structures were set up as a legacy of the struggle during the colonial period to 
maintain security (Jenkins 1984; Lane 2008; Notosusanto et al. 1984). At every level of government 
administration, the army territorial structure existed to maintain military penetration. The structures were (i) 
the Regional Military Command (Komando Daerah Militer/Kodam) at the provincial level, (ii) the Military 
Resort Command (Komando Resort Militer/Korem), (iii) the Military District Command (Komando Distrik 
Militer/Kodim) at the district level, (iv) the Military Rayon Command (Komando Rayon Militer/Koramil) at 
the sub-district level and (v) a non-commisioned officer or NCO with the grade of sergeant (Bintara Pembina 
Desa/Babinsa) at village level. These structures have now changed as the military (TNI) restructured its 
territorial command with Kodam control several Korem, and Korem is set up for provincial level. 
112 For a detailed study of Indonesian army penetration of the civil bureaucracy, see Jenkins (1984:42-49).   
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cases, the candidates were former or active commanders of the local Kodim  (Jenkins 
1984). There were two important reasons for the assignment of military officers in the civil 
bureaucracy. First, the engagement was part of the military personnel promotion scheme 
(tour of duty, tour of area) when there would be no chance to be promoted as an army 
general, which was highly politicized. Second and more importantly, the engagement was 
for maintaining the de-politicization policy of the military under Suharto’s regime (Lane 
2008).  The dwifungsi proved effective for military control of the civil administration. As 
Jenkins (1984:45) noted “[a] Bupati will coordinate his programs with the local Kodim 
commander”.  
Table 24.  List of Bupati Pangkep, 1960 - 2010 
Name  Period Remarks 
Andi Mallarangan 1960-1966  
HM. Arsyad B  1966-1979 Army background with Brigadier General 
rank (retired)  
H. Hasan Sammana  1979-1984 Army background with Colonel rank 
(retired) 
Djumadi Junus  1984-1989 Army background with Colonel rank 
(retired) 
H.M.R. Natsir  1989-1994 Army background with Colonel rank 
(retired) 
Baso Amirullah  1994-1999 Army background with Colonel rank 
(retired) 
H. A.Gaffar Patappe  
Drs. HM. Saman Sadek  
1999-2004 Bupati (bureacrat background) 
Vice Bupati (bureacrat background) 
H. Basrah Hafid SH, MM 2004-2005 Acting Bupati (bureacrat background) 
Ir.H.Syafrudin Nur Msi 
HA. Kemal Burhanuddin BSc  
2005-2010 Bupati (bureacrat background) 
Vice Bupati (politician background) 
Source: Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep (2008d) 
 
 
The breakthrough in the military dominance of the Pangkep administration began 
when the reformasi took place. Gaffar Pattape, a senior bureaucrat in Pangkep was 
appointed as the first civilian Bupati Pangkep for the 1999 – 2004 term (Box 3). During his 
Bupati-ship, Gaffar, in many ways, put more balance into his policy and administration 
commitments for the islands. He asserted that the islands of Pangkep must not be treated 
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by the kabupaten administration as “step children” through development neglect. Indeed, 
they must be an integral part of kabupaten administration (anak kandung) (Patappe 2004b: 
25).   
Gaffar criticized the development of a outer ring road in Ballocii that cost more 
than IDR 5 million (USD 575,000). For him, this amount of money could have been used 
for developing rural electrification for at least 25 islands because the cost of setting up 
electricity in one island was IDR 200 million to 400 million (Patappe 2004b). Gaffar also 
developed and rehabilitated several jetties in the islands113. Gaffar’s other pro-island 
policies included the installation of membrane technology to produce fresh water with the 
cooperation of the Agency for the Assessment and Application of Technology (BPPT) and 
the development of ice-box factories in the islands (Patappe 2004a, 2004b).   
Gaffar’s pro-islands policy attracted some criticism from the mass media, local 
parliament members and NGOs. His business travel to the islands, which took longer than 
to the mainland, was treated with scepticism and judged to be political by his political 
rivals (Patappe 2004b).  His decision to allocate a one billion Indonesian rupiah subsidy 
from the central government for building and operating two boats (kapal pelayaran rakyat) 
was alleged to be a misuse of funds and a case of corruption. However, Gaffar argued that 
the subsidies, which had been allocated to the private sector prior to the building of the two 
boats, had no impacts on the islands and their inhabitants. In fact, the private sector had 
misused its earlier subsidies (Patappe 2004b).   
 
                                                     
113 The new jetties development were in Pamalikang Island (50 meters), Marasende Island (100 meters), 
Kanyurang Island (145 meters), Balo Baloang Island (50 meters) and Sailus Island (50 meters). Rebilitation 
works were done in Samatellu Island (20 meters), Gondong Bali Island (25 meters) and Sarrrapo (95 meters) 
(Patappe 2004b).  
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Box 3. Gaffar Pattape 
Gaffar Patappe or Puang Terru was the first Bupati in Pangkep with a civil servant background after reformasi. He was 
born in 1942 in Bone to an aristocratic family and spent his educational life in Makassar. His title Andi is a term of 
deference used for Makassar aristocracy. He married the daughter of an aristocratic family, and had six children.  He 
graduated from the Faculty of Social and Political Science, Hasanuddin University in Makassar in 1975. He entered 
Pangkep administration as the Head of Political Division at the age of 23. He was then appointed as Camat (Head of 
Sub-district) Ma’rang for four years (1966 – 1970) and became one of the youngest Camat in South Sulawesi.  
During his 39-year career in the bureaucracy, Gaffar spent 25 years in Pangkep in various jobs and responsibilities. 
Gaffar held various positions in the Pangkep administration.  He was Head of the Finance Division (1970 - 1975), 
Head of the Development Division (1975 – 1981), Head of the Pangkep Planning and Development Agency/Bappeda 
(1981) and Regional Secretary (Sekwilda for years, 1981 – 1985). He moved to the Ujung Pandang (now Makassar) 
municipal administration in 1985 as the Head of the Agency to Promote Education, Implementation, Guidance for the 
Understanding and Application of Pancasila (Badan Pembinaan Pendidikan Pelaksanaan Pedoman Penghayatan 
Pengamalan Pancasila/BP-7) and became the Acting Ujung Pandang Municipal Secretary in 1988.  
He stepped up to the provincial administration in 1988. He received promotion to several key positions in economic 
and social affairs within South Sulawesi Provincial Administration. He was a Director of the Regional Production 
Management Bureau/Kepala Biro Bina Produksi Daerah (1988 - 1991), Vice-Chairman of the South Sulawesi 
Investment Coordinating Board/Badan Koordinasi Penanaman Modal Daerah (1991 – 1996) and then held the top 
position on this board in 1996 for two years. He was later appointed as Assistant to the Provincial Secretary (Asisten III 
Sekwilda) for Social Welfare Affairs in 1998 to 1999.  
He came back to Pangkep in 1999 as Bupati until 2004. During his Bupati term, Gaffar paid more attention to the 
islands of Pangkep by breaking the development neglect of the island kecamatan (kecamatan kepulauan). He 
allocated significant budgets for rural electrification and education for kecamatan kepulauan. He introduced an island-
based education system and life skill education for the islanders. Gaffar signed a Memorandum of Understanding 
(MoU) with the University of Makassar to conduct research on learning methods for islanders’ children (Metode 
Pembelajaran Anak Pesisri/Pulau). He then implemented the policy to recruit teachers and paramedics from among 
the islanders to teach and serve in the islands after they graduated from university or academy under Pangkep 
scholarships. In the transportation sector, he employed central government subsidies for development of two wooden 
ships (kapal motor perintis) KMP Amanagappa and KMP Kapoposan to serve as communication between the islands 
and on the mainland routes. These two boats were 32 meters long and seven meters wide with 200 gross tonnages 
and could carry up to 200 passengers.  
Gaffar was first Bupati of Pangkep who was 
concerned with the development of the islands 
and he implemented his concerns by putting 
his political and administration commitments 
on the line. For him, small island development 
in Pangkep had to regard the uniqueness and 
special lifestyle of the islanders. He argued 
that islanders would accelerate their 
knowledge and skills once they were given the 
chance.It must be government’s responsibility 
to unlock these chances or provide access to 
these chances. He published his critical thoughts; Memanusiakan Pulau, Demimu Rakyat Pangkep and Pengabdianku 
untuk Rakyat on how to promote development in Pangkep while he was a Bupati of Pangkep. Currently, Gaffar is 
running a campaign to become a member of the national parliament through nomination by the Partai Demokrat. 
Sources: Jurnal Celebes (2003a) and Patappe (2002, 2004a, 2004b)  
 
After he finished his term as Bupati Pangkep in 2004, Gaffar ran for direct 
election (pilkada) as Bupati Pangkep in 2005. Allied with Effendi Kasmin, a senior 
bureaucrat from Pangkep, Gaffar planned to gain another term as Bupati. Nevertheless, 
they had minority nomination and only gathered 27.87 per cent of the voter, coming 
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second after the pair Syafruddin Nur- Andi Bau Kemal, who received 57.62 per cent of the 
vote. Gaffar’s experience in the Pangkep administration and bureaucracy was not a 
significant factor in winning the first direct election in Pangkep. One of Gaffar’s failures 
was that he took voters for granted and did not make an intensive effort to communicate 
his political manifesto. He assumed that, based on his success as Bupati, the voters would 
vote for him. His political agenda in the election campaign was less attractive, than that of 
his rivals.  
Gaffar’s candidacy as Bupati was controversial because two local electoral 
committee members (KPUD) refused his candidacy whereas the chairperson of KPUD 
Pangkep, Amir Amin and another KPUD member, Irfandy Kaharuddin, set Gaffar’s 
candidacy in motion (Kompas 2005a). Different standpoints among the Pangkep KPUD 
members about the Gaffar – Effendi nomination led to the issuance of two confusing 
KPUD decrees. The first decree only contained two pairs of Bupati candidates; (i) 
Syafruddin Nur-Andi Baukemal Burhanuddin and (ii) Taufik Fachruddin-Ilyas Mengewa. 
This decree was signed by two KPUD members, Ratna Sari and Nur Rahmat Nur (Kompas 
2005b). The second updated decree included Gaffar Patappe-Effendi Kasmin, This decreee 
was signed by Amir Amin and Irfandy Kaharuddin (Kompas 2005a). The updated decree 
triggered a protest and the seizure of the KPUD office (Kompas 2005b). To prevent more 
protests, the Provincial KPUD facilitated the Pangkep KPUD to settle on the Bupati 
candidatures for the election (pilkada). KPUD Pangkep finally approved the candidacy 
Gaffar-Effendi with an attachment noting the objection from two KPUD Pangkep 
members114(Kompas 2005b).  
                                                     
114 The approval appeared in the revision of the KPUD Official Report (Berita Acara) No. 111/KPU-
PK/V/2005.  
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To run for the Bupati election, Gaffar had to resign from his Bupati position, as 
Law 32/2004 stipulated. During that transition period until the election, Basrah Hafid, the 
Assistant to the Provincial Secretary for Social Welfare Affairs (Asisten Sekwilda Bidang 
Kesra), was appointed as acting Bupati. Basrah ran Pangkep according to business as 
usual. There were no significant changes in administration and bureaucracy arrangements 
during his term as acting Bupati Pangkep.  
Basrah handed over the Bupati-ship when the pilkada results declared the pair 
Syafruddin Nur – Andi Baukemal as Bupati and Vice Bupati of Pangkep. Syafruddin was a 
senior bureaucrat with an engineering background. Prior to running for election, he was the 
Assistant Secretary of Makassar City (2002 – 2004). He spent almost ten years (1992 – 
2001) of his career in Pangkep as Head of Public Works (Kepala Dinas Pekerjaan Umum 
Kabupaten) before moving to the Makassar City administration in which he held various 
positions115.  
Andi Baukemal was a senior politician in Pangkep affiliated with the Golkar 
party. He was the Speaker (1999 to 2004) and the Deputy Speaker (2004 – 2005) of 
Pangkep’s Local Parliament (DPRD). Baukemal began as a Pangkep parliament member in 
1987, representing Golkar.  
In their election campaign, the pair Syafruddin-Baukemal put forth as their 
political manifesto a seven ji program (literally tujuh gratis or “seven gratis programs”). 
The pair promised to provide free services including ID card processing, education and 
health. In 2008, they promised to waive land and building tax for small tax payers, whose 
fees were less than IDR 20,000 (USD 2.5) (Ujungpandang Ekspres 2008).  
                                                     
115 Syafruddin held a position as Head of the Natural Resources Management Division of Bappeda 
Makassar (2001), Head of City Investment Services (2001-2002), Chairman of the Board of the Controller of 
the Makassar Water Supply Service (2002-2004) and City Cleaning Services (2002 – 2004).   
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During his term as Bupati, Syafruddin has used the upper-echelon staff from 
Gaffar’s term to fill his cabinet. He has avoided making fundamental changes in the 
bureaucracy. The latest restructuring of staff within Pangkep administration has made only 
minor changes with more rotation among the upper echelon. Surya Agraria, the Local 
Secretary (Sekda) remains in the position, which he has held since Gaffar’s term. Similarly, 
Natsir Sulaiman is still in a top position in the Pangkep administration as the Head of 
Pangkep’s Marine Affairs and Fisheries (DKP Pangkep). 
Syafruddin currently manages 5,205 Pangkep civil servants  (BPS Sulsel 2006), 
many of whom lack competency in running the public service due to a lack of analysis of 
workloads and work-needs (Ratnawati 2006a). Despite the requirement that civil servants 
may vary in each district in respect to their characteristics, mandates and capacity to 
govern, the number of civil servants in Pangkep remains remarkably large. This number is 
similar in size to other districts (2 – 3 % of the total area of South Sulawesi)  such as 
Bulukumba with 6,772 civil servants to serve 2.53 per cent and Soppeng with 5,718 for 
2.98 per cent of the total South Sulawesi area (BPS Sulsel 2006). 
5.5 Demographic profile and ethnographic setting 
The population of Pangkep is mostly concentrated in the coastal area: most of its 
kecamatans are coastal kecamatans that include many small islands.  In 2005, the 
population of Pangkep was 279,801 with 62,144 households and a gender ratio of 96.37116 
(BPS Sulsel 2006). The population aged 15 – 65 represented 62.83 per cent of the 
population (BPS Sulsel 2006). The population growth rate was 1.62 per cent for the period 
                                                     
116 This gender ratio includes more women (142,488)  than men (137,313) and this means that there are 
963 males for every 1,000 females (BPS Sulsel 2006).  This ratio has increased significantly compared to the 
near constant gender ratio of 906 to 909 that had existed for almost a decade, 1993 – 2002 (BPS Pangkep 
1997, 2003). 
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of 1999 – 2003. The figure is twice as high (3.21 %) in island kecamatans (BPS Sulsel 
2006). By 2010, Pangkep will have a population of 306,586 with 59,608 people in the 
three of the island kecamatan. More than half (50.99 %) of the Pangkep population spend 
IDR 100,000 to 200,000 per month (BPS Sulsel 2006). 
The ratio for the productive age population in Pangkep in 2002 was 68.33 
(KPPOD, 2003), an increase of about five per cent on the previous year. However, in 2005 
the ratio decreased to 57.66 per cent or 222,669 people (BPS Sulsel 2006). Pangkep has a 
ratio a 34.09 in its labour force of people with at least junior high school qualifications and 
work experience. The percentage of its economically active population is 81.89 per cent. 
Most of the working population are engaged in the primary sector (48,933) followed by 
business and personal services (15,795) and trading (14,004) (BPS Sulsel 2006). 
Geographically, based on landscape and environment, Pangkep’s people regard 
themselves as orang pantai (coastal people) and orang pulau (islanders) according to the 
location of their villages. People who define themselves, or are defined by others, as 
coastal people and islanders may come from the same ethnic group, but have created a 
different lifestyle appropriate to their environment. 
Bugis (or Ugi) and Makassarese are the two main ethnic groups in Pangkep, 
which, respectively, account for 58.13 per cent and 34.55 per cent of the total population. 
The other ethnic groups are Torajan (0.38 %), Mandarese (4.68 %), Luwu (0.02 %), and 
Jawanese (0.6 %). Two other ethnic groups of Duri and Selayar are in the minority in 
Pangkep. Both of these groups comprise less than 0.01 per cent of the total population. The 
“other ethnic” categories in Pangkep in 2002 consisted of 5,886 people or 2.25 per cent of 
the total population.  
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The presence of Bugis in Pangkep dates back to the migration of Bugis to 
Pangkep beginning in the 17th century to three main destination areas, Pangkajene, 
Bungaro and Labakkang117 (FKSS IKIP Ujung Pandang 1979). These three areas (now 
kecamatan) form enclaves of the Bugis language; Bugis is the mother tongue here. The 
language of Makassar is spread across Pangkep as it is in the rest of the South Sulawesi 
areas, especially in coastal areas (FKSS IKIP Ujung Pandang 1979). 
The languages spoken in kecamatans kepulauan are mixed and connected to 
group on the mainland of Sulawesi (Patappe 2004b). In Kecamatan Liukang Tupabirring, 
Makassarese and Bugis are the two main languages spoken. The Mandar and Sama Bajo 
languages are lingua franca in Kecamatan Liukang Tangaya although the origins of these 
languages are far from this kecamatan. People in Liukang Kalmas use Mandar as their 
common spoken language and refer to the myth of their ancestor leaving the Mandar land 
(Pamboang) to sail to the island in Liukang Kalmas after a big fire destroyed their houses. 
Another story tells of the Mandar people leaving their homeland to avoid the Kahar 
Muzakar rebellion (Patappe 2004b). 
Like the other districts of South Sulawesi province, Islam is the major religion of 
the Pangkep people (99.6 %) and they follow the Sunni tradition (Mazhab Shafii). There 
are 350 mosques in Pangkep (BPS Pangkep 2003). The Christian Protestant population 
accounts for 0.25 per cent and Catholic 0.17 per cent. Hindu Buddhist adherents share a 
very small percentage (14 people). The modernist movement, Muhammadiyah, has been 
active in promoting Islam and providing dakwah (Islamic preaching) in Pangkep. Islam in 
                                                     
117 The obscure relationship between the Bugis language and Makassar language in three enclaves was the 
major theme of the research of the FKSS IKIP Ujung Pandang. The FKSS studied whether the Makassar 
language in Pangkep was a combination of two different languages and that had merged to become a 
different language. The FKSS explored these different dialects and their political and other socio cultural 
background. The study concluded that the Makassar language in Pangkep consists of elements of the 
Makassar Liukang dialect, the Makassar Kajo dialect, the Bugis language and the specific dialect of 
Makassar Pangkep.  
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Pangkep has influences of the tarriqa (mystical order) Khalwatiyya118 (van Bruinessen 
1991, 1992). This tarriqa has been the most important locally-based religious movement 
with its headquarters located near to Maros, next to Pangkep (Reid and Reid 1988) 
5.6 The Economy of Pangkep 
The primary sector (agriculture and fisheries) and the processing industry are the 
two main contributors to the Pangkep economy. The primary sector provided 19.29 per 
cent and processing industry119  47.10 per cent to the Pangkep Gross Regional Domestic 
Product (GRDP)120 in 2003 (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2005c). Pangkep’s economic 
growth showed a steady increase of GRDP at an average 9.47 per cent during 1999 to 2004 
with similar increases in per capita GRDP, of 13.77 per cent for the period 1999 to 2003 
(Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2005c).  
In the medium term development, the primary sector and processing industry will 
remain the prime movers of the Pangkep economy together with mining activities in 
highland areas. Despite some uneven development and unbalanced exploration of marine 
resources, the fisheries sector is expected to be a leading economic contributor to the 
economy of Pangkep, especially in islands of Pangkep (Patappe 2002, 2004a).  
Fisheries have long been a source of revenue for Pangkep’s coastal community. 
Total production from tambak and fishing activities in Pangkep in 2007 was 21,852.24 
tonnes (BPS Pangkep 2003). Three kecamatan kepulauan (Liukang Tangaya, Liukang 
                                                     
118 The studies by Van Brumessen 1991 and 1992 are brief and provide concise background information 
on tariqa (mystical order) in South Sulawesi and Indonesia. Other suggested readings are Gibb (1983) and 
Rahman (2000), both of which are available online (Gibb 1983; Rahman 2000).  
119 Pangkep is making progress in industrial and other secondary sectors (KPPOD 2004). From an 
investment or business perspective, Pangkep is a district with good labour resources (KPPOD 2003, 2004). 
Among the 156 districts and cities surveyed by KPPOD, Pangkep was in second place in terms of work force 
availability and labour productivity, after Kabupaten Pesisir Selatan of West Sumatera.  
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Kalmas and Liukang Tupabbiring) provided more than half of the total fish catch landed in 
Pangkep. Typical fishing gear in these kecamatan are gillnet and fish traps (bubu). In 2002, 
these kecamatan contributed 3,896.7 tonnes or 55.27 per cent of fishery production for 
Pangkep. However, the value of fishing is much less than the value of tambak production. 
With 7,050 tonnes of total production, fishing activities only earned IDR 59,957,575,000 
(USD 6,891,675) while brackish water fish and shrimp ponds (hereafter called tambak) 
almost tripled this amount (IDR 154,584,105,000 or USD 17,768,287) with a total 
production of 8,886 ton (BPS Pangkep 2003). Export orientation and position as highly-
priced fisheries commodities of tambak products (milkfish and prawn) shared the higher 
earnings.  
Pangkep is one of the largest producers in South Sulawesi of tiger prawns and 
milkfish for the export and domestic markets (Astuti 2003). Tambak are the main 
economic contributor for Pangkep and provide jobs for 83.33 per cent of the labour force 
(Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2008b). In 2007,  the area of tambak increased to 13,496.80 
hectares with 17,493 people engaged as tambak breeders (Table 25) (Pemda Kabupaten 
Pangkep 2008b). Inland freshwater ponds remain an unpopular source of income 
generation in the fishery sector. Only 19 people were engaged in this activity with a total 
pond area of 67.31 hectares and minapadi fields of 120 hectares that produced 4.6 tonnes 
of inland fish (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2008b, 2008c).  
Pangkep was the main supplier of 600 million of milk fish fry and shrimp-post 
larvae121 for most of the tambak in South Sulawesi in 2003 (Haylor et al. 2003). Pangkep 
tambak breeders are innovators in tambak expansion in South Sulawesi. They have even 
                                                                                                                                                                 
120 GRDP is one of the indicators of economic development that is defined as total value added of the 
goods and services produced in a certain period for a particular region.  
121 In 2001, Kabupaten Pangkep produced 23 billion of shrimp post larvae.  
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expanded their expertise to other provinces such as Central Sulawesi, Southeast Sulawesi, 
East Kalimantan and South Kalimantan (Pemprov Sulsel 2002).  
Table 25.  Total areas and number of tambak breeders in Pangkep 
No. Kecamatan Area of tambak (hectares) Number of tambak breeders  
1. Minasa Tene 1,160.56 2,085 
2. Pangkajene 2,485.54 3,182 
3. Bungoro 1,726.44 1,242 
4. Labakkang 2,996.16 3,564 
5. Ma'rang 2,682.28 5,742 
6. Segeri 824.83 738 
7. Mandalle 719.26 807 
8. Liukang Tupabbiring 589.33 123 
9. Liukang Kalmas 196.37 83 
10. Liukang Tangayya 116.03 65 
 Total 13,496 17,497 
Source: Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep (2008b) 
 
 
 
Tambak activities have spread across the coastal zone of Pangkep, except in two 
kecamatan (Balloci and Tondong Tallasa) that are not suitable for tambak activities. The 
centres of tambak production are Labakkang (2,578.4 tonnes), Ma’rang (2.007.1 tonnes), 
Bungoro (1,022.3 tonnes) and Pangkajene (1,972.4 tonnes) (BPS Pangkep 2003). Four 
other kecamatan (Liukang Tupabirring, Segeri, Minasa Te'ne and Mandalle) produce from 
105 to 605 tonnes annually (BPS Pangkep 2003). Milkfish, king prawn and tiger prawn are 
the major high-priced tambak products in Pangkep (Table 26) with some of these products 
exported overseas. Another fish category shares equal weight with milkfish. This category 
is a by-product of tambak commodities consisting of mixed types of fish. These 
commodities are much less valuable than milkfish.  
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Table 26.  Total tambak areas and products 2003 - 2007 
Year 
Total tambak 
area 
(hectares) 
Products (tonnages) 
Total Milkfish King prawn Tiger 
prawn  
Other fish 
2003 
2004 
2005 
2006 
2007 
10,185.48 
11,759.59 
12,279.32 
13,494.80 
13,496.80 
5,493.5 
3,557.1 
11,942.00 
10,956.10 
10,988.12 
589.3 
369.3 
941 
763.60 
755.22 
11.6 
16.8 
8.0 
13.1 
65.7 
7,844.5 
9,755.4 
10,714.8 
10,618.9 
10,043.2 
13,938.9 
13,698.6 
23,605.8 
22,351.7 
21,852.2 
Source: Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep (2008b) 
 
The landscape of Pangkep’s coastal zone with 25 estuaries makes it suitable for 
the open and enclosed drainage systems that are important in the tambak system. 
Prevailing diurnal tides122 in Pangkep fit this tambak system. There are also various 
supporting facilities for developing tambak in Pangkep. Pangkep has the Palampang fish 
market, the biggest milkfish market in South Sulawesi (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 
2008b). Central and provincial governments have paid special attention to tambak 
development in Pangkep by establishing the Brackish water Aquaculture Development 
Centre (Balai Budidaya Air Payau/BBAP) Pangkep, experimental ponds, a laboratory for 
research on fish diseases in Segeri, and the Politeknik Pertanian Negeri Pangkajene 
(Technical Agricultural College) to teach practical expertise and knowledge in fisheries 
(Pemprov Sulsel 2002). There is also the Fishery Research Centre for Brackish Water 
Aquaculture (Balai Riset Perikanan Budidaya Air Payau) at Maros, a research unit of the 
MMAF, for developing and improving brackish water aquaculture techniques and methods 
including tambak. 
The history of tambak dates from the beginning of the 20th century when Pangkep 
was under the rule of Labakkang, Karaeng Tinggia (Tahawila 1979). The ruler developed 
tambak in areas of nypa and mangrove forest between the Lampoa River in the north and 
                                                     
122 High tide occurs twice a day with different tidal ranges; the second high tide is smaller than the first.  
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the Bontoala River in the south. Tambak development was intended for the royal family’s 
consumption only. The area of tambak at that time was approximately 1,000 hectares and 
supplies of brackish water came from the mixing of these two rivers. The ruler allowed his 
community to voluntarily work and develop tambak on the royal family land. The ruler 
kept these tambak as family properties and the community received a small amount of 
wages or other in-kind exchanges as compensation.  
The ownership of tambak has historically shifted since the beginning of 1960s. 
The royal family sold their tambak to non-noble, rich families to obtain cash for buying 
paddy fields (sawah), which provided more profit, trading capital (modal berdagang), 
schooling funds (biaya sekolah), to finance the pilgrimage to Mecca (naik haji) and to 
cover wedding ceremony expenses (Tahawilla 1979:19). Some royal family members 
migrated to urban areas such as Ujung Pandang (now Makassar) for business and 
education; thus, the tambak were left unmanaged and unattended. At the beginning of the 
1960s, the tambak of non-noble families in Manakku and Labakkang amounted to 155 
hectares but had increased by 25 per cent by the end of 1960s (Tahawila 1979).  
The era of the 1970s was the beginning of the introduction of intensification and 
modern aquaculture, such as poly-culture and fishpond technology. This era was also a 
period of change in tambak ownership (Tahawila 1979). The tambak ownership shifted 
from a cash system (balu laburu)123 to a long-term contract system based on a period of 
five to ten years (balu’ paja). Through this shift, tambak owners could determine their risks 
and obtain more economic benefits. The system provided 80 per cent of net production 
value to the owners with the rest going to contractor or pond breeders. The owners became 
responsible for production costs, such as seed and maintenance fees. 
                                                     
123 Balu laburu literally means “cash sale transaction”. This system was popular until the end of the 
1960s.   
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Seaweed culture became another key fisheries activity in Pangkep. Seaweed 
culture was concentrated in three kecamatan kepulauan, Liukang Tangaya, Liukang 
Kalmas and Liukang Tupabirring. Seaweed production remained roughly the same through 
the period 1997 to 2002 at approximately 7,000 tonnes annually (BPS Pangkep 2003). 
Kecamatan Liukang Tangaya has been the centre for seaweed culture, accounting for about 
98 per cent of total Pangkep production. In 2007, seaweed production increased by 20 per 
cent (8,649 tonnes) with  52,551 hectares under culture (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 
2008b). 
Connecting fishermen with a demanding external market in the live-fish trade has 
led to a shift in fishing technique. The live-fish market demands little or no injured live 
catch fish from open water. In order to fulfil the demand, fishermen have made 
adaptations, adopting new fishing gear and vessels. This adaptation process has led to a 
variety of boat types and fishing gear becoming common in Pangkep.  
There are four common types of fishing vessels in Pangkep: motorized/sail 
outrigger canoes (katinting or masin a bulo-bulo), motorized single hulls (jolloroq), 
western-style hull motor boats (motoroq) and larger western-style hull motor boats 
(kappalaq) (Table 27). The type of vessels available also determines the type of gear used. 
Fishing gear in Pangkep includes papekang (hook fishing), paddenreng (small-scale 
dragnet), pabu (fish trap), papuka (seine), pagae (purse seine), pacantrang (mid-scale 
trawl), paselang (trepang collector or reef fish catcher) and bagang (lift net) (Salam 2007).  
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Table 27.  Types of boats in Pangkep.  
 Outrigger canoe Jolloroq 
(motorized single 
hulls) 
Motoroq 
(western-style hull 
motor boats) 
Kappalaq 
(larger western-
style hull motor 
boats) 
Length  Not more than 5 
metres 
6 – 15 meters 5 – 13.5 meters 7 – 23.8 meters 
Breadth  Not more than 50 
centimeters 
0.7 – 1.55 meters 1 – 2 meters 2.1 – 7.75 meters 
Height Not more than 50 
centimeters 
0.65 – 1.15 meters 0.65 – 1.65 meters 0.65 – 3.8 meters 
Description Mostly single 
outriggers with 
outboard engine 
and sail 
Extreme slim body 
with sharp double 
ended stem and 
stern 
Stress on speed 
Western style hull Bigger western 
style hull 
Function Hook fishing and 
small gill nets. 
Supporting  lift net 
(bagang) 
Hook fishing, gill 
net (papuka), fish 
trap (pabu), dive 
fishing (paselang), 
fish carrier and 
logistic (pete-pete)  
Hook fishing, gill 
net (papuka), fish 
trap (pabu), dive 
fishing 
(paselang),small 
scale dragnet 
(paddenreng) and 
ferry (palimbang) 
Mid-scale trawl 
(pacantrang), 
purse seine 
(pagae), cold 
storage boat 
(paes), ferry 
(palimbang) and 
cargo boat (PLM-
perahu layer 
motor) 
Source: Adapted from Salam (2007) 
 
 
5.7 Coastal management in Pangkep 
“I believe if Pangkep can optimalize [its] marine and fishery sector, there will 
be more genuine local revenue (Pendapatan Asli Daerah/PAD) for Pangkep”.  
Pattape, 2004b. Pengabdianku untuk Rakyat p.79. 
 
Coastal areas in Pangkep comprise 781.13 square kilometres or more than 70 per 
cent of its total land areas. Pangkep also has more than 95 km of coastline (Pemprov Sulsel 
2002) that encompass several important coastal ecosystems. This section discusses coastal 
resource issues, stakeholders’ involvement and the local government response to coastal 
zone management (CZM).  
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5.7.1 Coastal resources and issues 
Coastal resources in Pangkep range from flat sandy beaches, coral reefs, estuarine, 
muddy beaches to mangrove swamps. Coastal resources serve as nursery grounds for 
several high value fish species (Sadovy and Liu 2004) and are an important source of 
income and livelihood for local people.  
There have been three important studies of coastal issues in Pangkep. These 
studies applied different perspectives to the identification of coastal issues. The first study 
by the South Sulawesi provincial government was also concerned with two other 
neighbouring districts. It identified thirteen issues in coastal zone management in Pangkep 
with a focus on mainland coastal areas (Pemprov Sulsel 2002). The second study by 
Proyek MCRMP Bappeda Pangkep in 2004 listed ten issues concerned with enhancing the 
management and development of activities on small islands (Proyek MCRMP Bappeda 
Pangkep 2004). These two studies identified CZM issues and examined the local problems 
in Pangkep but contained less in-depth investigation into the roots of the problems and 
possible solutions (Table 28).   
A recent study from Proyek MCRMP Bappeda Pangkep in 2005 has categorized 
the issues of coastal zone management in Pangkep into six main categories (Proyek 
MCRMP Bappeda Pangkep 2005). These categories are: (i) less than optimal use of coastal 
resources combined with poor sanitation; (ii) freshwater crisis in coastal areas and islands 
led by water aquifer depletion; (iii) coastal resources degradation; (iv) limited job and 
business opportunities; (v) lack of fisheries and marine tourism infrastructures; and (vi) 
lack of skills and supporting system in coastal resources use and management. 
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Table 28.  Coastal zone management issues in Pangkep according to two different 
studies. 
Coastal issues according to  
(Pemprov Sulsel 2002) 
Coastal issues according to  
(Proyek MCRMP Bappeda Pangkep 2004) 
 Abrasion (coastal erosion) 
 Sedimentation from river run-off  
 Intrusion of water into aquifers 
 Eutrophication (nutrient enrichment) from tambak and 
agriculture intensification activities 
 Mangrove conversion 
 Coral reef degradation 
 Use  of non-environmentally friendly  fishing gear and 
techniques (cyanide and trawl) 
 Paddy field conversion into tambak 
 Lack of information on fishing grounds  
 Harvesting and post-harvesting problems 
 High number of drop-out children of school age 
 Poor sanitation conditions  
 Poverty based on an unfair division in production 
sharing and the long-term practice of patron-client 
system.   
 Less than optimal coastal and fisheries resource use  
 Lack of qualified human resources 
 Lack of clean water and sanitation 
 Coastal resources degradation 
 Lack of law enforcement 
 Lack of pro-community economic institutions 
 Uneven marine tourism 
 Limited electricity for small islands 
 Poor inter-island transportation for small islands 
 Poor telecommunication and infrastructure for small 
islands 
 
5.7.1.1 Spermonde Archipelago 
Most of the islands in three kecamatan in Pangkep (Liukang Kalmas, Liukang 
Tangaya and Liukang Tappibiring) are part of the Spermode archipelago124 group. This 
archipelago exists on the Spermonde shelf, off the west coast of South Sulawesi in the 
Makassar Strait (PSSAL BAKOSURTANAL and FPIK Unhas 2007). This archipelago 
covers an area of 16,000 square kilometres and its water current depends on the Sulawesi 
Sea. The Spermonde archipelago has high biodiversity, which is now under threat. 
Spermonde has 78 genera and 262 species of coral on the reefs, distributed along 80 to 87 
per cent of the outer reefs (Jompa, Moka, and Yanuarita 2007).  Over the past 12 years, 
degradation of these coral reefs has reduced live coral by 20 per cent (Jompa, Moka, and 
Yanuarita 2007) 
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Most of the islands in Spermonde archipelago have fringing reefs ranging from 
100 to 200 meters in width. Spermonde archipelago has a barrier reef that extends for 143 
kilometres with 4,290 reefal areas125 (Tomascik et al. 1997:738) on the outer rim of 
Spermonde. There are 120 islands in this archipelago, which range from two hectares in 
Bone Batang Island to 3,328.20 hectares in area of Tanakeke Island. Most of these islands 
are under Pangkep administration, although some are under Barru, Maros, Makassar and 
Takalar administrations.  
Four bio-ecoregion zones are recognized in Spermonde archipelago. Hutchinson 
in 1945126 first introduced this division and it has become the main reference for the study 
of Spermonde archipelago (PSSAL BAKOSURTANAL and FPIK Unhas 2007). The first 
zone is the closest zone to the mainland of Sulawesi with an average of 10 metres depth 
and muddy sand substrates. The second zone is about five kilometres seaward from the 
mainland of Sulawesi with mostly 30 metres depth and dominated by reef islands. The 
third zone begins 12.5 kilometres seaward from the mainland of Sulawesi with 20 to 50 
metres depth and frequent two patch reefs. The fourth zone and outer zone consists of 
barrier reefs and is located 30 kilometres from the Sulawesi mainland. The eastern part of 
this zone has 40 to 50 metres depth while the western part has more than 100 metres. A 
Dutch funded research expedition127 in the mid-1990s conducted advanced research on the 
ecology and utilization aspects of Spermonde marine resources.     
                                                                                                                                                                 
124 Spermonde was named by Portuguese sailors in the 16th century who used to call this group of islands 
Spermon. Then Dutch reached this area in the 17th century and named it Spermonde.    
125 Calculation of the reefal area is based on the formula: (Reefal area km2) = [Lagoon width (km)/2] x 
[Length of barrier reef (km)] (Tomascik et al. 1997) 
126 See Hutchinson DR (1945) Coral Reefs and Cays of the Makassar Straits. HQ Allied Air Forces SW 
Pacific Area Intelligence. 
127 The Department of Fish Culture and Fisheries, Wageningen Agricultural University, The Netherlands 
in collaboration with Hasanuddin University supported a fisheries research project in the Spermonde 
Archipelago (WOTRO/UNHAS Buginesia Project). 
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The toponymy of the Spermonde archipelago follows an historical pattern. In the 
northern part, the island names start with the syllable ‘sa’, such as the islands of Salemo, 
Sanane, Saugi, Sagara, Sabangko, Satando, Salebo, Samatellue Lompo, Samatellue 
Borong, Sarappo Lompo, Sarappo Keke, Saranti, Sapuli, Sabutung and Sakoala128. These 
islands belonged to the domain of Tanate Barru, which was part of the Bugis Tallo 
Kingdom (Patappe 2004b; Suriamihardja 2007).  
In the southern part of Spermonde where Makassar is the main language spoken, 
there is no special pattern to the islands’ toponymy although there might be some influence 
from the Bone and Gowa Kingdoms in this part  (Patappe 2004b; Suriamihardja 2007). The 
islands of Badi, Balang Cadi, Balang Lompo, Bangko-bangkoang, Bonebonoang, 
Kondongbali, Karanrang, Kapoposang, Kulambing, Laiya, Lamputang, Langkadea, 
Pajenekang,  and Papandangan might have been under the influence of the Ruler of Bone 
(Suriamihardja 2007). The Gowa Kingdom’s legacy to the Spermonde toponymy includes 
Barrang Caddi, Barrang Lompo, Bonebatang, Bonetambung, Kodingareng Lompo, 
Kodingareng Keke, Laelae, Langkai, Lanyukang, Samalona, Kayangan, Bangkengdoang, 
Lantangpeo, Sanrobenge, Satangnga and Tanakeke. Nowadays most of these islands are 
administratively part of Makassar City and Takalar (Suriamihardja 2007). 
One area of the Spermonde archipelago, Batu Nambo in Mattiro Dalangeng 
village of Liukang Tupabirring, is the habitat of millions of fish (Patappe 2004b). This area 
has been a popular fishing ground for Spermonde fishermen because it has high economic 
value. Fishing is easy in this area. Fishing in Batu Nambo is also a lucrative business. In 
one fishing cycle129 (20 days), it is possible to earn IDR 20 to 50 millions (USD 2,300 to 
                                                     
128 Most of the “sa” islands are under Kecamatan Liukang Tappibiring. Another version of these islands’ 
toponymy is “sa” means island in the Bajo language, for example Sarrapo (island with much betelnut) 
(Patappe 2004b). 
129 Kalelleng in Bugis or kallang in Makassar.  
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5,750) by using lift nets (bagang) (Patappe 2004b). The fishing effort is left to bagang, 
which are set at night, with whole schools of fish lifted the following morning (Patappe 
2004b). 
In many cases, if fishermen gain access regularly to Batu Nambo for a year, this 
can be ‘a ticket’ for pilgrimage to Mecca (naik haji) for the following year. Making the 
pilgrimage (naik haji) is one of the main motivations for fishermen (mostly the ponggawa 
or leaders) to fish hard. By getting the title haji, their status is upgraded as well as their 
influence in local society. Being a haji means obtaining more privileges and respect from 
society. In most cases, being haji means more access to local power and capital for 
business expansion because a haji130 title is a guarantee of wealth and responsibility in 
lending capital.                  
Another important area in Spermonde is two islands, Sabuntung and Kulambing, 
which are under the administration of Liukang Tappibiring. These islands are important 
distribution ports for Borneo ironwood (Eusideroxylon zwagei) (Salam 2007). These two 
islands ports share more than 30 per cent of the ironwood trade for half of South Sulawesi 
province. The islands maintain good connections with several important ports in 
Kalimantan such as Kota Baru, Batu Licin and Balikpapan. During the Dutch colonial 
period, Sabuntung and Kulambing were important ports for the  west coast Sulawesi trade 
conducted by Mandarese, Buginese, Malays, Bajau and Makasarese to break the Dutch 
monopoly in trade at the beginning of the 18th century (Salam 2007). 
                                                     
130 Pilgrimage to Mecca (Haji) is the fifth principle (Rukun Islam kelima) in Islam. It becomes 
compulsory when a Muslim has enough wealth both for carrying out the hajj to Mecca and for looking after 
family while conducting the haji. In most cases, only wealthy ponggawa can carry out the haj. Fishermen 
will work hard and most cases work “smart” (by using dynamite bombs and cyanide) to increase their wealth 
for haj.   
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5.7.1.2 Mangroves  
Pangkep has 520.67 hectares of mangroves (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2008b). 
There is no detailed data on mangrove distribution in Pangkep. Planning documents, such 
as the Pangkep strategic and zoning plans on marine and coastal resources lack sufficient 
data and information. Mangrove degradation is one of  the current serious coastal issues in 
Pangkep (Pemprov Sulsel 2002).  
The growing tambak expansion131 that has occurred mostly on the mainland of 
Pangkep has converted mangrove swamps and green belt areas along the coast and has left 
almost no green belt areas. Within four years (2003 – 2007), there were 3,311.32 hectares 
of new tambak established in Pangkep (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2008b). A significant 
increase in tambak expansion occurred in 2004 with 1,574.11 hectares of new tambak 
added to provide a large proportion of milkfish production in 2005.  
In kecamatan kepulauan, mangroves exist in small parts of the Spermonde 
Archipelago, such as the Sabangko Island. Mangrove areas on Sabangko  Island are 
distributed in the northern and western parts of the island  with a density 19 trees per 100 
square meters (Jompa, Moka, and Yanuarita 2007). Mangrove areas in Sabangko cover an 
area of approximately 20.16 hectares (Zum 2004).  
Mangroves in Sabangko Island have been the nursery and feeding grounds for 
crabs and prawns. Most fishermen in these islands benefit from mangroves by catching 
crabs and prawns for their livelihood (PSSAL BAKOSURTANAL and FPIK Unhas 2007). 
Catching crabs is a low cost, part-time job that provides the fishermen with an income 
                                                     
131 Tambak expansion contributed to degradation of river water quality in Pangkep. The average total 
suspended matter (TSM) in four rivers in Pangkep reached a level of 120 to 2000 milligrams per litre, while 
the maximum threshold is only 30 mg/litre. Silting-up in the estuary is high, and has led to narrowing of the 
waterways.  There are also  cases of water aquifer depletion especially in Kecamatan Pangkajene due to 
tambak expansion (Pemprov Sulsel 2002).  
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throughout the year. During the west monsoon (musim barat), fishermen can get up to 20 
kilograms of crabs but this reduces to 1 to 2 kilograms in the east monsoon (musim timur).  
5.7.1.3 Coral reefs 
Coral reefs in Pangkep are located mostly in the kecamatan kepulauan or the 
Spermonde archipelago. There is no up-to-date comprehensive data on coral reef areas in 
Pangkep. The latest survey of the Spermonde archipelago only recorded coral reefs on nine 
islands that show the largest proportion of coral reef areas (Table 29).  
Most of the coral reefs in these kecamatan are in very poor condition as a result of 
destructive fishing activities such as around Balang Lompo Island and coral bleaching 
around Sarrapo Lompo (PSSAL BAKOSURTANAL and FPIK Unhas 2007). The 
percentage of live coral reefs in these areas has decreased significantly, especially in those 
areas close to Sulawesi mainland.  
Table 29.  Coral reefs areas in surveyed islands 
Island Total Areas of Island (hectares) Areas of Coral Reef (hectares) 
Pamangganggang 1.74 78.77 
Sarrapo 7.38 76.05 
Badi 7.41 36.07 
Lamputan 7.35 9.20 
Samatellu Borong 2.79 3.89 
Sagara 38.55 78.29 
Karanrang 6.08 9.72 
Balang Lompo 13.13 43.41 
Source: PSSAL BAKOSURTANAL and FPIK Unhas (2007) 
 
About 60 per cent of coral reefs in Pangkep are in a poor condition because of 
blast and cyanide fishing (Jurnal Celebes 2003b). Population pressures have also 
contributed to the degradation of coral reefs. Around uninhabited islands, the coral reefs 
are in relatively better condition than on inhabited islands (PSSAL BAKOSURTANAL and 
FPIK Unhas 2007). The exception is Kapoposang Island that has 82 per cent live coverage 
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of coral reefs and only 1.3 per cent of dead reefs (PSSAL BAKOSURTANAL and FPIK 
Unhas 2007).  
5.7.1.4 Seagrass beds 
There are 11 types of seagrass beds (padang lamun) in Pangkep, which are mostly 
found in Spermonde. The latest scientific expedition found eight species132 of seagrass in 
Spermonde that grow in the sandy substrates of the reef flats around the islands (PSSAL 
BAKOSURTANAL and FPIK Unhas 2007). The maximum density and live coverage of 
the seagrass beds in Pangkep occur at medium depths, which indicate seagrass beds in 
Pangkep are being consistently degraded.   
5.7.1.5 Monsoon 
The monsoon seasons in Pangkep are the major consideration for fisheries 
activities. As monsoons limit fishing activities, most fishermen in Pangkep maximize their 
fishing activities during the east monsoon or musim timur (or wettu timoro or simply 
rimoro in Bugis) that normally begins in April with stronger and steadier winds and little 
rain (Ammarell 1999). Musim timur brings a dry season (musim kemarau) that occurs from 
May to August. In musim timur, weather and sea conditions are relatively calm with little 
rain. This allows fishermen to fish even on the nearby high seas. Thus, the peak fishing 
season occurs in musim timur, between April to June.  
The rainy season (musim barat) is the period from November to February. In 
musim barat, weather and sea conditions are relatively strong with high waves that make it 
hard to fish. Musim barat restricts fishermen’s activities and in some cases halts their 
fishing activities. Most fishermen stay at home and find alternative income during musim 
                                                     
132 The species are Thalassia hemprichii, Haludule universis, Halophila ovalis, Cymodocea rotundata, 
Cymodocea serrulata, Enhalus acoroides, Halophila minor and Syngrodium isoetifolium.  
  190
 
barat. January to February is the lowest season for fishing due to bad weather conditions. 
School of fish become a scarce resource during this season (paceklik). In this period, most 
fishermen repair their fishing gear or engage in trading activities. .  
5.7.1.6 Poverty 
Poverty in Pangkep coastal and islands communities133 is due to a combination of 
low-level education, lack of promising job opportunities, reliance on seasonal fishing and 
the absence of government assistance in dealing with poverty (Patappe 2004a, 2004b). This 
combination opens up opportunities for ponggawa to operate. Ponggawa lend money and 
provide necessities to oorer clients (sawi) with high interest and short-term repayment 
periods. Most sawi quite often have difficulties in paying their debt with interest on time. 
Once sawi are trapped in this lending system, it is unlikely they can quit the system unless 
they experience some extraordinary circumstances such as obtaining capital to repay their 
debt and to setting up their own business. These circumstances create high dependency of 
clients (sawi) on their patron’s (ponggawa) support.  
Unlike on the mainland, there are no social strata in Pangkep island society.134 
Patron-client (ponggawa-sawi) arrangements are common in the islands for good economic 
reasons. On the demand side, sawi need employment, income and protection, while on the 
supply side, ponggawa have capital and fishing gear as sources of income and can offer 
protection for sawi to fulfil their needs. The controls by ponggawa of capital within a 
fishing community are the dominant factor in this relationship.  
Ponggawa- sawi has been an interdependent social phenomenon in Pangkep for a 
long time. Both ponggawa and sawi appreciate this relationship and are often resistant to 
                                                     
133 As in Konawe, greater household expenses than incomes characterize poverty in Pangkep. 
134 On the mainland, there are three distinct strata: noble (arung), middle class (to deceng) and common 
people (to sama).  
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change. In Pandangan Island for example where the ponggawa –sawi relationship exists as 
a very strong social and economic relationship in destructive fishing, ponggawa and sawi 
are resistant to any intervention program. Ponggawa are concerned that the intervention 
program will significantly reduce their social status and more importantly, their lucrative 
income. Meanwhile, sawi fear that they will lose their social safety net if they participate in 
any intervention program.  
The ponggawa-sawi135 relationship has been the most influential factor in the 
dynamic of coastal society in Pangkep. This historical socio-economy arrangement has 
been providing long-term social stability and benefits both for ponggawa as patrons/bosses 
and for sawi as clients/labourers (Yusran 2002). The combination of a highly bureaucratic 
banking credit and unprofessional fisheries cooperatives in the coastal areas makes the 
ponggawa-sawi system proliferate. There are complex pressures on stakeholders’ 
interactions in the ponggawa-sawi system where sawi remain in a weak position and 
experience many pressures and influences from other stakeholders (Tim Sosek Pokja 
Sulsel 2001).  
Ignoring the existence of ponggawa-sawi relationship in any coastal management 
program would lead to the program’s failure, as it is difficult to compete with the 
relationship without taking it into account. There are high social costs involved in ignoring 
and competing with the ponggawa-sawi relationship without concern for its long history. 
Therefore, revitalizing the ponggawa-sawi relationship has become a challenging task for 
Pangkep administration. Decentralized CZM must give more scope for Pangkep to 
manoeuvre and set up creative ways based on local values such as adopting the informal 
                                                     
135 In the tambak system, this relationship works through a patron employing a cheap and fast money 
lending system with high interest rate to the sawi (clients: usually tambak pond-breeders). This relationship is 
similar to the ijon system in Javanese agriculture. The study by Partadireja (1974) might be the first brief 
article on the ijon system in English based on insights from Indonesian scholars (Partadireja 1974). 
  192
 
role and invisible influence of ponggawa in the relationship without intending to change it 
dramatically.  
Currently, the ponggawa-sawi relationship is continually shifting from patron-
client toward a more economic production-oriented relationship (Informant M-Exp-Mak, 
2005). This shift changes the relationship into an employer-employee relationship that 
allows sawi to join their preferred ponggawa on a temporary basis with less cultural 
involvement but more economic considerations. This shift forces sawi away from the 
influences of a particular ponggawa. Even if sawi quit one particular ponggawa and found 
a new ponggawa, the main problem still exists, the sawi remain in poverty (Informant M-
Exp-Mak, 2005).  
In the current local political dynamics, ponggawa play a pivotal role. Ponggawa 
can fund Bupati candidates’ campaigns in return for support their own business agenda. As 
local elites, ponggawa have privileges in extending their political influence and 
preferences to their sawi (Bolong 1988; Mukhlis and Robinson 1985).  
5.7.1.7 Destructive fishing 
Pangkep is facing increasingly destructive fishing activities136. These activities 
constitute a major issue in Pangkep coastal zone management. Destructive fishing exists in 
the islands of the Spermonde archipelago. About 40 percent of Spermonde fishermen’s 
incomes comes from destructive fishing (DFW 2003). Spermonde archipelago serves both 
as the place of origin and target area of dynamite bomb and cyanide fishing137 (DFW 
2003). Most of the fishermen who engage in destructive fishing are Spermonde people who 
                                                     
136 Garcia (2008:1) defines destructive fishing practices as “all fishing methods that have an impact on the 
target resource and may affect also non-target species and the wider aquatic environment”.  This definition 
refers to fishing using or applying poisons, explosives, muroami,  and destructive practices (such as beach 
seining, bottom trawling, and large-scale pelagic driftnets) (Garcia 2008).  
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live permanently in the archipelago and have experience and knowledge of the target areas. 
In 2000, 2.83 per cent of 7,569 registered fishing vessels that operated in Spermonde were 
involved in destructive fishing (Pet-Soede, Cesar, and Pet 2000). Despite this small 
percentage, this figure represents the “tip of the iceberg” of the actual figures on 
destructive fishing in Spermonde. Dynamite bomb fishing dominates destructive fishing 
practices in Spermonde archipelago (69 %) (Table 29), while cyanide fishing’s share is 31 
per cent (DFW 2003).  
Destructive fishing practices often exist in the outer zone as well. The ecological 
conditions of this zone, with the barrier reefs as nursery and feeding grounds for schools of 
fish combined with a lack of surveillance are the main reasons why this zone has become 
the target area for destructive fishing practices. About 58 per cent of destructive fishing 
cases occurred in the outer zone with dynamite bomb fishing as the common practice 
(Table 30).  
Table 30.  Frequency of destructive fishing in Spermonde archipelago.  
Target areas 
 
Spermonde Zone 
Inner zone Middle inner 
zone 
Middle outer 
zone 
Outer zone Total 
Bomb Cyanide Bomb Cyanide Bomb Cyanide Bomb Cyanide Bomb Cyanide 
Coastal 
areas 
- - 7 8 41 - 15 - 63 8 
Coral reefs - - - 51 62 6 118 90 180 147 
Reef 
edges 
- - - 3 54 7 116 - 170 10 
Offshore 4 - 7 10 - - 3 16 14 26 
Total 4 - 14 72 157 13 252 106 427 191 
Source: DFW (2003)  
 
Despite its high risks, most fishermen prefer destructive fishing to conventional 
ways of fishing (hook line/pancing). For them, it is better to earn money at a high risk 
rather than going home with nothing. There is a Bugis proverb, mate maddarae na mate 
                                                                                                                                                                 
137 Destructive activities in the Spermonde archipelago constitute 52 percent of dynamite bomb fishing 
and 91 percent of cyanide fishing cases in Pangkep as a whole (DFW 2003). 
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malupue138, which literally means ‘better to die in a bloody way than to die hungry’.  This 
proverb refers to a pragmatic but destructive principle in exploiting marine and coastal 
resources. Pangkep fishermen commonly recite this proverb with pride.  Now it has 
become a major motivation and excuse for Pangkep fishermen to use destructive fishing 
methods especially those who are poor and are in debt to their ponggawa (Patappe 2004a, 
2004b). Traditions of local wisdom on extracting marine and coastal resources are 
disregarded for the sake of household needs and livelihoods.  
Relying on destructive fishing is a low cost, lucrative business. Destructive 
fishing provides quick cash return and is very efficient for fishing in coral reef areas 
regardless of how destructive it is. This is the main reason for the high occurence of 
destructive fishing in Pangkep. In such a situation, high demands for debt repayment and 
for household needs139 have forced fishermen to adopt a pragmatic attitude and to ignore 
resource degradation as a consequence of destructive fishing (Table 31). The motives for 
this destructive fishing currently go far beyond normal practices for subsistence 
consumption. High demand for Napoleon fish, for example, has led to the extensive use of 
destructive fishing methods. 
Law enforcement to deter destructive fishing is far from ideal. Law enforcement 
officers quite often provide backup for destructive fishing by being paid compensation 
(uang keamanan) for ignoring destructive fishing. The development of a surveillance 
station for Sea Police (Polisi Air/Polair) on one island on the eastern part of Liukang 
Tangaya was intended to provide insurance to ponggawa who engage with destructive 
                                                     
138 Literrally, mate maddarae means “death violently”; mate malupue means “death slowly “ due to 
hunger.  
139 To repay the debt with its high interest as well as filling household needs, poorer fishermen prefer the 
shortcut of asking ponggawa for the most effective fishing gear and techniques. As ponggawa prefer a big 
margin, they response to these requests from poorer fishermen (sawi) by providing destructive fishing 
methods such as dynamite bombs and cyanide.   
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fishing rather than preventing illegal and destructive fishing activities.140 Ponggawa were 
astute enough to donate money and building material for developing the station as a down-
payment for shielding their activities from law enforcement. Ponggawa also support the 
surveillance patrol of Polair by providing petrol (uang bensin) and money (uang rokok) in 
exchange for not catching their fishing vessels and providing information in advance of 
patrol schedules. 
Table 31.  Potential for continuity of destructive fishing in Spermonde archipelago   
Economy Social and culture aspects Ecology aspects 
 High demand for live reef fish 
 Low supply from non-destructive 
fishing sources 
 Price stability 
 Destructive fishing is an effective 
fishing practice 
 Low cost and less time 
consuming 
 Poverty among fishermen and 
coastal society 
 Fishermen trapped in debt  
 Motivation to gain large margins 
with cheap and easy methods 
(tend to choose negative ways) 
 Belief that there is unlimited 
stock in the seas 
 Low law awareness 
 Low law enforcement 
 Lack of awareness of issues of 
environmental protection and fish 
stock limitations 
 Wide distribution of coral reefs 
 Views that cyanide has less 
impact on coral reefs 
 Seasonal fishing due to natural 
constraints 
Source: DFW (2003) 
 
                                                     
140 Focus Group Disscusion with Pangkep COREMAP Senior Extension Officers (SETOs) on 22 July 
2007 in Dinas Kelautan dan Perikanan Pangkep.  
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5.7.1.7.1 Dynamite bomb fishing  
Dynamite bomb fishing141 is an easily applied method of delivering explosive 
materials (bom molotov142) to a target area. Once the blast has occurred, it kills fish and 
non-target species as well as destroying the ecosystem143 that produces high value fish. 
Dead fish will float to the surface and can be easily harvested. The low cost of the 
production of bombs for fishing can lead to a profit, even up to 2000 percent, when the fish 
are valued at market price (Alder and Christanty 1998; DFW 2003; Patappe 2004a, 2004b). 
However, a large proportion of profit goes either to the middlemen or the patron 
(ponggawa). Fishermen mostly bear the risk for a small part of the profit.   
Most bomb fishermen come from five islands under Pangkep administration: 
Karanrang, Balang Lompo, Lumu-lumu, Gondong Bali and Pandang (Table 32 and Figure 
19) (DFW 2003). Two of these islands (Karanrang and Gondong Bali) are also the original 
sites for cyanide fishing. 
Target species of this bomb fishing are high value demersal and pelagic fish that 
are marketed in the same way as fish that are not killed by bombs.  The catch proceeds 
from fishermen to middlemen (pabaloang) or ponggawa and ends up in the fish markets 
(TPI/PPI). There are also extended market chains in TPI that operate before consumers 
buy their fish. Fishermen can also sell their catch directly to the fish market on the 
                                                     
141 Dynamite bomb fishing is one of the national government’s main concerns. Economic loss from this 
non-friendly fishing method over the next 20 years is calculated to be more than USD 570 million or between 
USD 33,900 and USD 306,800 per square kilometres (Pet-Soede, Cesar, and Pet 1999; Pet-Soede and 
Erdmann 1998). Pet-Soede et al. (1999) estimated that 3.75 square meters for every 100 square meters of reef 
in Indonesia is subject to blast fishing. 
142 A bom Molotov can be made from a mixture of substances such as urea, ammonia and potassium 
nitrate mixed with kerosene in bottle. All these raw materials are available in the open market. 
143 Blasted ecosystems (mostly coral reefs) need a longer recovery period to regain  their original 
conditions. Rehabilitating coral reefs is usually expensive and labour intensive (Fox et al. 2005). Degraded 
coral reefs can take about a century to recover and become productive again .  In many cases, rehabilitation 
has to deal with a number of failures. 
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mainland if they have an established connection with potential buyers. TPI Rajawali and 
TPI Paotere are two popular markets for bombed fish from the Spermonde archipelago. 
Table 32.  Island of origin and target for bomb fishing in Spermonde. 
Fishermen’s Island of 
Origin  
Bomb Fishing Locations Distance Travelled 
Karanrang  
(Pangkep) 
Laiya 
Kulambing 
Podang-podang 
Sarrapo 
Kapoposang Marine Tousrism Park 
Puteangin 
1 hour 
2 hours  
1 hour 
2 hours 
3 – 4 hours 
3 – 4 hours 
Balang Lompo 
(Pangkep)  
Karanrang 
Badi 
Kodingareng 
Langkae - Lanyukang 
Kapoposang Marine Tousrism Park  
Puteangin 
1  - 2 hours 
1  - 2 hours 
2 – 3 hours 
2 – 3 hours 
3 – 4 hours 
3 – 4 hours 
Lumu Lumu 
(Pangkep) 
Lumu-lumu 
Langkae – Lanyukang 
Sarrapo 
Kapoposang Marine Tousrism Park  
1  hour 
2 hours 
2 hours 
3 – 4 hours 
Gondong Bali 
(Pangkep) 
Kapoposang Marine Tousrism Park  
Karanrang 
1  hour 
2 - 3 hours 
Pandangan 
(Pangkep) 
Kapoposang Marine Tourism Park  
 
1  hour 
Barang Lompo 
(Makassar) 
Langkae – Lanyukang 
Kodingareng 
2 – 3 hours 
2 hours 
Kodingareng Lompo 
(Makassar) 
Kodingareng 
Langkae – Lanyukang 
Tanakeke 
1 hour 
2 hours 
2 – 3 hours 
Source: DFW (2003) 
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Figure 19.  Map of islands of origin and the markets for bomb fishing in the Spermonde 
Archipelago.  
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5.7.1.7.2 Cyanide fishing 
Cyanide fishing is a highly toxic method using cyanide salts to stun fish in the 
areas around and within coral reefs.  The toxic impact of cyanide fishing is highly lethal. 
Even in low volumes, cyanide can kill coral reefs rapidly including small fish, coral polyps 
and symbiotic algae (Sadovy and Liu 2004). Because this methods is very effective in 
killing target fish species, the method continues in Pangkep to ensure supply for the 
worldwide live fish trade (Sadovy and Liu 2004), which has a value of US $ 1 billion 
annually (Burke and Spalding 2002).  
Cyanide fishing is a lucrative form of fishing in Pangkep. This method became 
popular in Indonesia in the late 1980s (Johannes and Riepen 1995) and was mainly 
triggered by high demand from rich Chinese in Hong Kong for live reef fish (Sadovy and 
Liu 2004). In Pangkep, cyanide fishing started to flourish when the live reef fish food trade 
(known as LRFFT144) began to focus on coral trout and groupers as promising 
commodities in 1990  (Sadovy and Liu 2004). At the same time, Makassar served as a  
tranship port for live reef fish, even from remote areas such as Kondongbali Island with 
holding tanks of about 100 kilograms that were emptied every 2-3 days (Sadovy and Liu 
2004). 
Most cyanide fishermen come from nine islands in Spermonde, five of which are 
under Pangkep administration (Sarrapo, Sarrapo Caddi, Doang-doangan, Gondong Bali 
and Karranrang), three under Makkasar administration (Barrang Caddi, Lae-lae and 
Barrang Lompo) and one island, Satangga Island, under Takalar administration (Figure 20) 
                                                     
144 LRFFT involves the catching and trading, including the export, of live reef fish for luxury retail 
markets. Supply chains for live fish trade involved foreign vessels and crew, and big investment for the 
handling and transport of live fishes (Donaldson et al. 2003). There is also a trend to train local fishers for 
more cost effective cyanide fishing (Donaldson et al. 2003; Sadovy and Liu 2004). 
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(DFW 2003). Clustered areas of cyanide fishing follow administrative boundaries because 
of the distances to target areas and markets for fish killed by cyanide (DFW 2003).  
 
Figure 20.  Map of the islands of origin and markets for cyanide fishing.  
Source: DFW (2003) 
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The market chain for fish killed by cyanide is relatively shorter than for bombed 
fishes. Cyanide-killed fish are mostly export-oriented commodities that need the shortest 
possible chains to ensure freshness. Fish markets, such as TPI Rajawali and TPI Paotere, 
serve as transit points for these fish (DFW 2003) before they are exported to foreign 
markets such as Hong Kong and Singapore. 
5.7.1.7.3 Deterrent actions for destructive fishing 
In order to prevent bomb and cyanide fishing in Pangkep, the district government 
has prohibited these two types of destructive fishing practices. Local Regulation (Perda) 
10/2001145 makes bomb and cyanide fishing illegal within Pangkep waters especially in the 
coral reef ecosystem (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2001). These destructive fishing 
practices, together with electric shock fishing, have a negative impact on coral reef 
ecosystems (Article 1 item 7 Perda 10/2001). The maximum sentence for using  illegal 
fishing techniques is six month in jail or a fine of IDR 5 million (Article 6 Perda 
10/2001).The local government can seize all fishing gear and vessels used in this illegal 
fishing (Article 7 Perda 10/2001).  
Enforcement of this Perda has shown little progress. The Perda requires the civil 
servant inspector (Penyidik Pegawai Negeri Sipil/PPNS) to investigate any fishing 
violations related to Perda. However, as my informants confirmed, the number of qualified 
PPNS is insufficient and in many cases, the local police and navy officials have a definite 
conflict of interest as the law enforcement officers and endorsers of illegal fishing 
activities.  
                                                     
145 Local Regulation 10/2001 on Prohibiting Coral Reef Exploitation and Destruction in Pangkep 
(Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Pangkajene dan Kepulauan Nomor 10 Tahun 2001 Tentang Larangan 
Pengusahaan dan Perusakan Terumbu Karang dalam Wilayah Perairan Kabupaten Pangkajene dan 
Kepulauan). 
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The Pangkep government also applies the strategy of involving ponggawa in 
coastal management committees in order to reduce destructive fishing. Appointed 
ponggawa are involved in the Collaborative Forum for Kapoposang Marine Tourism Park 
Development146 as committee members (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2007e). One well-
known ponggawa in Saugi Island, Haji M Tahir Daeng Ngitung, has served for more than 
two years in the Pangkep Coastal Community Empowerment Council, 147 an intra-agency 
council for conserving coral reefs and other important coastal resources (Pemda Kabupaten 
Pangkep 2006c, 2007d). However, this strategy has had little impact on deterring illegal 
fishing. Coordination of practical and realistic solutions is the main issue in the committese 
rather than distribution of functional arrangements.  The establishment of these committees 
is intended more for COREMAP project implementation requirements (Informant B-Gov-
Pkp 2007)148 rather than for strategic action by the Pangkep government to prevent illegal 
fishing and conserve the important coastal resources.  
At the village level, the Pangkep government has promoted local sanctuaries for 
fishing nurseries and zoning plans for fishing activities149. For example, in Mattiro 
Bombang Village150, the village government and its community have set up protected areas 
in two reefs, Torajae and Gusung in 2004 (Sadovy and Liu 2004). The village passed the 
Village Regulation 078/DMBB/III/2004 and displayed it on the village billboard (Figure 
                                                     
146 The Collaborative Forum for Kapoposang Marine Tourism Park Development (Forum Kolaborasi 
Pengembangan Taman Wisata Alam (TWA) Kapopposang) is a forum with 24 executive members and 
representatives from local government, branches of the local military, navy and police  the university, NGOs, 
and the community (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2007e) 
147 This committee has 32 members with the Bupati as chairperson. Membership of this committee is 
from local government, local military, navy and police branches, all heads of subdistricts in the three 
kecamatan Kepulauan, NGOs, and the community  (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2006c, 2007d). 
148 My informant confirmed that the idea of establishing the committees is “just to follow the guidelines 
(juklak) of COREMAP Project”. When I asked what the most important issues to strengthen the committees’ 
functions, he replied, “increasing honorarium is very important because the current honorarium is too small 
for committee members”. 
149 MCRMP supported Pangkep’s effort at promoting local sanctuaries.  
150 Mattiro Bombang is an island village near Sabangko, Sakoata, Sagara and Salemo islands. 
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21): it designated core and buffer zones. In the buffer zone, the village applies an open-
closed system. Access for fishing is open for the whole year with the use of limited fishing 
gear. In the core zone, fishermen are allowed access for fishing only during Syafar (the 
fifth month of the Moslem calendar). In other months, fishing is prohibited. The regulation 
only allows hook-and-line and other recommended traditional fishing gear for fishing in 
buffer and core zones (Sadovy and Liu 2004). 
 
 
Figure 21.  Posters illustrating the village regulation (Perdes) of  Matiro Bombang 
Village, Pangkep provides information about detailed regulations and the location of 
core and buffer zones of the protected area.  
Source: Sadovy and Liu (2004). 
  
5.7.1.8 Unreported fishing 
Unreported fishing is another major issue in Pangkep fisheries. Pangkep 
fishermen or fishermen fishing in Pangkep waters are reluctant to land their catches in 
Pangkep fish markets. They prefer to sell their catches to middleman (pa’balolang) or to 
land them at the fish market in Makassar. A combination of the long distances to the fish 
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landing station, poor post-catch handling facilities151 and unattractive prices are the major 
concerns of fishermen, prompting them to choose Maros or Makassar fish markets as their 
fish catch landing stations. This unreported fishing results in loss of revenue from fees for 
fish not landed in Pangkep. However, there are no exact figures on this loss of revenue due 
to the poor and out-dated data on the numbers of fishing vessels and fishermen involved 
and the gear used for this fishing. 
5.7.2 Stakeholders in Pangkep 
5.7.2.1 Local government institutions 
Similar to Konawe (Section 4.7.2.1), there are several local government agencies 
involved in coastal management in Pangkep. The Pangkep Marine Affairs and Fisheries 
Service (Dinas Kelautan dan Perikanan Pangkep/DKP Pangkep) and Pangkep Planning 
and Development Agency (Bappeda Pangkep) are the two local government institutions 
directly involved in coastal and fisheries activities. These two institutions, according to 
their mandates, are supposed to provide resources (staff, planning, funding and 
infrastructure) for the coastal zone management programs.  
Both DKP Pangkep and Bappeda Pangkep oversee important projects on marine 
and coastal resource management projects, COREMAP and MCRMP. DKP Pangkep 
administers the COREMAP Project, whose routine tasks are to encourage and provide 
technical services in developing marine and fisheries activities. DKP Pangkep is also 
responsible for issuing permits for marine and fisheries-related business activities within 
four nautical miles seaward.  
                                                     
151 Such as the lack of iceboxes for keeping the catch fresh. 
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Bappeda Pangkep is the executing agency for the Marine and Coastal Resources 
Management Project (MCRMP), an Asian Development Bank funded project tasked with 
strengthening local government capacity in coastal zone planning and management. With  
MCRMP assistance, Bappeda Pangkep has produced planning documentation on coastal 
zone management  (Proyek MCRMP Bappeda Pangkep 2004, 2005), which was revised in 
2006 (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2006d, 2006e). As a coordinating body on planning and 
development at the district level, Bappeda Pangkep reports to the Bupati and plays an 
important role in coordinating the planning and budget allocation of marine, coastal zone 
and fisheries development.  
Several local government organizations participate in the coastal zone 
management program in Pangkep. These organizations include (i) Pangkep Forestry and 
Plantation Service (Dinas Kehutanan dan Perkebunan Pangkep), (ii) Pangkep 
Environmental and Cleaning Service (Dinas Lingkungan Hidup dan Kebersihan Pangkep), 
(iii) Pangkep Tourism and Culture Service (Dinas Pariwisata dan Budaya Pangkep), (iv) 
Pangkep Public Works  Enterprise (Dinas Koperasi dan Pengusaha Kecil dan Menengah 
Pangkep), (v) Pangkep Health Service (Dinas Kesehatan Pangkep) and (vi) Pangkep 
Education Service (Dinas Pendidikan Pangkep). These dinas are technical offices of the 
Pangkep local government that report to the Bupati, and include some programs related to 
fisheries and coastal zone management.   
Dinas Kehutanan dan Pekebunan Pangkep has a program on mangrove 
rehabilitation and coral reef conservation. This dinas is responsible for slowing down 
mangrove conversion into tambak and ensuring that the green belt policy (jalur hijau 
sempadan pantai) applies in mangrove conversion.  
Dinas Lingkungan Hidup dan Kebersihan Pangkep is involved in a beach 
cleaning program (Program Bersih Pantai) and supports mangrove ecotourism. This dinas 
  206
 
has a mandate to provide technical assistance for sanitation improvement for coastal 
communities.  
Dinas Pariwisata dan Budaya Pangkep has the portfolio on marine and coastal 
tourism especially in Kapoposang Marine Tourism Park.  This dinas also supports 
mangrove ecotourism, and has an active program to document and support the heritage of 
the Siang kingdom.   
Dinas Koperasi dan Pengusaha Kecil dan Menengah Pangkep has the 
responsibility for providing technical assistance to small and medium scale productive 
enterprises for coastal and island communities. This dinas also promotes and gives 
technical and managerial assistance to Kelompok Usaha Bersama (enterprise groups) and 
has a revolving fund scheme for coastal and island communities.  
Dinas Kesehatan Pangkep is responsible for ensuring health facilities and services 
reach the outer inhabited islands in Pangkep in the form of paramedic and health facilities 
in kecamatan kepulauan. This dinas also runs sanitation improvement programs especially 
in coastal slum areas.  
Dinas Pendidikan Pangkep is engaged in the acceleration of the education system 
and facilities in the islands as a legacy of Gaffar’s pro-island policy and the 
implementation of campaign promises by the current Bupati to exempt basic education 
from fees.  
To coordinate coastal and fisheries programs, Pangkep has set up a supervisory 
team for marine and fisheries development that consists mostly of all these institutions 
(Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2007g). Pangkep has also established a development and 
service unit for aquaculture (Unit Pelayanan Pengembangan/UPP Perikanan Budidaya). 
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This unit seeks to strengthen market networks and develop partnerships in aquaculture 
activities including tambak culture (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2007h).  
5.7.2.2 Non Governmental Organizations 
Only a few Pangkep-based non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are active in 
Pangkep CZM as most of them focus on local socio-political issues instead of fisheries and 
coastal issues. Yayasan Wahana Lestari (The Wahana Lestari Foundation) is probably the 
only Pangkep-based NGO that is active in fisheries and coastal issues. This NGO’s 
representative serves as a member of the Pangkep Coastal Community Empowerment 
Council.  
Most of the NGOs that work on fisheries and coastal resources in Pangkep are 
Makassar-based. These NGOs include Yayasan Konservasi Laut (Marine Conservation 
Foundation/YKL), Destructive Fishing Watch (DFW) Indonesia, Yayasan Samudra 
Indonesia (Samudra Indonesia Foundation/Yasindo), Lembaga Maritim Nusantara 
(Nusantara Maritime Foundation/Lemsa), Lembaga Mitra Lingkungan Sulawesi Selatan 
(Environmental Partner Institute/LML Sul-Sel), Lembaga Pengkajian Pedesaan, Pantai 
dan Masyarakat (Institute for Rural Coastal and Community Studies/LP3M) and 
Konsorsium Permerhati Kapoposang (Kapoposang Care Consortium). All these NGOs 
have links with the Marine Science Department, Hasanuddin University (IK Unhas) as 
most of the executive and staff members of the NGOs are alumni of IK Unhas. In most 
cases, IK Unhas lecturers are also engaged with the NGOs’ projects or studies as experts 
(tenaga ahli).   
. 
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Box 4. Kapoposang and Konsorsium Pemerhati Kapoposang 
Kapoposang Island is an outer island in Mattiro Ujung village in Kecamatan Liukang Tuppabiring located at 119o 17’ 
00’’ to 119o 22’ 25’’ east altitude and at latitude 4o 47’ 00’’ to 4o 50’ 10’’ south. This island has high coastal and marine 
biodiversity in good condition. Together with the Samalona and Kayangan islands, Kapoposang is part of  a marine 
tourism park (Taman Wisata Alam Laut/TWAL Kapoposang) as stipulated by the Decree of the Minister of Forestry No. 
588/Kpts-VI/1996 on 12 December 1996. The marine park covers an area of 50,000 hectares. 
Travel to Kapoposang, an outer island,  takes many hours even from the capitals of various subdistricts.  Details of 
distance to Kapoposang distance are as follows: 
Destination  Distance    Travel Distance      
Makassar  112 kilometers  5 – 8 hours by perahu 42 horsepower 
      2 hours by speed boat (200 horsepower) 
Pangkajene  60 kilometers  6 – 8 hours by perahu 66 horsepower 
      2 hours by speed boat (200 horsepower) 
Balang Lompo  48 kilometers  5 – 8 hours with perahu 5 horsepower 
 
There is no regular transportation service to Kapoposang. Fishing vessels and cargo vessels (pete-pete) are available 
to travel to Kapoposang for IDR 7,500 to 10,000 (USD 0.9 – 1.2) per person. Kapoposang people can also get a free 
lift from ponggawa pulau fishing vessels that carrying grouper and cod (kerapu sunu).   
Bugis dominate the demographic profile of this island. They account for almost 95 percent of the Kapoposang 
population. Most of them are fifth generation on this island. The Bugis dominance in Kapoposang dates back to the 
first settlement of Bugis fishermen on this island in the 16th century.  
About 75 per cent (66 households) of Kapoposang people are engaged in fishing. Hand line (pancing ulur) and bottom 
gillnet (jarring insang tetap) are common fishing gear in Kapoposang, account for respectively, 44 per cent and 10 per 
cent of total fishing gear in Kecamatan Liukang Tapibirring. About 83 per cent of fishing vessels have only a one-tonne 
capacity and 4.3 per cent of fishing vessels have a capacity of 5 to 10 tonnes.  
Migrants (pendatang) are considered a threat to social life in Kapoposang. Drugs, gambling and the use of alcohol 
have emerged as a new lifestyle for some of the younger generation in Kapoposang. Interaction with youth from 
Pandangan Island (the neighboring island only 0.5 miles from Kapoposang) has triggered this lifestyle. 
PT Makassar Tirta Bahari (Makassar Diving Center/MDC), a Makassar based dive operator, has the tourism 
concession in TWAL Kapoposang. MDC has obtained its principal permit from Bupati Pangkep (Surat Bupati KDH 
Pangkajene dan Kepulauan No. 55.10/10/Diparda on 25 January 1999). This has allowed MDC to build homestay 
accomodation in the eastern part of Kapoposang and function as a single dive operator. MDC pays retribution to the 
Pangkep government. There is no direct involvement of the local community in this diving tourism activity in TWAL 
Kapoposang run by MDC.  
Dinas Pariwisata dan Budaya (Tourism and Culture Service) is reluctant to develop community tourism in 
Kapoposang. MDC also argued that community involvement in diving tourism would require a big step to pursue 
acceptably, high standards, such as training in customer services.  
To empower the local community and to establish community authority in managing TWAL Kapoposang, an alliance of 
the two leading NGOs in coastal and marine, YKL and Yasindo established the Konsorsium Pemerhati Kapoposang 
(Kapoposang Care Consortium/KPK) in June 2000. KPK intends to adopt a conservation principle that is fairer for the 
community. In doing so, KPK has conducted a series of training programs that include: mariculture, coastal resources 
awareness, community awareness, village institutions management, participatory mapping, fish processing, diving and 
group management.  
KPK also conducted a series of activities in community empowerment. KPK is running a pilot project on seaweed 
culture to generate additional or alternative income. KPK conducted participatory rural appraisal on local knowledge 
and norms of coastal resource management, and facilitated the empowerment of community institutions that include 
the enterprise group (Kelompok usaha Bersama/KUB Karya Bersama), the conservation group (Kelompok Konservasi 
dan Pelopor Pelestarian Kuda Laut) and the women’s group (Kelompok Perempuan Anggrek).  
Source: Tim Sosek Pokja Sulsel (2001) and Pusat Studi Terumbu Karang - Universitas Hasanuddin (2002, 2007) 
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A current common theme on the NGOs’ program is to advocate community and 
village governments to set up marine and coastal management areas (kawasan kelola 
laut/KKL), to pass regulations to administer KKL and to implement law enforcement in 
KKL152.  These programs are intended to reduce and prevent destructive fishing, especially 
in KKL areas. This is also part of raising community awareness of the importance of 
protecting the coastal ecosystem as the nursery and feeding grounds for high economic 
value species 
5.7.2.3 Academic institutions 
Pangkep has a Politeknik Pertanian Negeri Pangkajene dan Kepulauan (Pangkep 
Technical Agricultural College/Poltan Pangkep).  This polytechnic is the only educational 
institution to focus on practical expertise and knowledge of the fisheries in Indonesia. 
Among its five departments, Poltan Pangkep has four departments that focus on fisheries: 
Aquaculture (Budidaya Perikanan), Fishing Technology (Teknologi Penangkapan Ikan), 
Fisheries Processing Technology (Teknologi Pengolahan Hasil Perikanan) and Aqua-
business (Agribisnis Perikanan). Poltan Pangkep is active in promoting tambak and 
fisheries development in Pangkep through the transfer of technology and by helping its 
alumni find fisheries jobs in Pangkep.  
Makassar-based universities dominate the areas of scientific and policy studies in 
Pangkep CZM. Academics from Hasanuddin University (Unhas) often appear as technical 
experts in any of number of studies tendered by Pangkep local government. These 
academics are mostly based in the Marine Science Department of Unhas (IK Unhas). Some 
of them administer the Centre for Coral Reef Studies (Pusat Studi Terumbu Karang 
                                                     
152 In-depth discussion with Informants A NGO-Mak 2005 and B-NGO-Mak 2005. 
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Unhas/PSTK Unhas), a program supported by the Unhas Research Institute (Lembaga 
Penelitian Unhas).  
As the leading academic institution on marine science and fisheries in eastern 
Indonesia, IK Unhas has done a number of studies on Pangkep coastal resource 
management particularly on the Spermonde archipelago153 as part of its Tri Dharma 
Perguruan Tinggi commitments (The Three Elements of Indonesian Higher Education, 
which entail education, research and community service). Several studies were part of IK 
Unhas’ strategic research program and others were student honours theses (skripsi).  IK 
Unhas has also conducted collaborative research with foreign universities, national 
research institutions and independent researchers.  
IK Unhas also manages the Indonesian Sea Partnership Program (Program Mitra 
Bahari) as Regional Coordinator for South Sulawesi province. Program Mitra Bahari is a 
national partnership program under an MMAF initiative involving more than 20 regional 
universities and local governments. This program implements locally developed applied 
research, outreach/extension, education and policy activities that are intended to solve local 
coastal problems or strengthen local economies through matching funds from national and 
local funding sources.  
Several Unhas academics are involved in the coastal zone management policy 
process, mostly at the provincial level through their appointment as members of project 
implementation units. Currently, two of IK Unhas academics are members of the 
Provincial Steering Committee of the MCRMP Project and another two are key resource 
persons on the Provincial Task Force of MCRMP. Their educational background and 
                                                     
153 Unhas has conducted intensive studies on the Spermonde archipelago, mostly for the COREMAP 
Project.   
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training in fisheries and coastal resources have amplified their involvement in coastal 
policy.  
In the socio-cultural field, the former Social Science Research Training Center 
(Pusat Latihan Penelitian Ilmu-ilmu Sosial/PLPIIS) crafted a number of research studies in 
Pangkep. PLPIIS facilitated an exchange of scholars and researchers of universities in 
Indonesia to conduct research in South Sulawesi. This scheme was designed to provide a 
wide perspective on and insights into social and cultural aspects of life in South Sulawesi. 
The period 1975 – 1980 was the PLPIIS’s most productive research period on Pangkep, 
when a number of research papers were produced.  
5.7.3 Administering the coastal zone 
The main references for reviewing the local government’s commitment to 
financing coastal and fisheries programs are found in the local government budget 
documents (Anggaran Penerimaan dan Belanja Daerah/APBD). Pangkep APBD 
documents indicate a typical picture of high dependency of the local government budget on 
the central government’s transfer of development funds for programs such as coastal 
management and fisheries. Pangkep APBD documents show that its own revenues from 
marine affairs and fisheries are insufficient to fund any coastal management or fisheries 
programs. Therefore, without stimulus funding for coastal zone management and fisheries 
programs, Pangkep coastal and fisheries development will remain stagnant. Similarly, 
without innovative ways, Pangkep revenues from coastal and fisheries will remain less 
significant for Pangkep local area revenues (PAD) and consequently coastal and fisheries 
programs will continue to be a neglected sector.  
Pangkep APBD documents before reformasi make it clear that a large proportion 
of Pangkep’s routine budget was spent for salary and ordinary public administration 
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instead of being invested in development activities. Funding for development was mostly 
allocated by central government through vertical institutions of the various ministries 
(Kanwil or Kandep) or through specific grants such as Inpres and Banpres. As Kanwil or 
Kandep were part of the central government, these funds did not appear as part of the local 
government budget. After reformasi, these funds were transfered to Pangkep local 
government, thus significantly increasing the local government budget. However, within 
the first five years of reformasi, a large proportion of the local government budget was 
allocated for routine task expenditures. For example, in 2002, more than 50 per cent of 
Pangkep’s budget was spent for similar purposes through the General Allocation Fund 
(DAU).  
5.7.3.1 Available funding 
The Pangkep budget allocation for coastal and fisheries programs prior to the 
establishment of the MMAF in 1999 were part of the agriculture and forestry sector budget 
allocation (Sektor Pertanian dan Kehutanan/SPK). Despite the fact that fisheries and 
coastal production contributed a large proportion to the regional domestic product (PDRB), 
coastal and fisheries programs shared only a small proportion of total funding under SPK 
allocation. An army-based Bupati combined with less concern for coastal and fisheries 
programs contributed to this lack of Pangkep’s financial commitment to developing its 
coastal and island.  
By using the maximum pro-rata allocation (one third), the funding allocation for 
coastal and fisheries management programs in 1998 prior to MMAF establishment was 
only half of the available funding for coastal and fisheries after the establishment of the 
MMAF in 1999 (Table 33). Coastal and fisheries activities were neglected in favour of 
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revenue earning. Geographical conditions and the complexity of coastal issues in Pangkep 
led to neglect and ignorance of coastal and fisheries development.  
The establishment of the MMAF was a crucial factor for acceleration of concerns 
about the marginalized coastal matters and fisheries. The MMAF pushed intensively an 
agenda for fiscal balance for coastal and fisheries programs within local government. The 
MMAF also provided deconcentration funds (dana dekonsentrasi) for local government to 
promote the Ministry’s mandates in the region.  
Table 33.  Coastal and fisheries funding available for Pangkep 1994 - 2008 
Fiscal Year 
Annual Budget for 
Agriculture and 
Forestry Sector 
(including 
fisheries and 
coastal) (SPK) 
Estimated 
budget 
allocation for 
fisheries and 
coastal 
management 
(33% of SPK) 
Specific 
Alocation Fund 
(DAK) 
Fisheries 
Sharing 
Revenue (DBH) 
DAK + DBH 
1994/1995  335,130,000  110,592,900        
1995/1996 133,460,000    44,041,800        
1996/1997   425,090,000  140,279,700        
1997/1998     378,980,000  125,063,400        
1998/1999   452,300,000  149,259,000        
1999/2000 924,870,000  305,207,100        
2000/2001 1,407,240,000  464,389,200    684,390,000  684,390,000  
2002 901,450,000    679,740,980  679,740,980  
2003* -        960,000,000  960,000,000  
2004     1,040,000,000  2,012,989,358  3,052,989,358  
2005     1,200,000,000  1,272,727,000  2,472,727,000  
2006     3,750,000,000  752,992,730  4,502,992,730  
2007     3,506,000,000  454,545,454  3,960,545,454  
2008     3,506,000,000  454,545,454  3,960,545,454  
Sources: 
Data 1994 - 2000 are from website of Directorate General of Budget, Ministry of Finance 
Data 2001 based on revenue sharing of natural resources and mining.  
Data 2002 refers to Keputusan Menteri Keuangan Republik Indonesia Nomor 214/KMK.O6/2002 tentang Penetapan Perkiraan Jumlah 
Dana Bagian Daerah dari Sumber Daya Alam Minyak Bumi dan Gas Alam, Pertambangan Umum serta Perikanan Tahun Anggaran 
2002 
Data 2004 accounted from part of revenue sharing from natural resources. 
Data 2007 refers to Peraturan Menteri Keuangan Republik Indonesia Nomor 141 / PMK.07 / 2006 Tentang Penetapan Perkiraan 
Alokasi Dana Bagi Hasil Sumber Daya Alam Perikanan Tahun Anggaran 2007 
Data 2008 refers to Peraturan Menteri Keuangan 142/PMK.07.2007 tentang Penetapan Alokasi Dana Alokasi Khusus Tahun 2008 
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The MMAF provided more additional funding for Pangkep to engage in coastal 
and fisheries development programs through the establishment of the Fisheries Revenues 
Sharing (Dana Bagi Hasil Perikanan) in 2000 and the Specific Allocation Fund on Marine 
Affairs and Fisheries (Dana Alokasi Khusus/DAK Bidang Kelautan dan Perikanan) in 
2004. These two types of funding consistently allocate funding for coastal and fisheries 
programs. Commencing in 2003, funding available for coastal and fisheries programs has 
increased significantly, especially when compared to the 1999/2000 budget. However, 
these two types of funding have slowed down, and shown a steep decline since 2005. 
Despite the fluctuation in funding for Pangkep coastal and fisheries management programs, 
the general figures on the budget allocation for coastal and fisheries increased within a 
decade (1998 – 2008) (Figure 22). This increase also corresponds to the devaluation of the 
Indonesian currency during a time of economic crisis.154 The actual purchasing power of 
allocated funding remains similar to the budget before the economic crisis. 
                                                     
154 The economic upheaval in 1997 is known as krisis moneter or krismon (literally means monetary 
crisis) in Indonesia.   
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Figure 22.  Estimated funding available for coastal and fisheries programs in Pangkep 
(1994 – 2008).  
 
5.7.3.2 Budget allocation 
The budget allocation for coastal and fisheries programs in Pangkep has steadily 
increased since 2003 despite the budget allocation declining in 2005 (Table 34). By 2006, 
the budget allocation for coastal and fisheries programs amounted to 2.08 per cent of the 
total Pangkep budget. This proportion decreased to 1.82 per cent in 2007 but the nominal 
allocation increased by almost five per cent.  
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Table 34.  Pangkep Local Government Budget (APBD) 2003 - 2007 
No. Items 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
1 Budget Allocation for DKP Pangkep 831,061,627 3,292,472,023 3,825,103,903 7,039,995,959 7,359,489,566 
  Detailed allocations 
a. 
Salary, lump sum 
and office 
operation and 
maintenance 
473,061,627 594,092,023 657,753,903 823,320,959 886,289,566 
b. Assets and  maintenance costs 223,420,000 1,194,075,000 2,987,350,000 5,770,349,600 6,092,700,000 
c. 
Operational costs 
for coastal and 
fisheries facilities 
64,050,000 497,025,000 137,575,000 260,425,000 380,500,000 
d. Travelling costs 70,530,000 1,007,280,000 42,425,000 180,900,400 
Distributed in 
asset and 
operational cost 
2 Total Pangkep Budget (APBD) 203,315,802,212 221,576,050,923 245,560,731,641 338,893,089,231 403,664,141,043 
3 
Percentage DKP 
Budget (1) to Total 
Budget (2) 
0.41 1.49 1.56 2.08 1.82 
4 Revenue from DKP 21,500,000 33,038,500 30,038,500 56,000,000 31,100,000 
  Detailed revenues sources 
a. 
Coastal and 
fisheries extraction 
tax (Pajak 
pengambilan hasil 
kekayaan laut) 
- 2,500,000 2,500,000 - - 
b. 
Levies on fisheries 
adminsitration 
services 
6,500,000 6,000,000 6,000,000 5,500,000 5,500,000 
c. 
Asset sales (Hasil 
penjualan aset 
daerah yang tidak 
dipisahkan) 
15,000,000 24,538,500 19,038,500 Not listed anymore 
Not listed 
anymore 
d. Tambak rental fees  - - 2,500,000 50,500,000 25,600,000 
5 Total Pangkep Revenue 24,641,687,234 24,801,287,634 27,841,391,113 31,750,807,292 40,257,959,558 
6 
Percentage DKP 
Revenue (4) to 
Total Revenue (5) 
0.09 0.13 0.11 0.18 0.08 
7 
Percentage DKP 
Revenue (4) to 
DKP Budget (1) 
2.59 1.00 0.79 0.80 0.42 
 
Source: Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep (2003a, 2004a, 2004b, 2005a, 2005b, 2006a, 2006b, 2007a, 2007b) 
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Pangkep budget allocation for coastal and fisheries programs consists of four 
categories. These are: (i) salary and office operational and maintenance costs, (ii) assets 
and maintenance cost, (iii) operational costs for coastal and fisheries facilities and (iv) 
travelling costs. Sources for this budget allocation came mostly from the block grant 
allocation (Dana Alokasi Umum), DAK Bidang Kelautan, PAD and Dana Bagi Hasil 
Perikanan. The block grant allocation (Dana Alokasi Umum) was used mostly for paying 
civil servant salaries and office operational costs. On the revenue side, the sources of 
revenues were from (i) coastal and fisheries extraction tax, (ii) levies on fisheries 
administrative services, (iii) asset sales and (iv) tambak rental fees.  
In 2003, Pangkep’s allocated budget for coastal and fisheries programs were more 
than three times the estimated budget in 1999/2000. The budget for 2003 was 0.41 per cent 
of the total Pangkep budget. More than half of the budget was spent on routine 
expenditures (salary and office operational and maintenance costs). Spending on assets and 
their maintenance costs constituted the second largest proportion (27 %) of the annual 
budget. Revenue for coastal and fisheries programs came from asset sales (70 %) and levy 
on fisheries administration services (30 %). The total annual revenue share was only 0.09 
per cent of total Pangkep revenues.  
In 2004, the budget allocation for coastal and fisheries increased significantly 
compared to 2003 budget allocation. In year 2004, Pangkep allocated IDR 898,580,000 
(USD 103,825) for matching funds to the COREMAP Project Preparation funding as part 
of the local government’s contribution to the COREMAP Project. This matching fund was 
labelled in the APBD as travel costs for COREMAP Project assistance. The travel costs for 
the 2004 year budget were remarkably high: 30.59 per cent of total the budget allocation 
for coastal and fisheries. There is no further explanation in the detailed Pangkep APBD or 
confirmation from my informants regarding these high travel costs.   
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The largest proportion allocated in the 2004 budget was for asset and maintenance 
costs (36.27 %): most of these expenditures were spent for multi-year financed irrigation 
channels for tambak. The budget allocation for routine tasks also increased almost 20 per 
cent. Operational costs for coastal and fisheries facilities increased significantly, by 67.6 
per cent. Revenues in the 2004 annual budget saw an increase with large proportion 
coming from asset sales155 (74.4 %) while fees from coastal and fisheries extraction (7.5 
%) and retribution of fisheries administrative services (18.1 %) increased.   
The development of irrigation channels continued to constitute the largest 
proportion in the budget allocation for coastal and fisheries programs in the 2005 fiscal 
year. Pangkep spent IDR 1,320,000,000 (USD 151,724) for irrigation channels. This 
amount, combined with other asset and maintenance costs, constituted 78 per cent of the 
total budget for coastal and fisheries programs. Operational costs for coastal and fisheries 
facilities dropped by half for the 2005-year budget. Total budget allocation for coastal and 
fisheries program in 2005 amounted to 1.56 per cent of the total Pangkep budget. 
The revenue from coastal and fisheries activities in 2005 increased with the 
introduction of tambak rental fees that contributed eight per cent of annual revenues. Two 
other revenue sources, coastal and fisheries extraction taxes and levies for fisheries 
administrative services, remained the same as in the previous year. There was also a 
revenue decrease on asset sales. Total revenue from coastal and fisheries activities for the 
2005 fiscal year decreased by nine per cent of 2004 revenues.  
In 2006, the total budget for coastal and fisheries almost doubled with spending 
on asset and maintenance costs forming the largest proportion of the budget. Pangkep spent 
IDR 3,575,000,000 (USD 410,919) for the development of irrigation channels. Pangkep 
                                                     
155 Asset sales category in Pangkep APBD Budget refers to selling disposal of redundant inventories 
which are mostly office furniture, stationary and vehicles. 
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also allocated funding for the reclamation of a fish landing port (PPI). Other items in this 
budget increased, for example routine task expenditures rose by 25 per cent. Similarly, 
coastal and fisheries facilities’ operational costs increased by 89 per cent and travel costs 
rose significantly. These increased costs brought the budget for coastal and fisheries 
acitivities to 2.08 per cent of the total Pangkep budget.  
Sources of revenue from coastal activities and fisheries in 2006 came only from 
levies for fisheries administrative services and tambak rental fees. Pangkep received 90 per 
cent of these revenues from tambak rental fees. This significant increase corresponded with 
the increase in tambak area in 2006, amounting to 1,215.48 hectares of new tambak areas. 
These expanding tambak areas produced a significant revenue increase from tambak rental 
fees, which increased the proportion of coastal and fisheries revenues to 18 per cent of total 
Pangkep revenues. These two types of revenue remained the main revenue sources from 
the coastal and fisheries activities in fiscal year 2007.  
The budget allocation for coastal and fisheries programs in 2007 was almost ten 
times greater when compared to the budget allocation in 2003. The 2007 budget allocation 
for irrigation development amounted to IDR 2,945,454,000 (USD 338,558) or 40 per cent 
of the total budget allocation for coastal activities and fisheries. The combination of this 
budget allocation with high expenditures for fishing port (PPI) development and other asset 
expenses consumed 82.78 per cent of the total budget for coastal and fisheries activities.  
Routine expenditure in 2007 remained similar to that of the previous year with 
only a small increase. Operational costs for coastal and fisheries facilities increased by 46 
per cent compared to the 2006 figure. Travelling costs were distributed over asset and 
operational costs. Tambak rental fees were still the main contributor to Pangkep coastal and 
fisheries revenue although this source of revenue dropped by about half. This decrease 
corresponded to only two hectares of new tambak developed in 2007. This resulted in less 
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registration and administration as well as rental fees from tambak. This decrease led to a 
decrease from 18 to 8 per cent in the proportion that Pangkep fisheries and coastal revenue 
contributed to total Pangkep revenues.   
There are several remarks that need to be made about the Pangkep budget figures 
as a whole. In 2003, there was a surplus of IDR 802,103,190 (USD 92,125). In 2005 and 
2006, the Pangkep government invested part of its budget as shares in Bank BPD (a 
provincially owned bank), Bank Perkreditan Rakyat (The People's Credit Bank) and 
Perusda Mappatuwo (a local government owned company). Pangkep invested IDR 
6,876,800,000 (USD 790,436) in 2005 and increased this to IDR 6,985,120,877 (USD 
802,877) in 2006. These investments provide a safe way for the Pangkep administration to 
proceed instead of being subject to investigation by the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi/KPK).    
Pangkep’s budget allocations for coastal and fisheries activities provide an 
illustration of the high dependency of the local government budget on central government 
transfers. The Pangkep budget contains a large proportion of funding from the general 
block grant allocation (DAU) and the specific allocation fund (DAK). Most of the Pangkep 
expenditure assignments for coastal and fisheries activities contain only a small proportion 
of local revenues (PAD). Central government transfers are dominant. Revenues from 
coastal and fisheries constituted only a small proportion of the total Pangkep budget.  
The calculations for DAU have two important components, namely total area and 
number of population. DAU for Pangkep did not take into account Pangkep’s physical 
landscape with its 117 islands that require more attention and special treatment, including 
funding. The allocation of DAU only referred to total land area and the number of the 
population. Therefore the Bupati Pangkep sent a letter to the National Coordinating 
Agency for Surveys and Mapping (Badan Koordinasi Survei dan Pemetaan 
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Nasional/Bakosurtanal) to ascertain Pangkep’s total area including its marine and coastal 
areas as a basis for calculating the 2008 DAU allocation. By reference to satellite images 
and maps issued by Bakosurtanal, the total Pangkep area is 11,035.80 square kilometres 
which includes 892.36 square kilometres of land area156 and 10,143.44 square kilometres157 
of marine and coastal areas (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2007c). If Bakosurtanal confirms 
Pangkep calculation, then this could be an important reference for Pangkep to obtain more 
funding from DAU, as well as DAK and DBH. There could be a significant increase in the 
DAU transfer if the central government approves Pangkep proposal.  
5.7.3.3 Progress so far 
“Development of mainland and islands kecamatan [in Pangkep] needs to 
address each context and characteristic. [I believe] that the islands kecamatan 
will be in more need of accelerating marine and fishery sectors.    
Pattape 2004b. Pengabdianku untuk Rakyat p.79. 
 
Despite significant increases in Pangkep’s budget for coastal and fisheries 
programs, DKP Pangkep’s position in the Pangkep local government has remained 
relatively constant. DKP Pangkep continues as one of the important dinas. There was less 
political motive in reappointing the Head of DKP Pangkep when the Bupati position 
changed. Natsir Sulaiman, the current Head of DKP Pangkep has served in the same 
position that he held since Gaffar’s term as Bupati.  
The current Bupati Pangkep, Syafruddin Nur, has tended to keep upper echelon 
appointees including the Head of DKP Pangkep and the Local Secretary (Sekda) as part of 
his cabinet rather than changing them or imposing his interest by appointing his own men 
                                                     
156 The land area includes coastal and mountainous areas (801.50 square kilometres) and islands (90.86 
square kilometres). 
157 This figure is calculated by measuring up to four nautical miles seaward from each island at low tide.  
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to the upper echelon of the local bureaucracy. Restructuring of the upper echelon in 
Pangkep’s administration has mostly followed the rotation of jobs according to the “tour of 
duty and tour of areas” policy (Informant K-Gov-Pkp 2007). Syafrudddin’s policy to keep 
the upper echelon legacy of Gaffar’s administration can be said to lead to stability in 
administration. However, it could also raise problems through the lack of control of 
professional performance and constrain career pathway development (penjenjangan) for 
other potential staff.  
The current Pangkep Sekda, Surya Agraria, who served in this position under 
Bupati Gaffar must be willing to translate the new Bupati’s promises into action, especially 
those made during the local election campaign. In his campaign, Syafruddin158 promised to 
waive school fees for elementary and high schools and to provide free medical check-up 
fees in the public health centre. He also pledged to improve regulations on mining and 
plantations (Informant E-Gov-Pkp 2008). His campaign promises also placed emphasis on 
the islands as a basis for development (Informant D-Gov-Pkp 2007, Informant E-Gov-Pkp 
2008). Syafruddin has acted on several of his promises and is still working to fulfil more of 
his campaign promises. One of these tangible campaign promises, to waive education 
fees,159 was intended to provide a model for provincial government (Tribun Timur 2008).  
Syafruddin demonstrated his leadership in Pangkep with some achievements. The 
MMAF awarded him second place in the 2008 Coastal Award (Adibhakti Mina Bahari) in 
the governmental category. His commitment to continue the Gaffar policy on coastal and 
small island management was the main consideration for this award. He rehabilitated 
degraded mangrove areas and provided a 30 kilometre-long access road for tambak 
breeders (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2008b). His policy on providing free school and 
                                                     
158 Syafruddin Nur was the candidate of an alliance Golkar, PAN and PKB. 
159 Instruksi Bupati Pangkajene dan Kepulauan Nomor 440/125/Hukum Tertanggal 24 Desember 2005. 
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health fees for islanders as well as providing subsidies for diesel and gasoline to fishermen 
were key aspects in the assessment of his success for the Coastal Award. He was also 
granted a Forestry award in 2008 from the Ministry of Forestry for his re-greening effort in 
unproductive areas in Pangkep (Fajar On-line 2008).  
In some echelons of the DKP Pangkep administration, the significant increase in 
the budget available for coastal and fisheries program was not immediately associated with 
the competency needed to manage the budget. Implementation of programs involved few 
effective, creative and innovative ways for spending the budget on coastal and fisheries 
activities. In fact, the “wait for pedum and juknis 160 from the pusat (central government)” 
is still a common bureaucratic illness. This illness exists mostly among senior civil 
servants. New graduates who have recently joined the DKP Pangkep and Bappeda 
Pangkep have contributed more dynamic approach to DKP Pangkep and Bappeda Pangkep 
in the implementation of coastal and fisheries programs.  
As in Konawe, the earlier Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) actions 
against corruption that put many local civil servants in jail have created a fear factor in 
managing the local budget (APBD). The KPK actions proved to be effective shock therapy. 
It frightened the program managers and heads of offices in Pangkep local government. 
Now, program managers and office heads are sometimes too worried to spend the budget 
for planned programs. For them, it is better to have an unspent budget rather than being the 
target of an investigation by the KPK that sometimes acts with highly political motives.     
                                                     
160 Pedum is Pedoman Umum, an implementation guidelines document. Juknis is Petunjuk Teknis, a 
technical guideline document that contains technical aspects for some project or program activities.  
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5.7.4 Local regulations in Pangkep 
Pangkep has issued a number of local regulations (Peraturan Daerah/Perda) on 
coastal and fisheries management. In 1998, Pangkep issued Perda 19/1998 on levies for 
the fish landing port (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 1998). Three years later, Pangkep passed 
Perda 10/2001161 that prohibited coral reef exploitation and destruction in Pangkep 
(Section 5.7.1.7.3). This Perda bans destructive fishing methods and gear in coral reef, 
such as bombs, cyanide and electric shock fishing (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2001). It 
gives exemptions to research activities, sea-lanes, conservation and protection of genetic 
resources (Article 4). This Perda imposed a maximum sentence of six months in jail or a 
fine for IDR 5 million (Article 6) for violations and the seizure of all fishing gear and 
vessels (Article 7). However, this Perda failed to identify in detail the destructive fishing 
gear and methods that have various local names and usages in Pangkep.  
In 2002, Pangkep endorsed Perda 10/2002 on levies for administrative services. 
Under this Perda, there are three types of levy: (i) licenses (surat izin) with charges of IDR 
25,000 – 150,000, (ii) recommendations (rekomendasi) IDR 50,000 – 150,000 and (iii) 
certificates (surat keterangan/surat keterangan asal) IDR 5,000 – 50,000 (Pemda 
Kabupaten Pangkep 2002). Pangkep administration only issues fishing licenses (Surat Izin 
Usaha Perikanan) for fishing vessels less than 10 Gross Tonnage (GT) (Table 35). 
Similarly, recommendations and certificates are only related to the Pangkep local 
government’s authority on coastal and fisheries activities.  
                                                     
161 Local Regulation 10/2001 on Prohibiting Coral Reef Exploitation and Destruction in Pangkep 
(Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Pangkajene dan Kepulauan Nomor 10 Tahun 2001 Tentang Larangan 
Pengusahaan dan Perusakan Terumbu Karang dalam Wilayah Perairan Kabupaten Pangkajene dan 
Kepulauan). 
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Table 35.  Annual levy for fishing license vessels in Pangkep.  
Fishing Vessel Gross Tonnages Annual Levies 
1 to 2 GT IDR 25,000 
3 to 4 GT IDR 30,000 
5 to 6 GT IDR 40,000 
7 to 8  GT IDR 50,000 
9 to 10 GT IDR 150,000 
Source: Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep (2008c) 
 
 
Pangkep revised Perda 10/2002 into Perda 9/2006 changing several items as 
objects for tax. Through this revised Perda, Pangkep has a new set of retributions from 
tambak rental fees (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2006f). 
In 2003, Pangkep issued two Perda on coastal activities and fisheries.  The first 
was Perda 03/2003 on coastal and marine resources extraction taxes (Pemda Kabupaten 
Pangkep 2003b). Another Perda was Perda 5/2003 that regulated tariffs for the 
measurement, registration and certification of fishing vessels of less than seven gross 
tonnes (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2003c).  
In Perda 03/2003, there are 22 types of resources subject to tax, such as prawn, 
sea cucumber, crab, crocodile, flying fish egg, sea snake, shells and seaweed. Perda 
exempts taxes on these resources when they are for personal consumption and not for 
export purposes. This Perda identified these resources as a broad category for tax purposes 
without specifically mentioning either the scientific or the local names. To provide 
technical details of this Perda, Pangkep issued technical guidelines through Bupati Decree 
197/2004162 (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2004c).  
The amounts of the taxes set out in Perda 03/2003 are calculated from an 
appraisal of the volume of resource extraction multiplied by current market price or 
                                                     
162 Surat Keputusan Bupati Pangkajene dan Kepulauan, Nomor 197 Tahun 2004 tentang Petunjuk Teknis 
Pelaksanaan Peraturan Daerah Kabupaten Pangkajen dan Kepulauan, Nomor 3 Tahun 2003 tentang Pajak 
Pengambilan Hasil Kekayaan Laut.   
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standard price (Article 4). The Bupati annually issues these market or standard prices and 
then the Pangkep administration applies the percentage for tax. Taxes on fish, animals and 
seaweed are 1.5 per cent of total market value. For mariculture or aquaculture products, the 
figure is one percent of total production value (Article 5). Punishment of violations of this 
Perda is six months in jail or a fine of IDR 5,000,000 and seizure of fishing gear and 
vessels (Article 27).  
In 2005, Bupati Pangkep issued a decree on administering permits for harvesting 
non-timber products including mangrove forests (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2005d). A 
high-level of mangrove conversion in Pangkep is the cause of this decree but it is also 
intended to lessen upstream deforestation activities that can have destructive impacts on 
the coastal zone.  
The latest Perda is Local Government Regulation 6/2007 on Coastal Zone 
Management (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2007i). This Perda deals with various aspects of 
coastal zone management, such as management of boundaries, local government authority, 
planning, utilizing, controlling, disaster mitigation and organization of coastal zone 
management. Pangkep also revised its coastal zone planning and management policy 
including its strategic plan, management plan and action plan (Proyek MCRMP Bappeda 
Pangkep 2004, 2005). These documents express Pangkep’s political, financial and 
institutional commitment to marine and coastal management.  
5.8 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has focused on Pangkep as a case study area. Pangkep experienced 
military dominance in the Bupati position for more than three decades during the New 
Order. The position of the Bupati Pangkep was a part of kekaryaan (career) policy for 
military personnel, which was also known as dwi fungsi ABRI (the dual function of the 
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military). Pangkep experienced serious neglect of coastal and fisheries management during 
the time of the previous army-based Bupatis Pangkep whose primary doctrine was 
territorial and terrestrial in emphasis. This was also a reflection of previous national 
political policy that ignored marine and coastal resources, despite the fact that two-thirds of 
Indonesia’s area is marine. Because of the neglection and ignorance, island, coastal and 
fisheries resources in Pangkep were marginalized. To overcome these disadvantages 
required more resources (financial, human and institutional) as well as a political 
commitment.  
The role of Bupati has been proven to have an influence on coastal and fisheries 
policies. Changing leadership from army supremacy in the Bupati Pangkep position to a 
civil leader in the post-reformasi era opened up new horizons for coastal and fisheries 
management, supported by strong political and financial commitments to coastal and 
fisheries management. One previous and one current Bupati, Gaffar and Syafruddin, 
established a positive political commitment to island and coastal policy. Their public 
administration experiences as senior bureaucrats enabled them to adapt their commitment 
to practical spheres. Both of them had spent most part of their careers in Pangkep, which 
was also an important factor in running Pangkep district.  
The MMAF in 2008 awarded the current Bupati, Syafruddin Nur, the Coastal 
Award (Adibhakti Mina Bahari) in appreciation of his efforts in accelerating the 
development of the small islands and for promoting coastal and fisheries management in 
Pangkep. This award should be seen as recognition of the continuous efforts of Pangkep 
administration on small islands, coastal and fisheries management since Bupati Gaffar 
Pattape who had laid down the pathway.     
The chapter concludes that the Bupati can exert a highly significant influence on 
coastal and fisheries policy at the district level. If the momentum for strong political, 
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financial and institutional commitment remains at the same level or is increased, it will 
enhance coastal and fisheries activities as a promising sector. It seems that if the Bupati has 
a strong public administration background, it makes it easier to implement his political 
manifesto in local administration tasks. It would be different if the Bupati had only a 
political party background. This would make implementation tasks as the Bupati more 
challenging as they would require an adaptation process in the first phase of a Bupati’s 
time in office. The transition period can sometimes take a long time and it can be abused 
by rent seekers if the Bupati has no capability and capacity in public administration. If this 
happens, then innovative and effective programs to deliver better service remain as 
unachievable targets or irrelevant to reform.   
Coastal and fisheries activities in Pangkep generate a large proportion of the gross 
domestic products (PDRB). Milk-fish and prawns are two important commodities in 
Pangkep as well as live coral fish. Coastal and fisheries activities have been the source of 
income and livelihood for most Pangkep coastal communities. These activities also have a 
trickle-down effect on other coastal and fisheries-related activities. However, the funding 
availability for coastal and fisheries management during the New Order period was only a 
very small proportion of the local budget. The MMAF policy, as well as strong local 
political commitments, has increased significantly the budget allocation for coastal and 
fisheries management since 2000.  
These budget allocations require professionalism in bureaucracy to administer 
funding and to spend the budget in innovative and effective ways (tepat guna dan 
sasaran). Despite some cases of a lack of professionalism in service delivery, 
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professionalism in Pangkep administration is promising163 but there is also reluctance 
among staff who are averse to change. 
Professionalism is required to handle and deal with one of the most important 
issues in Pangkep coastal and fisheries management: destructive fishing from dynamite 
bombs and cyanide fishing. Pangkep has been known as one of hot spots for destructive 
fishing in Indonesia. To deter destructive fishing is the main challenging task for the 
Pangkep administration. It cannot be done by the Pangkep administration alone, but 
requires strong commitment from other institutions at various levels, especially law 
enforcement agencies.    
There are many factors involved in destructive fishing: the problem is a 
combination of economic, cultural and law enforcement dimensions. In the economic 
dimension, poverty is the main reason why many fishermen engage in destructive fishing. 
Poverty combined with the patron-client (ponggawa - sawi) relationships provide a social 
safety net for poor clients (sawi) but allow exploitation of resources by richer patrons 
(ponggawa). This combination creates a vicious cycle (lingkaran setan) that makes it 
difficult for sawi to exit. 
The next chapter discusses the general implications of the two case studies by 
returning to the main research questions identified in Chapter 1. The chapter will compare 
the case studies of Konawe and Pangkep and will pull together the strands of the arguments 
developed in earlier chapters.              
  
           
                                                     
163 There are some fresh and innovative staff who have joined the Pangkep administration. Most of them 
are keen to learn and toexercise professionalism in service delivery.  
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6 A TALE OF TWO DISTRICTS:  
 COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES  
 
Understanding local socio-political contexts sheds light on the dynamic of 
decentralized CZM in Konawe and Pangkep (Chapters 4 and 5). That is, the approaches 
taken by Konawe and Pangkep administrations on decentralized CZM reflect wider 
developments in local governance. The case studies of decentralized CZM in Konawe and 
Pangkep thus provide significant insight into a wide variety of historical and contemporary 
socio-political processes related to decentralized CZM, and provide an understanding of 
the major emerging trends in decentralized CZM.  
This chapter presents a synthesis of the key insights of the two case studies. I 
review the case studies’ findings and examine thematic similarities and differences 
between the operation of decentralized CZM in Konawe and Pangkep, particularly by 
comparing the need for decentralized CZM, the role of Bupati and local government 
commitments. This chapter is divided into three sections. I first identify the similarities and 
differences between CZM in Konawe and Pangkep and then I discuss the lessons that can 
be learned from this comparison. Overall, I argue that the local socio-political contexts in 
Konawe and Pangkep have determined the style and pathway of decentralized CZM 
implementation.  
6.1 Common and distinct themes 
The Konawe and Pangkep governments are dealing with new legal administrative 
domains with regard to CZM that require political, financial and institutional 
commitments. These new domains have transformed the setting of the local governments’ 
management of their coastal resources. The administration of CZM is entering a new 
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phase, which gives more responsibility to Konawe and Pangkep for the management of 
their designated areas and resources. The following sections describe in more detail the 
similarities and differences in decentralized CZM in Konawe and Pangkep, which 
highlight three important themes, namely motivation, the role of Bupati and local 
commitments to decentralized CZM.  
6.1.1 Motivation for decentralized CZM 
Konawe and Pangkep share the assumption that decentralized CZM is necessary 
to deal with their extensive geographical areas and to address local coastal issues that rely 
heavily on the local socio-political contexts. However, this assumption can seem an overly 
optimistic view of independent decentralization in CZM for Konawe and Pangkep.  
Motivation for decentralized CZM in Konawe and Pangkep gives the impression that 
decentralized CZM is demanded by the central government to foster and accelerate coastal 
management and solve coastal problems through lower government levels, rather than 
articulating the real desires of these kabupaten to manage their coastal resources and 
address local coastal issues. In other words, it can look as if the central government is 
simply imposing their agenda on the local governments. Meanwhile, Konawe and Pangkep 
meet these demands by providing partial commitments, a legacy of the New Order’s 
bureaucratic illnesses (corruption, collusion and nepotism) that still exist in the 
implementation of decentralized CZM. In most cases, the local administrations act 
unilaterally and with superiority towards communities, rather than as service providers and 
partners in resource management.  
Motivation for decentralized CZM in Konawe and Pangkep is part of an 
awakening to the need to formally manage the long-neglected coastal resources. However, 
much of the coastal resources are already degraded and it is difficult to affirm whether the 
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resources can provide economic return in a short period after financial commitments have 
been made or not. The time span for economic returns might take longer than predicted 
and, most importantly, the impacts of resource degradation appear quickly if there are no 
immediate resource recovery actions. Therefore, the argument for maintaining 
decentralized CZM in Konawe and Pangkep rests not on short-term economic return on 
investment, but on long-term restoration of the ecological functions of coastal resources 
that are not easy to quantify and are more abstract. This situation means the efforts to make 
real local government commitments on decentralized CZM are more challenging; many 
local government commitments to decentralized CZM are merely rhetorical, and occasion 
only sporadic, rather than holistic and integrated, responses to address coastal issues.  
   The Konawe case study underpins the view that decentralized CZM requires a 
reorientation and refocus from its current strategies due to administrative proliferation 
(pemekaran). Despite the significant reduction of its coastal areas because of the 
pemekaran process, Konawe still regards decentralized CZM as one way to improve its 
disadvantaged coastal areas, such as along the coast of Soropia and Wawonii Island. 
However, motivation for decentralized CZM in Konawe appears as just an additional task 
in the climate of “business as usual”. 
From a technical point of view, several Konawe coastal planning documents 
contain high quality mapping and simulation for planning purposes. As my informants 
confirm, most of these documents lack updated data and information, and have had little 
input from community participation and other stakeholders. Local government planning 
officers commonly cite difficulties in reaching the silent majority in communities and 
technical hitches in stakeholders’ inputs into programs and projects as excuses for these 
oversights. There are fears that these documents will be no more than artificial documents 
stacked in office bookshelves, rather than becoming the main references for policy-making 
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processes in CZM. In order to obtain new information and gain useful input from 
communities and stakeholders, the Konawe government needs to expand its approaches to 
CZM.  
The Pangkep case study highlights that in Pangkep, decentralized CZM is a 
vibrant concept in addressing its geographic challenges and the disadvantages of its 112 
islands. Motivation for decentralized CZM in Pangkep is occasioned by a combination of 
the fate of Pangkep as an archipelagic district (kabupaten kepulauan), the necessity to 
accelerate small islands development, and the order of Law 32/2004. Immediate actions 
were also required to address the degradation of resources caused by destructive fishing. 
Confusion and awkwardness in dealing with decentralized CZM was common in the initial 
phase of decentralized CZM. 
From another perspective, decentralized CZM in Pangkep is like shifting the 
responsibility for fixing a corrosive and fragile resource to a district government that has 
just realized its identity as an archipelagic district (Informant G-Gov-Pkp 2005). With 
limited resources for example bureaucratic administrative experience and qualified human 
resources, Pangkep was asked by the central government, communities and stakeholders to 
address coastal degradation and, at the same time, to maintain the condition of the existing 
good resources and to improve living conditions and income generation of coastal 
communities. In this sense, the central government is less concerned about the capability 
and capacity of the Pangkep government for multi-task assignments (informant G-Gov-Pkp 
2005).  Pangkep is struggling to define priority issues that, in many cases, are complex and 
interdependent. 
The motivation for decentralized CZM in Konawe appears to be an artificial 
commitment to manage the coastal zone in a sustainable and integrated manner because of 
the lack enthusiasm from the Konawe local government to reform its local bureaucracy to 
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be more responsive and accountable. Meanwhile, motivation for decentralized CZM in 
Pangkep corresponded with the necessity to address the acceleration of coastal and small 
island development that required Pangkep local government to initiate real improvement 
and better practices for a decentralized CZM.   
6.1.2 The Role of Bupati 
The Bupati is the most important actor in the decision-making process of 
decentralized CZM in Konawe and Pangkep. With legitimate power through direct election 
(pilkada), the Bupati holds the strategic role of directing the pathway of decentralized 
CZM. The Bupati is now accountable to local voters and has to fulfil his or her political 
campaign promises, many based on popular issues to obtain more votes, as part of their 
accountability to constituents and local parliaments.  
The Bupati’s strategic role can support or oppose decentralized CZM depending 
on the Bupati’s leadership and background. The Bupati’s strategic role operates within the 
framework of a five-year term in office and must be based on pragmatic political 
calculation. Thus, the Bupati is tempted to select only those programs that will benefit his 
or her political image, and in most cases, programs on CZM are less politically expedient 
than other more popular programs. As a result, decentralized CZM programs are less 
important to the agenda of the Bupati, and this can lead to less political, financial and 
institutional commitment to decentralized CZM.          
In Konawe and Pangkep, decentralized CZM was not part of the current Bupati 
political manifesto or their election campaigns. If there was a link to coasts or fisheries, it 
was only brief and did not address the existing resources and the way to manage them for 
the benefit of local development. Selling and marketing decentralized CZM for the Bupati 
campaign are difficult tasks because it is an unpopular issue and would only contributes a 
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limited share to their election votes. Indeed, it is difficult to formulate decentralized CZM 
into achievable programs within one period of a Bupati’s term.  
The victories of the current Konawe Bupati and Pangkep Bupati in the first direct 
elections in their districts were connected to campaign issues unrelated to decentralization 
of CZM. Their victories were linked to the influence of the Golkar party164. As candidates 
of the Golkar party, these Bupati had backup from loyal voters and a strong campaign team 
because the Golkar party still exert a strong influence in both districts, as it does in other 
parts of Sulawesi.  
The current Bupati of Konawe and Pangkep have bureaucratic experience as they 
have spent most of their careers in local government administrations. However, their 
leadership styles provide different tales. The Bupati of Konawe applies his ‘extended 
family’ style in his leadership ambitions in competition against other Tolaki clans and 
politicians from other archipelagic kabupaten (kabupaten kepulauan) in Southeast 
Sulawesi (Chapter 4).  He seems more concerned with the maintenance of his political 
position and influence over bureaucracy than with improving administrative capability and 
reforming the bureaucracy. The way he appointed his allies and extended family to the top 
Konawe positions without a transparent and merit-based process shows his authoritarian 
power in Konawe. He also tends to expand his political influence to new pemekaran 
kabupaten by maximizing his rights to propose the interim Bupati (Pejabat Bupati 
Sementara) for Kabupaten Konawe Utara (Section 4.5).   
On the other hand, the Bupati of Pangkep tends to maintain stability within the 
bureaucracy through not rotating Pangkep’s upper echelon officials (Section 5.4). That is, 
                                                     
164 Sulawesi is known for its strategic bases for the Golkar party in eastern Indonesia even post-reformasi.  
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he has kept several key people in the same positions they had under the previous Bupati to 
prevent the administration from falling into disarray.  
In his election campaign, the Bupati of Pangkep promised to provide a waiver 
policy for several government services fees for Pangkep citizens such as education and 
medical check-up fees. Now he needs to realize his campaign promises that will be 
indicators for leadership. His five-year term until 2010 is the test of his leadership capacity 
and will be important for his popularity if he chooses to run for Bupati a second time. To 
this end, he involves the administration in the pursuance of his political promises. Most of 
his promises can benefit Pangkep citizens as well as providing positive impacts on the 
local bureaucracy. His policy on decentralized CZM is a legacy of the previous Bupati, but 
with updated and modified approaches. He is continuing the pro-island policy that has 
provided many benefits to islanders. He still maintains budget allocations for coastal and 
fisheries management above 1.5 per cent of total Pangkep budget.  
To sum up, strong leadership through good policy as shown by the Pangkep 
Bupati will be an important investment in implementing decentralized CZM. The decision 
to continue rather than change the previous program that benefited decentralized CZM is 
the most important part of his policy that supports decentralized CZM.  
6.1.3 Local commitments 
Local political, financial and institutional commitments are essential to 
decentralized CZM. These three types of commitment are indispensable and dependent 
upon each other. Local political commitments are mostly from the Bupati as the chief 
executive in the district. Local political commitments relate to the willingness of the local 
parliament to commit to the Bupati’s programs on decentralized CZM. It then depends on 
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capability and capacity of local administration to translate the Bupati’s commitments into 
programs and projects that are expressed in the local budget (APBD).  
Local financial commitments are reflected in the local budget (APBD). The 
amount and shared percentages of coastal and fisheries management programs in the total 
budget are the main references for these financial commitments. However, they should be 
followed by the effectiveness and efficiency of the budget in funding CZM programs. The 
CZM budget spending falls within local governments’ discretionary functions. To measure 
the local financial commitments to decentralized CZM, the budget allocation must be 
closely compared with other priority or obligatory decentralization mandates, such as 
education and health.  
Local institutional commitments include the existence of a functional 
organization, a level of institutional support from both the executive and the legislative and 
local administration policy on coastal and fishery management. Institutional commitments 
ensure that local political and financial commitments support decentralized CZM. The 
existence of a functional organization for decentralized CZM provides the assurance of an 
appropriate channel for funding coastal and fisheries management. It can also be a suitable 
channel for translating political commitments on decentralized CZM into programs and 
projects. 
In Konawe and Pangkep, political commitments provide different pathways while 
financial and institutional commitments share similar pathways. The different local 
political contexts in Konawe and Pangkep influence the pathways of the political 
commitments. Financial commitments in Konawe and Pangkep benefit from extended 
financial commitments from the central government that allocates more funding for CZM 
programs through the general allocation fund (DAU), specific allocation fund (DAK), 
revenue sharing (DBH ) and ad hoc allocation budgets (Sections 4.7 and 5.7).  
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Konawe and Pangkep also have specific functional organizations for coastal and 
fisheries management, Dinas Kelautan dan Perikanan (Dinas KP/Marine Affairs and 
Fisheries Services), a part of their institutional commitment. The establishment of Dinas 
KP was a breakthrough and became an important step in decentralized CZM in Konawe 
and Pangkep. Establishing Dinas KP represented a big effort by the local government that 
required political will to deal with CZM affairs that were handled by specific dinas. Dinas 
KP fell into the category of an additional service for the local government.  
Government Regulation (PP) 8/2003165 is the primary reference for local 
government to establish the number and types of dinas according to their capacity. PP 
8/2003 limits local government to establishing a maximum of 14 dinas, which comprise 11 
dinas to conduct compulsory authorizations (kewenangan wajib) and three dinas to 
conduct additional authorizations (kewenangan tambahan).166 To establish Dinas KP, each 
kabupaten has to have a 750 score from six indicators from general criteria and eleven 
indicators from specific criteria (Table 35). Local government can only establish a 
functional organization as an office (kantor) at a lower level than a dinas in terms of 
budget, authority and responsibility if its total score is 500 to 750. Local government 
cannot establish a functional organization for CZM affairs if its score is less than 500. In 
this case, CZM affairs will then be carried out by functional organization similar to a 
division or sub-division.   
                                                     
165 The Government Regulation (PP) 8/2003 is a revised version of Government Regulation (PP) 84/2000 
that served as the previous government regulation on local government organizations. PP 84/2000 adopts 
“wide discretion [principles] on how to set up [local government] administrative structures” (DRSP 2006:49). 
PP 84/2000 led to a race by local government to set up organizations and positions beyond their needs and 
ability to fund (Pujiyono 2006). At the same time, central government “reassert[s] central control by 
imposing restrictions and embracing a much stronger regulatory role [that] reduc[es] the discretion of [local 
government] in reforming their organization” (DRSP 2006:49). PP 84/2000 introduced uniformity of echelon 
structure that was less concerned with workload, scope, complexity, challenging tasks and level of 
responsibilities (Pujiyono 2006). This uniformity created jealousy especially in local governments with more 
complex issues and responsibilities but earned similar remuneration as less complex and with fewer 
responsibilities  (DRSP 2006; Pujiyono 2006).  
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The general criteria for establishing dinas correspond to spatial area, population, 
administrative features and APBD budget for staff expenditure. These indicators contribute 
20 per cent of the total score in establishing the dinas. Specific criteria for establishing 
Dinas KP contribute 80 per cent to the total score, which is determined by the size of 
coastal, and fisheries resources, production and administration. With refers to general and 
specific criteria score for the establishment of Dinas KP at the district level (Table 36), the 
score for establishing Dinas KP in Konawe was 777 and in Pangkep 803. The score was 
adequate to establish a specific dinas on CZM affairs. This scoring also illustrates the 
greater magnitude of the Dinas KP in Pangkep compared with Konawe (Table 37).   
As DRSP (2006) reported, the scoring system in the Government Regulation (PP) 
8/2003 provided a rigid blueprint and limited local government in setting up organizations 
that met “their [local] characteristics and the core services that they must deliver” (DRSP 
2006: 52). To address these issues and to follow up on the new law on Regional 
Government (Law 32/2004), the central government withdraw PP 8/2003 and passed 
Government Regulation (PP) 41/2007 concerning Regional Government Organizations 
(Organisasi Perangkat Daerah). According to this PP, local government can “establish 
any type of organizations as long as the total number does not exceed that corresponding to 
the score determined by their spatial area, population density and APBD budget” (DRSP 
2006:51). Population density contributes the highest percentage (40 %) of the score for 
determining local government organization; spatial area contributes 35 per cent; and local 
budget/APBD 25 per cent. The PP also distinguishes between Java and outer islands 
classifications in regard to density of population. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                 
166 At the provincial level, this regulation sets a limit of a maximum 10 dinas that primarily deal with 
multi-sectoral or intra-kabupaten issues. 
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Table 36.  General and specific criteria score for the establishment of Dinas KP (Marine 
Affairs and Fisheries Services) at the district level.  
No. Indicators  Scale Percentage 
(%)  
Scores 
GENERAL CRITERIA 
1 Total Areas (Km2) 
4 
 
 < 15,000  400 16 Score  
 15,000 – 30,000  700 28 Score 
 > 30,000 1000 40 Score 
2 Number of population (persons) 
2 
 
 < 400,000 400 8 Score  
 400,000 –  750,000 700 14 Score 
 > 750,000 1000 20 Score 
3 Ratio of Apparatus Expenditure in Local 
budget/APBD (%) 
4 
 
 > 50  400 16 Score  
 30 – 50 700 28 Score 
 < 30 1000 40 Score 
4 Number of kecamatan 
2 
 
 3 – 9 400 8 Score  
 10 – 20 700 14 Score 
 > 20 1000 20 Score 
5 Number of villages 
4 
 
 <  50 400 16 Score  
 50 – 100 700 28 Score 
 > 100 1000 40 Score 
6 Characteristics aspect in regional 
development 
4 
 
 Local/regional  400 16 Score  
 National  700 28 Score 
 International 1000 40 Score 
SPECIFIC CRITERIA 
7 Marine Resource Utilization 
8 
 
 Exploration  400 32 Score  
 Exploration and exploitation  700 56 Score 
 Exploration, exploitation and 
conservation  
1000 80 Score 
8 Numbers of permits and licenses on 
aquaculture and capture fisheries 
8 
 
 < 5 400 32 Score  
 5 -10 700 56 Score 
 > 10 1000 80 Score 
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No. Indicators  Scale Percentage 
(%)  
Score 
9 Marine resources 
8 
 
 Capture fisheries  400 32 Score  
 Capture fisheries and aquaculture 700 56 Score 
 Capture fisheries, aquaculture, oil 
and minerals 
1000 80 Score 
10 Number of non-motorized fishing vessels 
7 
 
 < 100 400 28 Score  
 100 – 200 700 49 Score 
 > 200 1000 70 Score 
11 Number of motorized fishing vessels 
(armada kapal motor temple) 
7 
 
 <  50 400 28 Score  
 50 – 100 700 49 Score 
 > 100 1000 70 Score 
12 Number of Fish Landing Markets (Tempat 
Pelelangan Ikan/TPI)  
7 
 
 < 5  400 28 Score  
 5 – 10 700 49 Score 
 > 10 1000 70 Score 
13 Marine Fisheries Production (Tons/year 
7 
 
 <  2,000 400 28 Score  
 2,000 – 5,000 700 49 Score 
 > 5,000 1000 70 Score 
14 Total areas (Km2) 
6 
 
 < 3,000 400 24 Score  
 3,000 – 7,500 700 42 Score 
 > 7,500 1000 60 Score 
15 Total areas of inland waters (Km2) 
8 
 
 <  500 400 32 Score  
 500 – 1,000 700 56 Score 
 > 1,000 1000 80 Score 
16 Inland fisheries resources  
7 
 
 Modern 400 28 Score  
 Traditional 100 70 Score 
17 Total fisheries processing  products 
(Tons/year)  
7 
 
 <  2,000 400 28 Score  
 2,000 – 4,000 700 49 Score 
 > 4000 1000 70 Score 
Source: Government of Indonesia (2000)  
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Table 37.  Scoring for the establishment of Dinas KP (Marine Affairs and Fisheries 
Services) in Konawe and Pangkep. 
No. Indicators  Konawe Pangkep  
General criterion 
1  Total Areas (Km2)  28 Score  28 Score 
2  Number of population (persons) 8 Score  8 Score 
3  Ratio of Apparatus Expenditure in Local budget 
(APBD) (%)  
16 Score  16 Score 
4  Number of kecamatan 20 Score  14 Score 
5  Number of Villages  40 Score  28 Score 
6  Characteristics aspect in regional development  28 Score  40 Score 
Specific criterion 
1  Marine Resources Utilization  80 Score 80 Score 
1  Marine Resources Utilization  80 Score 80 Score 
2  Numbers of permits and licenses on aquaculture 
and capture fisheries  
60 Score 
 
60 Score 
3  Marine Resources 56 Score  80 Score 
4  Number of non-motorized fishing vessels  80 Score  70 Score 
5  Number of motorized fishing vessels (armada 
kapal motor temple)  
70 Score  70 Score 
6  Number of Fish Landing Markets (Tempat 
Pelelangan Ikan/TPI)  
 49 Score 28 Score 
7  Marine Fisheries Production (Tons/year)  70 Score  70 Score 
8  Total Areas (Km2)  42 Score  60 Score 
9  Total areas of inland waters (Km2)   32 Score 32 Score 
10  Freshwater fisheries resources 70 Score 70 Score 
11  Fisheries processing (Tons/year) 28 Score 49 Score 
TOTAL  777 Score 803 Score 
 
  The Konawe case study shows that Konawe local government’s commitment to 
decentralized CZM focuses heavily on a short-term target such as increasing its local 
revenues (PAD) from fisheries taxes with less consideration of long-term and strategic 
aspects of coastal and fisheries management. This lesser focus has an impact on its 
commitment to multiyear projects or providing matching funds (dana pendamping) for 
coastal management projects (Informant D-Exp-Kdi 2005) as economic returns will not 
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appear over a short term period. While Konawe passed its local regulation (Perda) on 
CZM, this regulation only contains the general principle for CZM rather than any locally 
practical administration for coastal resources. 
The case of Konawe reflects the intervention of the local parliament in executive 
administration that is mostly related to money politics (Informant A-Exp-Kdi 2005). The 
local parliament used its extended powers to push the Bupati and to impose its agenda on 
the appointment of the Project Manager for a big loan project in 2002 - 2003. The local 
parliament preferred to choose a Project Manager who could provide financial benefits for 
them or their parties (Informant A-Exp-Kdi 2005). The Konawe local parliament also 
demonstrated its power by giving hard time on the disscusion of the proposed matching 
funds for coastal and fisheries management and revising the proposal without consultation 
with the executive (Informant D-Exp-Kdi 2005).  
The Pangkep case study shows stronger and more continuous political 
commitment to decentralized CZM from the current Bupati and administration. In the pre-
reformasi period (pre-1998), coastal and island policies were neglected, and were met with 
rhetorical promises of small island acceleration. The military background of the pre-
reformasi Bupati contributed to this ignorance of the needs of the small islands.  
The first Pangkep Bupati in post-reformasi era, Gaffar Patappe, who had a 
bureaucratic background made a commitment to a pro-island policy and coastal and 
fisheries management in his political manifesto. The current Bupati follows and maintains 
the legacy of his predecessor on decentralized CZM with a similar commitment on pro-
island and pro-coastal policies. Although there has been no new effort made on his pro-
island and pro-coastal policies, his local political commitments have benefited 
decentralized CZM and are in keeping with his financial commitments.  
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Starting from fiscal year 2004, Pangkep’s financial commitments on coastal and 
fisheries management attached to Dinas KP Pangkep have remained above 1.5 per cent of 
the total Pangkep budget (Section 5.7.3.2). However, institutional commitments continue 
using less effective approaches, such as establishing adhoc committees based only on 
project targets rather than preparing a committee as the forum for collaboration and 
coordination for strengthening coastal and fisheries management. To set up the ideal 
committee would require small incentives for committee members (Informant B-Gov-Pkp 
2007) and coordination. 
The Pangkep case study highlights the need to reformulate the financial 
commitment of the central government with regard to Pangkep’s geographic position as an 
archipelagic district (kabupaten kepulauan). The Bupati Pangkep has already sent an 
inquiry letter to verify Pangkep administrative areas including coastal and marine waters to 
obtain additional general allocation funding (DAU) from the central government. The 
Pangkep local government argues that the islands and the coastal waters between the 
islands significantly increase the total area of Pangkep’s administration. But this is not 
reflected in the DAU allocation.  
Ideally, funding for an archipelagic kabupaten like Pangkep should be treated as a 
special case with particular geographic constraints that require additional funding. This 
request should reinforce Pangkep’s financial commitments once the central government 
has approved it. Pangkep will have to expand its political and financial commitment in 
budget allocations to kecamatan kepulauan and coastal management if Pangkep obtains 
additional DAU as a kabupaten kepulauan.  
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6.2 Which one is better? 
A comparison of Konawe’s and Pangkep’s efforts at decentralized CZM requires a 
close examination of their local socio-political contexts. To do the comparison, it is 
necessary to take account of several indicators related to reform of bureaucratic 
governance in the public sector (Table 38). Bureaucratic reform factors need to include 
how the local administration deals with decentralized CZM. Bureaucratic reform factors 
include staffing, procurement, participation, planning and budgeting procedures (World 
Bank 2006b).  
The outcome of implementing the bureaucratic reforms might not impact in the 
short term, but such reforms contribute to making decentralized CZM work at the district 
level. Bureaucratic reforms can also craft achievable decentralized CZM targets through 
minimizing informal patronage behavior and corrupt practices (unofficial payments, 
bribery and economic returns from rent-seeking) that prevent innovation, block greater 
participation and undermine accountability (World Bank 2006b). However, bureaucratic 
reform in Konawe and Pangkep is still uncommon, although there are some signs of the 
beginning of an adoption of bureaucratic reforms.  
Based on the discussion in the previous section and on the analysis tabulated in 
Table 38, it is clear that Pangkep scored better than Konawe on many criteria. Although 
Pangkep is relatively new in endorsing its local regulation (Perda) on CZM and in 
producing adequate technical coastal planning documents, the promise of bureaucratic 
reforms has made the biggest contribution to Pangkep’s score. 
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Table 38.  Comparison of Konawe and Pangkep in decentralized CZM  
Factors Konawe Pangkep 
Political dimensions 
Style of Bupati and political 
commitments 
 Role of Bupati is very significant for 
local political commitments.  
 Bupati is authoritarian and controls the 
local bureaucracy for his political 
expediency.  
 Bupati has less commitment to 
decentralized CZM 
 DPRD demonstrated its power in 
administering coastal and fisheries 
management 
 Role of Bupati is very significant 
despite the fact that some programs 
are still just rhetoric. Bupati is more 
concerned about the stability in 
bureaucracy.  
 Bupati continues his predecessor’s 
pro-island and pro-coastal policies 
as part of his commitment to 
decentralized CZM 
Stakeholders participation  Still limited  Still limited, but with intention to 
accommodate greater participation  
Accountability pressures  Internal monitoring from Bawasda 
(Local Monitoring Agency) is less well 
performed 
 Lack of press and community 
pressures 
 Makassar-based press and online 
community offer pressure and 
monitoring.  
Financial dimensions 
Funding  Available and allocated funding for 
coastal and fisheries management 
increased significantly.  
 Available and allocated funding for 
coastal and fisheries management 
increased significantly. 
Pakta integritas (integrity 
pact) for transaction with the 
public and private sector 
 Exist in some transactions, but 
collusion still involved   
 Exists in some transactions  
Performance based 
budgeting (Anggaran 
berbasis kinerja) 
 On-going process  On-going process 
Strengthen procurement 
process (Presidential 
Decree No. 80/2000) 
 Exists, but needs improvement  Exists, but needs improvement 
Percentage of CZM budget 
to total kabupaten budget 
 Average more than 2 percent.  Average more than 1.5 percent 
Institutional dimensions  
Structure  Bappeda and Dinas KP are two 
important institutions in decentralized 
CZM.  
 Bappeda administers the MCRM 
Project and Dinas KP manages the 
infrastructure development assistance 
from the MMAF.  
 Dinas KP was established from the 
extended functional tasks of previous 
Dinas Perikanan.  
 Bappeda and Dinas KP are two 
important institutions in 
decentralized CZM.  
 Bappeda administers the MCRM 
Project and Dinas KP manages the 
COREMAP Project.  
 Dinas KP was established from the 
extended functional tasks of 
previous Dinas Perikanan.  
Staff   Lack of qualified staff. 
 Tendency for exclusivity in managing 
CZM projects both in Bappeda and 
Dinas KP. 
 There are additional young and 
enthusiastic staff joining the 
Bappeda and Dinas KP. 
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Factors Konawe Pangkep 
Institutional dimensions 
Neutrality in bureaucracy  Less neutral, bureaucracy tends to 
follow patrimonial culture  
 Moderately neutral as there is some 
stability in bureaucracy 
Professionalism   Less professional, exclusiveness in 
lucrative projects, rare critics from 
inside and outside bureaucracy 
 Paternalistic behavior in bureaucracy 
is still common, exemplified by 
menunggu arahan lebih lanjut dari 
pusat (waiting for further guidance 
from central government) and intense 
direction from Bupati.  
 Lack of initiative in reaction to vital 
needs, is instead passively responsive. 
 Moderate professionalism with local 
wisdom for strengthening 
professionalism  
 In some parts, the legacy of juklak 
juknis still exists.   
Performance contract for 
Head of Dinas KP 
 Not yet  Not yet, but there is tendency 
More equivalent distribution 
of incentive payments 
 Does not exist, still appears 
patrimonial in bureaucracy  
 Not yet equivalent 
Proper test for lower 
echelon positions 
 Does not exist  Does not exist  
External assessment for 
promotion 
 Does not exist  Does not exist 
Performance base for 
service delivery 
 Does not exist  Does not exist 
CZM Regulation (Perda) and CZM Documents  
Time to produce  Quick   Slow 
Content  Contains highly technical views but 
misses stakeholders’ participation and 
inputs  
 First documents released were too 
abstract, but the updated documents 
are more focused and concise 
Implementation   Some are already implemented but 
highly dependent on the available and 
allocation funding 
 Some are already implemented, 
subject to maintaining commitment 
CZM initiatives  Limited due to dynamic local socio- 
political contexts 
 Struggling to prioritize the issues to 
manage 
Strategic issues  Refocusing strategies and approaches 
on decentralized CZM due to the 
pemekaran process. 
 Poverty in coastal communities is an 
endemic problem due to the lack of 
infrastructure and access to market. 
 Destructive fishing activities 
 Acceleration of small island 
development 
 Poverty in coastal communities 
especially in islands is common due 
to the limited work choices and need 
for alternative income generation, 
and patron-client relationship 
(ponggawa –sawi) 
Source: Extracted from interviews with informants in Konawe and Pangkep in 2005 and 2007, and observations.    
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Although Konawe has made significant steps and has developed better policy but 
this has been limited to the caucus of Bappeda Konawe staff and several agencies. Konawe 
efforts at translating decentralized CZM into the policy arena by endorsing Perda CZM 
and preparing planning documents have lacked participation by stakeholders. The products 
seemed to have been produced just to fulfill project requirements and just to have technical 
documents rather than realistic references for policy-making. 
6.3 Lessons learned 
The comparison of the approaches to the implementation of decentralized CZM in 
Konawe and Pangkep presents some salutary lessons. Both Konawe and Pangkep provide 
telling examples of local government efforts at implementing challenging decentralized 
CZM policy, but at the same time, the local governments also reveal a lack of bureaucratic 
reforms. This situation mirrors the central government bureaucracy, where bureaucratic 
reform is the forgotten agenda in the reformasi.  
The cases studies illustrate both the significant role of the Bupati as the local chief 
executive and the dynamic adjustment of local actors during the transition to decentralized 
CZM. In brief, the case studies are an examination of local actors seizing and maximizing 
their interest and gaining personally from CZM in the face of demanding tasks. Indistinct 
and unsettling policies and regulations have arisen because of the transition in dealing with 
new administrative domains. In most cases, this has left the management of the coastal 
zone at the district level in limbo. The attitudes of “just another additional task (hanya 
tambahan tugas baru)”167 and of the night market management (manajemen pasar malam) 
                                                     
167 “….as long as money from central government is available for further personal benefits for local elites 
and the manager; the program [project] will be sustained. Once it finishes, involvement will end”.  Informant 
C-Uni-Sulsel (2007). 
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in project implementation remain as big issues in the implementation of decentralized 
CZM.  
My examination of the decentralized CZM approaches of these two kabupaten 
suggests that creating and maintaining ‘enabling conditions’ that allow local government to 
take more responsibility is a vital factor for success. The presumption is that decentralized 
CZM will generate funds and expand the power of local government and this should 
translate into adequate and competent staffing and programs. However, the continuing lack 
of local government capacity and capability will keep decentralized CZM as one of the 
more challenging tasks for government. Therefore, decentralized CZM requires the 
strengthening of local government capacity and capability that can be achieved through 
local bureaucracy reforms.  
The case studies of Konawe and Pangkep also reveal the fact that the 
decentralized CZM programs are still driven by political calculations. Local leaders often 
use a personal cost and benefit analysis in their political calculation rather than improving 
policy implementations. Hidden agendas are a complementary puzzle for decentralized 
CZM implementation. 
The case of Konawe’s decentralized CZM offers the lesson that decentralized 
CZM can be highly politicized by the Bupati in an implementation process rooted in 
patron/client arrangements and ethnicity-based policy. Although the financial resources for 
coastal related activities have increased significantly, it was not sufficiently embedded in 
programs of implementation. Local government tends to adopt and adapt cronyism in its 
bureaucracy, thus accommodating the Bupati’s political agenda as a priority rather than 
providing better quality services (Informant A-Exp-Kdi 2005).  
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The political will of the Bupati of Konawe in relation to CZM has been distracted 
by highly dynamic political change and his efforts to maintain his position as the ‘first 
man’ in Konawe. His manifesto and vision on coastal resources are likely to be refocussed 
due to the pemekaran  Several efforts and steps forward on decentralized CZM in Konawe 
need to be embedded in plausible implementation programs and downwards accountability.  
The case of Pangkep emphasizes the need to address the structural imbalance of 
the general allocation fund (DAU) to further the coastal development program in its 
islands. The challenging tasks for Pangkep in fostering decentralized CZM are due to its 
geographic conditions and higher cost of service delivery in its islands. Therefore, the 
central government’s consideration and commitment are required on the Pangkep proposal 
to regard marine areas and islands as important components in DAU calculations. At the 
local level, Pangkep needs to encourage more localized and creative initiatives on CZM, 
such as revitalizing the ponggawa-sawi relationship. All these challenges require a high 
degree of political will as well as a shift in the development paradigm from a terrestrial to a 
marine based framework.  
Furthermore, decentralized CZM in these kabupaten highlights the importance of 
the central government, especially the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries (MMAF) 
as crucial actors in promoting decentralized CZM and providing capacity building and 
assistance in order to ensure the progress of decentralized CZM. This has to be achieved in 
parallel with building durable institutions that can persist beyond each leadership change. 
Central ministries and agencies, such as MMAF, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of 
Finance, Regional Autonomy Review Board (DPOD) and National Planning and 
Development Agency (Bappenas) are key players in fostering decentralized CZM. At the 
local level, governments have to involve related and important stakeholders such as private 
sectors and coastal communities as indispensible partners in implementing CZM.  
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The relationship between local and central governments should be based on a 
partnership model rather than a supra and lower levels relationship. The nature of the 
present governance and reformasi mandates does not allow for the hegemony and 
intervention of central government in local government affairs as practiced during the New 
Order period. The relationship must follow lines of partnership and devolution.  
6.4 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter has examined the similarities and differences betwen the case studies 
of Konawe and Pangkep. Each case study highlights the importance of local socio-political 
contexts and the role of local actors in shaping pathways to decentralized CZM. The case 
studies also reemphasized the importance of the dynamic of local socio-political factors 
that frame the implementation of decentralized CZM at the district or municipal level.  
Several factors contribute to making decentralized CZM work. The next chapter 
will discuss these factors and will suggest ways of making decentralized CZM work in 
Indonesia. 
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7 TOWARD EFFECTIVE DECENTRALIZED CZM 
 
My investigation into the dynamic nature of decentralized CZM in two case 
studies, Konawe (Chapter 4) and Pangkep (Chapter 5), and the lessons learned from the 
case studies and beyond (Chapter 6) leads to a discussion in this chapter on how to make 
decentralized CZM work for Indonesia. Effective decentralized CZM depends heavily on 
local socio-political frameworks. Further, several other requirements and conditions frame 
the work of decentralized CZM such as an understanding of the expectations of 
decentralized CZM, accountability and mechanisms for task and authority assignments. 
Effective decentralized CZM will be achievable when local leadership and incentives 
mechanisms are combined together with clear rules and mechanisms for assigning 
responsibility, authority and resources for decentralized CZM.   
This chapter describes the factors affecting decentralized CZM in the current 
Indonesian situation and draws some implications to achieve effective decentralized CZM. 
This chapter is divided into two sections. The first section explains and elaborates the 
factors that make effective decentralized CZM. This follows the logic of my argument that 
effective decentralized CZM implementation can occur when factors affecting effective 
decentralized CZM (understanding, accountability and clear mechanisms of role 
assignment) appear as pre-conditional factors of decentralized CZM. Local leadership, and 
incentives can then stream decentralized CZM into effective implementation.  
The second section describes the implementation of decentralized CZM from a 
broader perspective that involves a wide-ranging discourse on co-management, the need 
for bureaucratic reform, and on the logical consequences of the newly-enacted CZM law, 
UU-PWPPK. All these elements will contribute to the articulation of a decentralized CZM 
framework.  
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7.1 Toward Effective Decentralized CZM 
Decentralized CZM ties in with the administrative boundaries. The nature and 
characteristics of coastal resources require special treatment in decentralized 
CZM. 
(Informant H-Gov-Nat 2005) 
Decentralized CZM can not be standardized because not all local governments 
are ready to implement decentralized policy.  
(Informant D-Gov-Nat 2005) 
In the future, local government will have a critical role in assistance, mediation 
and facilitation in building common sense and trust  
(Informant F-Gov-Nat 2005) 
 
Based on the examination of two case studies and lessons learned (Chapter 6), 
there are three factors that require careful consideration in achieving decentralized CZM: 
(i) understanding of the expectations of decentralized CZM; (ii) upward and downward 
accountability; and (iii) mechanisms for assigning responsibilities, authority and resources. 
The central and local governments can only work in tandem and develop good 
decentralized CZM strategies when these three factors are fulfilled. Fulfilling the 
requirements and creating conditions for effective decentralized CZM relies on the process 
of choosing strategies for CZM. This process should include learning by doing, team 
building, building durable institutions beyond leadership change, and educating multiple 
stakeholders at different levels of involvement.  
Effective decentralized CZM relies on effective intergovernmental relationships 
and the efficient functioning of all levels of government in dealing with and taking part in 
managing coastal zones according to decentralization principles (Lowry 2000; Lowry, 
Jarman, and Machida 1993). Understanding the expectations of decentralized CZM, 
accountability and the mechanisms for assigning tasks and responsibilities contributes to 
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achieving effective intergovernmental relationships and efficient distribution of functions. 
These features require strong political commitment and consistency to make progress in 
the implementation of decentralized CZM (see also Lowry 2000). From this perspective, 
effective implementation of decentralized CZM corresponds to the establishment of 
consistent, accepted rules, the assignment of adequate and appropriate responsibilities, 
authority and resources. Several crosscutting features contribute to effective decentralized 
CZM implementation.  
The following subsections delineate the three crosscutting factors influencing the 
extent of effective decentralized CZM in Indonesia. I then examine those crosscutting 
features that help determine effective decentralized CZM: local leadership, incentives and 
innovations.   
7.1.1 Understanding of the expectations of decentralized CZM 
Decentralized CZM [so far] is like giving cosmetics to a baby girl. Local 
governments, as the baby girl, are not ready yet to apply the cosmetics to 
improve their performances. It is because they lack understanding of how their 
performances can be improved by implemented decentralized CZM.  
(Informant B-Gov-Mak 2005).  
The above comment from one of my informants on the implementation of 
decentralized CZM exemplifies the current situation of most local governments in 
Indonesia in dealing with the new administrative domain, CZM. His comment also 
emphasises the importance of local governments’ understanding of the expectations of 
decentralized CZM for its workability. Without this understanding, there might be a lack of 
genuine interest in and recognition of the possibility for decentralized CZM to empower 
local governments to effectively manage their coastal resources and deal with their local 
coastal issues. The absence of genuine interest will eventually hamper the effort toward 
effective decentralized CZM and create difficulties in setting up clear strategies to 
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implement it. As a result, there are the associated risks of blocking further progress in 
decentralized CZM.  
The expectations of decentralized CZM derive from the main expectation of 
decentralized policy in Indonesia that is intended to build local government capacity for 
managing coastal zones as well as to improve resource allocation and accountability 
(Dahuri and Dutton 2000; Dutton 2005; Idris, Ginting, and Budiman 2007; Siry 2006). 
These expectations are based on the assumption that local governments will have a better 
understanding than the central government of local needs and preferences, and this allows 
the application of more localized and effective management.  
With reference to this perspective, decentralized CZM is intended to make local 
governments more responsive to local coastal issues and needs and is “not about 
weakening the central [government] authority and preferring local elite” (Azis 2003:8). 
Indeed, decentralized CZM provides opportunities for local communities to become 
actively involved in local government activities and local issues. In this sense, 
decentralized CZM can be the catalyst in creating harmony and synergy between central, 
provincial and local governments as well as in empowering communities and other 
stakeholders to get involved in CZM.168  
Expectations for decentralized CZM rely on a well-articulated legal and policy 
framework as the guideline with clear directions on fulfilling the expectations of 
decentralized CZM. The absence of a well-articulated legal and policy framework causes 
local government to misinterpret or lack an understanding of the expectations of 
                                                     
168 Based on the purposes of coastal zone and small island management, decentralization is one of eleven 
principles in the management of coastal zones and small islands (Article 3 Law 27/2007). The other 
principles are sustainability, consistency, integration, legal certainty, partnership, equality, community/public 
participation, transparency, accountability and justice.  
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decentralized CZM. These conditions have the potential to create conflicts of interest and 
authority especially with the central government. As one of my informants noted:  
[d]espite claiming coastal and marine authority areas (pengkavlingan laut dan 
pesisir), in practice conflicts arose as a result of diverse interpretations of the 
right to manage and acceptance of the right to manage because of the lack of 
clarity from a legal framework.   
(Informant A-Exp-Nat, 2005) 
Misinterpretation or lack of understanding of the expectations of decentralized 
CZM causes at least two misleading actions. On one side, local governments might 
interpret the legal and policy framework only to benefit themselves and ignore the 
consequences and responsibilities involved in decentralized CZM. On the other side, local 
government might interpret decentralized CZM as shifting a problem to be solved instead 
providing opportunities to empower local government capacity. Then, the expectations of 
decentralized CZM remain as hollow rhetoric.  
The situation becomes worse when populist and opportunistic actors in local 
government dominate the local authority’s interpretation of the legal and policy 
framework, which can be counter-productive to the expectations of decentralized policy. 
Their misinterpretation or lack of understanding may persuade the local government to 
oppose the expectations of decentralized CZM. Local government might consequently 
ignore the role of coastal zones as a potential asset for local development or be reluctant to 
build a partnership with the central government and other stakeholders to fulfil the 
expectations of decentralized CZM.  
All these possibilities emphasize that a well-articulated legal and policy 
framework can prevent legal ambiguities in interpreting the expectations of decentralized 
CZM. Legal ambiguities can harm the process of decentralization because they create 
uncertainty in local government action. The labelling of actions as “illegal” by the central 
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government will occur if local government implements unregulated activities. Therefore, 
unclear and grey areas in the legal and policy framework need to be reformed in a 
minimalist and concise style to avoid ineffective decentralization.         
As the process of transition towards a more decentralized CZM has just begun, 
there is a variety of local government’s understandings of the expectations of decentralized 
CZM. Some local governments have an understanding of their mandates to fulfil the 
expectations of decentralized CZM but have little concern for managing coastal resources. 
Some are unclear about their mandates and how to accomplish them. Others are involved 
in the race to gain local revenue by legalizing a proliferation of permits and rights for 
extracting coastal resources with little interest in resource conservation and sustainability 
(Siry 2005). These experiences indicate that decentralized CZM has taken place with a less 
than adequate understanding of the expectations of decentralized CZM. 
 These experiences exist in both case studies. Konawe local government has a 
partial understanding of the expectations of decentralized CZM and the ways in which 
Konawe can fulfil these expectations. This has resulted in a combination of disinterest and 
efforts to carry on with “business as usual”. While the degree of understanding in Pangkep 
is similar, the ways of fulfilling of these expectations of decentralized CZM have benefited 
from the Bupati’s leadership to maintain the momentum of pro-coastal and pro-island 
policies.    
7.1.2 Upward and downward accountability 
Accountability169 is a critical factor for making decentralized CZM work. 
Accountability is about the obligation of power holders to keep stakeholders and the public 
                                                     
169 Study by Mulgan (2000, 2003) are good references that discusses the scope and meaning of 
accountability and the emergence of the concept of accountability in various academic discourses.  
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informed of the implementation of their mandates. Accountability  also refers to the 
assurance to be able to apply a ‘check and recheck mechanism’ (Mulgan 2003) on CZM 
programs. This perspective brings forward answerability and enforcement (Resosudarmo 
2007) into the implementation of decentralized CZM.  
In the current Indonesian climate of decentralized natural resource management, 
accountability consists of formal and informal accountability (Resosudarmo 2007). Formal 
accountability refers to the legal regulatory framework that requires the formal authorities 
managing CZM to provide reports and information on a regular basis and to clarify specific 
issues concerning the implementation of decentralized CZM, mostly to upper level 
authorities or legislative bodies. Informal accountability is related to non-governmental 
stakeholders monitoring the implementation of decentralized CZM. Informal 
accountability is mostly done by the mass media, NGOs, and community groups 
(Resosudarmo 2007).  
Implementation of decentralized CZM requires both upward and downward 
accountability from formal and informal bodies within a mechanism of checks and 
balances on its progress. Upward accountability is associated with the accountability to the 
upper level of government and downward accountability refers to the accountability to 
lower levels of governments, communities, NGOs, academics and the mass media. Without 
upward and downward accountability, decentralized CZM will be unlikely to provide 
benefits to local people and stakeholders or to maintain sustainable utilization of the 
coastal zone and its resources. Decentralized CZM then will just benefit selected local 
elites (bureaucrats, NGOs, entrepreneurs, politicians and community leaders) and the 
impacts of decentralized CZM will remain insignificant for communities, stakeholders and 
the resources themselves. The absence of accountability prompts the treatment of 
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decentralized CZM as another “business as usual” issue and as a source of lucrative 
informal and illegal income for several local elites.  
Upward and downward accountability is an essential factor in decentralized CZM 
as many actors at both the local and national levels merge in coastal and fisheries programs 
because more resources become available and are allocated to accelerate programs. 
Interaction and relationships among the actors should combine with mechanisms for 
downward and upward accountability to ensure the goals of decentralized CZM are 
achievable.  
The goal of decentralized CZM will fail if decentralized CZM lacks upward and 
downward accountability. Without accountability, there will be little or no trust in the 
authority for decentralized CZM policies and programs. Then, without the obligation to be 
accountable upwardly and downwardly, local government and local elites will tend to 
perform as new local dictators. Corruption, collusion and nepotism will occur at local 
levels as logical consequences of no accountability. From this perspective, it is important 
to address and pay close attention to accountability in the early stages of decentralized 
CZM. A significant shifting of power, resources and responsibility in decentralized CZM is 
not only an opportunity to empower local government, but in the absence of upward and 
downward accountability, it is also a chance for rent seeking, especially by local elites. 
Local government’s upward accountability is related to the control mechanisms of 
central and provincial governments in implementing mandates on CZM programs. These 
mechanisms refer to the obligation of the Bupati/Walikota to submit reports on the local 
administration to the Minister of Home Affairs through the Governor once a year (Article 
27 item 3 Law 32/2004). This report is the basis for the evaluation of local government 
administration and for enhancement of compliance of prevailing laws and regulations 
(Article 27 item 4 Law 32/2004). The provisions in the report on the running of the local 
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government administration allow the report to be made at the Bupati/Walikota’s own 
initiative or at the central government’s request (Elucidation Article 27 item 3 Law 
32/2004).  
  Local government’s upward accountability is also tied to the duties and authority 
of the local legislative (DPRD) in monitoring the implementation of development 
programs and local regulations (Article 27 item 2 Law 32/2004). As an element of local 
government (Article 40 Law 32/2004), the DPRD has the authority on to inquiry into 
formal accountability by local government and must supervise the implementation of local 
regulations, budgets, policies, programs and international cooperation at the district level 
(Article 42 Law 32/2004). However, the DPRD’s duties and authority often involve a story 
of contested power and can highlight its role as a power and project broker rather than as a 
supervisory executive.  
 Local government’s downward accountability is related to the roles of NGOs, 
communities, mass media and academics in assessing and pushing local government 
accountability by pressuring local government to inform stakeholders on the 
implementation of decentralized CZM. The stakeholders can then provide comments and 
raise issues related to the implementation of decentralized CZM. Their pressure can be 
asserted directly or indirectly through the DPRD.   
On many occasions, community voices and pressure from the mass media and 
NGOs can provide a powerful check and balance mechanism on local government’s 
downward accountability. However, this mechanism also has the potential for misdirection 
and misguidance. For example, local government can purchase media space to promote its 
counter arguments without following proper journalism ethics and transparency in order to 
maintain its image (Resosudarmo 2007).  
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Misdirection and misguidance in local government’s downward accountability 
exist in the opportunistic behaviour of newly emerging local actors in dealing with local 
government. The case study of decentralized CZM in Konawe exemplifies a common 
failure of downward accountability. Accountability in the Konawe case study provides an 
illustration of the emergence of new local actors who had been neglected in the previous 
era and who now engage in opportunistic behaviour and rogue involvement in 
decentralized CZM. The absence of accountability can lead to decentralized CZM 
benefiting only selected local elite players. A study by the World Bank (2007) of ten local 
and provincial government corruption cases found that corruption surrounding 
decentralized management occurs when there is a lack of accountability and a monitoring 
agency. The disclosure of corruption cases and the commencement of legal action against 
offenders is achieved because of the strong roles played by NGOs, academics and 
community groups in querying and overseeing the governance process as part of local 
government’s downward accountability (World Bank 2007).    
 Accountability is a pre-condition for maintaining effective decentralized CZM. A 
professional and neutral bureaucracy is crucial for implementing decentralized CZM and 
more broadly for administering local government (Ratnawati 2006a). Under the direct 
election system, the Bupati holds a highly political position for a five-year term. Each 
Bupati has a political manifesto and a different political style that can influence the local 
bureaucracy. Without strong professionalism and neutrality, the Bupati can exploit the local 
bureaucracy as his/her political tool in order to maximize his/her political and financial 
benefit with little concern for local development issues. In the absence of accountability 
and check and balance mechanisms, the Bupati becomes a newly-emerged local 
authoritarian who can control the local bureaucracy with his/her political calculations and 
short-term pragmatic choices.    
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The presence of a professional and neutral bureaucracy is an important factor in 
dealing with dynamic local political contexts where community, NGOs, mass media and 
academics are now more critical in watching and monitoring local government as it runs its 
administration and deals with local issues. A study of four provinces (East Java, Bali, East 
Kalimantan and West Sumatera) found that a professional and neutral bureaucracy has a 
positive correlation with strong downward accountability to community, NGOs, mass 
media, students and academics in overseeing local government affairs (Zuhro, Juoro, and 
Chaniago 2007). A professional and neutral bureaucracy can lead the process toward 
effective decentralization and democratization (Ratnawati 2006a). 
To pursue this desired professionalism and neutrality, the local bureaucracy can 
absorb local norms and values as long as they are in line with the principles of effective, 
efficient and transparent government. In Sulawesi where Bugis and Makassar ethnic 
groups are dominant in the bureaucracy, adopting local values, such as revitalizing the 
value of siri170 (honour/dignity), can be beneficial in achieving professionalism and 
neutrality in bureaucracy (Ratnawati 2006a).  
Achieving a professional and neutral bureaucracy in the districts of my case 
studies, as well as in Indonesia in general, is a challenging task because it requires a shift 
in the bureaucratic culture from one of patronage to one rooted in pluralism171 (Zuhro, 
Juoro, and Chaniago 2007). This shift requires a strong political will, capacity building and 
enhancement of human resources in a bureaucracy that is framed by commitment, 
consistency and transparency. . 
                                                     
170 For more detail about siri, see the discussions in Mattulada (1978), Mattulada and Abdullah (1983), 
Pelras (1996) and Tangke et al. (2003).  
171 Pluralism in bureaucracy refers to a bureaucracy that is highly influenced by non-bureaucracy or 
societal forces in its decision making process (Zuhro, Juoro, and Chaniago 2007:203).  
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To shift the Konawe local government toward pluralism, its bureaucracy requires 
more steps than Pangkep has undertaken. Konawe needs to complete its partial 
understanding of the expectations of decentralized CZM and improve downward and 
informal accountability. The Bupati Konawe needs to take the lead in keeping matters on 
track to create a professional and neutral bureaucracy. If lack of accountability especially 
downward accountability remains a problem for the bureaucracy in Konawe, pluralism in 
the bureaucracy will not be realised. 
Pangkep local government has a similar understanding of the expectations of 
decentralized CZM to Konawe local government. However, the Pangkep case study shows 
the importance of maintaining the seeds of accountability in the local bureaucracy. The 
Bupati has demonstrated that he heads a professional and neutral bureaucracy on several 
occasions by making non-partisan appointments to important upper echelon positions. 
Indeed, this Bupati’s actions have provided helpful conditions for the bureaucracy to 
administer local issues and avoid unnecessary disruption.    
7.1.3 Mechanisms for assigning responsibility, authority and resources 
Decentralized CZM has so far lacked clarity on the rules of the game, on who 
is doing what, how to play fairly. Decentralized CZM ignored the fact that the 
government will operate under a constellation of authority in applying 
decentralized policy in the coastal zone. 
 (Informant K-Gov-Nat 2005). 
 
As a part of government affairs, decentralized CZM is about the arrangement and 
setting up of mechanisms for assigning to all levels of government the responsibility, 
authority and resources for managing the coastal zone. Arranging and setting up these 
mechanisms requires norms, standards and criteria about what level of responsibility, 
authority and resources should be assigned to particular levels of government. In order to 
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maintain a harmonious relationship between inter-government structures, the division of 
responsibilities, authorities and resources in Indonesian decentralized policy should follow 
three criteria: transparency, accountability and efficiency172 (Article 11 Law 32/2004). 
These three criteria determine the type and scale of delegatation to local government. This 
should include funding sources, transfer of means and facilities, and human resources 
(Article 12 Law 32/2004).     
The mechanisms for assigning government affairs are stipulated in Government 
Regulation 38/2007 or PP 38/2007 (see Section 3.4.6). This regulation divides both 
mandatory and voluntary government affairs between central, provincial and local 
governments. PP 38/2007 emphasizes that each division of government affairs should be 
accompanied by financial sources, sufficient infrastructures and supporting systems, and 
adequate human resources (Article 3 PP 38/2007). 
The mechanisms for assigning CZM responsibilities in PP 38/2007 are divided 
into those that are optional (urusan pilihan) and seven others that are obligatory (Article 7 
item 4 PP 38/2007).173  It is up to local governments whether to include the optional 
mechanisms in their administration. If local governments think that it is not worthwhile or 
not necessary to undertake CZM, this may be because of geographic conditions or 
capacity. If local governments need to undertake CZM in their administration, then these 
local governments should declare CZM in their local regulations (Perda) as a government 
responsibility and implement the delegations to carry out these responsibilities within one 
                                                     
172 Elucidation of Law 32/2004 on externality criteria refers to the organization of government affairs 
determined pursuant to the size, volume and scope of impacts that arise due to the running of government 
affairs. Accountability criteria refer to the accountability of running government affairs that is determined 
pursuant to the proximity of the size, volume and scope of impacts that arise due to the running of 
government affairs. Efficiency criteria refer to the running of government affairs that are determined pursuant 
to the comparison of the highest level of effectiveness that may be gained. 
173 The other voluntary government responsibilities are: (i) agriculture; (ii) forestry; (iii) energy and 
mineral; (iv) tourism; (v) industry; (vi) trade; and (vii) transmigration. 
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year by establishing an organization and structure specifically assigned to administer CZM 
(Article 12 PP 38/2007).  
The role of the central government in the PP 38/2007 lies mostly in regard to the 
establishment of policies, norms, standards, procedures and criteria for managing marine, 
coastal and fisheries affairs. Central government has the responsibility for the 
implementation of coastal disaster mitigation that requires coordination with provincial and 
local governments. PP 38/2007 stipulates that the central government has exclusive 
authority in ratifying international treaties, fisheries quarantine from domestic and 
international intake, the appointment of official fish-port masters (syahbandar pelabuhan 
perikanan) and the approval for importing fishing vessels. 
Provincial governments’ roles are related to the implementation of policies, 
norms, standards, procedures and criteria for managing marine, coastal and fisheries affairs 
within provincial areas and in inter-district or inter-municipality issues. Local governments 
have a similar scope of authority to provincial governments in their assigned authority 
areas.  
The section on CZM in the PP 38/2007 discusses the administration of a broad 
spectrum of marine, coastal and fisheries affairs. The PP sets forth that technical details 
will be regulated through ministry rules (Article 15 PP 38/2007). However, it only includes 
a vague allocation of CZM tasks and responsibilities that follow the arrangements in the 
management authority of provincial and local governments, as stipulated at Article 18 Law 
32/2004. The scale of the authority is limited by the boundaries within which CZM applies. 
Local governments have primary responsibility for implementing CZM policy and 
conducting law enforcement efforts within areas of one third of the provincial authority, 
which generally equates to four nautical miles seaward from the coastline. Provincial 
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governments have the authority to implement CZM and conduct law enforcement within 
12 nautical miles beyond local government authority or one-third of its authorities’ areas.  
However, these CZM responsibilities and authorities as set down in PP 38/2007 
need to be expanded in more detail in the ministerial decree framework. Such detail should 
include the dimensions of the CZM as well as the tasks that are carried out at the edges of 
these areas.  
If such detail were available, it would require that the central government produce 
specific consistent, clear and tangible divisions for operating decentralized CZM. This 
challenging task needs wise perspectives and future-oriented thinking, especially from the 
central government. The dynamic of coastal zone issues also requires local government to 
deal with the challenging tasks and to anticipate unforseen future responsibilities. Without 
clear demarcation of responsibilities and the allocation of power and resource distribution, 
many ambiguities on who takes what role in decentralized CZM will appear, leading to 
confusion and non-compliance. This also opens the possibility of power struggle between 
central, provincial and local governments. This situation also has the potential, ultimately, 
to halt the implementation of decentralized CZM.          
The MMAF had passed several ministerial decrees addressing the administration 
of the division of marine, coastal and fisheries affairs before the issuance of PP 38/2007. 
These decrees also followed the mandated arrangements set down in previous laws and 
regulations such as Law 22/1999 and PP 25/2000 that explicitly divided management 
authority for central, provincial and local governments. Most of these decrees do not 
contradict the PP in terms of division of authority. In fact, these decrees are still the main 
references for marine, coastal and fisheries affairs in the PP. 
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Mechanisms put in place for assigning responsibility, authority and resources in 
both case studies show some promising progress. However, this progress could be speeded 
up if local government had a better understanding of the expectations of decentralized 
CZM and if true accountability existed within the local bureaucracy.  
7.1.4 Local leadership 
“Good [leadership] from the Bupati provides a stimulus for implementing 
decentralized CZM” 
(Informant A-Exp-Kdi 2005) 
Pursuing effective decentralized CZM should take into account the possibility of  
competition among different vested interests (Fox et al. 2005) that places political will, 
rational choices and sometimes pragmatic calculations as key considerations. Failure to 
address this possibility could cause an imbalance in power distribution and encourage the 
emergence of local elites. If the power imbalance combines with the absence of upward 
and downward accountability, then effective decentralized CZM must struggle with 
traditional decentralization problems such as the misuse of power and resources by those 
with newly-acquired responsibilities and authority (DRSP 2006). Furthermore, if a lack of 
accountability persists without consequences, it then can make vulnerable the 
implementation of effective decentralized CZM.  
To avoid these core problems and to pursue effective decentralized CZM, local 
chief executives (Bupati/Walikota) must play crucial roles. Leadership by local chief 
executives determines the quality of governance (voice and accountability, political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law and control of 
corruption), which has a strong positive correlation with decentralization (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2005).  
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Leadership by local chief executives should also contribute to the maintenance of 
discipline and consistency in implementing effective decentralized CZM. Discipline and 
consistency can moderate ineffective behaviour in decentralized CZM. In this view, the 
Bupati/Walikota has the right to put in place the necessary institutional arrangements and 
oversight mechanisms for pursuing effective decentralized CZM. 
Disconnections, as well as trial and error (bongkar pasang), among policies are 
the hallmarks of relatively new administrations dealing with issues such as decentralized 
CZM174. To limit the constraints on effective decentralized CZM, innovation by local 
government administration175 can have positive resonances in the implementation of 
effective decentralized CZM. In this context, innovation “can be used to encourage and 
facilitate improvement and change” (Patel 2006:31) though applying new concepts and 
tools.   
Innovation is contextual (Patel 2006). It can exist as part of the diversity of CZM 
practices. This perspective places innovation in line with the acknowledgement and 
awareness of the importance of local knowledge, norms, livelihoods and identities in the 
day-to-day activity of resource management. Addressing these local features can be 
beneficial in moderating, and even reducing conflicts in resource utilization and 
                                                     
174 Summarized from discussion with Informant B-Exp-Nat and Informant E-Exp-Nat in 2005.  
175 Well-known case studies in Solok, West Sumatera (World Bank 2007), Jembrana, Bali (Prasojo, 
Kurniawan, and Hasan 2004) and Sragen, Central Java (Prasojo, Kurniawan, and Holidin 2007) suggest that 
innovations exist that are in line with and can support decentralized policy without contravening laws and 
regulations. Innovation is the key ingredient in making decentralized policy work effectively in these three 
kabupaten.          
The Jembrana case study suggests that innovation in its bureaucratic reform improved its budget 
efficiency and staff performance in providing better service delivery to stakeholders,  despite the fact that this 
kabupaten faced several constraints (Prasojo, Kurniawan, and Hasan 2004). This case study suggests that 
innovation can exist even under non-ideal conditions for decentralized policy as long as strong political will 
and commitment are available, especially from local chief executives. 
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management (Informant A-Exp-Nat 2005) that contribute to ineffective decentralized 
CZM.    
To create enabling conditions for innovation, rewards and incentives are essential. 
Innovation also needs adequate skills in change management and a willingness to take 
risks (Patel 2006: 39). Furthermore, innovation requires appropriate access to resource 
development and testing (Patel 2006). All these required conditions can exist and be 
conducive, if the Bupati exerts political will and commitment to remove barriers for 
innovation.  
Behind the success of local innovation in handling local problems in 
decentralization, there was strong local commitment, consistency and leadership from the 
Bupati/Walikota (Prasojo, Kurniawan, and Hasan 2004; Prasojo, Kurniawan, and Holidin 
2007; World Bank 2007; Zuhro, Juoro, and Chaniago 2007). The Bupati/Walikota plays an 
important role as motivator and initiator, or even trailblazer, in shaping the culture of the 
local administration and responding to external challenges. In this sense, the role of 
Bupati/Walikota is crucial to initiating, shaping and creating enabling conditions for 
innovation in decentralized CZM.  
The case studies of Konawe and Pangkep confirm that local leadership is an 
important factor for bureaucratic reform and for effective decentralized CZM. Strong local 
leadership can ensure the existence of necessary and gradual change in the local 
administration. Rapid changes and reform in the implementation of effective decentralized 
CZM can occur if the local leader can adopt and commit to these changes (Informant B-
Exp-Kdi 2005). If a leader continues to carry on in an exclusive bureaucratic style, then 
change will rarely take place (Informant B-Exp-Kdi 2005).   
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7.1.5 Incentives  
Effective decentralized CZM needs incentives as part of a reward-and- 
punishment mechanism to encourage its implementation (Lowry 2000; Lowry, Jarman, and 
Machida 1993). Maintaining commitment and consistency in decentralized CZM depends 
on the existence of “psychological, political and financial incentives” (Lowry 2000: 34). 
These incentives are also crucial as a stimulus for local governments in implementing 
decentralized CZM where conditions for effective decentralized CZM remain unbalanced. 
Local governments are expected to carry out the multiple tasks and objectives of 
decentralized CZM. However, the actual conditions, such as the lack of revenue, or the 
lack of qualified human resources and technical capacity and capability, are still major 
issues.  
MMAF initiatives to confer Coastal Awards (Adibhakti Mina Bahari) has proven 
to be a valuable initiative for encouraging local governments in dealing with the 
implementation of effective decentralized CZM. These Coastal Awards were initiated in 
2000 and launched at the Second National Conference on Coastal Zone Management 
(Konferensi Nasional Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir) (Ditjen KP3K DKP 2004).  This 
biennial award has the following two objectives: first, it is to provide motivation and 
encouragement to primary stakeholders to implement integrated CZM; and second, it is to 
encourage primary stakeholders and journalists from the print media and TV to 
disseminate the concept of integrated CZM.  
There are four categories of Coastal Awardees, divided into ten groups (Ditjen 
KP3K DKP 2004). They are: 
1. Coastal zone management category (Governor/Bupati/Walikota, community leaders 
and NGOs); 
2. Coastal and marine research (researchers, university students and high school 
students); 
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3. Journalists (from print media and TV) 
4. Coastal community empowerment (entrepreneurs and local governments that care 
about the coastal community). 
 
Assessment for conferring these Coastal Awards is based on three criteria: general, 
specific and supporting (Ditjen KP3K DKP 2004). General criteria are applied to eligible 
people who are Indonesian citizens and are living in Indonesia and not facing any criminal 
charges. Specific criteria are (i) the awardees’ activities; (ii) orientation of the activities on 
sustainable development principles; (iii) coastal empowerment; and (iv) impact of 
activities on resources, socio-economic conditions and coastal communities’ welfare.  
Supporting criteria refer to the pre-requirements, conditions and technical aspects 
for each category of award. For example, to be considered for an award the Governor, 
Bupati or Walikota has to have initiated CZM program that uses resources for 
implementing CZM program (facilities, personals and funding) that come from the local 
budget (APBD). In addition, they must be active in coordinating and initiating their 
administration and community in implementing integrated CZM. There are minimum time 
requirements for NGOs if they are to be eligible. The NGOs must at least have three 
consecutive years working on CZM programs, including conservation, rehabilitation and 
sustainable utilization of coastal resources. For journalists, consideration is given to the 
number and quality of published articles, features and TV documentary programs on CZM.       
Assessors (technical team) for this award comprise CZM experts and the MMAF 
staff that work collaboratively and intensively for almost four months during the award 
selection process (Ditjen KP3K DKP 2004). With thirteen questions in the questionnaire 
form, the assessors probe the proposed awardees on scope, scale, frequency, duration, and 
required and allocated funding of their contribution to the benefits and impacts of CZM 
and coastal communities (Ditjen KP3K DKP 2004).  
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The results from this probing are the main references for assessing the applicants. 
Assessors conduct a compilation and ranking based on the number of submitted and 
eligible proposals. Verification is done by visiting locations and conducting ground 
checking. The MMAF does not have any baseline and regular updated rating information 
on local governments’ performances in implementing decentralized CZM. If the MMAF 
had this rating information and were to publish it, there would be additional pressure for 
local governments to implement effective decentralized CZM. Local governments would 
seriously take into account a published performance rating as they “tend to be sensitive to 
adverse policy” (Balakrishnan 2006: 178). Making information on performance readily 
available can also be an aid to implementing necessary reform in a bureaucracy 
(Balakrishnan 2006).  
Another initiative of the MMAF that provides incentives for implementing 
effective decentralized CZM is the accreditation program on coastal zone and small island 
management (Article 40 Law 27/2007). Accreditation is a recognition procedure for an 
activity that consistently meets the required standard of coastal zone and small island 
management (Article 1 Law 27/2007). This accreditation procedure is intended to 
strengthen the surveillance and control of coastal zone and small island resources (Article 
36 item 1 Law 27/2007). The procedure includes appraisal, valuation and incentives for 
management programs carried out voluntarily by the community (Article 1 item 40 Law 
27/2007). All levels of government can conduct accreditation and provide certification to 
endorsed coastal zone and small island management in their respective authority areas. The 
accreditation system follows the division of management areas as stipulated at Article 18 
Law 32/2004.  
  273
The MMAF passed a ministerial decree176 as technical guidelines to conduct 
accreditation for coastal zone and small island management that considers six aspects:  
1. relevance to priority issues; 
2. public consultation process; 
3. positive impact on the preservation of coastal zone and small island resources; 
4. impact on the coastal community welfare; 
5. appropriate implementation capacity; and  
6. policy and program support from central government and/or local government. 
 
A recommendation for accreditation follows the hierarchy of government, from 
lower to upper levels, with the approval for decisions being the right of the higher 
government level. For example, the Bupati/Walikota has the authority to formulate and 
propose recommendations for accreditation for the district/municipality level to the 
Governor or central government for approval (Article 40 item 6 Law 27/2007). At the 
provincial level, the Governor can formulate and propose accreditation of coastal zone and 
small island management programs within the provincial areas to the central government 
for approval (Article 40 item 5 Law 27/2007). At the community level, community 
organizations can submit their proposal for accreditation to the central government and/or 
provincial and local governments. Standards and guidelines for assessing accreditation for 
coastal zone and small island management program consist of six assessed aspects (Table 
39).  
 
                                                     
176 Peraturan Menteri Kelautan dan Perikanan Nomor PER.18/MEN/2008 tentang Akreditasi terhadap 
Program Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan Pulau-pulau Kecil.  
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Table 39.  Standards and guidelines for assessing accreditation coastal zone and small 
island management program.  
Aspect assessed Score Value Criteria 
(Scale 1 – 5) 
Result 
(Score X Value) 
1. Relevance to regional development plans  15    
 Relevance to priority issues as stipulated in Long 
Term Regional Development Plan (RPJPD) and 
Strategic Plan for Coastal Zone and Small Island 
Management (RSWP-3-K) 
5  5: Highly relevant 
1: Not relevant 
 
 Relevance to spatial plan (RTRW) and zoning 
systems (RZWP-3-K) 
5  5: Highly relevant 
1: Not relevant 
 
 Relevance to related law and regulations on 
coastal zone and small island management 
5  5: Highly relevant 
1: Not relevant 
 
2. Public consultation process 5    
 Community consultation  2  5: Have 
consultation 
1: No consultation 
 
 Using information or mass media 3  5: Use 
1: Not use 
 
3. Positive impacts of program on conservation 30    
 Reduced pollution level in water body 10  5: Pollution 
reduced 
1: No reduction 
 
 Reduced air pollution level  10  5: Pollution 
reduced 
1: No reduction 
 
 Reduced soil pollution level 10  5: Pollution 
reduced 
1: No reduction 
 
4. Positive impact of program on community welfare 30    
 Initiation and development in community of 
entrepreneurship  
15  5: Provide initiation 
1: No initiation 
 
 Enhance education and training 10  5: Increase 
1: Not increase 
 
 Improve health conditions 5  5: improve 
1: Not improve 
 
5. Appropriate implementation capacity 10    
 Financial resources  4  5: Available 
1: Not available 
 
 Infrastructure  3  5: Available 
1: Not available 
 
 Human resources  3  5: Available 
1: Not available 
 
 Policy and program support from Central 
Government and Local Government 
10  5: Available 
1: Not available 
 
Passing grade depends on the assessor 
Source: Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan (2008) 
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Accredited or certified coastal zone and small island management programs can 
get incentives from the endorsing government. The incentives can be a program and or a 
form of technical assistance (Article 40 item 4 Law 27/2007). Program assistance includes 
(i) support in tailoring the program to the proposed activity, (ii) formal recognition in the 
form of an endorsement or certification, and (iii) support in achieving consistency between 
central and local governments in the program implementation. Technical assistance 
includes support for human resources, equipment, knowledge improvement, 
communication and dissemination. This accreditation procedure provides new incentives to 
local governments to be active and adaptive to local needs and to local conditions. 
 
7.2 Beyond Konawe and Pangkep 
In this section, I draw on the conclusions from my comparative analysis of 
Konawe and Pangkep to take a broader look at CZM policy and practice in eastern 
Indonesia. I also relate the decentralization process in CZM to the decentralization of 
governments’ other natural resource management responsibilities, such as forestry, and to 
the possibilities for community-based management. The implementation of decentralized 
CZM in both case study areas as well as beyond Konawe and Pangkep should consider 
discourses on co-management, the need for bureaucratic reform, and logical consequences 
of the newly-enacted CZM law in 2007, UU-PWPPK. 
Konawe and Pangkep represent typical local administrations in eastern Indonesia, 
which are dominated by the influence of the previous ruling party, Golkar, and military 
penetration (mostly from the army) of the bureaucracy. These two types of hegemonic rule 
in eastern Indonesian local governments have contributed to the infertility of bureaucracy 
reforms.  
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The case studies show that the decentralization policy does not necessarily or 
immediately swing the pendulum of local government toward committed, effective and 
efficient local government implementation of decentralized CZM. The swing of the 
pendulum is influenced by local socio-political contexts. Local socio-political contexts rely 
heavily on the quality of the Bupati and the local parliament, as well as peer pressure from 
communities, NGOs and related stakeholders in order to ensure that the mandate for 
decentralized CZM takes the right path. However, the quality of the Bupati and the local 
parliament members is quite often unsatisfactory.  
As these case studies have indicated, recognition of CZM as a new domain of 
local administration is still embryonic in Indonesia. Central and local governments, for 
more than three decades during the New Order, neglected CZM.  During that period, 
policies and commitments were more rhetorical: there was systemic gap between policy 
and practices.  
The recognition of CZM as part of the decentralization package is not as 
developed as other decentralized natural resource management processes such as 
decentralized forestry. Power plays and contests of interest between central and local 
governments (tarik ulur kepentingan dan kekuasaan) and the partial application of selected 
decentralized policy have brought financial benefits to new emerging local actors in 
decentralized forestry management (Resosudarmo 2007). On the other hand, in 
decentralized CZM, the process contains some blurring and partial adjustment, even 
ignorance, as the coastal resources are less attractive than forests in term of economic 
returns to local governments.  
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Decentralized CZM is also less lucrative than forestry management177 as the 
harvest of coastal resources is less stable and less predictable. Decentralized CZM 
experiences fewer power struggles between central and local governments and between 
local actors, but this happens because the local governments often do not engage in CZM. 
In most cases, CZM suffers the effects of local government neglect of coastal resources. To 
run CZM as a new administrative domain after more than three decades of paternalistic 
bureaucracy is a challenging task for local governments that have limited technical 
capacity and capability to manage resources that are already degraded. 
Decentralized CZM in Konawe and Pangkep as well as in almost all Indonesian 
local government areas falls into the category of the early stage of “cooperative 
devolution” according to the classification by Lowry (2000) (Section 3.3). Within this 
category, central government still plays a significant role in decentralized CZM by 
providing general concepts, standards, norms, guidelines and procedures for a full range of 
planning, design and implementation responsibilities, thus providing authorization and 
resources to local governments that in turn make some contributions.  
In the early stage of cooperative devolution, central and local governments are 
involved in exploring the causes and consequences of CZM issues at the local level, and 
developing consensus views through collaborative planning and problem solving. Building 
local commitment through on-going interaction with the central government is a key factor 
in reaching cooperative devolution. The process involves providing incentives for local 
government and gradually increasing the authority of management. For Indonesia, 
                                                     
177 To avoid similar failure in managing resources such as in forestry, it needs to recognize the concept of 
ecosystem based management that “promotes a holistic approach to manag[e] ecosystems” (Kay and Alder 
2005: 63).  Based on this concept, goals for managing coastal resources are measurable for ecosystems 
process with regard to dynamic of coastal ecosystems, its complexity and interconnectedness in maintaining 
intergenerational utilization of resources. Human dimensions in this concept appear as important components 
as well as contexts and scale. It indeed allows adaptable and accountable approaches (Kay and Alder 2005). 
  278
cooperative devolution in decentralized CZM is more appropriate as it includes the notion 
of mutual partnership in decentralized CZM that is important in the central-local 
government relationship in the post-reformasi era. 
7.2.1 Community based management and co-management in decentralized CZM 
Collaboration is an appropriate management tool [that] is visible in the current 
Indonesia situation in decentralized CZM. There will certainly be some 
conflicts in collaborative management; however, conflict should be seen as a 
process toward collaborative management. Seeing conflict from a negative 
angle will lead to unresolved results. Therefore, if conflict can be managed to 
common agreement, then it will be good foundation for co-management.  
Informant A-Exp-Nat 2005 
The experiences from the Konawe and Pangkep case studies affirm the 
significance of stakeholder-oriented and resource-based principles. These principles 
concern the involvement of various stakeholders through the idea of shared responsibilities 
and authority to manage the resources. Successful decentralized CZM requires 
stakeholders’ involvement. More stakeholder involvement and more participatory 
management should in theory bring many advantages to local stakeholders and 
communities and this, in turn, should enhance marine and coastal resources and strengthen 
conservation efforts (UNDP 1998a)178. More stakeholder involvement and participatory 
management has been the mantra in broad conservation strategies worldwide. Community-
based management (CBM) and co-management are two approaches in these strategies that 
have been acknowledged as alternative solutions for managing natural resources.179  As 
                                                     
178 This premise has been a major driving force in the decisions by many international donor 
organizations to support natural resource management projects. The Coastal Resources Management Project 
(CRMP/Proyek Pesisir) of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), for example, 
uses an adaptive community-based approach in their project in North Sulawesi (Erdmann, Merrill, and 
Arsyad 2004). 
179 This has been acknowledged by a variety of authors such as Berkes (1989, 1994); Pomeroy (1994); 
Pomeroy and Williams (1994); Pomeroy (1995); Nikijuluw (1996); Pomeroy and Carlos (1996); Butarbutar 
et al. (1997); Nikijuluw (1997); Crawford et al. (1998); Jentoft et al. (1998); Kuperan et al. (1998); Pomeroy 
(1998); Crean (1999); Berkes et al. (2001); Elliott et al. (2001); Israel (2001); Pomeroy (2001); Thorburn 
(2002); Berkes (2003); Crawford et al. (2004); and Nielsen et al. (2004). 
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discussed in Section 3.3, the nature of CBM is people-centred.  The local community 
should take primary responsibility for major decision-making, while co-management rests 
on the concept of the sharing of responsibility.  
To adopt and adapt either CBM or co-management is one of the major concerns in 
decentralized CZM at present. The concern is complex and important because it must take 
into account how to integrate an appropriate approach into the formal government 
structures of such a diverse, multi-layered administrative system.  
Answer to the question of whether to apply CBM or co-management in the 
current Indonesian context should consider customary ecological knowledge and the 
management of coastal resources by incorporating local management practices180 into a 
framework of environmental law (Siry 2003). The decision then needs to integrate informal 
institutions, such as ponggawa-sawi (as the patron-client relationship is known in South 
Sulawesi) (Pet-Soede and Erdman, 1998; Yusran, 2002), julo-julo, arisan (mutual 
revolving fund mechanisms), yasinan and wirid pengajian (Islamic community gathering) 
(Sujianto and Maulana, 2002), into the management of coastal resources. All these 
informal institutions play important roles in the current local socio-political and legal 
frameworks that regulate coastal and fishery management.  
A promising option is to merge these informal institutions in coastal and fishery 
management as a way to reinvent coastal and fishery resources management (Purnomo 
2000; Siry 2005; Yusran 2002). The ponggawa-sawi relationship that for centuries has 
                                                     
180 Examples for local management practices known in Bahasa Indonesia are sasi (an open-closed system 
in Maluku), panglima laut (traditional resource manager in Aceh), malimau pasie, malimau kapa and alek 
pasie (traditional fishing ritual in West Sumatera). By the 1980s, these practices had suffered from the 
application of the rigid, uniform development approaches imposed by Law Number 5/1979 regarding Village 
Administration. This law facilitated the disintegration of traditional institutions, rights and norms that had 
survived for centuries, led to a decline in respect for community values, and created the uniformity of village 
administration across the nation. Unique village management such as the “nagari” system in West Sumatera 
(Siry 2003) was eroded. Individuality was not respected.  
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been economically and culturally linked to coastal communities and the rural fishing 
economy in South Sulawesi and some part of eastern Indonesia is one example (Alder and 
Christanty, 1996; Yusran, 2002). Strengthening and integrating the ponggawa-sawi 
relationship in fishery co-management could improve local leadership ability, provide for 
resource stability and give a measure of equity to resource access (Yusran, 2002). Ignoring 
the relationship or replacing it with new and alien concepts will incur resistance from 
coastal communities, which can lead to conflict.  
Similarly, to replace or eliminate the role of ponggawa in coastal communities 
without involving the ponggawa themselves will incur high social costs especially when 
ensuring the new concept works in the community. New or revitalized concepts might not 
be sufficient in the social and economical values of coastal communities.  Therefore, any 
effort to integrate informal institutions in CZM should not involve a new or unexpected 
concept that aims to totally change and replace the current system over a short period. 
Processes and strategies must involve existing local actors as stakeholders.  
In Indonesia, institutionalizing CBM or co-management faces a number of 
obstacles. There is a great array of individual and community social and cultural 
differences across this vast archipelago of more than 17,000 islands. Local communities 
are generally not used to public participation in the environmental policy decision-making 
process. Local communities’ participation is less examined, questioned or systematically 
investigated (Lindayanti, 2000). The legacy of years of centralist and controlling 
administration has made the community wary of participation and involvement. To 
determine community participation and involvement as well as strategies for coping with 
rapid social and political change requires understanding the diverse social, economic, 
cultural and political factors that govern the livelihoods of communities (Thorburn 2002; 
Yusran 2002).  
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CBM or co-management will be difficult to institutionalize in an environment 
where the bureaucracy is also learning to adapt to major decentralization strategies, where 
capacity building in regional areas is critically needed and where the community is unused 
to and untrained in exercising its political power. To institutionalize CBM or co-
management one should consider the resources required for developing institutional 
capacity. These resources can be termed transaction costs.  
There are three major categories of transaction costs: information costs, collective 
decision-making costs, and collective operational costs (Abdullah, Viswanathan, and 
Pomeroy 1998) (Table 40). In Indonesia, transaction costs in implementing and 
institutionalizing CBM are relative high because more expenditure on information and 
collective decision-making costs are required due to the time and complexity of getting the 
community ready.  
Table 40.  Transaction costs in CBM and co-management. 
Information Costs Collective Decision-Making Costs Collective Operational Costs 
 Unshared information 
 Searching and acquisition 
 Opportunist behaviour 
 Acquiring and integrating 
period 
 Consensus and coordinating  
 Lack of  consensus  
 Opportunist behaviour 
 Gaining acceptable agreement 
 Monitoring activities and 
evaluating performance 
 Monitoring, enforcement and 
compliance costs 
 Resource maintenance costs 
 Resource distribution costs 
Source:  Adapted from Abdullah et al. (1998) 
 
As Indonesia has just begun a major decentralization process, the shifting grounds 
of governance often transform into a lack of substantial support for new institutional 
arrangements.  There is no movement of qualified government personnel to the community 
level. The initial adoption and adaptation processes of decentralization were not 
sufficiently clear although they have created ‘decentralization euphoria’. There has been a 
rush to pass local legislation permitting a range of coastal area developments. If the coastal 
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resources are mismanaged under this decentralization euphoria, it will continue the saga of 
uncontrolled coastal resource degradation.   
To minimize the degradation of coastal resources and to ensure better coastal 
resources management, CBM and co-management can be powerful approaches in 
decentralized CZM. However, making a choice between CBM and co-management as the 
appropriate approach is not an easy decision. The decision should regard current socio-
economic conditions, existing values and norms, and the legal system, all of which are 
indispensable.  
In the current Indonesian situation, I argue that CBM is the less applicable 
approach for decentralized CZM. There are several reasons why CBM is not the 
recommended as ideal approach. The first reason is related to achieving the essential goal 
of ‘community confidence’, which does not exist at present. Community confidence is a 
term which describes the effort of government to engage communities for “their ideas, 
experience, values and capabilities on behalf of resource conservation objectives, at the 
same time it seeks ways for communities to become better remunerated and better served” 
(Uphoff 1998:5). To get community confidence, communities must first be empowered, 
financed and resourced.  However, current changes in the legal and political structure have 
not been consolidated yet.  
Second, in order to be successfully implemented, CBM must be carefully planned 
and prepared, sufficiently well-funded with effective monitoring and evaluation, and 
appropriately staffed (Pomeroy and Carlos 1996). Initiating and institutionalizing CBM is 
costly and time-consuming (Kuperan et al. 1998). The lack of incentives for communities, 
which are the primary beneficiaries, will cause CBM to fail, especially in protected area 
management.  Strong governmental and inter-organizational support is also essential for 
the success of effective CBM. At present, this support does not exist at the local level in 
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Indonesia. If one or more of these important features is missing, then CBM programs or 
projects are set to fail.  
Similarly, flexibility and responsiveness to change are fundamental to the success 
of community-based activities(Berkes et al. 2001). In most cases, the supporting systems 
frequently need significant and radical restructuring. Understanding the pre-existing 
conditions, such as the local organization and its ability to command respect and trust from 
community to enforce institutional arrangements, is an essential requirement for success. It 
is also necessary to determine the nature of the leadership of local organizations that can 
ensure the vitalization of community participation and provide for the recognition of 
proportionate rights and authorities. Local leadership must also understand that power 
devolution is deeply rooted in a complex system of laws, customary rights, policies and 
administrative procedures, at both national and local government levels. 
CBM also requires supporting laws and regulations as enabling tools. In the 
absence of legal regimes, which is primarily the government’s domain, CBM is unable “to 
define, preside over and redefine the rules of resource use” (Lindsay 1998:1). CBM also 
entails several stages in the development of different activities and interventions over time. 
A study by Satria and Matsuda (2004) on awig-awig (local rules and community institution 
on coastal resources management) in West Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia, mentioned that the 
growth of community institutions in managing coastal resources management requires 
government and other stakeholders’ recognition. 
To shift coastal resource management in Indonesia from government control to a 
more community-based orientation require would considerable change to the structure of 
administration as well as laws and policies to support the new management arrangements 
(Kuperan et al. 1998). Local power elites and structures that have embedded into the 
Indonesian political system would need to be shifted and adjusted. CBM becomes more 
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difficult to be implemented in the absence of, or through the inappropriate use of, 
incentives and rewards to provide economic benefits to the community in conserving and 
managing coastal resources (Bailey and Zerner 1992; Berkes 2003; Crawford et al. 1998).  
Given such constraints, CBM is considerably less feasible than co-management 
for current decentralized CZM in Indonesia. Partnerships among stakeholders at multiple 
levels are required to deal with the huge complexity and specific locales of Indonesian 
coastal resources. Such complexity would need multiple network sites and tailor-made 
management strategies to fit each local situation and to build human resource capital at all 
levels of partnership. Co-management as a process better addresses these needs.  
Co-management appears to be the most appropriate approach for decentralized 
CZM in Indonesia because co-management involves partnership arrangements between the 
various levels of government, the individual resource users, other stakeholders and the 
local communities. This partnership arrangement is essential in decentralized CZM 
implementation. Therefore, co-management has more chance of success than a more 
radically decentralized approach, such as total CBM, which would only place additional 
pressure on local communities during a period of considerable change.  
Co-management stresses an impact-oriented, long-term approach and a process-
oriented short-term model for multiple sites and multiple stakeholders at both local and 
national levels. Indeed, co-management, as Pomeroy and Rivera-Guieb (2005:11) point 
out, “addresses issues beyond the community level, at regional and national levels, and 
multiple stakeholders, and allows these issues, as they affect the community, to be brought 
more effectively into the domain of community”. These qualities make co-management 
much more suited than CBM to the current Indonesia situation, where coastal issues vary 
from local to national levels.  
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In an era of devolution, it seems incongruous that a call for central government 
intervention is a critical issue in the decentralization process. External factors, which are 
counter-productive to the efforts of decentralized CZM implementation, such as destructive 
fishing and the market-driven exploitation of fishing grounds, need central government 
intervention and a legislative framework. The co-management approach allows 
government intervention to deal with such external factors.  
Central government intervention can take a number of forms, from more 
involvement at the education and information stages to large-scale inter-area coordination. 
This need not mean a return to centralist authoritarianism. In a legal framework, it is also 
apparent that compliance and enforcement of legislation governing the management of 
coastal resources cannot be completely decentralized.   
As Indonesia has just recognized (de jure and de facto) the right of local 
communities in managing their coastal resources, it will be better to introduce gradually 
community involvement rather than try to change rapidly their mindset and interaction. 
Rapid change without preparing communities could lead to frustration and failure and, as a 
consequence, uneven community participation. Similarly, there is an even greater need to 
shift the government mindset regarding its relationship with communities, to be more 
willing to develop the communities’ role and make communities important stakeholders in 
decentralized CZM.  
Co-management is a process in which the respect accorded to various interests 
and stakeholders is part of an adaptive learning process that delivers better coastal resource 
management in Indonesia. The process of co-management also aims to improve 
compliance and enforcement of regulations and provide a more inclusive decision-making 
strategy. It will prove to be a valuable learning process for both governments and 
communities. It will enhance the chances, benefits and sense of ownership for better 
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coastal resource management. To ensure that the process runs well, early participation and 
involvement with multiple stakeholders and interests are needed.  
In regard to current decentralized CZM in Indonesia, co-management is an 
appropriate approach as it allows for the development of a model containing a balance of 
power between governments, communities as a whole and a wide range of individual 
stakeholders. For communities that have had long experience suffering under hidden and 
shadowy disempowering programs, co-management can be an empowering tool for 
communities that have just entered the decentralization process.  
Communities are still trying to adjust to a new social and political environment 
after three decades of centralized and repressive governmental control. Self-regulation and 
active participation in local management strategies at the local community level has not 
occurred yet. To ensure a significant improvement in community and stakeholder 
involvement in coastal resource management processes, a gradual process such as that 
promoted by co-management is essential. Empowerment and adjustment of community 
and stakeholders’ roles in the decision-making process are important factors for local 
communities in Indonesia to deal with the shifting policy on CZM. 
7.2.2 Bureaucracy reforms 
Bureaucratic reforms are another important factor in decentralizing CZM. 
Bureaucratic reforms can foster or limit the implementation of decentralized CZM. An 
effective and accountable bureaucracy, as the main objective of such reforms, will provide 
a supporting strategy for better implementation of decentralized CZM through appropriate 
legal mandates, functions, roles and responsibilities as well as transparent and accountable 
personnel (DRSP 2006). Meanwhile, an absence of effective and accountable bureaucracy 
will jeopardize the implementation of decentralized CZM due to “the complexity and 
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ambiguities of the regulatory framework combined with a flagrant lack of enforcement of 
the rules and the presence of rent seeking” (DRSP 2006:47). This can only allow 
corruption, collusion and nepotism (KKN Gaya Baru) among local ethnic elites, district 
officials and entrepreneurs to further their own interests. Coastal resources and coastal 
communities will remain victims of development instead of actors in their own 
development. Local elites and stronger ethnic groups maximizing their collusive benefits 
from decentralized CZM process will persist and prosper. 
To achieve an effective and accountable bureaucracy in decentralized CZM 
requires reforms to the bureaucracy that cover organizational, financial and legal areas. 
Bureaucracy reforms are a “[dynamic process] to organize the delivery services in a more 
efficient and effective way and to manage human resources and support government 
objectives” (DRSP 2006:47). This requires the adjustment of roles and responsibilities to 
perform new tasks in new organizational settings (DRSP 2006). In most cases, bureaucracy 
reforms are in line with the adoption of some new public management tools such as the 
performance-based staffing, budgeting and integrity pacts (pakta integritas) for project 
tenders. These tools can be steps forward and lead to more accountable district 
governments as they apply decentralized CZM. It also can put pressure on the bureaucracy 
to offer service-oriented administration.  
To shift the government’s mindset and to come up with bureaucratic reforms in 
decentralized CZM requires strong political vision and commitment, especially from the 
Bupati, who is an important local actor. As DRSP (2006:58) noted, “[bureaucratic reforms] 
will be sustainable only if political leadership [from Bupati] is secured including the will to 
address the prevailing uncertainties”.  It will be a challenging task to shift from a culture of 
‘business as usual’ to an entrepreneurial bureaucracy with efficiency and effectiveness as 
key words. Consistent visions and commitments are keys to the bureaucracy reforms. 
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During the last seven years, learning from local social and political changes in better 
governance (such as direct election, more demand on local government accountability and 
smarter constituent of local parliament) actually provide enough ammunition to set in 
motion bureaucratic reform in decentralized CZM. 
As bureaucracy reforms deal with new roles and responsibilities, learning by 
doing is important for reforms in local governments especially in dealing with a new 
administrative domain (urusan baru) such as CZM. For most local governments, CZM and 
the application of decentralization principles are new things in their administration. It takes 
time and requires more effort to accelerate factual and ideal expectations in decentralized 
CZM (Informant B-Gov-Kdi 2007).  
Learning by doing can benefit from exposure to external driving forces, such as 
donor assistance for decentralization or CZM projects.181  Institutions exposed to external 
decentralization programs or assistance are relatively more ready to manage change and 
implement decentralized policy through their experiences during the project 
implementation and interaction with donors and the central government (Informant A-Exp-
Kdi 2005). For example, both Konawe and Pangkep administer the MCRM Project. This 
project provides training and capacity building for local governments involved in 
decentralized CZM (Informant A-Gov-Nat 2005).  
The MCRM Project also applied a more robust and predictable incentive scheme 
for local project managers, who are mostly from Bappeda, by offering them short courses 
overseas if they actively engage with CZM, support and facilitate the enactment of local 
government regulations (Peraturan Daerah/Perda) on CZM. The MCRM project 
                                                     
181 In most cases, CZM projects such as MCRMP conduct annual regional and national meetings for 
national and local project managers to share their experiences, success and failure stories in running the 
project, as well as dialogue with project partners. The projects usually organize training and study tours both 
domestically and internationally to enhance the capacity of local government staff.  
  289
managers have had the opportunity to study CZM and to observe day-to-day CZM 
application in another country. Because of the incentive of overseas training in the project 
scheme, there was increased motivation to do better and more effective work to achieve 
outputs for predictable incentives (Informant A-Gov-Nat 2005). Indeed, a short course 
overseas gave participants good perspectives on CZM as well as self-confidence to project 
managers for dealing with CZM. This exemplified how important it is to create robust and 
predictable incentives for civil service staff in the bureaucratic reform process.  
One of the major issues in bureaucratic reform is to get the right person in the 
right place and at the right time (DRSP 2006). In decentralized CZM, the phenomenon of 
overstaffing with too many generalist staff and a lack of critically skilled staff with a 
coastal and fisheries background is an organizational constraint. This issue is not exclusive 
to local government, but also occurs in the central government, such as with the MMAF 
project when high numbers of academics transferred to the ministry to make up for the lack 
of critical skills for some ministry tasks.  
Another major issue in bureaucratic reform is to improve the accountability at 
each level of government. Again, accountability is not an exclusive issue for local 
government but also applies to central government. Indeed, what has happened in local 
government is actually a mirror of the situation at the national level. Brokering and bribery 
in the national legislative assembly for additional funding (DAU and DAK) has been 
transformed at the local level through collusion, corruption and exclusiveness in tendering 
for projects. Most of the costs are still a mystery and stories are told just to ease suspicions 
and guilty consciences (hanya pengobat telinga) (Informant A-Exp-Kdi 2005).  One of my 
informants emphasized:  
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Decentralized [CZM] also has the potential for decentralized corruption that 
makes a new king and queen at the local level. The bupati is a king and 
legislative members are the queen. Again, this is a reflection of the national 
level situation. My analogy is like this: if you want to check whether a fish is 
good, you just need check its head, no need to check all of its body. If it is 
good, then the rest should be good. Similarly, if you want to check 
accountability at the local level, you have to check it at the national level. If it 
is consistently implemented at the national level, then it must be the case at 
local levels.    
(Informant A-Exp-Kdi 2005)  
Accountability protects local and central governments against the ‘endemic 
illnesses in implementing decentralization such as mismanagement, low rates of target 
achievement and financial leakages in the implementation process (Informant F-Gov-Nat 
2005)182. Accountability is also essential to prevent informal patronage behaviour in the 
bureaucracy that leads to power abuse, corruption and collusion for the sake of loyalty 
(World Bank 2006b). Accountability can minimize the existence of semi-formalized 
systems of financial benefits such as unofficial payments, bribery, graft, returns from the 
rent seeking (World Bank 2006b). Accountability can also limit people with informal 
patronage ties from holding key positions in the bureaucracy that creates extra-budgetary 
transactions and traps staff in a paternalistic loyalty network (World Bank 2006b).  
Currently, accountability is an important part of the agenda in bureaucratic reform, 
including decentralized CZM and with regard to wider service delivery improvement 
(DRSP 2006). This agenda, however, still faces a barrier to implementation due to the lack 
of broad and comprehensive bureaucratic reform (DRSP 2006). To breakdown the barriers 
requires commitment and consistency in applying accountability. Improvements involve 
complexity and have consequences and impacts. Without commitment and consistency, 
bureaucratic reform will be lip-service only.    
                                                     
182 In many projects, achieving 20 percent of total targets can be categorized as success (Informant F-
Gov-Nat 2005). This presents chronic unaccountability in project management and the bureaucracy.  
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7.2.3 Challenges to the implementation of Law 27/2007  
The enactment of Law No. 27/2007 concerning Management of Coastal Zones 
and Small Islands (Undang-undang No 27 tahun 2007 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah 
Pesisir dan Pulau-pulau Kecil/UU-PWPPK) is one big step forward in managing coastal 
resources and small islands in Indonesia. This law, together with Law 31/2004 concerning 
Fisheries, crafted the pathway for the MMAF in managing coastal zones, fisheries and 
small islands. The law provides a general framework for coastal zone and small island 
management. For effective implementation, the law requires 21 derivative regulation 
packages (4 government regulations, 6 presidential decrees and 11 ministerial decrees) that 
were supposed to be released within a year after the enactment. However, some of these 
regulations packages are still in the process of being enacted.  
UU-PWPPK is one of the laws that has adopted a series of public consultations in 
its legal drafting process. The process applied a three-track public consultation strategy that 
consisted of (i) formal consultations with central government agencies and local 
government representatives, (ii) informal consultations with NGOs, universities, 
businesses, community leaders, and political parties and (iii) a mass media campaign to 
raise public awareness through television, print and radio (Idris et al. 2003). Twelve public 
consultations were conducted in 10 provinces, which engaged more than 1,100 active 
participants from NGOs, academia, communities, local governments and national 
stakeholders, who were part of a parallel involvement of local government staff from 15 
provinces and 43 districts (Idris et al. 2003).  
The development process of UU-PWPPK took almost seven years. The process 
began with a redefinition of the standard process in 2000 through preparing the Naskah 
Akademis (academic papers) which contained in-depth studies that supported and justified 
a new statute. The process benefited from the USAID project CRMP, known as Proyek 
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Pesisir183, and the model of the US Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA) of 1972 
concerning voluntary initiatives and the certification process for coastal zone planning and 
management (Patlis 2005). Then, the draft of Law 27/2007 (RUU Pesisir) was discussed in 
legislative sessions and debated for six years (Siry 2005). 
 
7.2.3.1 Boundaries  
During the draft UU-PWPPK consultation, one of the issues under debate was the 
CZM boundaries for each level of government. The definition of coastal zones in Indonesia 
follows the dynamic of ecological processes in coastal zones as transition areas between 
land and sea (Article 1 item 2 Law 27/2007; see also Section 3.1). As transition areas, 
coastal zones are influenced by changes in the land and sea (Article 1 item 2 Law 
27/2007); this implies a need for flexibility and the recognition of these changes in coastal 
zones. The changing factors can occur through human or natural causes, or both. This 
definition has become the standard definition in almost all coastal zone planning and 
management policy documents in Indonesia184. The overlay of this definition onto 
administrative boundaries was a challenging task since ecological and administrative 
boundaries in many cases did not match.  
To settle disputes over discrepancies between ecological and administrative 
boundaries, UU-PWPPK states that coastal zone management landward boundaries follow 
                                                     
183 Proyek Pesisir facilitated the process of organizing Naskah Akademis and lesson learned experience 
for highing ranks officers of the MMAF on US CZMA 1972. 
184 Rokhmin Dahuri, former the Minister of Marine Affairs and Fisheries and Director of the Center for 
Costal and Marine Resources Studies, Bogor Agricultural University (CCMRS-IPB), was the pioneer in 
introducing this definition through his main reference book on Indonesia CZM, Pengelolaan sumber daya 
wilayah pesisir dan lautan secara terpadu (Integrated coastal zone and marine resource management) 
(Dahuri et al. 1995),his training course on Integrated Coastal Zone Planning and Management (ICZPM) and 
several studies and policy papers.    
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sub-district (kecamatan) boundaries (Article 2 Law 27/2007)185 and seaward boundaries 
follow the stipulation of Law 32/2004 that provides up to 12 nautical miles for provinces 
and that one third of the provincial management areas come under district administration.  
7.2.3.2 Planning instruments 
UU-PWPPK provides the general provisions of CZM related to administration 
and implementation. The law stipulated the need for provincial and local governments to 
set up their coastal and small islands planning instruments (Article 7) to consist of four 
planning documents: strategic, zoning, management and action plans (Table 41). These 
planning documents must contain evidence of communities’ involvement in their drafting 
process (Article 7 item 4 Law 27/2007) with technical details on how to involve the 
communities that will be regulated under these ministerial regulations (Article 7 item 2 
Law 27/2007).  
 
                                                     
185 Article 2 UU-PWPPK stipulated: “administrative areas from the sub-district to the sea as far as 12 
nautical miles as measured from the coastline” (Ruang lingkup pengaturan wilayah pesisir dan pulau-pulau 
kecil meliputi daerah peralihan antara ekosistem darat dan laut yang dipengaruhi oleh perubahan di darat 
dan laut, ke arah darat mencakup wilayah administrasi kecamatan dan ke arah laut sejauh 12 (dua belas) 
mil laut diukur dari garis pantai). 
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Table 41.  Coastal zone and Small Island planning documents. 
Type of planning documents Contents and remarks Duration 
Coastal and Small Island Strategic Plan  
(Rencana Strategis Wilayah Pesisir dan 
Pulau-Pulau Kecil) 
 
Vision and mission of local 
government on coastal zone and 
small islands 
A part of local government’s long 
term development plan 
Local government’s interest and 
strategic issues related to coastal 
zone and small islands 
20 years but can be 
reviewed at least every 
five (5) years.  
Coastal and Small Island Zoning Plan  
(Rencana Zonasi Wilayah Pesisir dan Pulau-
Pulau Kecil) 
 
Direction for utilization coastal zone 
and small islands 
Space allocation in coastal zone and 
small islands 
Consideration and integration to 
other local government’s plans. 
Must be established as Local 
Regulation (Perda) 
20 years but can be 
reviewed at least every 
five (5) years. 
Coastal and Small Island Management Plan  
(Rencana Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan 
Pulau-Pulau Kecil) 
 
Policy and administration procedures 
on managing coastal zone and small 
islands 
Priority scales on coastal zone and 
small islands management 
Report and surveillance mechanisms 
in coastal zone and small islands 
management 
Human resources allocation   
Five years but can be 
reviewed at least once a 
year 
Coastal and Small Island Action Plan  
(Rencana Aksi Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir 
dan Pulau-Pulau Kecil) 
 
Detail actions for achieving aims in 
zoning and management plans 
One to three years 
Sources: Articles 7 – 14 Law 27/2007 
 
7.2.3.3 Accreditation  
UU-PWPPK initiated accreditation mechanisms that apply voluntary and 
incentive-based mechanisms to boost local government’s performance in managing coastal 
zones and small islands. There are six standards used for assessing accreditation: (i) 
relevance to priority issues, (ii) public consultation process, (iii) positive impacts on 
environmental protection, (iv) impacts on community welfare, (v) capability of 
implementation and (vi) program and policy support from the central and local 
governments (Departemen Kelautan dan Perikanan 2008). The accreditation mechanisms 
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also adopted the concept of minimum performance standards (Standar Pelayanan 
Minimal/SPM)186 (Siry 2005). 
7.2.3.4 Coastal Concessionaire  
UU-PWPPK introduced a new scheme for central and local governments for 
managing coastal zones, the Concessionaire of Coastal Water (Hak Pengelolaan Perairan 
Pesisir/HP3). The HP3 is a mechanism for granting rights to Indonesian citizens, legal 
entities and coastal communities (indigenous, traditional and local) to treat coastal zones as 
part of their property or to utilize coastal zones for their activities. These rights cover water 
areas, water columns, coastal seabeds and small islands (Article 16 item 2). HP3 will be 
issued in the form of certificates (Article 20 item 2) that can be transferable and used as 
collateral for financial guarantees (Article 20 item 1). The maximum timeline for this right 
is 20 years, with a possible extension of another 20 years (Article 19). This right will be 
effective as soon as government regulation (PP) and guidelines on administering 
procedures to obtain, register and cancel the HP3 becomes available (Article 20 item 4). 
The draft of the PP is now under discussion and is a priority for the MMAF to complete. 
The earliest implementation of this HP3 will be 2010 (Informant V-Gov-Nat 2007). 
Put simply, HP3 is a ‘principle license’ (izin prinsip) for allocating spaces and 
suitable activities in a coastal zone. To conduct any activity in allocated coastal zones 
requires a ‘utilization license’ (izin pemanfaatan) that is administered by sectoral licensing. 
HP3 will be granted if the activities match the zoning plan. Similarly, HP3 will be rejected 
or cancelled if the activities are unacceptable in the coastal zone. HP3 licensees must be 
concerned with the correct preservation of coastal and small island ecosystems, indigenous 
                                                     
186 SPM is associated with its twin concept, obligatory functions (kewenangan wajib). These twin 
concepts are useful tools for improving local financial management  (Ferrazzi 2005). The tools are also 
intended for accountability and measuring the elected local actors’ performances.   
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and traditional communities as well as the national interest and crossing rights for foreign 
ships (Article 17 item 2). HP3 licenses cannot be granted in conservation zones, fish 
sanctuaries, service routes, harbours or beaches (Article 22).  
 The basic ideas underlying the HP3 concept traditionally exist in some parts of 
Eastern Indonesia (Saad 2000a, 2000b, 2000c, 2003) such as sasi in Maluku and bagang in 
Selayar district that can be used as bride wealth (mahar perkawinan) (Saad 1994, 2000a, 
2003). The concept of HP3 also adopted the Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) from 
fisheries management in Canada, New Zealand and Iceland (Idris et al. 2003). This concept 
is meant to solve the legal ambiguity in CZM by providing clarity for the management of 
coastal resources as well as in the identification of responsible stakeholders in cases of 
resource degradation. HP3 also addresses the needs of current business communities in 
mariculture (seaweeds, pearls and oysters), tambak and tourism concerning legal security 
in the utilization of the coastal zone for these activities.  
Despite some good intentions in the HP3 concept, the licensing may stir up 
controversy among some environmental and community groups. Fisheries Justice Coalition 
(Koalisi Rakyat untuk Keadilan Perikanan/KIARA)187 and the Indonesian Forum for 
Environment (Wahana Lingkungan Hidup/WALHI - Friends of the Earth Indonesia)188 are 
                                                                                                                                                                 
 
187 KIARA was established in 2003 with initiation from several NGOs such as WALHI, Bina Desa, 
Federasi Serikat Nelayan Nusantara (FSNN) and persons concerned with marine affairs and fisheries. 
KIARA activities focus on (i) policy reforms, (ii) shrimp tambak and mangroves, (iii) illegal, unregulated, 
unreported fishing, (iv) coastal zone and small island management. For the first phase, KIARA funding 
obtained from the Netherlands Oxfam but the funding stoped due to internal financial issues (Informant J-
Exp-Nat 2007). M Riza Damanik, WALHI’s Manager for Coastal and Marine Campaign Affairs, took up 
KIARA leadership as the General Secretary and takes the militant opposite views on UU-PWPPK as his 
trademark (Informant J-Exp-Nat 2007).  
188 WALHI (http://www.walhi.or.id) is one of the largest forums of non-government and community-
based organisations in Indonesia. WALHI has representatives in 25 provinces and has over 438 member 
organisations (as of June 2004). Its main agendas are social transformation, people’s sovereignty, and 
sustainability of life and livelihoods, with special focus on defending local communities from injustice 
carried out in the name of economic development. 
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two active environmental groups that are sceptical about the HP3 concept. They doubt the 
success of HP3 implementation and argue that HP3 will lead to competition for resource 
extraction, as already is the case with Forestry Concessionaire (Hak Pengusahaan 
Hutan/HPH).  
The fact that marginalized local communities and fishermen have only limited 
access and resources to be able to apply for HP3 is amongst the reasons for “HP3 
scepticism” (Informant J-Exp-Nat 2007). Opposition to HP3 seems to be an outstanding 
feature of the agenda of KIARA and WALHI. WALHI is applying for a judicial review 
appeal on the UU-PWPPK to the Constitutional Court (Kompas 2008b).  
KIARA and WALHI argue that the stated opportunity for indigenous, traditional 
and local communities to apply for HP3 licenses is merely rhetoric because the HP3 
application gives priority to owners of capital rather than to communities. Competition 
between communities and capital owners or enterprises in HP3 applications will leave 
communities in a marginal position due to their lack of resources. For KIARA and 
WALHI, HP3 involves dishonesty and collusion between government and businessmen 
(perselingkuhan penguasa dan pengusaha) (Informant V-Gov-Nat 2007). They have 
criticized the narrow definition of indigenous (adat) communities (Article 18 item 2) that 
limits the opportunity of indigenous communities to obtain HP3. However, until now 
KIARA and WALHI have not provided any concrete revision of the HP3 concept, nor an 
alternative concept. As my informants confirmed, cancellation of UU-PWPPK is a last-
ditch stand (harga mati) for KIARA and WALHI.    
With this scepticism, KIARA and WALHI have ignored the explicit stipulations of 
UU-PWPPK that placed priority on the community’s right of guarantee and the pro-
community orientation in several of its articles (Informant L-Gov-Nat 2007, Informant V-
Gov-Nat 2007). The explicit articles on community rights state that communities can 
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benefit from UU-PWPPK public consultation with AMAN (the Alliance of Customary 
Communities in Indonesia/Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara) and several other 
community groups. Several explicit articles in UU-PWPPK concern communities, such as:  
 the community as primary stakeholder (Article 1 item 30);  
 recognition of three types of community (indigenous/adat, traditional and local); to 
distinguish type of community and prevent any blurred definition of community 
(Article 1 item 32, 33 and 34);  
 appreciation of local wisdom (Article 1 item 36), the importance of a community’s 
involvement in the formulation of coastal planning documents (Article 7 item 4);   
 the requirements to consider indigenous community (Article 17); and  
 the privilege of indigenous communities in HP3 process (Article 18). 
 
7.2.3.5 Granting Process of Coastal Concessionaire  
UU-PWPPK clearly stated the operational requirements on implementing HP3 
should empower and recognize traditional and local communities’ existence and rights, as 
well as the protection of indigenous communities’ rights (Article 21 item 4 a, b and c Law 
27/2007). The HP3 applicants need to take into account community rights to obtain access 
for coastal demarcation (sempadan pantai) and estuaries (Article 21 item 4d Law 
27/2007). Apart from the community’s concern in HP3, in UU-PWPPK 10 out of 80 
articles are specifically on communities’ rights, obligations and involvement (Articles 
60,61 and 62), empowerment (Article 63), dispute settlement (Articles 64, 65, 66 and 67) 
and the possibility to appeal in class actions (Articles 68 and 69).  
From a legal point of view, UU-PWPPK takes a highly precautionary approach to 
the potentiality of power abuse of community rights and misconduct in granting HP3 by 
imposing a strictly multilayer process to HP3 approvals. This regulatory framework cannot 
be implemented or applied in the absence of a competent and accountable local 
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government that must fulfil all the legal and administrative requirements before granting 
HP3.  
The HP3 granting process follows the decentralized CZM arrangements as 
stipulated in Law 32/2004 concerning Regional Government in accordance with the 
administrative jurisdiction at each level of government (Article 23 item 4 Law 27/2007).  
Central government, which in this case is the Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries, has 
the authority to issue HP3 for coastal zones and small islands located in the inter-province 
areas and in particular, in national strategic areas (Kawasan Strategis Nasional 
Tertentu/KSNT) (Article 50 item 1 Law 27/2007)189 those are located under provincial or 
district administration. At the provincial level, the Governor has the authority to issue HP3 
for coastal zones up to 12 nautical miles seaward and in inter-district or inter-municipality 
coastal waters (Article 50 item 2 Law 27/2007). At district or municipal level, the 
Bupati/Walikota has the authority to issue HP3 for coastal waters in one third of the area 
within the provincial jurisdiction (Article 50 item 3 Law 27/2007).  
To have the authority to issue HP3, provincial and local governments must fulfil 
several requirements. Provincial and local governments must have four coastal zone 
planning and management documents (strategic, zoning, management and action plans) 
that in their formulation should contain community involvement and follows norms, 
standards and guidelines from the MMAF (Article 7 Law 27/2007). Because HP3 is related 
to space allocation for suitable activities, then the zoning plans must be established as 
Local regulations (Perda) to satisfy its legal basis. Without Perda on coastal zoning plans 
                                                     
189 Establishing KSNT requires approval from the national parliament and its process includes (i) 
submission of proposal consideration to the national parliament, (ii) hearing, (iii) establishment of an 
integrated and independent research team, which comprises representative from university, government and 
scientific authority, and (iv) issuance by the parliament of the consideration for granting the establishment of 
KSNT (Elucidation Article 50). 
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or the other three planning documents, provincial and local governments have no authority 
to issue HP3.  
After fulfilling all the requirements of these four coastal planning documents, 
provincial and local governments must then take into account technical, administrative and 
operational requirements for assessing HP3 applications (Article 21 Law 27/2007). 
Technical requirements include consistency of the zoning plan with the management plan, 
results of public consultation and analysis of coastal environmental impact assessment 
(Article 21 item 2 Law 27/2007). Administrative requirements cover the formulation of an 
implementation plan, analysis of the proposal’s appropriateness for coastal carrying 
capacity and a system of surveillance and reporting (Article 21 item 3 Law 27/2007). 
Operational requirements include (i) empowerment of local communities, (ii) recognition, 
admiration and protection of the indigenous rights and local community’s, and (iv) 
provision of access to coastal demarcation areas (sempadan pantai), estuaries and 
rehabilitation of degraded resources (Article 21 item 4). All these requirements are meant 
to ensure the HP3 granting process matches the aim of providing legal clarity and security 
in utilizing coastal zones without ignoring the rights of indigenous, traditional and local 
communities (Informant V-Gov-Nat 2007).  
However, there are five challenges facing provincial and local governments in 
implementing the HP3. First, the technical capacities and capabilities of provincial and 
local governments to formulate the four planning documents remain a major issue. 
Provincial and local governments must now deal with unfamiliar complex procedures that 
have possibilities for inaccuracy in their implementation. As discussed in the previous 
section, CZM is a new administrative domain that lacks the qualified human resources to 
deal with CZM or related matters.  
  301
Second, the quality and quantity of the data and information required formulating 
the planning documents is still unreliable and most of them are out of date. Provincial and 
local governments face the high costs of data collection and surveys that may cause them 
just to rely on old data or secondary data and information. Meanwhile, the dynamics of 
coastal zones under natural and human influences rapidly changes conditions and 
ecological interactions in coastal zones. This challenge could lead to the creation of poor 
quality planning documents and poor analysis of resource allocation. 
Third, there is the possibility that the HP3 will be treated as a competitor or 
barrier to sectoral licensing by other sectors (dinas) at the level of provincial and local 
governments. Some provincial and local governments have already issued sectoral licences 
operating in coastal zones. The introduction of the HP3, which concerns space utilization 
in coastal zones, could cause either mutual actions opposition efforts to the role of Dinas 
KP to issue HP3 from other dinas within provincial and local governments. Not all sectors 
may agree and follow or adjust their sectoral licensing to integrate with the HP3 
mechanism. HP3, as product of marine affairs and fisheries sector, may continue to be 
treated as one among several development sectors rather than being adopted as an 
umbrella-licensing instrument in coastal zones.  
Fourth, establishing boundaries in coastal zones for HP3 requires highly skilled 
human resources and a spatial authority that still does not exist. Establishing HP3 needs 
clear spatial boundaries to prevent potential future conflicts.  
The last challenge is inherent in the set-up of coordination mechanisms for 
integrating HP3 in provincial and local governments’ licensing system and matching them 
with other sectors’ licensing. Coordination mechanisms among various stakeholders in the 
coastal zone are important to decentralizing CZM. CZM cannot be done achieve by Dinas 
KP itself, but requires effective and strong coordination among dinas in local government 
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administrations, including neighbouring districts, provinces and at the national level. 
Indeed, it needs strong political will from the Bupati.  
All these challenges illustrate that the implementation of HP3 faces technical and 
institutional challenges that require careful attention and clarity to prevent possible 
technical and practical problems in implementation. Setting up clear, fair and transparent 
guidelines for HP3 implementation will avoid predatory behaviour and unfair competition 
over obtaining HP3. The lessons learned and the traumatic experiences of the HPH 
granting process for forest resources that led to the massive destruction of forest resources 
and an imbalance of power and benefit should be remembered and taken into consideration 
in developing technical and detailed guidelines for the implementation of HP3. This 
process is critical and requires wide contributions from a wide range stakeholders 
including from the NGOs such as KIARA and WALHI. This process can be medium for 
KIARA and WALHI to demonstrate their critical thoughts by providing alternative or 
improvement inputs for the improvement of HP3 granting process.     
7.3 Concluding Remarks 
We have to be optimistic with all the shortages [in the transition period of 
decentralization] because it is a process that will give us lessons to be learned 
and opportunities toward better [decentralized CZM] 
(Informant D-Exp-Nat 2005)  
 
This chapter has examined the key empirical factors that contribute to effective 
decentralized CZM. Three key factors (understanding and awareness, accountability, and 
mechanisms for assigning responsibilities, authorities and resources) are involved in 
effective decentralized CZM, and are indispensible to each other. These three factors are 
important in the current context of Indonesian decentralized CZM, but can only be 
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effective if crosscutting features such as local leadership and incentive also exist. The 
chapter also look beyond Konawe and Pangkep to the broader CZM situation in Indonesia.  
The next chapter will present my concluding arguments on decentralized CZM in 
Indonesia; it summarizes the finding of the dissertation, draws out the importance of the 
local socio-political contexts in successful decentralized CZM and draws the implications 
of this research in both theory and in practice.   
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8 CONCLUSIONS  
 
This dissertation has examined the dynamics of decentralized CZM in Indonesia 
as a newly devolved administration task for local government (Article 18 Law 32/2004). 
The dissertation has argued that effective decentralized CZM in Indonesia can be achieved 
when the presence of factors those explain in Section 7.1 combine with strong and 
committed local leadership and incentives mechanisms. This study has shown that the 
effectiveness of decentralized CZM relies heavily on local socio-political conditions. These 
local dynamics, in some cases, lead to an obfuscation of the issues and unclear 
management solutions. In other cases, these dynamics provide the pathway for pursuing 
the hopes and expectations directed toward the decentralized policy in CZM. This chapter 
summarizes the research results from the two case studies and highlights the key 
contributions to the discourse on decentralized CZM in Indonesia. This chapter then 
identifies areas for further research.  
8.1 Dissertation summary 
This dissertation seeks to understand decentralization policy in the context of 
CZM and is organized around the five following research questions:  
1. What is the extent and nature of decentralized CZM in Indonesia? 
2. How do the dynamics of local socio-political conditions affect decentralized CZM 
implementation? 
3. How have district decision-making processes in coastal zone management been shaped 
in the context of decentralisation? 
4. What are the theoretical and practical requirements for effective decentralized CZM?  
5. What are the lessons that can be learned from the process of decentralized CZM 
implementation in the Indonesia context? 
 
  305
These five research questions were addressed in three connected parts. The first 
part (Chapters 1, 2 and 3) explained the research approach and methodology (Chapter 1).  
Chapters 2 and 3 set out the working definitions of the main concepts and current discourse 
on the theory and practice of decentralization, coastal management and decentralized 
CZM. The second part (Chapters 4 and 5) analysed two district case studies. The final part 
(Chapters 6, 7 and 8) attempted to synthesize the key themes of the research findings, drew 
policy implications and recommended areas for further investigation. The three parts of 
this dissertation offers eight contributions to the discourses of decentralized CZM in 
Indonesia by: 
1. Illustrating the history of decentralization policy as the framework to understanding 
the context of dynamic decentralization policy (Chapter 2); 
2. Defining decentralized CZM as it is constructed through a combination of concepts 
relating to decentralization, CZM, and integrated CZM (Chapter 3); 
3. Outlining the evolution of CZM in Indonesia and the dynamic of its implementation 
(Chapter 3);  
4. Providing two detailed case studies analysing the implementation of decentralized 
CZM, in Konawe and Pangkep, that show the dynamic of local socio-political and 
shifting power constellations at the local level (Chapters 4 and 5); 
5. Drawing out key elements of the nature and drivers of comparative lessons learned 
from the two case studies (Chapter 6); 
6. Identifying implications and overarching considerations for decentralized CZM 
(Chapter 6); 
7. Extracting a synthesis of the dynamics of decentralized CZM implementation beyond 
the two case studies (Chapter 7); and  
8. Outlining factors affecting the achievement of effective decentralized CZM (Chapter 
7). 
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8.2 The extend and nature decentralized CZM 
This dissertation finds that decentralized CZM will remain an important policy for 
archipelagic countries like Indonesia. The main rationale behind decentralized CZM is the 
need to address specific diverse local conditions in Indonesia. Management of these 
specific and diverse conditions cannot rely on a uniform and centralized approach. It 
requires locally tailored management. With limited administrative resources, it will not be 
possible for Indonesia to take on every coastal and marine management issue with the 
same degree of urgency.  
Decentralized CZM is a new domain for local government in Indonesia which is 
intended to provide more sensitivity and awareness of local problems and to find local 
solutions as well as to cut through the administrative decision making process. 
Decentralized CZM implies fundamental changes for Indonesian governance systems and 
for the central-local government relationship now that coastal zones belong under local 
government. As a result, the nature of decentralized CZM is marked by a gradual shifting 
and learning process. The process offers challenges in its implementation due to the lack of 
capacity and the lack of attractiveness for the coastal zone and its resources in the local 
political and economy.  
Local socio-political contexts and the role of central government in promoting 
decentralized CZM are equally important. Analysis of the two case studies suggests that 
the implementation of decentralized CZM is still in its early stages and will continue to 
require the presence of the MMAF to keep balance and consistency in maintaining political 
will, commitment and resource distribution in decentralized CZM implementation. 
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8.3 The importance of local socio-political contexts 
The two case studies, of Konawe and Pangkep, highlight the importance of local 
socio-political contexts for investigating the implementation of decentralized CZM at 
district level in Indonesia. It outlines the importance of the role of the Bupati for 
decentralized CZM. The Bupati can be viewed as the new emerging local authoritarian 
whose highly politicized decision-making in regard to decentralized CZM leave little space 
for accountability and government improvement (Chapter 4). The Bupati can initiate and 
maintain the momentum of pro-coastal and pro-island policies by accelerating CZM in 
less-advantaged areas (Chapter 5). The Bupati can also be paragons for clean leadership 
that limits opportunistic behaviour from the local administration and local elites, who 
might capitalize on decentralized CZM for personal gain. However, effective decentralized 
CZM becomes even more difficult to achieve when the Bupati themselves accrue power 
for personal benefit only. 
As the frontline of decentralized CZM implementation, the Bupati and local 
government administration determine the success or failure of decentralized CZM 
practices. The Bupati and the local government administration play significant roles in 
setting up policy, allocating and spending local budgets, providing technical assistance to 
the community, encouraging local CZM initiatives and integrating local values, norms and 
practices into local policy. The Bupati and local government administration can be an 
initiator, promoter and accelerator of innovation in the implementation of decentralized 
CZM. In order to do so, the Bupati and local government administration need qualified 
human resources responsive to and anticipative of the dynamic of local socio-political 
affairs as well as coastal zone conditions. The combination of innovations by qualified staff 
and technology investment will improve the efficiency of decentralized CZM. However, in 
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a contrary role, the Bupati and local government administration have the potential to steer 
the administration of CZM into short-term resource extraction through unsustainable 
policy and regulation of coastal zone utilization.  
The two case studies raise the importance of formal and informal accountability in 
decentralized CZM implementation. Formal accountability mechanisms in the two cases 
studies highlight the importance of the local legislature (DPRD) in watching over 
decentralized CZM implementation by the Bupati and local government administration. To 
ensure the local legislature is reliable, the DPRD must be free from opportunistic 
behaviour and take seriously the mandates and authorizations of the Bupati and local 
government administration in carrying out fair and accountable governance. These cases 
studies also highlight the need for non-governmental stakeholders to share involvement in 
accountability mechanisms to make sure checks and balances are in place, as well as for 
pressuring local governments to implement effective decentralized CZM.  
8.4 Shaping the decision-making process in decentralized CZM 
Local socio-political contexts have shaped and influenced the extent and 
characteristics of decentralized CZM implementation through the quality of the local 
leadership, the dynamics of local stakeholders’ interactions, power distribution among 
local stakeholders and local government interactions with higher levels of government 
(Section 7.1). The quality of local leadership especially as shown by the Bupati is vital in 
determining the direction of decentralized CZM implementation.  
The district case studies showed that local leadership could either push the 
implementation of decentralized CZM in progressive ways or keep it as ‘business as usual’ 
with little improvement in management and governance of coastal zones. Thus, the quality 
of local leadership frames the conditions for enabling effective decentralized CZM. Local 
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leaders can be supportive, ignorant or even reluctant towards the process of implementing 
decentralized CZM. In most cases, the calculation of political benefits by local leaders 
(mostly from the Bupati) is the deepest motivation for setting up policy or making 
decisions about the implementation of decentralized CZM.  
Local actors’ interactions are mostly the result of shared organizational and 
personal interests and responsibilities among stakeholders. Shared interests and 
responsibilities define decentralized CZM as it is constructed through a combination of 
concepts relating to decentralization and the distribution of power among stakeholders. In 
some cases, distrust and power struggles exist in these interactions because of competing 
interests among stakeholders. This sometimes blurs the demarcation between 
organizational and personal interests and can lead to rent-seeking behaviour.  
Power distribution among stakeholders is significant for the implementation of 
decentralized CZM (Section 7.1.3). Power distribution involves the distribution of benefits 
that, in many cases, can leads to competition for power and interest. Power distribution 
affects the decision-making process and the way that stakeholders interact among 
themselves. Therefore, setting up clear ‘rules of the game’ is necessary to avoid the abuse 
of power and the mixing of interests in the implementation of decentralized CZM. Analysis 
of the two cases studies suggests that political calculations remain as big challenges in the 
local government decision-making process including in the process of decentralized CZM. 
This is a logical consequence of more power devolution to local governments.  
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8.5 Theoretical and practical requirements for decentralized CZM 
Decentralized CZM in practice relies heavily on a combination of enabling factors 
as explained in Section 7.1 especially in relation to the regulatory framework underpinning 
the process of decentralized CZM. A clear and firm legal regulatory framework is an 
important condition for ensuring that the processes of intergovernmental relationship exist 
in a fair, logical and appropriate order. Thus, the legal regulatory framework must contain 
both upward and downward accountability mechanisms (Section 7.1.2) as well as 
mechanisms for informal accountability from non-government stakeholders. Setting up 
accountability mechanisms, norms, standards and policies for decentralized CZM requires 
the role of central government.  
In return, such a clear and firm legal regulatory framework must also involve 
consistency from the central government in arranging and distributing authority, 
responsibility and resources for decentralized CZM. Consistency among sectors in central 
government should provide clarity and assurance for local government to carry out its 
mandated powers and responsibilities and to utilize resources for decentralized CZM 
implementation.  
The analysis in the cases studies provide evidence for the argument that effective 
decentralized CZM is inextricably linked with the role of local leaders and socio-political 
conditions at the local level. This finding further emphasises the importance of 
accountability mechanisms in decentralized CZM, and suggest further investigation into 
the issues of (i) whether the progress of decentralized CZM can be linear in its 
development with improving accountability mechanisms and (ii) whether the key to 
improvement will be a better understanding of role of various forms of accountability and 
the linkages between with local-central governance.       
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8.6 Lessons learned from decentralized CZM  
The analysis of and lessons learned from the two districts suggests the importance 
of central government as an initiator, promoter, evaluator and creator of the ideas, 
regulatory frameworks, norms and standards necessary for the implementation of 
decentralized CZM. The role of the central government is vital to maintain a balance of 
control over the coastal zone and its resources.  
The central government sets up and maintains a fiscal balance between local and 
central governments. The central government ensures that a local area revenues (PAD) and 
local government regulations (Perda) for PAD follow the regulatory framework and take 
into account ecological and social considerations. The central government’s cancellation of 
many local governments Perda because of the lack of ecological concern (Appendix 1) 
clearly illustrates the significant role of central government in ensuring local governments 
follow the principles of good PAD190 in their local law making process.  
The case of Pangkep (Chapter 5) where a recalculation of the general allocation 
fund (DAU) to make it more relevant to the archipelagic district was required highlights the 
need for the central government to review current DAU applications in terms of fiscal 
balance. The central government can reformulate the DAU allocations to be more specific 
to archipelagic districts like Pangkep that face unusual geographic and development 
challenges. In addition, the central government can also take a vital role in the specific 
allocation fund (DAK), and establish mechanisms for revenue sharing (DBH) accruing 
from coasts and fisheries.  
                                                     
190 Almost, if not all, PADs are tax bases. With reference to Article 2 Law 32/2004, local taxes should not 
(i) conflict with the public interest, (ii) exert economic distortion and (iii) stand in the way of sustainable 
environmental considerations.      
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The central government’s role as the balancer of power distribution is useful to 
avoid excessive exploitation of coastal resources due to the significant power shift to local 
government. Maximizing the extraction of coastal resources without concern for ecological 
considerations during the transition period from centralistic to decentralized policy, as 
happened during 1999 – 2003, is evidence of  the little concern by some governments for 
ecological considerations compared with the desire to earn local revenue and obtain short-
term economic benefits. 
The role of central government is also important in providing a clear and firm 
legal regulatory framework for decentralized CZM in order to provide stability and to 
guarantee the administrative devolution to CZM. In an absence of a clear and firm legal 
regulatory framework, there are opportunities for power abuse that tend to repeat the 
legacy of the New Order (corruption, collusion and nepotism - KKN Gaya Baru) but with a 
different locus and modus. Furthermore, power struggles can arise in the race to gain and 
maximize interests and benefits due to the misinterpretation of the regulatory framework. 
Distrust and reluctance to devolve authority, responsibility and resources are a logic 
consequence of power struggles that distract from the implementation of decentralized 
CZM.       
The central government, in this case the MMAF, plays a considerable role in 
supporting the implementation of decentralized CZM. As described in Chapters 4 and 5, 
both Konawe and Pangkep districts have had significant increases in their budget 
allocations for coastal and fisheries affairs as part of the MMAF’s agenda to accelerate 
coastal and fisheries development. The MMAF has played an avant-garde role in 
promoting revenue sharing (DBH Perikanan) and specific allocations funds (DAK 
Kelautan) for coastal and fisheries affairs. The MMAF also provides deconcentration funds 
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for provincial and local government to implement activities to achieve national targets on 
coasts and fisheries that cannot be covered by local government budgets.  
The MMAF has actively established norms, standards and policies for 
decentralized CZM implementation. MMAF’s efforts in proposing and supporting two 
laws on coastal and fisheries (Law 31/2004 on Fisheries and Law 27/2007 on Coastal Zone 
and Small Island Management) are evidence of the central government’s significant role in 
promoting decentralized CZM. Both laws contain the underlying spirit of decentralized 
CZM that shifts responsibilities, authority and resources to local governments. The MMAF 
has developed specific implementation and technical guidelines for these two laws through 
government regulations, ministerial decrees and other general guidelines and regulatory 
instruments. 
The MMAF is at the frontline of central government agencies that include 
community and public consultations in the law making process. The MMAF has shown its 
significant role on harmonizing the complex, inter-related laws and regulations on CZM 
that in some cases were contradictory. The MMAF has also worked in tandem with NGOs, 
academics and community representatives to ensure that the rights and privileges of 
indigenous, traditional and local communities are accommodated in the laws that neglected 
them for more than three decades.  
A future role for the MMAF will still be necessary to set up and oversee the 
assignment of mechanisms for responsibilities, authority and resources. The provisions of 
Law 27/2007 clearly assigned the MMAF responsibility to generate technical details and 
guidelines for the implementation of coastal zone and small island management in 
decentralization contexts.  Such technical details and guidelines include those for the 
coastal concessionaire (HP3) mechanisms, local marine conservation areas (kawasan 
konservasi laut daerah/KKLD), local planning for coastal zone and small island 
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management (strategic, zoning, management and action plans), and accreditation 
mechanisms.  
The analysis of the two cases studies underlines the importance of the MMAF in 
promoting and raising the awareness among local governments about decentralized CZM. 
The MMAF’s role is vital to encouraging local governments’ understanding of the 
importance of managing coastal zones in sustainable ways and in an integrated manner. 
Indeed, the central government needs to ensure that for the local government every step 
forward in managing coastal zone in sustainable and integrated ways is beneficial for local 
development, local communities and local stakeholders as well as for coastal resources. 
The MMAF’s initiation of the Coastal Award (Adibhakti Mina Bahari) exemplifies the 
importance of central government in promoting and encouraging local government 
awareness of the implementation of decentralized CZM through providing incentives and 
rewards for successful implementation and best practices. 
The MMAF’s involvement is particularly significant in the absence of local 
government awareness and commitment. As CZM is classified as an optional 
administrative task for local government, the MMAF can fill a vacuum and make up for 
the lack of commitment from local government to administering coastal zones (section 
6.3.2 and 7.13). If conflicts occur across administration boundaries, the MMAF can 
intervene in inter-district CZM issues and conflicts through direct involvement or through 
the provincial government. The role of MMAF is thus strategically important for CZM in 
border districts or outer islands.  
8.7 Policy and research implications  
The two case studies address the question of whether the current implementation 
of decentralized CZM can provide positive outcomes and develop trends that can turn into 
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gradual improvement. Despite the existence of some unsuitable conditions for effective 
decentralized CZM, the two case studies suggest both promising and challenging aspects to 
the implementation of decentralized CZM.  
The role of local government will become even more important in forthcoming 
years as a result of Law 27/2007. One of its most important roles is the entitlement of local 
government to manage and implement HP3 (Coastal Concessionaire Right) in its assigned 
area (section 6.3.3). Local government capacity to manage and implement HP3 has now 
become controversial. Therefore, it is essential to investigate (i) the workability of the 
implementation of HP3 concepts at the local government level; and (ii) the appropriate 
mechanisms for the implementation of HP3 that can avoid the pattern of power abuse 
similar to those experienced in forest concessions (HPH). This further investigation will be 
valuable to counter doubts about HP3 implementation and more importantly, will stand as 
a precautionary approach to mismanagement of the coastal zones.   
The two cases studies have identified the role of local stakeholders (NGOs, 
communities and academics) in district decision-making for decentralized CZM 
implementation. The level of their participation, how they have attempted to influence 
district decisions, and the extent to which these stakeholders influence decisions needs 
further investigation. An investigation of effective arrangements for local stakeholders’ 
involvement can provide a better understanding on local dynamics of decentralized CZM. 
Co-management become visible as the most appropriate approaches for local stakeholders’ 
involvement, which need further investigation on the appropriate level of the involvement 
of partnership arrangements between the various levels of government, the individual 
resource users, other stakeholders and the local communities.  
Replicating this research in other parts of Indonesia will provide a more in-depth 
comparison of decentralized CZM implementation. It is important to canvass more case 
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studies to learn more about decentralized CZM implementation. Perhaps studies of other 
districts will reveal other insights even as they reemphasize the importance of local socio-
political considerations in decentralized CZM implementation.     
8.8 Concluding Remarks 
Decentralized CZM will continue to be effective if responsive, and qualified local 
governments consistently cooperate with a committed central government to shift power to 
a new constellation of decentralized contexts. Both local and central governments must 
work together to shape the implementation of effective decentralized CZM.  
The two cases studies in this dissertation have provided divergent examples of 
how local governments deal with their coastal zones in different coastal settings. Despite 
the being at an early stage, the signs and seeds for effective decentralized CZM 
implementation exist and can grow more significant in the future.  
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Number Concerning Recommendation of 
Finance Minister  
(Number and Date) 
1 Kabupaten 
Banyuasin 
44/2003 Retribusi Izin Pengangkutan Barang di Darat, 
Laut, Sungai, dan Penyeberangan dalam 
Kabupaten Banyuasin 
(Fees on Permits for Goods Transportation 
on Road, Marine Water, River and Crossover 
within Banyusasin District) 
S-015/MK.7/2004  
7 June 2004 
2 Kabupaten 
Jembrana 
09/2003 Retribusi Pelayanan Izin Usaha Perikanan 
(Fees for Fishing Enterprise Administration) 
S- 026/MK.10/2006  
23 February 2006 
3 Kabupaten 
Jeneponto 
12/2003 Izin Usaha Perikanan 
(Permits for Fishing Enterprise) 
S-017/MK.10/2005 
8 March 2005 
4 Kabupaten 
Kotawaringin 
Barat 
16/2003 Perubahan Pertama Atas Perda No. 15 
Tahun 2002 tentang  Retribusi 
Pengangkutan Hasil Hutan, Pertanian, 
Perkebunan, Perikanan dan Industri  
(First Amendment on Local Regulation 
15/2002 concerning Fees from Products of 
Forest, Agriculture, Plantation, Fisheries and 
Industries) 
S-074/MK.10/2006  
22 May 2006 
5 Kabupaten 
Maluku 
Tengah 
05/2003 Retribusi Hasil Perikanan 
(Fees on Fisheries Products) 
S- 148/MK.7/2007  
16 July 2007 
6 Kabupaten 
Maluku 
Tengah 
4/2003 Retribusi Izin Usaha Perikanan 
(Fees on Fisheries Enterprise) 
S- 017/ MK.10/2005 
8 March 2005 
7 Kabupaten 
Serang 
2/2003 Retribusi Kegiatan Usaha Perikanan dan 
Kelautan 
(Fees on Fisheries and Marine Enterprise) 
Without 
recommendation 
8 Kabupaten 
Tana Toraja 
16/2003 Retribusi Penyebaran/Pemasaran Benih Ikan 
Air Tawar dalam Kabupaten Tana Toraja  
(Fees on Distribution and Marketing 
Freshwater Fish Seed within Tana Toraja 
District) 
S-102A/MK.10/2005  
29 August 2005 
9 Kabupaten 
Tana Toraja 
17/2003 Retribusi Pemeriksaan Pengujian Mutu Ikan 
dalam Kabupaten Tana Toraja 
(Fees on Fish Quality Control in Tona Toraja 
District) 
S-102A/MK.10/2005  
29 August 2005 
10 Kabupaten 
Tanah Laut 
04/2003 Retribusi Penerbitan Surat Keterangan 
Kecakapan Kapal Motor Perairan Daratan 
dan Kelautan 
(Fees on Issuance of Vessell Liability Pass) 
S-05/MK.07/2006  
14 December 2006 
11 Kota Ambon 04/2003 Retribusi Izin Usaha Perikanan 
(Fees on Fisheries Enterprise) 
S-017/MK.10/2005 
8 March 2005 
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 Provinsi/ 
Kabupaten/Kota 
 
Number Concerning Recommendation of 
Finance Minister  
(Number and Date) 
12 Kota Ambon 14/2003 Retribusi Izin Usaha dan Pungutan 
Hasil Perikanan 
(Fees on Fisheries Enterprises and 
Fish Products) 
S-017/MK.10/2005  
8 March 2005 
13 Kota Sibolga 06/2003 Retribusi Hasil Perikanan 
(Fees on Fish Products) 
- 
14 Kota Sorong 08/2003 Retribusi Pendaratan dan 
Pelelangan Ikan 
(Fees on Fish Landing and Auction 
Facilities)  
S-090/MK.7/2007 
20 April 2007 
15 Provinsi Kalimantan 
Barat 
7/2003 Retribusi Pengujian Mutu Hasil 
Perikanan 
(Fees on Quality Control of Fish 
Products) 
S-23/MK.10/2005 
14 April 2005 
16 Provinsi Nusa 
Tenggara Timur 
11/2003 Retribusi Perizinan Usaha 
Perikanan 
(Fees on Fisheries Enterprises) 
S- 148/MK.7/2007 
16 July 2007 
2004 
17 Kabupaten Aceh 
Jaya 
20/2004 Pajak Hasil Usaha Perikanan 
Kabupaten Aceh Jaya 
(Fisheries Enterprise and Fish 
Products Tax) 
S~148/MK.7/ 2007  
16 July 2007 
18 Kabupaten Asahan 02/2004 Perizinan Usaha Perikanan 
(Permits on Fisheries Enterprise) 
S~120/MK.10/2006  
18 July 2006 
19 Kabupaten Gunung 
Mas 
21/2004 Retribusi Pengangkutan Penjualan 
Hasil Hutan, Pertanian,Peternakan, 
Perkebunan,Perikanan dan Industri 
(Fees on Goods Transporation on 
Products of Fores, Agriculture, 
Animal Husbandry, Plantation, 
Fisheries and Industry)  
S~74/MK.10/2006  
22 May 2006 
20 Kabupaten Merauke 04/2004 Retribusi Izin Usaha Perikanan 
(Fees on Fisheries Enterprise 
Permits) 
S~148/MK.7/2007 
16 July 2007 
21 Kabupaten Muna 4/2004 Retribusi Izin Usaha Angkutan Laut 
Lokal dan Pelayaran Rakyat Lokal 
(Fees on Permits for Local and 
People  Shipping Enterprise) 
~ 
22 Kabupaten Pulang 
Pisau 
20/2004 Pungutan Daerah Atas  
Pengangkutan dan atau Penjualan 
Hasil Pertanian, Peternakan, 
Perikanan, Hutan Ikutan dan hasil 
Industri Keluar daerah Kabupaten 
Pulang Pisau 
(Output Tax on Transportation and 
or Sales of Products of Agriculture, 
Animal Husbandry, Forests and 
Industry in Pulang Pisau District)   
S~74/MK.10/2006  
22 May 2006 
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 Provinsi/ 
Kabupaten/Kota 
 
Number Concerning Recommendation of 
Finance Minister  
(Number and Date) 
23 Kabupaten Rote 
Ndao 
24/2004 Retribusi Pengambilan dan 
Pengeluaran Hasil Produksi 
Pertanian Tanaman Pangan dan 
Hortikultura, Perkebunan serta 
Kehutanan Kabupaten Rote Ndao 
(Fees on Extracting and Exporting 
Products of Agriculture, Horticulture, 
Plantation and Forest in Rote Ndao 
District) 
S~41/MK.10/2005 
30 June 2005 
24 Kabupaten Rote 
Ndao 
34/2004 Retribusi Izin Pengumpulan dan 
Pengeluaran Hasil Kelautan  
(Fees on Collecting and Exporting 
Marine Products) 
S~23/MK.10/2005  
14 April 2005 
25 Provinsi Kalimantan 
Selatan 
2/2004 Retribusi Izin Usaha Perikanan 
(Fees on Fisheries Enterprise 
Permits) 
S~093/MK.10/2006  
23 June 2006 
26 Provinsi Kalimantan 
Selatan 
3/2004 Retribusi Pengujian dan Sertifikasi 
Mutu Hasil Perikanan 
(Fees on Fisheries Quality Control 
and Certification) 
S~093/MK.10/2006 
23 June 2006 
27 Provinsi Kalimantan 
Selatan 
4/2004 Retribusi Penjualan Produksi Balai 
Benih Ikan Sentral  
(Fees on Sales of Fish Fingerling 
Centre)  
S~093/MK.10/2006 
23 June 2006 
28 Provinsi Maluku 11/2004 Retribusi Izin Usaha Perikanan 
(Fees on Fisheries Enterprise 
Permits) 
S~23/MK.10/2005 
14 April 2005 
29 Provinsi Maluku 15/2004 Retribusi Pemeriksaan Mutu dan 
Sertifikasi Hasil Perikanan 
(Fees on Fisheries Quality Control 
and Certification) 
S~018/MK.10/2005 
15 March 2005 
30 Provinsi Maluku 
Utara 
9/2004 Retribusi Izin Usaha Perikanan 
(Fees on Fisheries Enterprise 
Permits) 
S~017/MK.10/2005 
8 March 2005 
2005 
31 Kabupaten Cianjur 17/2005 Perubahan Kedua atas Perda 
Nomor 18 /' 2000 tentang Retribusi 
Usaha Perikanan 
(Second Ammendment on Local 
Regulation 18/2000 concerning 
Fees of Fisheries Enterprise) 
S- 148/MK.7/2007 
16 July 2007 
32 Kabupaten Kapuas 09/2005 Perizinan Usaha Perikanan 
(Fees on Fisheries Enterprise 
Permits) 
S-093/MK.10/2006 
23 June 2006 
33 Kabupaten 
Sumbawa 
18/2005 Retribusi Jasa Transportasi Laut 
(Fees on Sea Transportation 
Serivices) 
- 
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 Provinsi/ 
Kabupaten/Kota 
 
Number Concerning Recommendation of 
Finance Minister  
(Number and Date) 
34 Kota Jayapura 05/2005 Retribusi Penumpang Kapal Laut 
dan Pesawat Udara 
(Fees for Ship and Aeroplane 
Passengers) 
S-093/MK.10/2006 
23 June 2006 
35 Kota Pangkal Pinang 9/2005 Kepelabuhan di Kota Pangkal 
Pinang 
(Port Management in Pangkal 
Pinang Municipality) 
S-093/MK.10/2006 
23 June 2006 
36 Kota Ternate 15/2005 Retribusi Penyelenggaraan 
Pelelangan Ikan di Kota Ternate 
(Fees for Fish Auction in Ternate 
Municipality) 
S-026/MK.7/2007 
1 February 2007 
37 Provinsi Banten 8/2005 Retribusi Pengujian Mutu Komoditi 
Hasil Perikanan 
(Fees on Fisheries Product Quality 
Control) 
S- 148/MK.7/2007 
16 July 2007 
 2006    
38 Kabupaten Toba 
Samosir 
9/2006 Retribusi Tempat Pendaratan Kapal 
(Fees on Fishing Vessel Landing 
Port) 
S- 199/MK.7/2007 
17 September 2007 
39 Kota Samarinda 20/2006 Retribusi Pelelangan dan Pangkalan 
Pendaratan Ikan 
(Fees on Fish Auction and Fishing 
Vessel Landing Port) 
S- 148/MK.7/2007 
16 July 2007 
40 Provinsi Riau 
Kepulauan 
6/2006 Usaha Perikanan Provinsi 
Kepulauan Riau 
(Fisheries Enterprise in Riau 
Kepulauan Province) 
S-008/MK.7/2007 
26 January 2007 
 
Revision 
 Provinsi/ 
Kabupaten/Kota 
 
Number Concerning Recommendation of 
Finance Minister  
(Number and Date) 
1 Kabupaten Lamongan 7/2004 Retribusi Izin Usaha Perikanan 
dan Kelautan di Kabupaten 
Lamongan 
(Fees on Fisheries and Marine 
Enterprise in Lamongan District) 
S-132/MK.10/2005 
13 October 2005 
 
Sources:  
http://www.djpk.depkeu.go.id/data/Perda_batal_2003.htm 
http://www.djpk.depkeu.go.id/data/Perda_batal_2004.htm 
http://www.djpk.depkeu.go.id/data/Perda_batal_2005.htm 
http://www.djpk.depkeu.go.id/data/Perda_batal_2006.htm 
http://www.djpk.depkeu.go.id/data/Perda_batal_2007.htm 
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Appendix 2.  Reasearch aid memoir and general questions for 
informants  
 
 
 
LISTS OF QUESTIONS 
 
Making Decentralized Coastal Zone Management Works in Indonesia:  
Case Study of Kabupaten Konawe and Kabupaten Pangkajene Kepulauan 
 
Brief Description:  
 
This research is a study to examine and compare the effectiveness decentralization of coastal 
zone management in two districts of two provinces in eastern Indonesia by applying indicators and 
factors beyond the effective decentralization. This study aims to construct an analytical framework 
based on empirical work on how to make decentralization work in Indonesia, and to identify policy 
implication based on the results.   
 
Researcher:    Hendra Yusran Siry 
Address:  Resource Management in Asia-Pacific Program, Research School of Pacific and Asian 
Studies, The Australian National University, Coombs Building, Fellows Road, Canberra 
ACT 0200, Australia. 
Telephone:  +612 6125 8072 
Fax:  +612 6125 1635 
 
Following the protocols elaborated in this document, this research will entail human subjects re-
search that consists of a conversation with each participant for roughly thirty minutes. During the 
course of the conversation (which will be personalized toward each person, as I am not doing sta-
tistical research but rather in-depth interview), I will bring up a series of core issues related to 
decentralized coastal zone management.  
 
Prior to all interviews where verbal consent is used, I will first confirm the following points: 
 Do you feel you understand the nature of this research and are comfortable and willing to 
participate in this project? 
 Do you understand that you are free to withdraw your participation at absolutely any time, 
or to refrain from answering certain questions that you would rather not answer? 
 Do you have any questions about this project before we begin? You are free to ask me any 
questions throughout as they arise, as well. 
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General questions:  
 
1. Can you explain about the existing institutions (formal/informal) functions in decentralized 
coastal zone management within various policy systems?  
2. If alternative institutional arrangements are required, how to re-arrange the institutions? 
Can you give some examples?  
3. To what extends, the existing institutions have capability and capacity to change and adapt 
re-arrangement? Can you give more explanations?  
4. How do these institutions affect behavior related to resource management? 
5. How do they interact with each other and with external institutions?  
6. How to identify policy implications?  
7. Does the institutional arrangement create conflicts? 
8. What are the key influences on implementing decentralized coastal zone management have 
had/could have effectiveness?  
9. How can appropriate indicators be designed to measure the effectiveness of decentralized 
coastal zone management? 
10. Do you aware about co-management, which quite extensive promoted as a vogue alterna-
tive concept? Do you think co-management has been useful in promoting effective 
decentralized coastal zone management?  
11. Can co-management handle cross-scale issues and deal with the scaling up issues? If it can, 
what kind of institutional arrangements are required? What are the prospects of co-
management under that new arrangement?   
12. As a part of decentralization spirit, do traditional rights and norms exist and play roles in 
the decentralization coastal zone management? What are the potential constraints in institu-
tionalizing the traditional rights and norms on decentralization coastal zone management?  
13. How effective is it using the traditional rights and norms on decentralization coastal zone 
management?  
14. How have you assessed the successful level of the institutionalization of the traditional 
rights and norms? 
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Appendix 3.  List of laws related to CZM during the New Order 
period  
 
No. Law No/Date Description 
 
1. Marine Water Act  4/1960* 
 6/1996 
All coastal resources are under the central government for the 
prosperity of citizens and to regulate the use of marine water 
resources 
2. Basic Agrarian Act  5/1960 Land tenure system and land rights 
3. Forestry Act  5/1967* 
41/1999 
Basic provision for forestry management 
4. Mining Act 11/1967 Basic provision for mining management 
5. Oil and Gas Act  8/1971 Basic provision for oil and gas public company 
6. Continental Shelf Act  1/1973 The continental shelf of Indonesia 
7. Local Government Act   5/1974 
22/1999* 
Devolution of central government jurisdiction to provincial and 
district governments 
8. Environmental 
Management Act 
 4/1982* 
23/1997 
Basic provision for the management of the living environment 
9. National Defence Act 20/1982* 
2/2001 
Basic provision for national defence and the mobilization of 
citizens 
10. EEZ Act  5/1983 Indonesian exclusive economic zone 
11. Basic Industrial Act  5/1984 Basic provision for industrial development 
12. Fishery Act   9/1985 Basic provision for fishery management 
13. Basic Electricity Act 15/1985 Basic provision for electric power and supply management 
14. Living Resource 
Conservation Act  
 5/1990 Basic provision for the management of all designated 
protected areas, and conservation of living natural resources 
and their ecosystems 
15. Tourism Act  9/1990 Basic provision for tourism development and management 
16. Basic Agricultural Act 12/1992 Basic provision for agriculture and farming systems 
17. Livestock, Fish and 
Crops Quarantine Act 
16/1992 Basic provision for livestock, fish and crop quarantine 
procedures 
18. Shipping Act 21/1992 Basic provision for shipping and port system 
19. Spatial Planning Act 24/1992 Basic provision for comprehensive and integrated approaches 
to the spatial plan and management of terrestrial resources 
20. Biodiversity 
Conservation Act 
 5/1994 Ratification of the convention on biodiversity 
21. Financial Balance Act 25/1999 Balancing the local and central government finances and 
revenue for development 
Note: * means the act has been revised by the subsequent number 
Source: Putra (2003: 82) 
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Appendix 4.  List of Government Regulations and Presidential 
Decrees that regulate coastal resource usage 
during the New Order period  
 
No. Legislation No/Date Description 
 
1. Government Regulation 17/1974 Controlling the implementation of exploration and 
exploitation offshore oil and gas 
2. Government Regulation 29/1986 Analysis of impact to the environment 
3. Government Regulation 28/1985 Forest protection and sustainable use of forest products 
4. Government Regulation  6/1988 Coordination of sectoral and local government affairs 
and planning 
5. Government Regulation 20/1990 Water pollution control 
6. Government Regulation 51/1993 To impose environmental impact analysis for every new 
projects that harm the environment 
7. Government Regulation 19/1994 Hazardous and toxic waste management 
8. Government Regulation 25/2000 Jurisdiction and authority of Central and Provincial 
Governments 
9. Presidential Decree 32/1990 Management of protected areas and buffer zone  
10. Presidential Decree 77/1995 Environmental Impact Management Agencies 
11. Presidential Decree 77/1996 Decree for National Marine Council 
12. Presidential Decree 196/1998 Environmental Impact Control 
Source: Putra (2003: 83) 
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Appendix 5.  List of Local Regulations (Peraturan 
Daerah/Perda) on CZM 
 
No Provinsi/ 
Kabupaten/Kota 
 
Status of Perda and Remark   
1 Provinsi Sumatra Utara Perda 
2 Kabupaten Langkat On-going process at local parliament (DPRD) 
3 Kabupaten Deli 
Serdang 
On-going process at Law Division of Kabupaten Secretariat (Bagian Hukum) 
4 Kabupaten Asahan On-going process at local parliament (DPRD) 
5 Provinsi Sumatra Barat On-going process at Bureau of Law,  Provincial Secretariat (Biro Hukum) 
6 Kota Padang On-going process at Law Division of Kabupaten Secretariat (Bagian Hukum) 
7 Kabupaten Pesisir 
Selatan 
On-going process at local parliament (DPRD) 
8 Kabupaten Padang 
Pariaman 
Perda was granted. Local Regulation 5/2007 concerning Coastal and Marine 
Management in Padang Pariaman District 
(Perda No 5 th 2007 tentang engelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan Laut Kabupaten 
Padang Pariaman) 
9 Provinsi Riau On-going process at Bureau of Law,  Provincial Secretariat (Biro Hukum) 
10 Kabupaten Indragiri Hilir Perda was granted on 26 March 2008. Local Regulation 22/2008 concerning 
Coastal and Small Island Management  
(Perda No 22 Th 2008 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan Pulau-Pulau 
Kecil) 
11 Kabupaten Bengkalis On-going process at Law Division of Kabupaten Secretariat (Bagian Hukum) 
12 Provinsi Bengkulu Perda was granted on 28 March 2007. Local Regulation 3/2007 concerning 
Coastal and Small Island Management  
(Perda No 3 Th 2007 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan Pulau-Pulau 
Kecil)  
13 Kota Bengkulu On-going process at Law Division of Kabupaten Secretariat (Bagian Hukum) 
14 Kabupaten Bengkulu 
Utara 
On-going process at local parliament (DPRD) 
15 Provinsi Jambi Perda was granted on 3 March 2008. Local Regulation 3/2008 concerning 
Coastal and Small Island Management  
(Perda No 3 Th 2008 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan Pulau-Pulau 
Kecil) 
16 Kabupaten Tanjung 
Jabung Barat 
Perda was granted on 15 December 2008. Local Regulation 4/2005 
concerning Coastal and Marine Management  
(Perda No 4 Th 2005 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan Laut) 
17 Kabupaten  Tanjung 
Jabung Timur 
Perda was granted. Local Regulation 5/2008 concerning Coastal Zone 
Management  
(Perda No 5 Th 2008 tentang Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Pesisir) 
18 Provinsi Kalimantan 
Barat 
On-going process at local parliament (DPRD) 
19 Kabupaten Bengkayang Perda was granted with local initiated. Local Regulation 14/2002 concerning 
Integrated Coastal Community-based Management in Bengkayang District 
(Perda No 14 Th 2002 tentang Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Wilayah Pesisir 
Terpadu Berbasis Masyarakat di Kabupaten Bengkayang) 
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No Provinsi/ 
Kabupaten/Kota 
 
Status of Perda and Remark   
20 Kabupaten Pontianak On-going process at Law Division of Kabupaten Secretariat (Bagian Hukum) 
 
21 Kabupaten Ketapang Perda was granted. Local Regulation 13/2006 concerning Integrated Coastal 
Management in Ketapang District 
(Perda No 13 Th 2006 tentang Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Wilayah Pesisir 
Terpadu Kabupaten Ketapang) 
22 Provinsi Kalimantan 
Tengah 
On-going process at Bureau of Law,  Provincial Secretariat (Biro Hukum) 
23 Kabupaten Kapuas On-going process at local parliament (DPRD) 
24 Kabupaten 
Kotawaringin Timur 
Perda was granted on 14 February 2006. Local Regulation 1/2006 concerning 
Coastal and Marine Management in Kotawaringin Timur District 
(Perda No 1 Th 2006 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan Laut 
Kabupaten Kotawaringin Timur) 
25 Kabupaten 
Kotawaringin Barat 
On-going process at local parliament (DPRD) 
26 Provinsi Kalimantan 
Timur 
On-going process at Bureau of Law,  Provincial Secretariat (Biro Hukum) 
27 Kabupaten Tarakan On-going process at Law Division of Kabupaten Secretariat (Bagian Hukum) 
28 Kabupaten Kutai Timur On-going process at Law Division of Kabupaten Secretariat (Bagian Hukum) 
29 Provinsi Nusa Tenggara 
Timur  
Perda was granted on September 2007. Local Regulation 4/2007 concerning 
Coastal and Marine Management  
(Perda No 4 Th 2007 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan Laut) 
30 Kota Kupang Perda was granted on September 2007. Local Regulation 21/2007 concerning 
Coastal and Marine Management  
(Perda No 21 Th 2007 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan Laut) 
31 Kabupaten Kupang On-going process at Law Division of Kabupaten Secretariat (Bagian Hukum) 
32 Kabupaten Timor 
Tengah Utara 
On-going process at Law Division of Kabupaten Secretariat (Bagian Hukum) 
33 Provinsi Nusa Tenggara 
Barat 
Perda was granted on 25 February 2008. Local Regulation 2/2008 concerning 
Coastal and Small Island Management  
(Perda No 2 Th 2008 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan Pulau-Pulau 
Kecil) 
34 Kota Mataram On-going process at local parliament (DPRD) 
 
35 Kabupaten Lombok 
Barat 
On-going process at local parliament (DPRD) 
 
36 Kabupaten Sumbawa Perda was granted on 1 August 2007. Local Regulation 22/2007 concerning 
Coastal and Marine Management  
(Perda No 22 Th 2007 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan Laut) 
37 Provinsi Sulawesi Utara Perda was granted. Local Regulation 38/2003 concerning Integrated Coastal 
and Marine Community-based Management  
(Perda No 38 Th 2003 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan Laut Terpadu 
Berbasis Masyarakat di Provinsi Sulawesi Utara) 
38 Kabupaten Minahasa Perda was granted. Local Regulation 2/2002 concerning Integrated Coastal 
Community-based Management  
(Perda No 2 Th 2002 tentang Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Wilayah Terpadu 
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No Provinsi/ 
Kabupaten/Kota 
 
Status of Perda and Remark   
Berbasis Masyarakat di Kabupaten Minahasa) 
 
39 Kota Bitung Perda was granted on 18 August 2006. Local Regulation 4/2006 concerning 
Integrated Coastal Management in Bitung Municipality 
(Perda No 4 Th 2006 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir Terpadu Kota 
Bitung) 
40 Kabupaten Bolaang 
Mongondow 
Perda was granted on 16 February 2007. Local Regulation 11/2007 
concerning Integrated Coastal Management  
(Perda No 11 Th 2007 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir Terpadu) 
41 Provinsi Sulawesi 
Tengah 
Perda was granted on 2 July 2007. Local Regulation 26/2007 concerning 
Coastal and Small Island Management  
(Perda No 26 Th 2007 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan Pulau-Pulau 
Kecil) 
42 Kabupaten Donggala Perda was granted. Local Regulation 10/2006 concerning Coastal Zone 
Management  
(Perda No 10 Th 2006 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir) 
43 Kabupaten Parigi 
Moutong 
Perda was granted on Mei 2007. Local Regulation 7/2007 concerning Coastal 
Zone Management  
(Perda No 7 Th 2007 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir) 
44 Kabupaten Poso On-going process at local parliament (DPRD) 
 
45 Provinsi Sulawesi  
Tenggara 
Perda was granted on 25 December 2005. Local Regulation 10/2005 
concerning Coastal and Marine Management  
(Perda No 10 Th 2005 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan Laut Provinsi 
Sulawesi Tenggara) 
46 Kabupaten Konawe Perda was granted on 2 October 2006. Local Regulation 18/2008 concerning 
Coastal and Marine Management  
(Perda No 18 Th 2006 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir dan Laut) 
47 Kabupaten Buton Perda was granted on December 2007. Local Regulation 10/2007 concerning 
Coastal Zone Management  
(Perda No 10 Th 2007 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir) 
48 Kabupaten Muna Perda was granted on 23 July 2007. Local Regulation 8/2007 concerning 
Coastal Zone Management  
(Perda No 8 Th 2007 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir) 
49 Provinsi Sulawesi 
Selatan 
Perda was granted on 19 December 2007. Local Regulation 6/2007 
concerning Coastal and Marine Management  
(Perda No 6 Th 2007 tentang Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Pesisir dan Laut) 
50 Kabupaten Maros  Perda was granted on 12 December 2005. Local Regulation 12/2005 
concerning Coastal Zone Management  
(Perda No 12 Th 2005 tentang Pengelolaan Sumberdaya Pesisir dan Laut) 
 
51 Kabupaten Pangkajene 
dan Kepulauan 
Perda was granted on 5 March 2007. Local Regulation 6/2007 concerning 
Coastal Zone Management in Pangkajene dan Kepulauan District 
(Perda No 6 Th 2007 tentang Pengelolaan Pesisir Kabupaten Pangkajene dan 
Kepulauan)  
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No Provinsi/ 
Kabupaten/Kota 
 
Status of Perda and Remark   
52 Kabupaten Takalar On-going process at Law Division of Kabupaten Secretariat (Bagian Hukum) 
 
53 Provinsi Gorontalo Perda was granted on 4 March 2006. Local Regulation 1/2006 concerning 
Integrated Coastal Zone Management in Gorontalo Province 
(Perda No 1 Th 2006 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir Terpadu di 
Provinsi Gorontalo) 
54 Kabupaten Gorontalo Perda was granted on 30 December 2006. Local Regulation 6/2006 
concerning Coastal Zone Management  
(Perda No 6 Th 2005 tentang Pengelolaan Wilayah Pesisir) 
55 Kabupaten Boalemo On-going process at local parliament (DPRD) 
Source: (Miranti and Putra 2008) 
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Appendix 6.  Division of marine, coastal and fisheries affairs. 
 
Primary role/Authority areas/Sub-
division/Divisional item on marine, coastal 
and fisheries affairs 
Central Government Provincial 
Government 
Local Government 
Establishment 
policies, norms, 
standards, 
procedures and 
criteria 
Implement policies, 
norms, standards, 
procedures and 
criteria within 
provincial authority 
areas 
Implement policies, 
norms, standards, 
procedures and 
criteria within local 
authority areas 
 Beyond 12 nautical 
miles (including EEZ) 
12 nautical miles  One third of 
provincial authority 
General affairs    
1. Fish quarantine (domestic and 
international)  
   
2. Management and utilization of fisheries 
resources 
   
3. Research and technology development 
on fisheries 
 
 
 
Including to 
coordinate 
implementation 
 
Including to 
coordinate 
implementation 
4. Fisheries development plan    
5. Accreditation of certified institution on 
quality control of fisheries products 
 
Including technical 
facilitation 
 
Including to provide 
technical guidance 
 
6. Cooperation on integrated fisheries 
utilization 
  
Including to provide 
technical guidance 
 
7. Zoning for fisheries activities    
8. International fisheries cooperation   
Including to provide 
planning 
 
Including to 
provide planning 
9. Development of collecting, analyzing, 
presenting and distributing system, on 
data and information fisheries statistic    
   
10. Capacity building and human resources 
development 
   
11. Coastal and small island development    
12. Research and development on marine 
and fisheries 
   
13. Exhibition, distribution and 
dissemination technology of fisheries 
development 
   
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Primary role/Authority areas/Sub-
division/Divisional item on marine, coastal 
and fisheries affairs 
Central Government Provincial 
Government 
Local Government 
Establishment 
policies, norms, 
standards, 
procedures and 
criteria 
Implement policies, 
norms, standards, 
procedures and 
criteria within 
provincial authority 
areas 
Implement policies, 
norms, standards, 
procedures and 
criteria within local 
authority areas 
 Beyond 12 nautical 
miles (including EEZ) 
12 nautical miles  One third of 
provincial authority 
Capture fisheries affairs    
1. Management fisheries resources on 
assigned authority areas 
   
2. Stock estimation and total allowable 
catch (TAC) 
  
Including to 
coordinate 
implementation 
 
Including to 
coordinate 
implementation 
3. Facilitation of fisheries cooperation     
4. Protection and utilization of fisheries 
genetic plasma 
   
5. Fish migration and distribution maps  
 
 
Including to support 
and distribute 
 
Including to 
support and 
distribute 
6. Fishing license  
for fishing vessels 
more than 30 GT or 
less than 30 GT but 
employ foreign 
crews 
 
for fishing vessels 10 
to 30 GT and no 
foreign crews 
involved 
 
for fishing vessels 
less than 10 GT 
and no foreign 
crews involved 
7. Fishing fee/taxes    
8. Fishing enterprise    
9. Empowerment small scale fishermen    
10. Institutional strengthening and 
employment system  
   
11. Investment and promotion    
12. a. Appointment fishing port development 
and management 
13. b. Management of fishing auction point  
(Tempat Pelelangan Ikan) 
   
 
14. Fisheries port in border areas   
Including to support 
 
Including to 
support 
15. Operational and appointment of fishing 
port master (Syahbandar) 
   
16. Fishing vessels development    
17. Fishing vessels registration   
for fishing vessels 
more than 30 GT  
 
for fishing vessels 10 
to 30 GT  
 
for fishing vessels 
less than 10 GT 
18. Fishing gears development    
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Primary role/Authority areas/Sub-
division/Divisional item on marine, coastal 
and fisheries affairs 
Central Government Provincial 
Government 
Local Government 
Establishment 
policies, norms, 
standards, 
procedures and 
criteria 
Implement policies, 
norms, standards, 
procedures and 
criteria within 
provincial authority 
areas 
Implement policies, 
norms, standards, 
procedures and 
criteria within local 
authority areas 
 Beyond 12 nautical 
miles (including EEZ) 
12 nautical miles  One third of 
provincial authority 
19. Approval for imported fishing vessels    
20. Productivity of fishing vessels   
Including to support 
 
Including to 
support 
21. Deployment of supporting devices and 
remote sensing apparatus 
   
22. Physical checking of fishing vessels  
for fishing vessels 
more than 30 GT  
 
for fishing vessels 10 
to 30 GT  
 
for fishing vessels 
less than 10 GT 
23. Liability of fishing vessels and fishing 
gears 
   
24. Management and placement of Fish 
Aggregating Devices (FADs) or rumpon 
   
25. Engineering and technology 
development 
  
Including to support 
 
Including to 
support 
Aquaculture    
1. Culture fisheries/aquaculture    
2. Hatchery products in inland, brackish 
and marine waters 
   
3. Quality of fish seed/parent stocks    
4. Inland, brackish and marine hatchery 
station  
   
5. Procurement, utilization, distribution and 
monitoring fisheries drugs, chemical, 
biological compound and pellet  
   
6. Accreditation of certified hatchery    
7. Water resources and land use 
management 
   
8. Infrastructure and support system 
management 
   
9. Export and import recommendations    
10. Establishment potency and land 
allocation 
   
11. Techniques for releasing and recalling 
parents stocks  
   
12. Techniques for natural parents stocks    
13. Aquacultures permits and regulation on 
foreign workers on aquacultures 
   
14. Intake, outtake, procurement and 
distribution of fish culture 
   
15. Fish cultures and protection    
16. Transportation, storage and fish health 
management 
   
  359
Primary role/Authority areas/Sub-
division/Divisional item on marine, coastal 
and fisheries affairs 
Central Government Provincial 
Government 
Local Government 
Establishment 
policies, norms, 
standards, 
procedures and 
criteria 
Implement policies, 
norms, standards, 
procedures and 
criteria within 
provincial authority 
areas 
Implement policies, 
norms, standards, 
procedures and 
criteria within local 
authority areas 
 Beyond 12 nautical 
miles (including EEZ) 
12 nautical miles  One third of 
provincial authority 
17. Outbreak and affected areas of fish 
diseases 
  
Including to 
coordinate 
 
18. Fish seed information system   
Including to 
coordinate 
 
19. Specific fish cultures technology     
20. Hygienist and sanitation on aquaculture 
enterprise  
  
Including to 
coordinate 
 
Including to 
provide technical 
guidance and 
monitoring 
21. Partnership in aquacultures enterprise   
Including to 
coordinate 
 Including to 
provide technical 
guidance and to 
encourage 
22. Floating cages (karamba jarring apung)    
Monitoring and surveillance    
1. Monitoring on utilization and protection 
of fisheries genetic plasma 
   
2. Monitoring on hatchery and fish 
diseases controlling 
   
3. Monitoring certified hatchery    
4. Monitoring quality of fish seeds, parents 
stocks, food, drugs and raw material for 
aquacultures  
   
5. Total Quality Management (TQM) or 
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point 
(HACCP) in fish processing unit 
   
6. Export quality of aquacultures product     
7. Management and protection of fisheries 
resources in small islands 
   
8. Monitoring of fisheries resources 
utilization in marine waters 
   
Processing and marketing    
1. Processing and marketing of fisheries 
products 
   
2. Development and management of fish 
market  
   
Including to 
maintain 
3. a. Accreditation of quality control and 
fish processing  
4. b. Laboratory for testing fisheries 
products 
 
 
 
, Including to issue 
quality certificate 
 
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Primary role/Authority areas/Sub-
division/Divisional item on marine, coastal 
and fisheries affairs 
Central Government Provincial 
Government 
Local Government 
Establishment 
policies, norms, 
standards, 
procedures and 
criteria 
Implement policies, 
norms, standards, 
procedures and 
criteria within 
provincial authority 
areas 
Implement policies, 
norms, standards, 
procedures and 
criteria within local 
authority areas 
 Beyond 12 nautical 
miles (including EEZ) 
12 nautical miles  One third of 
provincial authority 
5. Quality control in fish processing unit, 
transportation and storage in 
accordance to TQM and HACCP 
   
6. Development and management of 
laboratory for quality control  
   
7. Monitoring antibiotic residue, bio-
pollutant, hazardous material and 
environmental quality 
   
8. Investment and business development 
in fisheries business 
   
9. License on fish processing and 
marketing of fisheries products 
   
Extension and training    
1. Training and education on functional, 
technical, skill development, 
management and leadership on marine 
affairs and fisheries 
   
2. Extension on marine affairs and 
fisheries 
   
3. Accreditation and certification of type of 
training on marine affairs and fisheries 
   
Source: p. 792 - 823 
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Appendix 7.  Konawe administrative statistics 
 
Kecamatan Capital Total Areas 
(Km2) 
% Kelurahan Desa Population 
Abuki Abuki 637.56 5.46 1 23 14,866 
Amonggedo Amonggedo 
Baru 
123.75 1.06 0 13 9,688 
Anggaberi Anggaberi 75.01 0.64 5 0 7,800 
Asera Andowia 2,197.72 18.83 1 31 11,628 
Besulutu Besulutu  111.26 0.95 0 11 7,602 
Bondoala Laosu 178.77 1.53 1 24 11,735 
Lambuya Lambuya 177.52 1.52 1 11 10,934 
Langgikima Langgikima 476.75 4.09 0 5 7,938 
Lasolo Tinobu 262.50 2.25 1 19 9,109 
Latoma Waworaha 936.34 8.02 1 10 7,550 
Lembo Lembo 78.12 0.67 0 9 7,577 
Meluhu Meluhu 207.03 1.77 0 7 8,809 
Molawe Molawe 365.06 3.13 0 8 7,571 
Pondidaha Pondidaha 156.28 1.34 1 9 8,948 
Puriala Puriala 268.78 2.30 0 12 7,589 
Routa Routa 2,188.58 18.75 1 17 7,500 
Sampara Pohara 60.01 0.51 1 20 10,659 
Sawa Sawa 118.15 1.01 1 14 8,044 
Soropia Toronipa 102.51 0.88 1 19 11,244 
Tongauna Tongauna 223.77 1.92 5 9 14,734 
Uepai Uepai 118.76 1.02 1 10 9,644 
Unaaha Punaaha 33.75 0.29 9 0 17,894 
Wawonii Barat Langara Laut 92.63 0.79 1 4 7,500 
Wawonii Selatan Bobolio 233.77 2.00 0 9 7,654 
Wawonii Tengah Lampeapi 142.39 1.22 0 5 8,015 
Wawonii Timur Munse 252.53 2.16 1 11 7,316 
Wawonii Utara Lansilowo 146.26 1.25 0 9 7,550 
Wawotobi Wawotobi 85.50 0.73 11 13 25,320 
Wiwirano Lamonae 1,505.09 12.90 0 6 7,502 
Wongeduku Puuduria 113.76 0.97 1 21 17,554 
TOTAL 11,669.91  45 359 307,474 
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Appendix 8.  Pangkep administrative statistics  
 
Kecamatan Centre Total Areas 
(Km2) 
% Distance 
(kms) 
Kelurahan Desa Population 
Liukang Tangaya Sapuka 120.00 10.79 262.43 1 7 14.251 
Liukang Kalmas Kalu Kuang 91.50 8.23 185.82 1 6 11.664 
Liukang Tupabirring  Balang 
Lompo 
140.00 12.59 27.06 1 13 27.471 
Pangkajene Minasa 
Te’ne 
47.39 4.26 0.00 9 0 36.182 
Balocci Balleangin 143.48 12.90 21.00 4 1 15.835 
Bungoro Bungoro 90.12 8.10 2.00 3 5 32.974 
Labakkang Labakkang 98.46 8.85 5.00 4 9 39.707 
Ma'rang Bonto-bonto 75.22 6.76 15.00 4 6 29.248 
Segeri Segeri 78.28 7.04 22.00 4 2 20.595 
Minasa Te'ne Minasa 
Te’ne 
76.48 6.88 2.50 5 3 28.607 
Tondong Tallasa  111.20 10.00 25.00 0 6 8.649 
Mandalle  40.16 3.61 30.00 0 6 12.752 
Total  1112.29 100.00  36 64 277.935 
Distance = Distance from capital of Kabupaten (mil) 
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Appendix 9.  Statistical information concerning the Islands in 
Pangkep 
 
 No Kecamatan Desa/ Kelurahan Island Status 
Area 
(Km2) Population 
1. 
Liukang 
Tupabbiring 
Mattiro 
Ujung 
 Pandangan 
 Kapoposang 
Inhabited  
Inhabited 
10.00 
5.00 
658 
461 
2. 
Mattiro 
Wallie 
 
 Samatellu Lompo 
 Samatellu Pe’da 
 Samatellu Borong 
 Salebbo 
 Reang-reang 
Gusung Bano-banoang 
Gusung Batu Luara 
Inhabited  
Inhabited 
Inhabited 
Inhabited  
Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
39.00 
20.00 
15.00 
20.00 
10.00 
5.00 
2.00 
1.376 
33 
139 
353 
- 
- 
- 
3. 
Mattiro 
Bombang 
 
 Salemo 
 Sakuala 
 Sagara 
 Sabangko 
Gusung Torajae 
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
 Uninhabited  
10.00 
9.00 
3.00 
1.00 
1.20 
1.747 
538 
375 
176 
- 
4. Mattiro Kanja 
 Sabutung Inhabited  14.00 1.412 
5. Mattiro Uleng 
 Kulambing 
 Bangko-bangkoan 
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
3.00 
2.00 
1.000 
838 
6. Mattiro Labangen 
 Laiya 
 Wali 
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
3.00 
2.00 
866 
164 
7. Mattiro Bulu  Karanrang Inhabited  3.00 2.246 
8. Mattiro Baji 
 Satando 
 Saugi 
 Camba-cambayan 
 Sapuli 
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
 Uninhabited  
Inhabited  
4.28 
2.00 
0.40 
1.20 
420 
422 
- 
429 
9. Mattiro Dolangan 
 Podang-podang 
Lompo 
 Podang-podang Cadi 
 Lamputtang 
 Pala 
 Cengkeh 
Inhabited  
 Uninhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
3.00 
1.00 
1.20 
1.30 
0.50 
867 
- 
391 
241 
2 
10. Mattiro Deceng 
 Badi 
 Pajenekang 
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
9.00 
2.00 
1.658 
1.121 
11. Mattiro Sompe 
 Balang Lompo 
 Balang Caddi 
 Panambungan 
 Langkadea 
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
 Uninhabited  
Inhabited  
8.00 
7.00 
2.00 
0.70 
2.602 
140 
- 
1 
12. Mattiro Bone 
 Bonto Sua 
 Sanane 
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
3.50 
2.50 
1.067 
1.032 
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No Kecamatan Desa/ Kelurahan 
Island Status Area 
(Km2) 
Population 
13. 
Liukang 
Tupabbiring 
Mattiro 
Langi 
 Sarappo Lompo 
 Sarappo Keke 
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
11.00 
8.00 
1.504 
924 
14. 
Mattiro 
Matae 
 
 Gondong Bali 
 Saranti 
 Tambakulu 
 Pammangganga 
Inhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
91.00 
10.00 
3.20 
2.10 
1.022 
- 
- 
- 
15. 
Liukang  
Tangaya 
Sabalana 
 
 Sabalana 
 Matalaang 
 Sanane 
 Makarangana 
 Lilikang 
 Pammolikkang 
 Laiya 
 Gusung Bassi 
 Meong 
 Saribu 
 Banuaia 
 Santigian 
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
24.00 
12.00 
2.00 
4.00 
1.20 
1.10 
0.50 
0.70 
0.40 
1.40 
1.90 
1.90 
393 
1.019 
374 
168 
161 
135 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
16. 
Balo-
baloang 
 
 Balo-baloang Lompo 
 Balo-baloang Caddi 
 Sumanga 
 Sanipa 
 Pelokan 
 Langkoitang 
 Saregge 
 Manukang 
 Sadolangan 
 Pelokan Kecil 
 Bangko-bangkoang 
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
13.20 
12.10 
10.11 
9.10 
7.01 
8.01 
2.10 
2.40 
1.10 
1.13 
1.01 
591 
90 
662 
229 
379 
428 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
17. 
Sabaru 
 
 Sabaru 
 Jailamo 
Inhabited  
 Uninhabited  
11.40 
10.10 
750 
- 
18. 
Tampaang 
 
 Tampaang 
 Aloang 
 Kawassang 
 Sapinggang 
 Bako 
 Pandangan 
 Satunggul 
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
 Uninhabited 
 Uninhabited 
 Uninhabited 
11.60 
10.10 
9.10 
1.17 
0.90 
0.89 
0.99 
222 
328 
214 
246 
- 
- 
- 
19. 
Satanger 
 
 Satanger 
 Karangan Satanger 
Inhabited  
 Uninhabited 
17.50 
16.49 
839 
- 
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No Kecamatan Desa/ Kelurahan 
Island Status Area 
(Km2) 
Population 
20. 
Liukang  
Tangaya 
Sapuka 
 
 Sapuka 
 Tinggalungan 
 Kembang Lemah 
 Sapuka Kecil 
 Sambar Jaga 
 Sambar Gitang 
 Sambar Galang 
 Caka-cakalang 
 Lamu-lamuruang 
 Sarassang 
 Sarassang Kecil 
 Karang Koko 
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
 Uninhabited  
14.00 
13.10 
12.10 
10.17 
8.10 
1.13 
1.1 
0.70 
0.90 
0.97 
1.00 
1.04 
1.769 
250 
569 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
21. 
Sailus 
 
Sailus Besar 
Sailus Kecil 
 Makaranganan 
 Marabatuan 
 Saujung 
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
 Uninhabited  
18.60 
17.40 
14.30 
10.49 
8.00 
1.417 
600 
417 
324 
- 
22. 
Kapopo-
sang Bali 
 
 Kapoposang Bali 
 Karangan Dondo 
 Sadapur 
 Sakonci 
 Sarimpo 
Inhabited  
 Uninhabited 
 Uninhabited 
 Uninhabited 
 Uninhabited 
10.40 
9.39 
1.10 
0.98 
0.93 
642 
- 
- 
- 
 
23. 
Liukang  
Kalmas 
Kelurahan 
Kalu-
kalukuang 
 Kalu-kalukuang 
 Togo-togo 
Inhabited  
 Uninhabited 
 
23.00 
0.50 
2.051 
- 
24. 
Dewakang 
Lompo 
 
 Dewakang Lompo 
 Dewakang Caddi 
 Bangkuluang 
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
10.90 
8.00 
2.00 
1.112 
300 
83 
25. Marasende  Marasende Inhabited  12.40 929 
26. Kanyurang 
 Bangko-bangkoang 
 Butung-butungan 
 Kanyurang Caddi 
 Doang-doangan 
Lompo 
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
 
83.90 
2.10 
1.40 
4.00 
909 
303 
686 
 
27. 
Doang-
doangan 
Lompon 
 Doang-doangan 
Lompo 
 Bangko-bangkoang 
 Togo-togo 
 Bangko-bangkoang 
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
 Uninhabited 
 Uninhabited 
 639 
639 
891 
475 
28. 
Sabaru 
 
 Sabaru 
 Pamolikang 
Inhabited  
 Uninhabited 
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No Kecamatan Desa/ Kelurahan 
Island Status Area 
(Km2) 
Population 
29. 
Liukang  
Kalmas 
Panmas 
 Masalima 
 Salinang 
 Pammatuang 
 Togo-togo 
 Bangko-bangkoang 
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
Inhabited  
 Uninhabited 
 Uninhabited 
11.60 
4.10 
10.00 
0.50 
1.00 
2.719 
561 
1.498 
               Source: Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep (2008a) 
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Appendix 10.  Details of local rivers in Pangkep. 
 
No. Kecamatan Rivers (Sungai) Length (Kms) Type of river 
1. Minasa Te'ne 
  
  
Kalibone 9 Kms Primary 
  Mangemba 3 Kms Inlet of Kalibone River 
  Panaikang 6 Kms Inlet of Kalibone River 
    Tala-tala 2 Kms Inlet of Maleleng River 
    Langa-langa 2 Kms Inlet of Maleleng River 
    Risin  2 Kms Inlet of Maleleng River 
    Lamperangan 2 Kms Inlet of Maleleng River 
    Sub-total length  26 Kms   
2. Pangkajene Maleleng 8 Km Primary 
    Baru – Baru    1.5 Kms Inlet of Maleleng River 
    Bonto Panno 4 Kms Primary 
    Pa'celang    1.5 Kms Primary 
    Pangkajene   10 Kms Primary 
    Padadaya 1 Kms Inlet of Pangkajene River 
    Sub-total length   26 Kms  
3. Bungoro Passalisian 1 Kms Inlet of Pangkajene River 
     Bulu-bulu 1 Kms Inlet of Pangkajene River 
     Kampung baru 2 Kms Inlet of Pangkajene River 
     Padang-padangan 3 Kms Primary 
     Parang-parangan 1.5 Kms Primary 
    Sub-total length 8.5 Kms   
4. Labakkang Labakkang 6.5 Kms Primary 
     Gentung 7 Kms Inlet of Limbangan River 
     Lerang-lerang 5 Kms Inlet of Limbangan River 
     Limbangan 9 Kms Primary 
    Sub-total length 27.5 Kms   
5. Ma'rang  Lempangan 5 Kms Primary 
     Sidenreng 5 Kms Primary 
    Sub-total length 10  Kms   
6. Segeri  Salo-salo Batue 2 Kms Inlet of Bawasalo River 
     Bawasalo 7 Kms Primary 
     Bawa Bone 4 Kms Primary 
     Benteng 7 Kms Primary 
    Sub-total length 20 Kms   
7. Mandalle  Lempangan (Sengkae) 5 Kms Primary 
     Kekeang 4 Kms Primary 
     Mandalle 4 Kms  Primary 
    Sub-total length 13 Kms   
    Total length      131 Kms   
Source: (Pemda Kabupaten Pangkep 2008c) 
